1. Strong emergence - I would accept that it is logically impossible and that it is not pure materialism anyway.
2. Therefore, I would adopt weak emergence. That would force me to adopt the identity theory.
3. Type-Type Identity can be refuted by multiple realization.
4. So, the next step is to adopt Token-Type. Here the problem arises: depending on what we categorize an emotion?
4.1. The only way here is represented by functionalism, which can in turn be refuted by inverted qualia or multiple realization. — Eugen
, I can just ignore them altogether.let's assume that we all agree that everything up to 4 is proven to be false. — Eugen
What remains?1. We don't need the same physical structure - multiple realization solved.
Having no categories, but simply experiences, I don't need a justification for fitting an experience into a category, so:
2. I don't need to equate an experience with a function. There is no law of nature that prevents the existence of an experience without it fulfilling a specific purpose.
I realize that this position is very weak in terms of explanatory power, but I don't see any logical argument that invalidates this exact position. So feel free to hit me with counterarguments. Thank you! — Eugen
But, if I were a materialist, I would go further and eliminate the notion of Type altogether. — Eugen
There are no types of experiences, only experiences. — Eugen
There are no types of experiences, only experiences. Toothache and leg pain are classified as pains only because they are similar, so it is for language purpose, but in reality they are two different things. Similar does not mean identical, so:
1. We don't need the same physical structure - multiple realization solved.
Having no categories, but simply experiences, I don't need a justification for fitting an experience into a category, so:
2. I don't need to equate an experience with a function. There is no law of nature that prevents the existence of an experience without it fulfilling a specific purpose. — Eugen
Ok... elaborate a bit please, it looks like you're saying something there — Eugen
I'm not your philosophy teacher. You either learn those concepts and debate or ignore this OP. — Eugen
Those are not ''my terms". — Eugen
Eugen may get scolded by the mods.T Clark I thought to answer that Clarky is my philosophy teacher in this site. But I didn't want to get scolded by Eugene again — javi2541997
I know that everything I will present from 1 to 4 is debatable, but, for the sake of the argument, let's assume that we all agree that everything up to 4 is proven to be false. — Eugen
Therefore, if I were a materialist.
1. Strong emergence - I would accept that it is logically impossible and that it is not pure materialism anyway.
2. Therefore, I would adopt weak emergence. That would force me to adopt the identity theory.
3. Type-Type Identity can be refuted by multiple realization.
4. So, the next step is to adopt Token-Type. Here the problem arises: depending on what we categorize an emotion?
4.1. The only way here is represented by functionalism, which can in turn be refuted by inverted qualia or multiple realization.
Unfortunately, I have noticed that most materialists stop here. But, if I were a materialist, I would go further and eliminate the notion of Type altogether.
There are no types of experiences, only experiences. Toothache and leg pain are classified as pains only because they are similar, so it is for language purpose, but in reality they are two different things. Similar does not mean identical,...
so:
1. We don't need the same physical structure - multiple realization solved.
Having no categories, but simply experiences, I don't need a justification for fitting an experience into a category, so:
2. I don't need to equate an experience with a function. There is no law of nature that prevents the existence of an experience without it fulfilling a specific purpose.
I realize that this position is very weak in terms of explanatory power, but I don't see any logical argument that invalidates this exact position. So feel free to hit me with counterarguments. Thank you!
I would adopt weak emergence. And I'd jump straight to functionalism. I didn't think functionalism was a subset of identity theory. I thought Identity theory was that the mind is the brain, or something like that. — bert1
Token-type identity? Which side is the physical, which the mental? I don't think I've understood this one. I did a quick search and nothing immediately came up. — bert1
but I thought multiple realisability was one of its features, not a bug. — bert1
I disagree with you here. In principle one could have two identical brains realising the same function. In that way we would have two experience of the same type, assuming functionalism. They would be qualitatively identical, but quantitatively distinct. Have I misunderstood you? — bert1
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