• frank
    14.6k
    This challenge comes from Saul Kripke’s Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (1982). Note that Kripke advises against taking it as an attempt to correctly interpret Wittgenstein (which is a convoluted statement considering the nature of the challenge), but rather it's a problem that occurred to him while reading Wittgenstein. This post is the challenge in my words:

    We start with noting that there is a number so large, you've never dealt with it before, but in our challenge, we'll just pick 57. You've never dealt with anything over that. You and I are sitting with a skeptic.

    I ask you to add 68+57.

    You confidently say "125."

    The skeptic asks, "How did you get that answer?"

    You say "I used the rules of addition as I have so often before, and I am consistent in my rule following."

    The skeptic says, "But wait. You haven't been doing addition. It was quaddition. When you said plus, you meant quus, and: x quus y = x+y for sums less than 57, but over that, the answer is always 5. So you haven't been consistent. If you were consistent, you would have said "5.""

    Of course you conclude that the skeptic is high and you berate him. He, in turn, asks you to prove him wrong. Show some fact about your previous usage of "plus" that demonstrates that it wasn't "quus."

    Up next: the implications of the challenge and possible solutions.
  • T Clark
    13k
    I ask you to add 68+57.

    You confidently say "125."

    The skeptic asks, "How did you get that answer?"

    You say "I used the rules of addition as I have so often before, and I am consistent in my rule following."

    The skeptic says, "But wait. You haven't been doing addition. It was quaddition. When you said plus, you meant quus, and: x quus y = x+y for sums less than 57, but over that, the answer is always 5. So you haven't been consistent. If you were consistent, you would have said "5.""
    frank

    Sorry. There's something I'm missing. If I apply the definition of addition to 68 and 57, I get 125, not 5. What you are describing, "quus," is a different operation which is not consistent with that definition.
  • frank
    14.6k
    Sorry. There's something I'm missing. If I apply the definition of addition to 68 and 57, I get 125, not 5. What you are describing, "quus," is a different operation which is not consistent with that definition.T Clark

    You haven't been doing addition. It was quaddition.
  • T Clark
    13k
    You haven't been doing addition. It was quaddition.frank

    I think this is where I'm supposed to berate you.
  • frank
    14.6k

    Right. You say: "No! I've been doing addition, not quaddition. Stop embarrassing yourself, you baboon!"

    Then I ask you for a fact about your previous behavior that shows that the rule you were following was addition rather than quaddition.
  • schopenhauer1
    10k

    Is this something about word-games and their context?
    In another thread I was saying thus, and I think it might have some relevance about context and the meaning of terms (like plus and quus):

    For physicists, "nothing" has a different connotation than the classic philosophical notions of nothing. It just needs zero energy to be considered "nothing" in physics I guess. And of course, that is unsatisfying in a philosophical sense that the theoretical principles and laws and fields that underlie this "nothing" still need to be accounted for.

    So yeah, various terms can be thought of differently (have different definitions and uses) in different language communities.

    Quus guy's logic is using it differently than plus guy's.

    The only other answer is Quus guy simply misinterprets the language-game of a particular mathematics-using community.
  • T Clark
    13k
    Then I ask you for a fact about your previous behavior that shows that the rule you were following was addition rather than quaddition.frank

    Does my behavior include my invisible, to you (and perhaps to me), mental processes? If it does, I say "I already have given you that fact."
  • frank
    14.6k
    Is this something about word-games and their context?
    In another thread I was saying thus, and I think it might have some relevance about context and the meaning of terms (like plus and quus):
    schopenhauer1

    Yes, definitely. The challenge ends up being about the meaning of any word.

    For physicists, "nothing" has a different connotation than the classic philosophical notions of nothing. It just needs zero energy to be considered "nothing" in physics I guess. And of course, that is unsatisfying in a philosophical sense that the theoretical principles and laws and fields that underlie this "nothing" still need to be accounted for.schopenhauer1

    :up:
  • schopenhauer1
    10k
    Yes, definitely. The challenge ends up being about the meaning of any word.frank

    Cool.
  • schopenhauer1
    10k

    I mean, who is to say the tribes that have a word for "one", "two" "three" "anything more than three" is wrong? If used in a way that everyone gets by, there you go.
  • frank
    14.6k
    Does my behavior include my invisible, to you (and perhaps to me), mental processes? If it does, I say "I already have given you that fact."T Clark

    In the challenge, it's granted that you know everything there is to know about your mental processes.

