Hmmmm……most obviously, I suppose, objects are separated from concepts by definition, when the former is conditioned by space and time, but the latter is conditioned only by time, each being defined accordingly. Metaphysical theory-specific distinctions might be something like…objects are determinable from sensibility, concepts are determined from understanding, defined accordingly. Another way…phenomena represent objects perceived, concepts represent objects merely thought, again, defined accordingly.

In such case where an object is itself a concept, re: the predicate in an a priori cognition, that object separates from concepts generally as a matter of relation, or, more precisely, judgement. Here, though it isn’t so much a separation by definition as of belonging.

The problem with definitions is that there aren’t any that perfectly relate representations to each other, except those for mathematical objects.
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I didn’t notice you added to your comment.

The reason to believe in the totality of possible appearances the “world” represents, even without immediate perception, is….experience. Given experience, the negation of reason to belief, is a contradiction.

What if we ask the opposite? What are the reasons to believe that I exist?

Before answering the last question, I consider that we must ask ourselves about the conditions for a statement like "I, Jhon, exist" to be true. If we assume that it is true, wouldn't it be equivalent for a future in which I am in fact already dead? That is to say: "I, John, exist" and "John existed" would be equivalent in the future, and if we accept the first statement as true we must necessarily also accept the last statement as true.

What does this mean? That neither perception nor self-awareness can establish the truth conditions for objective discourse. And this means that for the statement "I exist" to be true, the perception of myself is not a sine-qua-non condition of its truth and objectivity. Non-perception would be essential and a sine-qua-non for true and objective discourse.

And is not what we call the "external world" the domain of Non-perception, as what is not me, as the other, even as another subjectivity other than mine? This being said raises the question of the reasons for believing Whether or not the external world exists is a petitio principii – as long as we expect that the answer [whether affirmative, negative or inconclusive] can be true or false.

We give reasons for something to be true or false. And we hope that in a debate those reasons are valid no matter who utters them. If another person presents our reasons that we consider valid, we must necessarily say that they are also valid. Hence the truth about our existence or the existence of the "external world" does not necessarily depend on whether we perceive it or not. And on the contrary, the conditions of truth and objectivity seem to presuppose a world beyond my perception.

And on the contrary, the conditions of truth and objectivity seem to presuppose a world beyond my perception. — JuanZu

Assume for the sake of argument that only your mind exists (i.e. metaphysical solipsism is correct).
Assume also that you believe in the existence of a mind-independent material world.

It is both the case that there isn't a world beyond your perception and the case that there is an objective truth (and which incidentally is contrary to your beliefs).

Mind-independent truths do not depend on the existence of mind-independent things.

Mind-independent truths do not depend on the existence of mind-independent things

If the question is about the existence of the "external world" necessarily the truth of the affirmative answer depends on mind-independent things. But the question lies in the conditions of truth and objectivity. These conditions, as stated above, cannot depend on perception. In this sense, if "existing" says something about me then it can only be true on the condition that my existence is also something non-perceptual.

In this sense, if "existing" says something about me then it can only be true on the condition that my existence is also something non-perceptual. — JuanZu

If your existence just is the occurrence of your perceptions then your existence isn't non-perceptual.

What I meant was, if you believe in what you are perceiving is the world ... then are you not in some sort of illusion that you are perceiving the world, when what you are thinking of the world ... are perhaps less than trillionth of a dust in size compared to the actual world? — Corvus

Yes, you can call it an illusion. This is what a lot of Easter polosophies assert. But I never liked this term that is used to actually mean our personal, subjective reality, i.e. how each of us view reality. The term "illusion" actually means misconception, false or misleading idea or impression of reality, etc. If we are fully conscious and not under the influence of alcohol, drugs, etc., I cannot call an illusion my view of the world in that state. This is my reality. I live with it. (Well, most of the time.) Otherwise, we have to call everything that exists for us an illusion. Can you live with it every moment in your life? Even if you consider and believe it to be true, it's a totally useless belief, it can't help you at all, since you can't do anything about it. So it is much more practical I believe to consider the --indisputable for me-- fact that the world and reality is what we consider, believe the world and reality, It's an agreement, a contract we make with life. Those who can't do that are in a big trouble. :smile:

