• Janus
    15.8k
    I disagree with everything you've written there, or at least find it all irrelevant to the question. I remain convinced that whether determinism or indeterminism is the case, that there is no sui generis will and that therefore no one is, in any purely rationally defensible sense, blameworthy or praiseworthy for their actions. Of course, people will continue to praise and blame if they cannot refrain from, or see no reason to refrain from, doing so.

    On the other hand, it seems obvious to me that some individuals can deliberately cultivate their freedom from culturally acquired and genetically determined compulsions, but whether or not a particular individual is capable of this and the degree to which they are capable of it is down to what they are constitutionally equipped to be capable of. Blame is not pragmatically necessary but of course restraint is necessary in cases where individuals are a threat to others.
  • Joshs
    5.3k


    ↪Joshs I disagree with everything you've written there, or at least find it all irrelevant to the questionJanus

    You find it irrelevant to the question because you have paired down your definition of blame (strictly the product of sui generis will) so severely that most of the ways in which it is treated by contemporary psychologists and philosophers is off limits to the discussion.
  • Janus
    15.8k
    No, I haven't pared down the concept of blame, but made a distinction between blame which can be rationally justified and blame which is merely affectively driven.

    I say that blame is not any more rationally justifiable in cases where harm is caused by humans than it is in cases where harm is caused by other animals or natural events.
  • Joshs
    5.3k
    I say that blame is not any more rationally justifiable in cases where harm is caused by humans than it is in cases where harm is caused by other animals or natural events.Janus

    I happen to agree with you on that, but just to make sure we’re on the same page, do think that any of the following cognitive assessments can be rationally justified, and if so , which ones and on what rational basis?

    the cool, non-emotional, rational desire for accountability , condemnation, contempt, righteous indignation, perceiving the other as deliberately thoughtless, rude, careless, negligent, complacent, lazy, self-indulgent, malevolent, dishonest, narcissistic, malicious, perverse, inconsiderate, intentionally oppressive, anti-social, hypocritical, repressive or unfair, disrespectful, greedy.

    Most philosophers find anger to be a rational assessment in certain situations. For instance, Robert Solomon argues that anger can be ‘right'. Striking his own balance between subjective relativism and objective rationalism, he says
    “Anger, for example, is not just a burst of venom, and it is not as such sinful, nor is it necessarily a “negative” emotion. It can be “righteous,” and it can sometimes be right.”

    Philosopher Jesse Prinz writes:

    …we have strictures against killing innocent people; and we have strictures prescribing equal opportunity. These principles are grounded in reason and subject to rational debate. . But justice also requires passion. We don't coolly tabulate inequities—we feel outraged or indignant when they are discovered. Such angry feelings are essential; without anger, we would not be motivated to act....Rage can misdirect us when it comes unyoked from good reasoning, but together they are a potent pair. Reason is the rudder; rage propels us forward.

    Existentialist philosopher John Russon offers:

    “Anger can be unjustified, to be sure, and in that case it enacts a fundamentally distorted portrayal of the other. But anger can also be justified, and in that case it can be the only frame of mind in which the vicious and hateful reality of the other is truly recognized.”

    The social constructionist Ken Gergen writes that anger has a valid role to play in social co-ordination “There are certain times and places in which anger is the most effective move in the dance.”

    Eugene Gendlin, a phenomenological psychologist and philosopher allied with Heidegger, considers anger to be potentially adaptive. He says that one must attempt to reassess, reinterpret, elaborate the angering experience via felt awareness not in order to eliminate the feeling of anger but so that one's anger becomes

    “fresh, expansive, active, constructive, and varies with changes in the situation”. “Anger may help handle the situation because it may make the other change or back away. Anger can also help the situation because it may break it entirely and thus give you new circumstances.” “ Anger is healthy, while resentment and hate are detrimental to the organism.“

    Do you agree with any of these philosophers about the rational value of anger?
  • Janus
    15.8k
    I happen to agree with you on that, but just to make sure we’re on the same page, do think that any of the following cognitive assessments can be rationally justified, and if so , which ones and on what rational basis?Joshs

