And these sense, they involve eyes, skin, and other bodily parts?

Can you see where I am going - you assume that these things exist as a part of your "scientific" explanation.

Isn't that so?

Yes. Indirect realists aren't idealists. They're realists. They just recognize, contrary to the claims of naive realism, that mental phenomena exist, that distal objects and their properties are not constituents of mental phenomena, that many (even all) of the properties of mental phenomena are not properties of distal objects, that many (even all) of the properties of mental phenomena do not even resemble the properties of distal objects, and that we have direct knowledge only of mental phenomena.

They just recognize, contrary to the claims of naive realism, that mental phenomena exist, that distal objects and their properties are not constituents of mental phenomena, — Michael

And you deduce, or perhaps infer, the existence of the world, including the things around you, from what the senses present to you?

How does that work?

And you deduce, or perhaps infer, the existence of the world, including the things around you, from what the senses present to you?

How does that work? — Banno

Are you asking how induction and the scientific method work?

Are you asking how induction and the scientific method work? — Michael

Ah. SO you induce the existence of the world by application of "scientific method"?

SO does this method involve falsification, or is it statistical?

Thanks for humouring me.

Ah. SO you induce the existence of the world by application of "scientific method"?

SO does this method involve falsification, or is it statistical? — Banno

I believe in the existence of distal objects because I believe that the existence of distal objects best explains the existence and regularity and predictability of experience.

I believe in the existence of distal objects because I believe that the existence of distal objects provides the best explanation for the existence and regularity and predictability of experience. — Michael

"Best explanation".

Statistical, then. Bayesian inference? You compared a set of other explanations, and decided that "here is a hand" is the best one for your seeing a hand before your face?

Yes. It's more reasonable than "an evil demon is deceiving me".

Why?

On what basis did you decide that it is "more reasonable" that there is a hand before you than that an evil Damon is tricking you?

What did you use as your Prior? And what constituted the new information you used to adjust the posterior probability distribution?

It's not based on anything. It's just what seems most reasonable to me. I don't pretend that it's anything more than that.

t's not based on anything. It's just what seems most reasonable to me. — Michael

How is it an inference, then, and not a sentiment, or a mere prejudice?

And how is that "scientific"?

How is it an inference, then, and not a sentiment, or a mere prejudice? — Banno

My belief that my experiences are caused by distal objects is a "prejudice". My belief that a distal cow exists is inferred from a) my "prejudice" that my experiences are caused by distal objects and from b) I experience a cow.

But none of this is relevant to the point being made.

Naive realists claim such things as this:

The second formulation is the constitutive claim, which says that it introspectively seems to one that the perceived mind-independent objects (and their features) are constituents of the experiential state. Nudds, for instance, argues that ‘visual experiences seem to have the NR [Naïve Realist] property’ (2009, p. 335), which he defines as ‘the property of having some mind-independent object or feature as a constituent’ (2009, p. 334), and, more explicitly, that ‘our experience […] seems to have mind-independent objects and features as constituents’ (2013, p. 271). Martin claims that ‘when one introspects one’s veridical perception one recognises that this is a situation in which some mind-independent object is present and is a constituent of the experiential episode’ (2004, p. 65). — https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11098-021-01618-z

the conscious “phenomenal” character of that experience is shaped by the objects of perception and their features, where this is understood in a constitutive, rather than merely a causal, sense. — https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/display/document/obo-9780195396577/obo-9780195396577-0340.xml

colours are mind-independent properties of things in the environment that are distinct from properties identified by the physical sciences — https://academic.oup.com/book/5610

Indirect realists reject these claims, and the science of perception supports this rejection.

That's all there is to it.

My belief that my experiences are caused by distal objects is a "prejudice". — Michael

That's fine - My belief that I have a hand is much the same.

Going back over it again, your belief that you have a hand, rather than that you are deceived by an evil demon, is a prejudice, not an inference.

But it's not "scientific", not derived from "scientific method" - something which would be extraordinary in the babe who makes this inference.

After this analysis it is clear that indirect realism is not based on inference nor on science. It is a prejudice.

But none of this is relevant to the point being made. — Michael

Of course, for you it can't be, because the argument just presented undermines the mystique of "scientific method"

And then, yet again, the Authoritarian Quote. Meh.

The upshot is that indirect realism doesn't get the scientific stamp of approval its fans so desire.

Just to be clear, the decision here is not between indirect realism and direct realism. Since at least Austin it has been about rejecting that framing of perception; declining to set the issue in terms of that distinction.

Cheers, Michael

The upshot is that indirect realism doesn't get the scientific stamp of approval its fans so desire. — Banno

This is what the science of perception shows:

The process of perception begins with an object in the real world, known as the distal stimulus or distal object. By means of light, sound, or another physical process, the object stimulates the body's sensory organs. These sensory organs transform the input energy into neural activity—a process called transduction. This raw pattern of neural activity is called the proximal stimulus. These neural signals are then transmitted to the brain and processed. The resulting mental re-creation of the distal stimulus is the percept.

To explain the process of perception, an example could be an ordinary shoe. The shoe itself is the distal stimulus. When light from the shoe enters a person's eye and stimulates the retina, that stimulation is the proximal stimulus. The image of the shoe reconstructed by the brain of the person is the percept. Another example could be a ringing telephone. The ringing of the phone is the distal stimulus. The sound stimulating a person's auditory receptors is the proximal stimulus. The brain's interpretation of this as the "ringing of a telephone" is the percept.