Are you really perceiving the world? Or have you been perceiving less than a trillionth of a dust in the size of the world? — Corvus

Ha! This is playing with litreral meaning of words and phrases. When I'm saying "I perceive the world" I certainly don't mean I perceive every atom in it! I mean "the part of the world that I am able to perceive." Come on, this is more than obvious.

I don't see how being conscious is enough to perceive all the objects around you. — Corvus

Same as above. Of course it is not enough. Perceiving is becoming aware of and identifying something by means of our senses. I am aware of a big part of what my senses can receive. (They are receiving more than I can be aware of.) Ir also depends on my attention, i.e. where I direct my mind and thoughts to ot leave them to be directed to.

You are saying that you believe in the existence of the unperceived object, but still not giving any reason or ground for the belief. — Corvus

By "unperceived" you mean "never having been perceived" or "not being currently perceived"?
Anyway, I don't have to give a reason for believing that something exists if I don't have any reason why it doesn't. So, we come back once again to the non-ending issue of opposite views of the same thing. It's like the two sides of a coin, only that mine is heavier! :smile:
If the coin falls on its head, I have no reason to doubt about or prove that the other side is tail, do I?.

If you are totally open minded about all the possibilities that can happen to the unperceived existence, be it a tree, or a cup you have seen before, then you don't have reason (or you have less reason - depending on the situations) to believe it is still existing while not perceiving it. — Corvus

It depends on the object.

But you have not answered any of the questions from the agreed point of view. Most of your answers seem to have been based on the subjective concept of the world. Therefore we have not moved much forward from where we started. :) — Corvus

This is basically true. But it's you who have insisted to go on! :smile:
And I don't complain. I enjoyed the trip. :smile:

What I have stated is precisely that existence can no longer be reduced to perception. That is, the statement "this perception exists" can only be true if existing is not equivalent to being-perceived. In this order of things, perception has no greater ontological value than "the external world."

What I have stated is precisely that existence can no longer be reduced to perception. — JuanZu

You seem to be arguing that both (1) and (2) are true:

1. "things external to my perception exist" is true only if things external to my perception exist
2. "I exist" is true only if things external to my perception exist

(1) might be true (even a truism) but (2) is a non sequitur, and the claim that (2) is true because (1) is true is also a non sequitur.

All we can say a priori is that:

3. "I exist" is true only if I exist

You seem to be arguing that both (1) and (2) are true:

1. "things external to my perception exist" is true only if things external to my perception exist
2. "I exist" is true only if things external to my perception exist

(1) might be true (even a truism) but (2) is a non sequitur, and the claim that (2) is true because (1) is true is also a non sequitur. — Michael

You are not taking into account the conditions of truth and objectivity. For the statement "This perception exists" to be true, it requires, so to speak, an impersonal and non-subjective space of validation. Which would have been demonstrated in the example of the future statement. Therefore, ontologically, perception is one more thing among other things in the impersonal and non-subjective world. That is to say, we cannot doubt the existence of the "external world" more than our own perception.

You are not taking into account the conditions of truth and objectivity. For the statement "This perception exists" to be true, it requires, so to speak, an impersonal and non-subjective space of validation. Which would have been demonstrated in the example of the future statement. Therefore, ontologically, perception is one more thing among other things in the impersonal and non-subjective world. That is to say, we cannot doubt the existence of the "external world" more than our own perception. — JuanZu

I think you're being ambiguous with your use of the term "external world", and this is open to equivocation. Consider again my example above:

1. Only my mind exists
2. I believe in the existence of a mind-independent material world

My belief in the existence of a mind-independent material world is objectively false, but only my mind exists.

Is there an external world in this situation?

