I was interested in what I thought you meant Wos...

Suggestions for what, exactly? Given the rough start here, I'm uncertain what you are asking me for.

You're only interested in how you appear obviously.

I've no idea what could possibly lead you to say something like that...

Ah well...

Indeed. I did notice that I left out the "excess" part and have since corrected that. That's nothing intentionally done on my part, nor did it make a difference to the critique. Don't take things so personal Wos. I certainly do not intend or mean you harm in any way, shape of form.

I still question whether all problems point to an excess or a deficiency.

What is sensory data, and does containing it equate to being about it? — creativesoul

Sensory data is the sounds, colors, shapes, smells, tastes, and tactile sensations that appear in the mind. If we didn't equate the data as being about something then, the sensory data would be the things themselves (solipsism). There would be no causal relation between the "data" and some external cause of the data. There would be no world for the data to be about. Our minds would effectively be the world. Making the distinction of sensory data being about something as opposed to not being about something is making the distinction between realism and solipsism.

This works from the dubious presupposition that being a thing is what allows introspection(metacognition).

We can think about our own thought/belief because of the terms "thought/belief". That is how. — creativesoul

I only need the terms "thought/belief" to convey to others that I have a thought/belief. I don't need the words to think about thinking, only to convey that I'm thinking about thinking to others. I can imagine myself thinking about something without using those terms at all.

You wrote:

Sign language is a type of written language.

Gestures are not marks. — creativesoul

"Seeing self-contemplation" is a tricky way to talk. Self-contemplation happens in more than one way, and does so quite differently, depending of course, upon the complexity of agent involved the process of introspection. It is important to note here that self-contemplation cannot get exceed the scope of knowledge afforded to the creature by virtue of the complexity of it's thought/belief system. Self-conception - as we know it - requires written language, for it is an integral part of having a worldview. — creativesoul

I would think a person interested in language development and meaning – you would know a lot about Koko. Koko demonstrates self-reflection and feelings. She makes art, asks questions and uses a computer and telephone in elemental ways. Hand signs are like writing on the beach before a wave comes in and washes it away. Koko is the first animal we have ever really talked to – that is extraordinary just in itself.

I don’t know where you wish to go in this thread. I have presented a few worthy ideas, as have others, which you either ignore or dismiss. You do have a fine mind, but there is something suspect about your agenda. I don’t have the time or inclination to find out what it is – best of luck to you.

Indeed... Koko's story can be compelling. I haven't carefully examined it in a while, and when I have, I quickly found that Koko's trainer seemed to be clearly projecting her own thought/belief onto Koko. The interactions were very similar to what happens in a court of law when counsel is said to be "leading the witness". That said... Koko most certainly gestures as a means to get what she wants. That, on my view, qualifies as rudimentary language use as compared/contrasted with the simpler sort of stimulus - response we see from other creatures capable of learning. Rats and levers.

Several folk have presented ideas. All are relevant in some way. I do not judge those in terms of being worthy/unworthy. I am but one person with limited time to reply, and I attempt to do that as much as possible when I can.

I do try to keep the focus upon the topic and not the participants. This isn't a chat room.

What counts as cognition on your view?

You wrote:

My notion of cognition can be viewed in a “line of continuation”. We started as single cell organisms. We progressed to where we are now. Somewhere in this continuum we developed the ability to think – cognize. Did cognition and ability to hold meaning – what you call thought/belief – develop simultaneously? I do not know – all is speculation. If we look at dinosaur predators and ask – did they have thought/belief? It seems so because they looked at another animal and saw food. Food is meaningful. Did they have state of mind? I doubt it. My question is whether or not there is a fulcrum between thought and belief in the “line of continuation”? I think it is worthy of speculation to a certain degree – and – I think we have reached that degree. There is another fulcrum in the “line of continuation” for the question of state of mind. When did beings start to think about their own thoughts?

By and in large Thinker, our viewpoints seem to be in agreement. It seems that they may differ a bit in the details(taxonomy perhaps).

These are all interesting questions. By my lights, in order to answer them we must first know what counts as thought, belief, cognition, meaning, and/or state of mind. Are these simply terms defined by us, and thus we cannot get them wrong? Or do they consist(s) in/of elements which are not existentially contingent upon language?

I'm not sure if there is a point(fulcrum) where upon reaching it we cross over from thought to belief or to a state of mind, etc. If the line of continuation were a timeline, it seems that that could be a helpful means of pursuit. However, on my view there is no difference between what thought and belief consists in/of. The terms are certainly used differently, and that use is metacognition at work. While we distinguish between thinking and believing by virtue of the difference between suspending one's judgment(thinking can be and often is contemplation of something or other) as compared/contrasted/opposed to believing that something or other is the case(is true). So, here we could say that those are two distinct states of mind, and it would make perfect sense.

