In one sense they are political in that you're arranging the basic economy of the home, which is where we all begin. But in the other sense you have to utilize the system of private property rights in order to establish a space for those who fit in, which is actually quite insular rather than addressing the needs of people at large. — Moliere

If you want to be involved in politics on the large scale, you have to get involved in politics. there is no clean, safe, happy way to do that atm. It's a fairly binary choice - not because of philosophical or ideological conflict, but just because of where we are in history.

Right!

Answering my own hook question: that's where the hedonic ethic starts to fall short. There are some circumstances, namely political, which the hedonic ethic is incomplete for. I believe this is true for all ethical philosophies. They are good-at or good-for, rather than good simpliciter or an arbiter of all action allowing us to once and for all categorize our actions and choose the good ones. And when they are good-at or good-for isn't subject to a rule: it's a choice which we make.

But in favor of this still counting as a moral realism, rather than the obvious anti-realism that this seems to indicate, I might say that hedonism is the first morality, cribbing from Levinas. It's not always the case, but often enough we look out for ourselves and our pleasures and our people and our projects first, and we are even expected to do so. So if there is a higher ethic, something beyond human beings seeking pleasure, due to us being human we have to find a way to satisfy our hedonism regardless.

And then from Levinas I would depart to Kate Millet's Sexual Politics -- forming a Bildungsroman that starts with human pleasure and integrates sexual, racial, and economic equality as a worthy pursuit. Just tempered by human pleasure and joy -- because while anger is a gift, it's a double-edged one that can turn into rage and hate if left unchecked.

And that's definitely not tranquil.

So if there is a higher ethic, something beyond human beings seeking pleasure, due to us being human we have to find a way to satisfy our hedonism regardless. — Moliere

I don't know about 'higher', but I put avoiding pain - both the suffering and inflicting of pain - should precede the pursuit of even the noblest of pleasures.

:up:

Heh. Then for all my studying you are more devout than me, and you'd still ask "Why not hedonism?" where I would say "well, sometimes anxiety is worth it -- and not because it leads to a calmer state of mind"

But for me ethics can never be finished. It's always a reflection which I come back to and think through. Which isn't to say I can say, in the abstract, when it's a good thing to take on anxiety. Only that I've made that choice before and it felt right, even though the dogma said it was wrong.

To retain some amount of Epicurean credence, the beginning of the letter to Monoeceus:

And to say that the season for studying philosophy has not yet come, or that it is past and gone, is like saying that the season for happiness is not yet or that it is now no more. Therefore, both old and young alike ought to seek wisdom, the former in order that, as age comes over him, he may be young in good things because of the grace of what has been, and the latter in order that, while he is young, he may at the same time be old, because he has no fear of the things which are to come.

I think Epicurus is right on happiness, and I think happiness makes us more willing to do good towards one another, but the world is such that people aren't happy, do cruel things, and the Epicurean philosophy isn't enough to stop them.

You have to want tranquility, and most people are attached to, as Epicurus would say it, groundless desires.

And given that we're a social species, and even more deeply interconnected now through a world economy, what others do matters for the purposes of living a tranquil life.

So there might be a political angle I could work in. But given the time I wouldn't want to make it consequential -- I'd want it to be virtue-theoretic somehow.

Then for all my studying you are more devout than me, and you'd still ask "Why not hedonism?" where I would say "well, sometimes anxiety is worth it -- and not because it leads to a calmer state of mind" — Moliere

I don't think I would, actually. I don't reject or renounce my negative feelings. They're not pleasant, but they're reasonable, necessary; they serve a function and fill a need I could probably explain if I took the time and attention to articulate it - probably; not really sure. In any case, I don't consider them as suffering or pain, possibly because I don't feel as intensely or with such commitment as I did at 20 (when there was an immersive, creative pleasure in being miserable), or even 35 (when I considered it instructive; conducive to empathy toward others). I find that one's perspective on everything, even one's own emotional state, changes over time.

But then another aspect of my life has changed over time: my physical world, and especially my social world, has shrunk, even as my info-sphere has expanded. Perspective is skewed; it's an entirely different configuration and dimensions from what it was 20, 30, 40, 50 years ago.