If you assume that only your mind exists, you can no longer ask about the existence of the external world, you have already closed the way to answering that question. You would want to say that "you only know that your mind exists." But this knowledge already presupposes conditions of truth and objectivity. With which we return to my argument.

If you assume that only your mind exists, you can no longer ask about the existence of the external world, you have already closed the way to answering that question. — JuanZu

I'm showing that there can be an objective truth about what does and doesn't exist even if there isn't an external world, and so your claim that an external world is required for there to be an objective truth about what does or doesn't exist is false.

If only my mind exists and if I believe that a mind-independent material world exists then my belief is objectively false and it is objectively true that a mind-independent material world doesn't exist.

it requires, so to speak, an impersonal and non-subjective space of validation — JuanZu

What's a "space of validation"? It certainly seems very different to what most mean by "external world". Most mean something like a collection of material objects extended in space, behaving according to some set of physical laws, with our perceptions being a byproduct of these processes. It's certainly not a truism that this is required for "this perception exists" to be true.

You are not showing, you are hypothetically assuming that there are truths about the existence of which their truth does not depend on the external world. But those are hypothetical assumptions. Therefore it cannot be admitted as an argument.

What I claim is that any statement you make about your existence presupposes conditions of truth and objectivity. Otherwise you would have to give me an example of a truth about the existence of something that exists only on the basis of your perceiving it. You will not find it, because the meaning of that truth will always be impersonal just as the objective content of "I, Michael, perceive" is equivalent to that of "Michael perceives."

Thus, if the conditions of truth and objectivity are impersonal [because if I say that you perceive I would not be wrong, I am something that you do not perceive] then your existence is a "property" that can only be validated by going beyond the perception. Therefore your existence is no more true or false than that of the world and the things that we also say "exist."

What I claim is that any statement you make about your existence presupposes conditions of truth and objectivity. — JuanZu

Which doesn't require an external world. If only my mind exists then it is objectively true that a mind-independent material world doesn't exist (and even if I believe otherwise).

then your existence is a "property" that can only be validated by going beyond the perception. — JuanZu

My perceptions depend on my existence, therefore awareness of my perceptions validates my existence -- and I am aware of my perceptions.

How exactly would I "go beyond" my perceptions anyway? It's really not clear to me now if you're arguing for external world realism or nihilism.

Which doesn't require an external world. — Michael

It requires it since there are no better reasons to affirm your existence than the existence of the world.

My existence doesn't depend on the existence of some second thing; it depends only on my existence. — Michael

It depends on your existence being a non-perceptual "property." And being unperceived is, curiously, something that characterizes the "outside world." That is, your existence is in a certain sense already an exteriority.

... there are no better reasons to affirm your existence than the existence of the world. — JuanZu

Arguing that the existence of an external world is the best explanation for my existence is different to arguing that objective truths depend on the existence of an external world. I'm arguing against the latter, not the former. I can (and do) accept the former.

I think it comes down to whether you are more justified in believing the world no longer exists when you don't perceive it or if some other explanation is more justified. In almost all examples I think the other explanation is more justified. Fortunately, we perceive the world with not only one sense, but with five, and we also have the faculty of memory. In tandem, these usually give us warrant to continue believing the world exists even when we don't perceive it, or when our perceptions are hampered. Also, it begs the question how the self can continue to exist independently of the world, so that alone may be considered warrant for believing in the objective world even when one cannot perceive it. As far as we know a mind cannot exist independently of a brain, and a brain is physical and requires a physical world to exist in and evolve out of.

Also, it begs the question how the self can continue to exist independently of the world, so that alone may be considered warrant for believing in the objective world even when one cannot perceive it. — GRWelsh

I think the opposite: it begs the question how the world can continue to exist independently of the self (or selves).

