Metaphysics of Action: Everybody has a Philosophy

Pantagruel

From my current reading about Collingwood's reform of metaphysics, I find his overarching aim of consolidating metaphysics to a self-creating thought fits well with my main focus, which is to define a metaphysics of self-creative action. Basically thought is what writes itself in reality. Trivially this is evident in material culture. (Which means at some point "conscious" intent is written into matter. This phenomenon has a purely physical analog in the quantum-classical phase transition, which is little understood. Collingwood has an interesting concept concerning the role of analogous thinking in bridging different domains of thought. But I digress, in a couple of ways.)

If per Collingwood our thought is underpinned by absolute presuppositions in the form of convictions or existential commitments, it follows that the effort to solve philosophical problems must tend to the creation or modification of existential commitments. Which commitments find their most compelling form in the actual praxes whereby mind enacts itself. The self-maintaining efforts of the human mind, wherein values are written into the fabric of culture through significant, meaningful human activities of all kinds, art, medicine, music, politics, religion. Philosophy, according to Collingwood, being the ultimate-synthesizing (and underlying) form of all these activities. Philosophies cannot directly shape the actions of the large groups of people that collectively, statistically, bring the structures and artefacts of civilization into being and cause them to be perpetuated. But an individual's philosophy is what can and does shape his actions. Everybody has a philosophy, Collingwood says.

Individual human actions underly and sustain the ongoing activity which is the human mind. Therefore, an individual whose actions tend towards collectivism will best discover those transformational (metaphysical) truths engendering actual-constructive praxes. Which is to say, an individual, will tend to discover and create opportunities to act in accordance with their principles or convictions, to the extent that he succeeds in explicitly formalizing (materializing) his meaning. Which is a philosophy of enaction.

180 Proof

IMO, everyone "has" a worldview (i.e. an acculturated perspective consisting of (tribal) prejudices, customs & conventions aka "common sense", or what Socrates called "an unexamined life") but almost no one critically reflects on their/our "existential commitments" (i.e. engages in, or "enacts", philosophizing). R.G. Collingswood seems to exaggerate (re: "absolute presuppositions") in order to dramatize the importance of cultural ideology / symbology in a similiar vain as the neo-kantian Ernst Cassirer (or, to a much less coherent extent, the psycho-mystagogue C.G. Jung).

Pantagruel

R.G. Collingswood seems to exaggerate — 180 Proof

I'm very much concerned with why people actually do what they do. My take is that rationality is constitutive and instrumental for the thinking thing. From what I have seen (and experienced) the real challenge to reason is less an external than an internal one. We don't discover, embrace, and implement optimal truths because, at some perplexing level, we don't want to. This requires a deep commitment powerfully motivated, operating at the level of the existential commitments described by Collingwood. What you call exaggeration, Collingwood calls conviction. As do I.

180 Proof

From what I have seen (and experienced) the real challenge to reason is less an external than an internal one. We don't discover, embrace, and implement optimal truths because, at some perplexing level, we don't want to. — Pantagruel

Yes, as is confirmed in large part by many decades of cross-cultural reseaches in e.g. evolutionary psychology (we are primates, not "cartesian subjects") and cognitive neuroscience (with a large brain hardwired with cognitive biases constituting a dominant, atavistic survival engine rather than a "truth engine") with which Collingwood's 'cultural idealism' is substantively inconsistent. Thus, the overwhelming majority of human beings only have worldviews (re: fantasy (e.g. mythology, theology, ideology ...)) and not philosophies (re: reflection) which they struggle – as you say, Pantagruel, "the real challenge" – to attain as critical/dialectical/existential self-correctives.

Pantagruel

↪180 Proof

You seem to be implying that mythologies, theologies, and ideologies do not have actual impacts on how people behave. This is patently not the case. Collingwood's strength is that he recognizes the complex and pluralistic nature of the human experience of reality, which includes the aesthetic dimension, as well as the others you cited. Cultural anthropology is an inclusive, not an exclusive project.

Like Descartes, Collingwood sees mind as the true object of philosophical inquiry, and I concur. Science reveals as much about the nature of (the instrumentality of) the scientific mind as it does about its putative objects. As I mentioned elsewhere, to much derision as I recall.

180 Proof

You seem to be implying that mythologies, theologies, and ideologies do not have actual impacts on how people behave. — Pantagruel

Just the opposite as my previous references to 'evolutionary psychology', 'cognitive neuroscience' & 'critical/dialectical/existential self-correctives' of philosophy make clear (if you carefully read my post). I'm pointing out that any or all of these constituents of hand-me-down worldviews – mythology, theology, ideology – are the dominant drivers (i.e. culturally enabling constraints) of almost all human judgments and not, as you (or your reading of Collingwood) seem to imply, philosophical reflections (e.g.) on "absolute presuppositions".

Pantagruel

↪180 Proof

I stand corrected. You are criticizing these elements as faux-values to be reflectively corrected. I stand with Collingwood's view, that everyone has a philosophy. The fact that it hasn't evolved to a reflective stage is central to his model. I'd disagree that these humanistic elements are negative and require only critical correction (I hope I've got that right). They suffer from being misinterpreted by first-level dogmatic scientisms whose goal is to subjugate these disparate values, rather than understanding them. Why should anything Collingwood says be interpreted as contradicting evolutionary psychology or neuroscience? Again, only from the perspective of a critical dogmatism.