This is indirect realism, not naive realism.

Distal objects and their properties are not constituents of visual or auditory or olfactory experience.

The process of perception begins with an object in the real world, known as the distal stimulus or distal object. By means of light, sound, or another physical process, the object stimulates the body's sensory organs. These sensory organs transform the input energy into neural activity—a process called transduction. This raw pattern of neural activity is called the proximal stimulus. These neural signals are then transmitted to the brain and processed. The resulting mental re-creation of the distal stimulus is the percept.

To explain the process of perception, an example could be an ordinary shoe. The shoe itself is the distal stimulus. When light from the shoe enters a person's eye and stimulates the retina, that stimulation is the proximal stimulus. The image of the shoe reconstructed by the brain of the person is the percept. Another example could be a ringing telephone. The ringing of the phone is the distal stimulus. The sound stimulating a person's auditory receptors is the proximal stimulus. The brain's interpretation of this as the "ringing of a telephone" is the percept.

Sure. Agree entirely.

And what is seen is the shoe; what is heard is the phone - not the percept.

If it were the percept that is seen or heard, then we would have to provide another explanation, how it is that the percept is seen, how it is that the percept is heard. If the sequence produces a percept, and it is that which is seen, you are left with the need to explain how the percept is seen (by an "inner eye"?). We would have the homunculus problem.

If this is to be an explanation of seeing or hearing, the percept is not what is seen or heard, but part of the seeing, part of the hearing.

I feel pain, pain is a percept, therefore I feel a percept. Nothing about this entails a homunculus. The schizophrenic hears voices and I see things when I dream. You are reading something into the grammar of "I experience percepts" that just isn't there and so inventing a strawman for indirect realism.

Indirect realists don't argue that percepts exist, that distal objects and their properties are not constituents of these percepts, and that perception is indirect, as if this latter claim is distinct from the other two. Rather, by "perception is indirect" they just mean that percepts exist and that distal objects and their properties are not constituents of these percepts – and the science of perception supports this.

Which is precisely why so-called "non-naive direct" realism is consistent with indirect realism. See Semantic Direct Realism.

I feel pain, pain is a percept, therefore I feel a percept. — Michael

Nice slide.

Is pain a unique percept, distinct from salience? Pain differs from mere touch in forcing itself on one's attention. Special case; or at least, a different case, with similarities to proprioception. The language here is distinct, as is clear in Wittgenstein's discussion.

Which raises a question that might be provocative.

You know where your hand is at the moment. Do you know this indirectly? What could that mean? How is proprioception indirect?

You know where your hand is at the moment. Do you know this indirectly? What could that mean? How is proprioception indirect? — Banno

It's what I said above:

Indirect realists don't argue that percepts exist, that distal objects and their properties are not constituents of these percepts, and that perception is indirect, as if this latter claim is distinct from the other two. Rather, by "perception is indirect" they just mean that percepts exist and that distal objects and their properties are not constituents of these percepts – and the science of perception supports this.

This is true even for proprioception (notwithstanding that "distal object" isn't quite the correct term to use when referring to one's hands), given that proprioceptive errors are possible.

The process of perception begins with an object in the real world, known as the distal stimulus or distal object.

That which appears….

the object stimulates the body's sensory organs.

Perception….

These sensory organs transform the input energy

Sensation….

This raw pattern of neural activity

Intuition….

These neural signals are then transmitted to the brain and processed

Productive imagination…..

The resulting mental re-creation of the distal stimulus is the percept.

Phenomena…..

Full stop.

Of particular note is the resulting mental re-creation of the distal stimulus, as yet has no name, but is merely the instantiation of the system operational parameters in general, constant over every “distal stimulus”, a.k.a., sensibility. In other words, the brain has only been informed that there is an object, which has been transformed into something it can use, as opposed to the object’s real worldly material composition, from which follows the properties which define the object, or articulate how the material composition is to be comprehended, are not included in, nor are they available from, the mere sensation of it.
————

the grammar of "I experience percepts" that just isn't there…. — Michael

This is correct, insofar as experience cannot be of mere precepts, iff the above is the case. By experience is made explicit knowledge of what that distal object is, which cannot occur from mere nameless presentation to the brain without the brain then doing something additional to it, by which a name is given. In metaphysics, this is the domain of cognition; in neuroscience, network enabling, and tacit explication that experience should never be part of the systemic process itself, but is the end obtained by it.
————

And what is seen is the shoe; what is heard is the phone - not the percept. — Banno

What is seen and heard is sensation in general, derived from the stimulus of the distal object, in general. It has not been determined, i.e., as “shoe” or “phone”, or as any particular named objects.

Is it not the precept that is seen or heard, or, in general, it is not the precept that is sensed. It is the sensed that is the precept, non-fallicious cum hoc ergo propter hoc, upon arrival in the brain (in fact), or, arrival in understanding (metaphysically).

The definitive footnote: it can only be said what is seen is the shoe iff there is already extant experience of that particular distal object, and even so, such is merely facilitated convention, and not the technical operation of the system itself, which remains ever constant.
————

Indirect realists aren't idealists. — Michael

They must be, albeit of a specific variety, insofar as indirect realists, as such, cannot be proper scientists. Following the “science of perception”, only an idealist will be inclined to assign conceptual systemic representations to the operation of the brain without ever taking a single measurement, whereas the measurements with which a scientist concerns himself do not have the same names as the idealist’s representations.
———-

All this has been done already. Only the names have been changed to protect ignorance of the source.