    I think the problem is that following the rules of addition are exactly the same as following the rules of quaddition up to the number 57. What in your mental processes would have been different so as to prove that you weren't quadding rather than adding?
  • frank
    14.6k
    I mean, who is to say the tribes that have a word for "one", "two" "three" "anything more than three" is wrong? If used in a way that everyone gets by, there you go.schopenhauer1

    I'll have to come back to this.
  • schopenhauer1
    10k

    To me, it seems like the same idea really, but a real life example of how math is radically different. The rule is you can add to three but any more, it's just a "a bunch of stuff" (you mine as well say 3+X). The focus here should not be the content but the fact that there is a different rule on how addition works in that language community.
  • schopenhauer1
    10k
    To me, it seems like the same idea really, but a real life example of how math is radically different. The rule is you can add to three but any more, it's just a "a bunch of stuff" (you mine as well say 3+X). The focus here should not be the content but the fact that there is a different rule on how addition works in that language community.schopenhauer1


    In other words, it's almost a "nominalism" versus "essentialism" argument. Early Wittgenstein versus later Wittgenstein might be another phrasing. Logical positivists versus post-modernists. And on and on.
  • T Clark
    13k
    I think the problem is that following the rules of addition are exactly the same as following the rules of quaddition up to the number 57. What in your mental processes would have been different so as to prove that you weren't quadding rather than adding?frank

    Ah... Now, maybe, I understand your point. I'd forgotten that I'd never encountered 57 before. Let me think... Ok, for natural numbers, the definition of "addition" can be traced back to counting. Are you saying that I can count to 56, but for any larger number I'm doing something different?
  • frank
    14.6k
    Ah... Now, maybe, I understand your point. I'd forgotten that I'd never encountered 57 before. Let me think... Ok, for natural numbers, the definition of "addition" can be traced back to counting. Are you saying that I can count to 56, but for any larger number I'm doing something different?T Clark

    It's specifically about your assessments of past behavior. You assume you know the rules you were following. Kripke's skeptic suggests that there is no fact of the matter. The fiction of "quadding" is just meant to illustrate this.
  • frank
    14.6k
    It's specifically about your assessments of past behavior. You assume you know the rules you were following. Kripke's skeptic suggests that there is no fact of the matter. The fiction of "quadding" is just meant to illustrate this.frank

    I got this wrong. Kripke's challenge is not about epistemology. It's metaphysics. That's the point of the emphasis on facts.

    Wow.
  • T Clark
    13k
    It's specifically about your assessments of past behavior. You assume you know the rules you were following. Kripke's skeptic suggests that there is no fact of the matter. The fiction of "quadding" is just meant to illustrate this.frank

    Rats. Now I'm back to not getting it again.

    On the web, I found a discussion of this issue. Here's a link:

    https://iep.utm.edu/kripkes-wittgenstein/#H1

    It doesn't make things any clearer to me. I give up.
  • frank
    14.6k
    I give up.T Clark

    Your challenges still helped me flesh it out, so thank you.
  • T Clark
    13k
    Your challenges still helped me flesh it out, so thank you.frank

    Anytime you need somebody to be confused, I'll be happy to help.
  • frank
    14.6k
    Anytime you need somebody to be confused, I'll be happy to help.T Clark

    :lol:
  • Janus
    15.6k
    You lay out 68 marbles and then you lay out 57 marbles in a separate row, then you ask the other "what are the names of the numbers of marbles in the two rows". Then you push them together and ask the other to count all the marbles and say what the name for that number of marbles is.
  • jgill
    3.6k
    You and Kripke may be excused. Return to dinner when you have stopped playing your little games.
  • frank
    14.6k
    You and Kripke may be excused. Return to dinner when you have stopped playing your little games.jgill

    Hey, general relativity came out of little games.
  • frank
    14.6k
    Following our failure to deliver a fact that distinguishes our historic use of "plus" vs "quus," it appears Kripke's skeptic has caused the "idea of meaning to vanish into thin air."