180 Proof

You are criticizing these elements as faux-values — Pantagruel

I have not stated or implied this.

to be reflectively corrected.

The unexamined life is not worth living. ~Socrates

I stand with Collingwood's view, that everyone has a philosophy.

Your dogma, sir, flies in the face of the demonstrable fact (throughout history and across cultures) that very few people actually live examined lives (i.e. actually philosophize).

... (I hope I've got that right). They suffer from being misinterpreted by first-level dogmatic scientisms whose goal is to subjugate these disparate values, rather than understanding them.

Strawmaning non sequitur. We're obviously talking past one another .. :roll:

Pantagruel

Your dogma, sir, flies in the face of the demonstrable fact (throughout history and across cultures) that very few people actually live examined lives (i.e. actually philosophize). — 180 Proof

Twas yourself equated philosophy with reflection. I made careful to point out this is not necessarily the case. If you've no issues with religions, mythologies, and ideologies as cultural and personal drivers, fine; I could have sworn you meant to subject these to critical revision.

It's clear to me that your philosophical objectives are not synthesizing or synergistic, and you seem determined to misinterpret my writing to facilitate your own criticisms. You want to expound on how evolutionary psychology and neuroscience (in some mysterious way) contradict Collingwood's humanistic agenda? Have at it. I'm all ears.

180 Proof

I could have sworn you meant to subject these to critical revision. — Pantagruel

And again, your contention has nothing to do with what I've writeen. To wit:

philosophies (re: reflection) [ ... ] as critical/dialectical/existential self-correctives — 180 Proof

i.e. examining one's own 'unexamined life' (e.g. one's 'unexamined' assumptions, biases, desires, etc).

Pantagruel

↪180 Proof

Again, something you brought up. Forgive me for misunderstanding you, your writing really isn't very clear.

Perhaps you should start your own Lounge topic? Or test your mettle in one of the topical forums. I see the Lounge as an opportunity for friendly constructive speculation. You seem not to grasp the concept.

180 Proof

↪Pantagruel

Why not just concede the point like an adult? Btw, your selective misreading is both tedious and disingenuous.

Pantagruel

Why not just concede the point like an adult? Btw, your selective misreading is both tedious and disingenuous. — 180 Proof

What point? You made one unsupported claim - that evolutionary psychology and neuroscience contradicts Collingwood - I offered to listen to your explanation, but you ignored that and chose to continue your rants. Your suggestion that what we have is a Weltanschauung and not a Philosophy is trivial and a matter of taste, convention, or nomenclature, so not worth debating. You seem to hold some sort of negative opinion of the role of mythologies in determining behaviour although you won't say what, only that I am wrong when I attempt to characterize it.

You will note, this isn't a topical forum, it isn't the Shoutbox, it is the Lounge. For me, it is a relaxed space to exercise my philosophical speculations in a productive way. Not dogmas, metaphysical speculations concerning the metaphysical nature of belief and action, that beliefs are the ultimate constituents of mind and thought, which is a metaphysical supposition – not an axiom, theorem or statement of fact – so no "burden of proof" required (to quote you).

You, sir, are an ill-mannered lout.

180 Proof

:lol: You simpletons confess by projection.

Pantagruel

↪180 Proof

Why don't you choose to harass someone else? After all, that is what philosophy is about.

Thanks for polluting my Lounge thread with your nonsense.

Tom Storm

I'm very much concerned with why people actually do what they do. — Pantagruel

:up: The classic question of the modern era.

From what I have seen (and experienced) the real challenge to reason is less an external than an internal one. We don't discover, embrace, and implement optimal truths because, at some perplexing level, we don't want to. — Pantagruel

I'm not a theorist or a psychologist but I have worked with people (often at their worst: suicidal, overdosing, psychotic, violent) for 3 decades. People are not overly rational creatures. We tend to come at things from emotion and retrofit reasons and justifications. We tend to be reactive - a product of experiences - which we process emotionally to make sense of them. I think we deceive ourselves a lot and hold accounts of ourselves and our world that are visceral and inchoate and unexamined.

I stand with Collingwood's view, that everyone has a philosophy. The fact that it hasn't evolved to a reflective stage is central to his model. — Pantagruel

I've never made up my mind about this. I suspect it doesn't amount to a philosophy as such. More a disposition and a series of values which may coalesce as a kind of worldview. Do people hold presuppositions that inform these worldview? I believe they do to some extent. I also believe people often make choices that contradict these presuppositions because these 'feel better' in the doing.

Thus, the overwhelming majority of human beings only have worldviews (re: fantasy (e.g. mythology, theology, ideology ...) and not philosophies (re: reflection) which they struggle – as you say, Pantagruel, "the real challenge" – to attain as critical/dialectical/existential self-correctives. — 180 Proof

I suspect this is right. Whatever worldview they hold appears to be 'shallow' and tends not to be the product of examination. I guess underpinning these 'mythologies' are some vague presuppositions. Probably notions similar to: "Everything must makes sense." "God will take care of it." "No one can be trusted."

