I would never attempt to restrict your freedom to express yourself, no matter how much I might disagree with the focus of your expression. I might be frustrated that I cannot change your mind, but I will defend your freedom of expression as long as you do not incite violence. — universeness
I use the term spiritual, as referring to human breathing and movement and nothing of the transcendent or esoteric. — universeness
Do you dismiss yoga? — ucarr
If X is Transcendent AND if X is a Fact, then X belongs to TF-set. The set's okay, there just are not any members (so far) which (can) satisfy both rules simultaneously. — 180 Proof, c2008
In philosophy, supervenience refers to a relation between sets of properties or sets of facts. X is said to supervene on Y if and only if some difference in Y is necessary for any difference in X to be possible. — Wikipedia
You've completely misread what I wrote. The argument does not refer to "transcendent T" or "transcendent F". You're objecting to a strawman, ucarr, rather than what I wrote.Regarding the first sentence of your quote, you posit the conditional that a transcendent T is coupled with a transcendent F such that they instantiate membership within TF-set. — ucarr
To wit: IFF TF-set has two membership rules – (1) X is transcendent, (2) X is a fact, THEN there is not any X that satisfies both membership rules; THEREFORE TF-set does not have any actual members.
Is this paraphrase any clearer? — 180 Proof
Hello 180 Proof, can you talk a little bit about how you understand supervenience?
I ask for your thoughts on supervenience because within the context of sets of logical relations, I, more-or-less, equate supervenience and transcendence. — ucarr
:up:Here's how I understand your communication:
The property of transcendence and the cognitive entity "fact" are mutually exclusive. Given this, there is and cannot be any set of transcendent facts. — ucarr
Yes, they are non sequiturs.Did you ignore my questions to you because you think them evidence of my misapprehension of your communication?
I don't share this view. To transcend a fact isn't remotely "similar" to a property or process supervening on/over a fact.Since, in my view, transcendence_supervenience are similar, ...
You've completely misread what I wrote. The argument does not refer to "transcendent T" or "transcendent F". — 180 Proof
IFF TF-set has two membership rules – (1) X is transcendent, (2) X is a fact, THEN there is not any X that satisfies both membership rules; THEREFORE TF-set does not have any actual members. — 180 Proof
To transcend a fact isn'tcremotely "similar" to a property or process supervening on a fact. — 180 Proof
If X is Transcendent AND if X is a Fact, then X belongs to TF-set. The set's okay, there just are not any members (so far) which (can) satisfy both rules simultaneously. — 180 Proof
You have quoted my demonstration; show it is invalid as is or concede the point. I've no interest in trying to persuade you of anything, ucarr. — 180 Proof
Regarding the first sentence of your quote, you posit the conditional that a transcendent T is coupled with a transcendent F such that they instantiate membership within TF-set.
Since both f(t) + f(f) = f(t+f) and f(t+f) = {t,f}, then X, a transcendent fact TF transcends itself and thus TF and its transcendence {t,f} reciprocally vary i.e., transcend each other. This is higher-order transcendence_supervenience as determined by the paradoxicality of self-transcendence (a transcendent fact).
So your first sentence contradicts your second sentence. Instead of: The set's okay, there just are not any members (so far) which (can) satisfy both rules simultaneously, we have: The set's okay, and its members transcend_supervene each other, albeit paradoxically. Self-transcendence, when misread through the lens of Newtonian determinism, acquires the appearance of an empty set. — ucarr
You've completely misread what I wrote. The argument does not refer to "transcendent T" or "transcendent F". You're objecting to a strawman, ucarr, rather than what I wrote. — 180 Proof
Since "posit" means: put forward as a basis of argument, and you put forward as a basis of argument that:
IFF TF-set has two membership rules – (1) X is transcendent, (2) X is a fact, THEN there is not any X that satisfies both membership rules; THEREFORE TF-set does not have any actual members.
— 180 Proof
then my saying, as interpretation of your argument that: membership rule (1) X is transcendent means X = transcendent (per rule (1) seems correct as does rule (2) X is a fact interpreted as meaning X = fact (per rule (2). — ucarr
You've only defended your own misreading (↪180 Proof)¹ – res ipsa loquitur. Again, ucarr, invalidate what I actually argue¹ or concede the point. — 180 Proof
IFF TF-set has two membership rules – (1) X is transcendent, (2) X is a fact, THEN there is not any X that satisfies both membership rules... — 180 Proof
Regarding the first sentence of your quote, you posit the conditional that a transcendent T is coupled with a transcendent F such that they instantiate membership within TF-set.
Since both f(t) + f(f) = f(t+f) and f(t+f) = {t,f}, then X, a transcendent fact TF transcends itself and thus TF and its transcendence {t,f} reciprocally vary i.e., transcend each other. This is higher-order transcendence_supervenience as determined by the paradoxicality of self-transcendence (a transcendent fact).
So your first sentence contradicts your second sentence. Instead of: The set's okay, there just are not any members (so far) which (can) satisfy both rules simultaneously, we have: The set's okay, and its members transcend_supervene each other, albeit paradoxically. Self-transcendence, when misread through the lens of Newtonian determinism, acquires the appearance of an empty set. — ucarr
This is a declaration "X" and "fact" are mutually exclusive. — ucarr
Here's how I understand your communication:
The property of transcendence and the cognitive entity "fact" are mutually exclusive. Given this, there is and cannot be any set of transcendent facts.
— ucarr
:up: — 180 Proof
The upshot of the above argument follows from conceptualizing the wave function as a member of a set. Before measurement, its presence within a set, being probable, suggests the set is empty whereas, in fact, the occupation of the set by probable members positions said occupation somewhere between empty and occupied. This is an argument that denies TF-set is empty. — ucarr
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