    Why? Because if we weren't following any specific rule in the past, then it follows that we aren't now, in spite of my confidence that I know now what I mean by "plus."

    I'm not quite following why this is true. Why does meaning have to be rule following? Why can't it pop into thin air in the present?

    There's something I'm missing
  • flannel jesus
    1.4k
    Following our failure to deliver a fact that distinguishes our historic use of "plus" vs "quus,"frank

    Surely the only thing you need to prove historically that you weren't quadding is to show any instance where you've added two numbers > 57, right?
  • Count Timothy von Icarus
    2k


    If I've done proofs via induction using addition, doesn't this show that I've taken addition all the way to the infinite in the past?

    That or I smugly pull out a crumpled sheet of paper from my pocket with the Peano Axioms written on them. I inform the skeptic that, as a good positivist, I only preform arithmetic by starting from this sheet and working up from there. "Show me how it is possible to derive quusing from these axioms and I will accept your proposition."

    Still, I get the point. Defining systems only in terms of past use seems to miss something.
  • frank
    14.6k
    Surely the only thing you need to prove historically that you weren't quadding is to show any instance where you've added two numbers > 57, right?flannel jesus

    Yes, but in the thought experiment, you've never done that. The idea is that in real life there's a number you've never added up to before. For the sake of presenting the challenge, we just pick 57.

    If I've done proofs via induction using addition, doesn't this show that I've taken addition all the way to the infinite in the past?Count Timothy von Icarus

    I think so, but in the challenge, you've never added numbers up to above 57.

    That or I smugly pull out a crumpled sheet of paper from my pocket with the Peano Axioms written on them. I inform the skeptic that, as a good positivist, I only preform arithmetic by starting from this sheet and working up from there. "Show me how it is possible to derive quusing from these axioms and I will accept your proposition."Count Timothy von Icarus

    He grants that math has specified rules, but is there a fact that shows you're following those rules every time to add? Do you really take the sheet out?

    Still, I get the point. Defining systems only in terms of past use seems to miss something.Count Timothy von Icarus

    He sees it as an outcome of the private language argument. This is the PDF text if you become fascinated enough to read it. :grin:

    Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language
  • Philosophim
    2.2k
    I think we're missing a lot of context here. Taken at face value, this is objectively stupid. What's the point? I'll just ask him back, "But wait. You haven't been doing quaddition. It was addition. When you said quss, you meant pluss, and: x + y = x quss y for sums less than 5, but over that, the answer is always 57. So you haven't been consistent. If you were consistent, you would have said "57.""

    Then I would put it on THEM to prove to me instead of doing it myself. If they refused, I would ignore them from then on for wasting my time. :D
  • Fooloso4
    5.5k
    Wittgenstein's solution to the paradox at PI 201 is that addition is a public practice. Rather than Kripke's appeal to what addition means to an individual or what her intention is or how he interprets it, there is simply the rules of arithmetic that are applicable to all numbers.

    201 ... For what we thereby show is that there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but which, from case to case of application, is exhibited in what we call “following the
    rule” and “going against it”.

    That’s why there is an inclination to say: every action according to a rule is an interpretation. But one should speak of interpretation only when one expression of a rule is substituted for another.

    202. That’s why ‘following a rule’ is a practice. And to think one is following a rule is not to follow a rule. And that’s why it’s not possible to follow a rule ‘privately’; otherwise, thinking one was following a rule would be the same thing as following it.

    Kripke poses the challenge:

    Who is to say that this [quus] is not the function previously meant by '+'? (9)

    The answer is simple: the rules of arithmetic. We either follow them correctly or we do not. When Kripke substitutes 'quus' for some cases of '+' he in not substituting one expression of a rule for another. Quus has no place in the rules of arithmetic. Kripke or his skeptic is not interpreting or misinterpreting the rules of arithmetic, he is disregarding them.

    If our ability to follow rules correctly and consistently is not dependent upon the application of a privately held conceptual understanding of the rule (the justified mental fact), but can be explained in terms of training and conformity to standard practice, then what remains of the skeptical problem?
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