Succinct. But merely a curiosity in physics and math. — jgill

Sure - until they’re applied or embodied, at least. Or anytime we attempt to describe our understanding of reality in non-mathematical terms.

What has seemed ‘essential’ for ‘our culture’ in the past has been found on numerous occasions to be no indication of its accuracy, let alone its importance or appropriateness. — Possibility

Our practices can be appropriately done, but they are (mostly) not judged to be “accurate”. You can have an appropriate excuse, but it cannot be an “accurate” excuse. Measuring is accurate, the retelling of the facts of an occurrence can be more or less accurate, but there is no standard against which we would call most of our practices “accurate”. The “conditions for objectivity” have “not been lost”, they were imposed in the first place (from math). The desire for that certainty creates the need for a theoretical solution to what is just the varied conclusions available or not under our ordinary criteria.

”practices… are perpetually open to rearrangements, rearticulations, and other reworkings”. That this has been happening long before you and I get there does not render it a priori. — Possibility

Yes our practices are not fixed, however, as I tried to claim previously, they are not decisions, arrangements, or solutions. They are the ways we have lived our lives over thousands of years; changing our shared expectations that create the implications on which our actions are judged is not resolved intellectually but culturally, over time as we change how we live, judge, and expect. And another point I was trying to make is every practice is different in the means and possibility of its evolution and extension.

And by a priori I am pointing out that there is no reference here, only reasons, interests, what matters; and that we do not easily see these, but must deduce them, reflect on what has been there but is normally overlooked, assumed.

there is no standard against which we would call most of our practices “accurate”. The “conditions for objectivity” have “not been lost”, they were imposed in the first place. The desire for that certainty creates the need for a theoretical solution to what is just the varied conclusions available or not under our ordinary criteria. — Antony Nickles

New materialism revokes the problem of evaluating modes of existence using criteria immanent to the mode itself or to practices as self-sufficient, autonomous arrangements (‘the intra-active engagements of our participation’). Being immersed in practices undertaking, how can one keep any basis for comparative evaluation or any means of applying normative criteria? Answering this question, Deleuze formulates his immanent ethics thesis as “There are never any criteria other than the tenor of existence, the intensification of life.” (Deleuze, ‘What is philosophy,” pg 74).

Thought is itself inextricably material and discursive in Barad’s sense of materiality as intra-action, thought is just one of infinitely many sites of material entanglement. — Joshs

The new materialistic perspective of the co-constitution of all things in a ceaseless movement of intra-action evacuates distinctive features evaluating thought as a particular site of the highest modes of human existence. If nature is a flow running through everything rather than a prescriptive essence unique to each being or species, it does not seem that anything effectively concerning human ethical or political norms arises from that new materialist realization.

Our practices can be appropriately done, but that is not on a measure with their being “accurate”. You can have an appropriate excuse, but it is not accurate. Measuring is accurate, the retelling of the facts of an occurrence can be more or less accurate, but there is no standard against which we would call most of our practices “accurate”. — Antony Nickles

Yes, you can have an appropriate excuse in theory, but if delivered incorrectly or without qualitative precision - that is, done without accuracy - it may be deemed ‘inappropriate’ in practice. Accuracy is a qualitative term - one that I use instead of ‘appropriateness’ to avoid a human-centred bias, and to encourage broader accountability then simply what ‘culture’ currently deems appropriate.

The “conditions for objectivity” have “not been lost”, they were imposed in the first place. The desire for that certainty creates the need for a theoretical solution to what is just the varied conclusions available or not under our ordinary criteria. — Antony Nickles

There’s no desire for certainty here in acknowledging conditions for objectivity - again, there’s a distinct human-centred bias in your choice of words. And I’m not sure what ‘theoretical solution’ you’re referring to. What are ‘ordinary criteria’ but ‘conclusions’ themselves - apparatuses that reconfigure the world by enacting agential cuts?

Objectivity is about accounting for “the constitutive practices in the fullness of their materialities, including the enactment of boundaries and exclusions, the production of phenomena in their sedimenting historiality, and the ongoing reconfiguring of the space of possibilities for future enactments”. It’s about including all of the relevant features of any intra-action, in order to be more responsible and accountable with our involvement.