Arguing that the existence of an external world is the best explanation for my existence is different to arguing that objective truths depend on the existence of an external world. I'm arguing against the latter, not the former. I can (and do) accept the former — Michael

They depend on the "external world" as a non-perceptual exteriority where the non-perceived occurs. There is no value that objectivity and truth is worth that does not exceed the order of the perceptual towards the non-perceptual. Something is true even if I am no longer alive to perceive it, be it the truths of physics, mathematics, etc. Thus, if the statement "I perceive therefore I am" will ever be true, it is only on the condition of a non-perceptive world on which being in this or that way is based [since when we say the truth of a thing we say what it is] Isn't this our relationship with the world? Isn't this the relationship of the perceptual with the non-perceptual? But the most important thing is that my existence cannot be excluded from that exteriority since we could not even know that we exist.

Something is true even if I am no longer alive to perceive it, be it the truths of physics, mathematics, etc. — JuanZu

That doesn't mean it depends on an external world.

Mathematical truths, for example, do not depend on the mind-independent existence of matter, energy, space, or time.

Or maybe you mean something else by "external world"? You haven't been clear.

I am not talking exclusively about material objects. You can, if you want, consider numbers, logic, ideas, theories, etc., as Non-material objects or ideals [or as a kind of materiality that is not reducible to physicalism]. But the important thing is that its existence along with mine cannot be reduced to perception. There is an outside of perception and consciousness that bases our knowledge about things, including, obviously, our existence.

I am not talking exclusively about material objects. You can, if you want, consider numbers, logic, ideas, theories, etc., as Non-material objects or ideals [or as a kind of materiality that is not reducible to physicalism]. But the important thing is that its existence along with mine cannot be reduced to perception. — JuanZu

I'm not a Platonist. I don't believe that non-material objects or ideals "exist". As such I'm not a mathematical realist; I'm a mathematical antirealist. But even mathematical antirealists can believe in the objective truth of mathematics (in the sense that we might all be wrong).

The argument holds regardless of whether you are a Platonist or not. And I claim that this argument that I have presented is not false. I claim is true, even if I am no longer around to perceive it or be aware of it. Objective truths are founded in a world beyond consciousness and perception. Otherwise we fall into the ontological version of the liar paradox [if we claim that perception exists just because we perceive ourselves].

The argument holds regardless of whether you are a Platonist or not. — JuanZu

If Platonism isn't true and there is an external world then the external world is exhausted by matter, energy, space, and time.

If mathematical truths depend on the existence of an external world and if Platonism isn't true then mathematical truths depend on the existence of matter, energy, space, or time.

Mathematical truths do not depend on the existence of matter, energy, space, or time.

Therefore, either Platonism is true or mathematical truths do not depend on the existence of an external world.

The relevance of the ‘reality’ of the existence of such a fist does naught to reduce sensation of pain. — I like sushi

The pain is conclusive proof that the fist exists.

The pain is conclusive proof that the fist exists. — PL Olcott

Pain can be caused by things other than fists.

Truth itself <is> purely conceptual.

The pain is conclusive proof that the fist exists.
— PL Olcott

Pain can be caused by things other than fists. — Michael

That the world exists (an abstract concept) is verified to be true (also an abstract concept) on the basis of anything that appears to be any physical sensation (not merely an abstract concept).

That the world exists (an abstract concept) is verified to be true (also an abstract concept) on the basis of anything that appears to be any physical sensation (not merely an abstract concept). — PL Olcott

But what isn't verified is that there is more to the world than those physical sensations.

No. If you are not a Platonist, mathematical objects may depend on or be nothing more than objects emerging from brain processes. And a physicalist will have to demonstrate that. The conclusion you reach is false. But my argument holds. If we are not Platonists we can say that truths depend on a world beyond the perception that guarantees their possibility. We can, if we are not Platonists, say that we are only talking about physical and chemical processes that occur in the brain and that a mathematical truth is based on these processes. Processes that we do not precisely perceive when we think about those truths. The unperceived appears again. As I have said, the important thing is to understand this world as exteriority beyond perception towards non-perception as a condition of possibility of any objective truth, including the truth about our existence.