I don't think I would, actually. I don't reject or renounce my negative feelings. They're not pleasant, but they're reasonable, necessary; they serve a function and fill a need I could probably explain if I took the time and attention to articulate it - probably; not really sure. — Vera Mont

Then I've misinterpreted you in my own way as I try to mark out distinctions and such.

I agree with this in that I don't reject or renounce negative feelings. I think the Epicurean philosophy can lead one to being even more able to feel those feelings. They are healthy to feel, I think.

But then another aspect of my life has changed over time: my physical world, and especially my social world, has shrunk, even as my info-sphere has expanded. Perspective is skewed; it's an entirely different configuration and dimensions from what it was 20, 30, 40, 50 years ago. — Vera Mont

I'm at about the 20, 30 line -- not the 40, 50 line. But I still can empathize with perspective being skewed, and feeling like everything is different now from whenever.

I can promise one thing: it's never uninteresting!

A curse! ;)

One of my cravings is for boredom. May I never have another interesting thing happen to me again. I march to the drum of the blinking last man who wants good sleep.

I march to the drum of the blinking last man who wants good sleep. — Moliere

Marching in that state, you're liable to keel over and the rest of the sleepwalkers will march right over you. Not a pretty end for such a pretty cat!

:D

Further Epicurus' theory gets at something fundamental about desire -- that our desires can be the reason we are unhappy, rather than us being unhappy because we're not satisfying those desires, and so the cure of unhappiness is to remove the desire rather than pursue it. — Moliere

Indeed. Good post!

Which is a very different kind of hedonism from our usual understanding of the word since it's centered around limiting desire such that they can always be satisfied and you don't have to worry about them rather than pursuing any and all of them. — Moliere

True, but 'hedonism' as it is often used is more of a philosophical punching bag than something which anyone actually adheres to. Hedonism as a moral philosophy invariably distinguishes between good pleasure-desires and bad pleasure-desires, just as Epicurus does. Even the hedonists who hold that all pleasures are commensurable still hold that there are praiseworthy and blameworthy decisions when it comes to seeking pleasure. In short, hedonism as a moral philosophy must still be at least a prescriptive theory, and not merely descriptive.

I think the misunderstanding arises in no small part from amateur hedonists who, while trying to defend their theory, end up falling back into something which is so safe as to be merely descriptive. Having thus fallen back, they have successfully defended themselves from being wrong, but they have at the same time failed to put forth a theory which says anything substantial, and they also lead onlookers to believe that hedonism is a flat, one-dimensional beast. ...So maybe Epicurus is odd to us in part because we are surrounded by such lazy hedonists. :grin:

I think the misunderstanding arises in no small part from amateur hedonists who, while trying to defend their theory, end up falling back into something which is so safe as to be merely descriptive. — Leontiskos

A good point. I think of them as untheorized hedonists - they are more likely to be using the term in an undifferentiated fashion to describe 'pleasure seeking' despite the consequences. Dissipated voluptuaries tend to have a limited shelf life.

.So maybe Epicurus is odd to us in part because we are surrounded by such lazy hedonists. :grin: — Leontiskos

What I've liked about Epicurus is the setting of achievable standards for hedonism - we do not really require all that much in order to be happy. It lends itself to a minimalist spin on the idea of contentment which contrasts well against the avaricious, materialistic acquisitiveness of consumer capitalism, even when pursued at an unambitious, middle-class magnitude.

A good point. I think of them as untheorized hedonists - they are more likely to be using the term in an undifferentiated fashion to describe 'pleasure seeking' despite the consequences. Dissipated voluptuaries tend to have a limited shelf life. — Tom Storm

Yes, I think that's right. And of course there are unreflective individuals who do seek pleasure in an undifferentiated fashion, but this would be 'hedonism' as an unreflective way of life rather than 'hedonism' as a moral philosophy. I think it would be hard to find a moral philosopher who advocates for undifferentiated pleasure seeking.

What I've liked about Epicurus is the setting of achievable standards for hedonism... — Tom Storm

That's a good point. I have been lamenting something of the opposite in Aristotle, who is in some ways elitist. Epicurus provides a way of life which is universally accessible and which can be enacted in greater or lesser ways.