↪Pantagruel

I'm interested in an example of what might count as a philosophy and how this might differ to a worldview.

I think it is true that most of us partake in a type of philosophical thinking, particularly when we encounter challenges - death and suffering - and we may even use some philosophically derived ideas or tools to process these challenges. Most people certainly end up developing beliefs and assumptions about how the world is which may flirt with the key questions of philosophy. But I personally come down on the side that this is generally unsystematic, impressionistic, emotionally driven and often predicated upon unexamined templates provided by superstitions or religions.

180 Proof

Whatever worldview they hold appears to be 'shallow' and tends not to be the product of examination. I guess underpinning these 'mythologies' are some vague presuppositions. Probably notions similar to: "Everything must makes sense." "God will take care of it." "No one can be trusted." — Tom Storm

:up: :up:

Most people certainly end up developing beliefs and assumptions about how the world is which may flirt with the key questions of philosophy. But I personally come down on the side that this is generally unsystematic, impressionistic, emotionally driven and often predicated upon unexamined templates provided by superstitions or religions.

:100:

Pantagruel

Which is to say, an individual, will tend to discover and create opportunities to act in accordance with their principles or convictions, to the extent that he succeeds in explicitly formalizing (materializing) his meaning. Which is a philosophy of enaction. — Pantagruel

This is the direction that I was actually hoping to explore before that unfortunate digression.

I've since moved from Collingwood to Dilthey's hermeneutics. He believes that the process of en-symbolization (my term for creating symbols), the representation of the universal in the particular, cannot be a function of understanding merely, because it is a creative-imaginative act. Hence my recent comment on how the meaning of an original text overflows and is not captured by its analyses. This is also at the heart of the Davos debates of Heidegger and Cassirer. Dilthey's en-symbolization takes place in the context of the moral world, where an individual action can embody a universal principle (via moral choices). Which is the direction I see a philosophy of enaction taking.

So what is this saying? The best solution will succeed in conveying its meaning most completely? Or that the meaning that is best able to convey itself is the best solution? Both. We are thinking these thoughts we are now because civilization is what it has been and because matter has evolved in a certain way up to this point.

But only up to this point, the past. After this point, an event of en-symbolization has occurred (this event of en-symbolization is occurring, i.e. cogito ergo sum). This is true whether matter creates mind or mind creates matter because it is a synthesis anyway. Ideas get encapsulated. There would be no progress of thought if there was no continuity in the life of ideas. In fact, it is this very continuity in the life of ideas which is the device of self-creating agency, civilization. Complex ideas engender complex configurations.

Ideas exist to convey messages. Ideas are a conduit. Between disparate perspectives.

Understanding, for Dilthey, is to grasp something's unique individuality, and this is tied to one's own unique moral agency and responsibilities.

Pantagruel

I'm working on something new now, what I think of as the 'science of everyday life.' It concerns the ongoing undercurrent of the Cartesian and Positivist legacies in modern thought, and their mutual failure to either successfully accommodate or integrate. I do think there is a growing trend towards a naive scientism (because more and more people don't really understand the science of the modern world). And I think that scientism is also naively driven (at a more informed but still insufficiently critical level) by idealogues of more extreme forms of positivism (like Carnap). Of course positivism isn't, prima facie, scientism. But it can so very easily become that.

Pantagruel

A little bit about my personal philosophy of understanding. My studies in cognitive science led me to believe that we don't steer our minds the way that we steer a car, more like how you would steer a battleship. However your mind is programmed to think right now (the dominant set of cognitive habits) largely determines the nature both of what you will perceive (based on perceptual-conceptual filtering) and how you will react or respond. It is possible, of course, to alter our cognitive habits, but this usually requires prolonged focus and effort, akin to the process of acquiring a new skill.

When it comes to reading and understanding complex material, therefore, I believe that something like digestion and gestation is needed. New understandings need time to be assimilated into the complex adaptive system that is our practical conceptual framework in order to produce what I conceive of as deep understanding.

The whole point of new knowledge, however, is not merely its assimilation. I assume that what we mean by the growth of understanding is the accommodation of our conceptual framework to the new knowledge. Since this conceptual framework determines what we think and how, the accommodation to new knowledge should ultimately result in constructive changes to our conceptual framework, and thus to constructive changes in the way we perceive and interact with other minds and with reality in general.

One aspect of this change should relate to the steering-delay phenomenon itself. That is, as my awareness of my dependence on my self-constructed conceptual framework for decisions and actions grows, appropriate focus and effort should engender the skill of identifying, acquiring, assimilating, and accommodating to new constructive knowledge. That is, we should be capable of learning to more directly control our interactions with reality by more rapidly developing new cognitive habits; essentially becoming more free, which is to say, having a more immediate-constructive discretion over our choices. This conforms with Platos'/Socrates' contention that wrong choices are made out of ignorance and are to that extent not free.

Metaphysics of Action: Everybody has a Philosophy

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