May I suggest that we focus on the topic rather than each other. You've no warrant for questioning my participation. You're also sorely mistaken for even assuming that I've any kind of specific agenda here. Suffice it to say that I'm prone to cast a very critical eye upon this subject matter. I do the very same thing to my own work, and look for others to do the same. It's nothing personal. That, I can asure you. Being able to answer valid criticism is imperative.

You wrote:

Yes I think very young, pre-linguistic children come to understand that if they cry someone will typically come around to see what's up, when they hear the word 'no' while initially I don't think they really understand it, they soon pick up the fact that this sound means that they need to aware of something.

Children come to know and learn language through first watching it's use, drawing correlations between situation and state of mind.

Those amidst language acquisition doubt neither sense perception nor the truthfulness of what their being taught.

Many other species have some ability to communicate, have calls and such that might qualify as symbols. I am coming to believe that the peculiarity of language is that it is a far more powerful tool than we could have needed just for communication at the time when language emerged.

This last statement presupposes that we have understanding and/or some knowledge of the emergence of language within our species. There are little to no artifacts available for examination. Thus, I think it is crucial to employ what little evidence we have with considerable scrutiny. We have current language, all sorts of theory.

I think either language answered to other purposes (than communication) from the beginning, or, my guess, it's an accident that we ended up with so much more than we needed.

By my lights, there's no reason to presuppose intention where none is warranted. I wouldn't have any justification for claiming to know what counts as "more than we needed". Animal needs differ according to the animal. The differences between the languages of different species does not serve to ground, justify, and/or warrant concluding anything in particular about the complexity of language that we need.

I would say that we need exactly what we have. Language has vestiges, mind you... But we have no justificatory ground to claim we have a more complex language than necessary.

It's just speculation. But if you're going to explain what language is or how it works, you ought to try not to leave out whatever it is that makes language distinctive from other sorts of animal communication.

(I see @Wayfarer has chimed in with a related point as I was writing.)

What's different is complexity of correlations.

It's not that I'm leaving differences out as a means to not consider them. To quite the contrary, what I'm setting out are the necessary existential conditions for that. I'm setting out how that comes to be the case. I'm actively setting out the common denominators extant within all statements of thought/belief after we set all of the subjective particulars aside. I am doing so because that is the only method of arriving at justification/warrant for the claims being made. Complexity is a subjective particular of human language, as is the written aspect. Those are unique to us. The target is that which is common to all.

Whoa. I missed this bit...

OK. my thought is that the kind of meaning associated with language, made possible with language, is reflective, generalized meaning. The idea represented as 'tree' is an example.

A particular tree may have some meaning for a cat, because she, for example, climbs the tree, sharpens her claws on it or hunts birds in the tree. But in this case the meaning is associative; a kind of significance, for want of a better word; the tree stands out to the cat as a gestalt, you might even say.

How could we go about setting out the cat's meaning? Saying that she sharpens her claws on it and hunts birds in it reports facts involving the cat's behaviour. What sort of justificatory ground could we pave in order to acquire knowledge of the extent and/or complexity involved in the cat's meaning based upon such behaviour(s)? Not much, but thankfully that's not the only place to look.

Seems to me that we would be hard pressed to be able to say much at all if we had not first acquired a knowledgable understanding of thought/belief itself. Then, and only then, could we have 'insight' into her mental ongoings by virtue of knowing what they are/were made up of; by virtue of knowing the necessary elemental constituents of all thought/belief.

It is my contention that the whole of philosophy has gone horribly astray by virtue of never having gotten thought/belief right.

Saying that she sharpens her claws on it and hunts birds in it reports facts involving the cat's behaviour. — creativesoul

Yes, but we know that she responds differently to that particular tree than she does to others, that it figures in her daily awareness and activities in ways that many other trees and objects don't at all. Of course if we had not our own prelingual experience to draw upon upon we could not have this intuition, about her, but then we could not have any intuitions at all in that case, and nor could we ever have collectively developed or individually learned language in the first place, so the fact of our prelingual experience goes without saying, it is simply indispensable, and must be assumed as a condition of, all our doings and knowings, of all our perceptions, thoughts and beliefs.

Well put.

I would question something however...

If it is the case that prelingual experience consists, in part at least, of thought/belief then that experience cannot rightfully be called a precondition thereof.

Would you agree with that?