On the one hand, we have reality, and on the other we have our "picture" of reality. What bridges that gap? Well, I think Witt's answer is the logical relations. — 013zen
4.18 Logical forms are without number.
Hence there are no pre-eminent numbers in logic, and hence there is no possibility of philosophical monism or dualism, etc — ibid.
5.5561 There cannot be a hierarchy of the forms of elementary propositions. We can foresee only what we ourselves construct.
Empirical reality is limited by the totality of objects. The limit also makes itself manifest in the totality of elementary propositions. — ibid
5.61 Logic pervades the world: the limits of the world are also its limits.
So we cannot say in logic, ‘The world has this in it, and this, but not that.’
For that would appear to presuppose that we were excluding certain possibilities, and this cannot be the case, since it would require that logic should go beyond the limits of the world; for only in that way could it view those limits from the other side as well.
We cannot think what we cannot think; so what we cannot think we cannot say either.
5.62 This remark provides the key to the problem, how much truth there is in solipsism.
For what the solipsist means is quite correct; only it cannot be said, but makes itself manifest.
The world is my world: this is manifest in the fact that the limits of language (of that language which alone I understand) mean the limits of my world.
5.621 The world and life are one.
5.63 I am my world. (The microcosm.)
5.64 Here it can be seen that solipsism, when its implications are followed out strictly, coincides with pure realism. The self of solipsism shrinks to a point without extension, and there remains the reality co-ordinated with it. — ibid.
6.363 The procedure of induction consists in accepting as true the simplest law that can be reconciled with our experiences.
6.6631 This procedure, however, has no logical justification but only a psychological one.
It is clear that there are no grounds for believing that the simplest eventuality will in fact be realized. — ibid.
In order to conflate them there must be some pertinent distinction that is not understood. I do not see how or where Wittgenstein makes such a distinction. It is a distinction you impose on the text. — Fooloso4
Then what is the purpose of Witt saying:
"The total reality is the world" (2.063). — 013zen
(2.04)The totality of existing states of affairs is the world.
Compare this to:
The totality of existing states of affairs is the world.
(2.04) — Fooloso4
(2.06)The existence and non-existence of states of affairs is reality.
(We call the existence of states of affairs a positive fact, and their non-existence a negative
fact.)
(2.05)The totality of existing states of affairs also determines which states of affairs do not exist.
... while reality is the totality of positive and negative facts. — 013zen
(4.0621)The propositions ‘p’ and ‘∼p’ have opposite sense, but there corresponds to them one and
the same reality.
How else could the world of the happy man be different from the world of the sad man? — 013zen
The world...my world, is in my mind and is made up of pictures of reality. — 013zen
The propositions ‘p’ and ‘∼p’ have opposite sense, but there corresponds to them one and the same reality.
(4.0621)
If 'p' exists in the world then 'not p' does not. If If 'p' exists in reality then 'not p' does not. That 'not p' does not exist is a negative fact. It is true that 'not p' does not exist. — Fooloso4
They do not differ with regard to the facts of the world. In both cases the facts remain the same. — Fooloso4
“In brief, the world must thereby become quite another. It must so to speak wax or wane as a whole. The world of the happy is quite another than that of the unhappy” (6.43). — 013zen
He makes a distinction between the world and my world. — Fooloso4
Correct - the same reality, despite the worlds being "quite another" entirely. — 013zen
I can see you no longer want to focus on the quotes wherein Witt does not make a distinction between the world, and "my world". — 013zen
Where he literally says, when death occurs THE world ceases to exist. — 013zen
I appreciate you directing me to another post, but truthfully if you can't admit how your interpretation requires you to supplant what's literally said with slight modifications in order to maintain it, that's indicative that - while you might be right in many regards - that your theory needs reworking. — 013zen
(5.641)Thus there really is a sense in which philosophy can talk about the self in a non-psychological way.
What brings the self into philosophy is the fact that ‘the world is my world’.
The philosophical self is not the human being, not the human body, or the human soul, with which psychology deals, but rather the metaphysical subject, the limit of the world not a part of it.
(5.632)The subject does not belong to the world: rather, it is a limit of the world.
Where he does not make a distinction must be looked at in light of where he does. The text hangs together as a whole. — Fooloso4
How are we to understand this? Clearly the world does not literally cease to exist. Wittgenstein is dead. The world has not ceased to exist. There is more to this than can be seen by focusing on a part to the exclusion of the whole. — Fooloso4
It does not supplant what is said, it attempts to explain it in light of what else is said, that is, with regard to its place in the whole of the text. It is not as if he is rejecting what he said previously about the world being the totality of facts. — Fooloso4
That "the world is my world" means that the world of the metaphysical subject ends when the metaphysical subject does. — Fooloso4
It is like the eye and the visual field. It does not alter what is in the world, but rather the ability of the metaphysical subject to see it, to experience it, to live it. — Fooloso4
Again, I'd like to reiterate that it seems that you and I agree on many of the salient points, and I think draw similar conclusions — 013zen
It is like the eye and the visual field. It does not alter what is in [reality], but rather the ability of the metaphysical subject to see it...[which determines the world they see] — Fooloso4
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