Yes our practices are not fixed, however, as I tried to claim previously, they are not decisions, arrangements, or solutions. They are the ways we have lived our lives over thousands of years; changing our shared expectations that create the implications on which our actions are judged is not resolved intellectually but culturally, over time as we change how we live, judge, and expect. And another point I was trying to make is every practice is different in the means and possibility of its evolution.

And bya priori I am pointing out that there is no reference here, only reasons, interests, what matters; and that we do not easily see these, but must deduce them, reflect on what has been there but is normally overlooked, assumed. — Antony Nickles

I don’t see where I claimed that practices are decisions, arrangements or solutions in the sense of human intentionality. It is human exceptionalism that leads to reasons and interests being assumed or overlooked as ‘a priori’. What cannot be taken for granted is difference - as Barad says, “it is what matters”.

Practices (regardless of human intentionality, intellect or culture) are habitual or embodied intra-actions that are material-discursive in nature. But they are not ‘ours’ to possess, attributing agency necessarily to humans. Barad argues that matter itself is agentive - “mattering is differentiating, and which differences come to matter, matter in the iterative production of different differences.”

So yes, every practice is different, but it is differentiating that constitutes each practice, each reason or interest, and even culture itself - “not just what matters, but what is excluded from mattering”.

Being immersed in practices undertaking, how can one keep any basis for comparative evaluation or any means of applying normative criteria? — Number2018

My point is that we do have criteria for each practice for the judgments we make about them (whether they are appropriate within what we identify as that thing). What is normative is our lives themselves Cavell says. And we can make explicit those criteria for, say, an excuse, an apology, what we would call “following a rule”, or pointing, walking (compared to running)…

nature is a flow running through everything rather than a prescriptive essence unique to each being or species, — Number2018

But this “if” is flawed in both premises. We are not unique; and it is our “prescriptive” inculcation into a society and history that allows us to judge someone’s act, if necessary, along the criteria of what has come to be essential to that being what it is—to us, for example, identifying an excuse from a reason.

I agree with most everything you are saying and believe we are for the most part preaching past each other to the same choir. However.

There’s no desire for certainty here in acknowledging conditions for objectivity... And I’m not sure what ‘theoretical solution’ you’re referring to — Possibility

I agree with your description of an “accounting” to the criteria for what are “relevant features”, but that is not the classic conception of what “objectivity” is. Plato and Kant’s idea of a metaphysical “object” for comparison with its “appearance” to us was born of a desire for certainty (exactness), not just responsibility, accountability. This is the theoretical picture which I think is continued through in having “discursive” and “materiality” (the word, then the referent) with a tweak to try avoid the conclusion it is “metaphysical”.

What are ‘ordinary criteria’ but ‘conclusions’ themselves - apparatuses that reconfigure the world by enacting agential cuts? — Possibility

I’ll take from what I said to Number2018: we do have criteria for each practice for the judgments we make about them (whether they are appropriate within what we identify as that thing). What is normative is our lives themselves Cavell says. And we can make explicit those criteria for, say, an excuse, an apology, what we would call “following a rule”, or pointing, walking (compared to running)…

“Appropriateness” is precise, rigorous, and clear. Accuracy is a judgment to a set criteria, and so imposed onto an ordinary setting. This is how objectivity was created (out of the desire for an outside, higher, predictable, general criteria).

So yes, every practice is different, but it is differentiating that constitutes each practice, each reason or interest, and even culture itself - “not just what matters, but what is excluded from mattering”. — Possibility

And here I agree as well. To have a something we must push against everything. This speaking is a kind of violence and death. I would also point out that off course the “what” that is excluded is importantly also a “who”.