    When I spoke of rational justification I was referring to "pure' rational justification, I think the examples you offered may be cases of practical rational justification. The difference is that practical rational justification does not issue from the nature of the thing as pure rational justification does, but from the nature of the effect the thing has, or the nature of the effect that holding the judgement has.
  • Tobias
    994
    False. I went through this giving examples of both conceptually. You are just wrong. A person claiming bare that someone promised them something isn't even a legal consideration. It's a nothing. A nonsense. It isn't going to even get you listened to by the judiciary in any form, unless you have some evidence. Even that, usually, needs leave to be adduced.AmadeusD

    It depends on jurisdiction and on where and when it is uttered. If I interview a witness than him or her saying that something promised them something, is relevant. Of course the defense can argue it is somehow not recorded but I as a judge can take into account whether I find this witness credible or not.

    If you can't prove it in court, it probably does. If there is literally no record of your marriage, you are not married. That's how a legal obligation works. If you're conflating moral obligations with legal ones, that's a bit rich.AmadeusD

    No, that is not how legal obligation works. You confuse obligations with rules of evidence. If I am married legally and the marriage is not legally dissolved I am simply married. Say a nuclear weapon wipes out all the registries, then there is no evidence of my marriage anymore, but I am still married. I still have the legal obligation to care for my partner. There is just no evidence for the marriage and if I walk away from my obligation it cannot be enforced by a court. That though does not make the obligation somehow disappear, or the marriage somehow annulled.

    You could have stopped here, acknowledged you have defeated your own point, and moved on. But here we go...AmadeusD
    You could have dispensed with your silly condescending tone, but here we go...

    Why you are mentioning ontological positions is beyond me so I'm just going to ignore that dumbass conclusion.AmadeusD

    It is indeed beyond you but that is not really my problem.

    It literally renders them non-existent. If you have a false memory of making a promise, does it exist? No. You can't prove it. You have absolutely nothing but your memory to rely on. THe promise doesn't exist. Your apparent attachment to it does.AmadeusD

    No, it If I remembered making a promise but I did not make a promise, there is no promise. If I think I see a pink elephant but it is in fact a figment of my imagination, then it does not exist. However not because I cannot prove that there is no pink elephant but because there is no pink elephant. The same holds for promises.
  • javi2541997
    5.2k
    Say a nuclear weapon wipes out all the registries, then there is no evidence of my marriage anymore, but I am still married. I still have the legal obligation to care for my partner. There is just no evidence for the marriage and if I walk away from my obligation it cannot be enforced by a court. That though does not make the obligation somehow disappear, or the marriage somehow annulled.Tobias

    Sorry to intrude myself in your debate, but since I am also a law graduate and I work for the land registry in Madrid, I think I can make some useful points:

    As you previously stated, Tobias, it depends on the legislation we are taking into account, but since you and I live under the "umbrella" of the European Union, there is a basic principle: the company does not exist if it is not recorded. If the company is not recorded, it becomes irregular and the stakeholders respond with their goods and not with the company's goods. I mean, without a registration, the company lacks of "affectio societatis"

    On marriage and its registration. It is interesting that you state that if the civil records get destroyed, the marriage remains.

    Well, yes and no...

    It is obvious that you still have some obligations to your spouse, but your marriage becomes "insufficient" as the legal codes of my country says. Specifically, the 61st of the Spanish Civil Code says: For the acknowledgment of the marriage it ought to be recorded in the civil registry.
    If it is not registered, or you lack some certificate, you can lose some advantages. For example, in terms of taxes, it cannot be proven you are a family unit. In terms of perceiving a pension from the state, there could be problems of evidence that marriage existed, etc.
    With the aim of preventing unfair results, the Civil Code provides basic rights and principles between spouses, but these are very basic.

    So, more or less, your marriage remains, but it is insufficient. I would say it mainly exists between you and your spouse, not to the state, me (if I am a creditor) or the judges.
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