There’s no desire for certainty here in acknowledging conditions for objectivity... And I’m not sure what ‘theoretical solution’ you’re referring to
— Possibility

I agree with your description of an “accounting” to the criteria for what are “relevant features”, but that is not the classic conception of what “objectivity” is. Plato and Kant’s idea of a metaphysical “object” for comparison with its “appearance” to us was born of a desire for certainty (exactness), not just responsibility, accountability. This is the theoretical picture which I think is continued through in having “discursive” and “materiality” (the word, then the referent) with a tweak to try avoid the conclusion it is “metaphysical”. — Antony Nickles

Not accountable to the ‘criteria’, but to our inherent inseparability from the world. Objectivity means without bias, judgement or prejudice. Plato and Kant’s ‘object’ demonstrates a striving for a sense of certainty at the cost of accuracy in terms of responsibility and accountability. Kant’s focus on this ‘object-in-itself’ as a given is I think one of two key distortions in his philosophy (the other is its human exceptionalism). Bracketing out uncertainty behind a dualism is a cop-out.

But I think the point being made with ‘material-discursive’ is that there is no inherent distinction between these practices of ‘mattering’ - that the process is structurally the same.

A performative understanding of discursive practices challenges the representationalist belief in the power of words to represent pre-existing things. Unlike representationalism, which positions us above or outside the world we allegedly merely reflect on, a performative account insists on understanding, thinking, observing and theorising as practices of engagement with, and as part of, the world in which we have our being. — Barad

Representationalism, the metaphysics of individualism and the intrinsic separability of knower and known - all of these are in question according to quantum mechanics. It’s not a matter of trying to avoid the label of ‘metaphysical’ - it’s about seeing a logical practicality in structural alignment between semantic and ontological theories. It’s nothing particularly new - The Tao Te Ching did this thousands of years ago.

So yes, every practice is different, but it is differentiating that constitutes each practice, each reason or interest, and even culture itself - “not just what matters, but what is excluded from mattering”.
— Possibility

And here I agree as well. To have a something we must push against everything. This speaking is a kind of violence and death. I would also point out that off course the “what” that is excluded is importantly also a “who”. — Antony Nickles

Sure, but I’m talking about recognising the practice of differentiating a ‘subject’ (‘who’) from an already entangled materiality - not just with other humans, but with everything. The point is that we don’t have to push against everything in order to have a something. We can differentiate without othering or separating.

This is the paradigm shift required - to understand that when I talk about a ‘something’, I’m engaging in a material-discursive practice, not referring to some individual something that exists as such, independently of both of us. In this way, I acknowledge a variability (uncertainty) not just between my intra-action differentiating ‘something’ and yours, but also the possibility of changes occurring to this agential cut as we continue discussions, as we discuss with others, and as this ‘something’ and the various apparatuses I involve in observing/measuring/describing it, continue to intra-act in the world. These are the conditions for ‘objectivity’.

I didn’t say it was easy…

Being immersed in practices undertaking, how can one keep any basis for comparative evaluation or any means of applying normative criteria?
— Number2018

My point is that we do have criteria for each practice for the judgments we make about them (whether they are appropriate within what we identify as that thing). What is normative is our lives themselves Cavell says. And we can make explicit those criteria for, say, an excuse, an apology, what we would call “following a rule”, or pointing, walking (compared to running)… — Antony Nickles

It could be understood that your point is based on the premise of a clear and transparent meaning of
‘we.’ When you write: ‘We do have criteria,’ ‘We can make explicit,’ ‘We would call,’ and ‘Our lives,’
there may be an implicit reference to a legitimate community, establishing a comprehensive ground of rationality. Yet, my life interrelates to broader life networks that are not mine. My living
and my practices are embedded into rapidly changing, unstable social, economic, and organic environments that affirm and support their interdependency. Under these conditions, how can one rely upon universal community consensus on Reason and Judgement? From Derrida’s point of view, one should confront the generative, performative moment of decision—the event where one engages in an outcome that’s never guaranteed by the process (in the moment of deliberation, you can’t know if it’s the “right” decision). “A decision can only come into being in a space that exceeds the calculable program that would destroy all responsibility by transforming it into a programmable effect of determinate causes. There can be no moral or political responsibility without this trial and this passage by way of the undecidable. Even if a decision seems to take only a second and not to be preceded by any deliberation, it is structured by this experience experiment of the undecidable". (Derrida, ‘Limited Inc’, p 116;) Preceding our recourses to a community and objectivity, the event of deciding necessitates their ongoing re-invention and re-explication.

Shallow analysis:

When a group convenes and creates an "object", let's say a social movement, in the process of intra-acting, there is entanglement plus creation.

When two players rack the billiards and play a game of pool, there is intra-acting and entanglement, but the eight ball is the same old eight ball.

When two players rack the billiards and play a game of pool, there is intra-acting and entanglement, but the eight ball is the same old eight ball. — jgill

According to Barad, space, time , and matter do not exist prior to the intra-actions that reconstitute entanglements, so it can’t be the same old eight ball even apart form the pool game.

so it can’t be the same old eight ball even apart form the pool game — Joshs

Oh, but it is. It aligns perfectly from my last game. Well, a few more scratches. As for Barad, They are a person who has taken a certain perspective of quantum physics and applied it to feminism, genderism, and other societal issues - perhaps successfully. Elsewhere applied it seems highly speculative and tangential rather than fundamental.

With regard to math education, They seem more concerned with the entire physical, social, familial and emotional environment in which math is learned. Not so much with the nitty gritty of the subject of mathematics as with the entire environmental structure intra-acting. There is some value in that.

so it can’t be the same old eight ball even apart form the pool game
— Joshs

Oh, but it is. It aligns perfectly from my last game. Well, a few more scratches. As for Barad, They are a person who has taken a certain perspective of quantum physics and applied it to feminism, genderism, and other societal issues - perhaps successfully. Elsewhere applied it seems highly speculative and tangential rather than fundamental. — jgill

If by ‘same’ you mean similar enough to pass for same, that’s fine by me, as long as you recognize that there is nothing intrinsic to an entity that persists identically from one moment to the next, since we’re no longer talking about self-same objects but changing configurations of intra-actions.

As far as the relevance of Barad’s work outside of societal issues, Barad is not intending to revolutionize the practical doing of physics but rather provide a new philosophical interpretation of it. Is this tangential to the real subject matter of physics? Barad doesnt think so.

I part company with my physics colleagues with neopositivist leanings who believe that philosophical concerns are superfluous to the real subject matter of physics. Rather, I am sympathetic to Bohr's view that philosophy is integral to physics. Indeed, Einstein felt much the same way and once quipped: ‘‘Of course, every theory is true, providedyou suitably associate its symbols with observed quantities.'' In other words, physics without philosophy can only be a meaningless exercise in the manipulation of symbols and things, much the same as philosophy without any understanding of the physical world can only be an exercise in making meaning about symbols and things that have no basis in the world. This is why Einstein and Bohr engaged with all their passions about the meaning of quantum theory.

I get the impression that you think the social-philosophical and natural science spheres of knowledge are somehow independent , such that what amounts to a revolution in one sphere may be irrelevant to the interpretive underpinnings of the other.

The practical doing of physics hasn’t changed very much in the past 80 years, according to a number of historians of physics. Meanwhile, there have been important changes in social science and philosophy over that span. This has led to the suggestion that the creative juices in physics have been stagnating. This doesnt prevent physics from ‘working’ in the sense of continuing to solve the same puzzles it has been solving in the same way over the past 80 years. But it keeps the field from finding new and more powerful ways to solve puzzles. I think Barad is a more talented philosopher than physicist. I believe they have started the creative juices flowing , and it will take a brilliant physicist to translate those juices into changes in the way practicing physicists do their job.

it will take a brilliant physicist to translate those juices into changes in the way practicing physicists do their job — Joshs

It will be interesting to see if anything comes of her ideas. Certainly, quantum theory these days seems more a reifying of mathematics.

I get the impression that you think the social-philosophical and natural science spheres of knowledge are somehow independent — Joshs

I see physics notions like entanglement applied to social sciences, but the other way around is a bit more obscure. Psychology in physics? The measurement problem? As for mathematics, Barad and her followers suggest a loosening of the framework of the subject, citing the concept of non-Euclidean geometry. But this is always happening in the research community - nothing new here. However, to propose something similar in math education at the early levels is bold, to say the least. Reminds me of the New Math of the 1960s and 1970s.