Its not an assumption, its a proof if anyone can grasp the concept. If you can't discretely experience, then you can't differentiate between the letters, words, and sentences you read. In communicating with each other, we've already proven we discretely experience. To even doubt the idea that you discretely experience means that you have experience, and that you can view it as parts like words and concepts. Its proof by contradiction. — Philosophim

Well no, we haven't proven a "we" here, just assumed. Again you're still making an assumption based on your own experience, but you could just be talking to yourself (a la figments of imagination and all that). I can have experience, supposedly, but that doesn't mean I am viewing it as parts and words and concepts. You're assuming too much.

We can also prove that animals discretely experience. As long as they consistently model behavior beyond random chance that shows they can identify something, they do. Does this mean they can every comprehend what they're doing in a meta analysis like we can? Not necessarily. But, this theory of knowledge can easily be applied to any discretely experiencing thing, not merely humans. — Philosophim

Nope, we can't prove animals discretely experience, we can only infer that based on behavior. Also calling it theory of knowledge is a stretch, you're kinda anthropomorphizing here.

Here's an example.

Probability: The chance of winning a lottery ticket is 1 out of 10,000,000.
Possibility: People have won the lottery before, so its possible I could win.
Plausible: God will intervene and make the next ticket I purchase a winning ticket.

If I was discussing with someone else, or even analyzing these myself, I might be very tempted to want one of these inductions over the other. But, if I understand what's most rational, whatever I or anyone else may feel, its most rational to make my decision using the probability. The most rational conclusion is not to buy a ticket, and put the money to some better use. — Philosophim

Why is it most rational to take your position of probability? Depending on the person it might be more rational to believe god will do it. Something being rational doesn't mean right or true necessarily. This is just another assumption.

If this is a theory of knowledge, it should work everywhere including science. Context is of course important as well. To continue with the example earlier, Newton's laws were still sound when we used them for small bodies. Once relativity was found out, we also could reduce it down to Newton's laws at small bodies. This allowed us to use a simpler equation and set of identities at one level, and the more complex set of equations and identities at another. — Philosophim

Well no, you can have different theories of knowledge like science does where different ones apply to different levels of reality. That's why quantum physics was such an upset.

Agreed, but this theory defeats radical skepticism. There is a base of distinctive knowledge, and everything builds up from that. Further, you can take the vocabulary within the theory, apply it to itself from the beginning, and it still holds strong. If you would like, put forward some radical skepticism ideas and I will post how the theory solves the issue. — Philosophim

You haven't really shown it has defeated radical skepticism, I keep saying you're making a bunch of assumptions. Even the fact I experience isn't certain, I could be wrong in some wacky and EXTREMELY paradoxical or whatever way. You still haven't even gotten past the existence of an experiencer or an I (and Eastern philosophy has some strong challenges to both). You pretty much have to take axioms like everyone else.

As I've noted, my theory starts with a proof by contradiction. To be able to If we couldn't discretely experience, then we could not understand the concept of discrete experience. Because we do understand the concept, we discretely experience. Since this is neither circular, dogmatic, or regressive, I've refuted the Manchausen Trilemma.

Lets go one farther using the hierarchy of induction. The M Trilemma states that all ideas will end in an irrational position.

We don't applicably know this as we have not applied the M Trilemma to all ideas. Therefore this is an induction.

We don't have a probability as we don't have enough applicable knowledge to establish one.
We do know that some ideas have ended by resting on a circular, dogmatic, or regressive idea, we do know its possible for this to happen to ideas.
Its plausible that all ideas fall to the M Trilemma.

Since we know it is possible that some fall to the M Trilemma, but the claim that it applies to all is a plausibility, it is more rational to hold onto the possibility and dismiss the plausibility if we decide to settle on a belief. So the more rational induction to hold is that it is possible that ideas can end up falling to the M Trillemma. The induction that all will, is less cogent, and therefore can be dismissed in any rational discussion. — Philosophim

Well no, we don't understand the concept of discretely experience, again this is just a you thing. Get out of your own head. It is very much circular.

Lastly it's not really induction that all will, it's just a fact. Everything is built on language that only makes sense in a social setting and that we made up to be self referential in order to talk to each other. So off the bat you're on shaky ground. For your theory to even get off the ground it has to take things as a given, just like everything else. Chiefly the axioms listed in the video I posted, faith in your observations and that you can know things. We take these for granted a lot of the time.

You haven't really gotten around it.

I can have experience, supposedly, but that doesn't mean I am viewing it as parts and words and concepts. — Darkneos

Yes, because you answered my question. To answer my question you would have had to read. If you read, then you're able to part existence out. Can you differentiate between letters? Then you discretely experience. Your very denial that you discretely experience leads to a contradiction, therefore you discretely experience.

Now, its plausible that you as a discrete experiencer doesn't exist, and its all a figment in my head. Except I've never actually applicably known a situation where this has happened to me before. So for me, its not possible. I have applicably known other people who type things online, so it is possible you are another person that types things online. As what is possible is the more rational induction, I choose to stick with what I know is possible, and not plausible. I'm not stating that I applicably know you exist, that I cannot prove. What I can prove is that I did not type the letters in your reply, and that the only way something was able to, is if it discretely experienced.

Nope, we can't prove animals discretely experience, we can only infer that based on behavior. Also calling it theory of knowledge is a stretch, you're kinda anthropomorphizing here. — Darkneos

You may not realize how basic discrete experience is. Words are discrete experiences, but you have discrete experiences without words. Experience is the sum total of all the sights sounds, thoughts etc that stream into us. Discrete experience is the ability to focus on one or more combinations out of the noise. Something that did not discretely experience would be incapable of doing this, and just be a mess of input without any processing. We don't infer that animals discretely experience, we can test them by seeing if they have intention and attention, then attempting to divert that attention and intention.

Example: As a very basic test, put an animal in a room. Have an open exit. See if the animal ever tries to leave. A non-discrete experiencer would not be able to recognize there is an exit just like a camera cannot recognize anything about the picture it is taking.

Why is it most rational to take your position of probability? Depending on the person it might be more rational to believe god will do it. Something being rational doesn't mean right or true necessarily. This is just another assumption. — Darkneos

The hierarchy of induction is built up through the rational arguments for distinctive and applicable knowledge. Do you agree the arguments for distinctive and applicable knowledge are sound? If not, we'll need to go there first as the hierarchy of inductions relies on this. Rationality is not a desire, its a consequence of how far removed from applicable knowledge an induction is.

Depending on a person's context, yes, it might be more rational to believe God will do it. But they must applicably prove so within their context. Do they have distinctive knowledge of a God that's non-synonymous with another identity? Have they ever applicably known this God? Have they applicably known God to change a lottery ticket before? If not, then its merely a plausibility. Compared to the known probability, its still more rational for them to choose the probability.

Also, we can evaluate other people as being rational, as being rational is objective. I can ask a person all of these questions, and if they give answers that do not align with actually applicably knowing these questions, then we can tell them they did not actually applicably know, and were not being rational. Their feelings or disagreement is moot.

Of course, if they have applicable knowledge of a God that fits their distinctive knowledge, its still at best a possibility. Meaning that the known odds still make it more rational to choose the odds then believe God will change the ticket.

Well no, you can have different theories of knowledge like science does where different ones apply to different levels of reality. That's why quantum physics was such an upset. — Darkneos

Instead of reality, I note it as context. Reality is just what it is. I cut this portion out of the rewrite, but it appears most of your questions actually apply to this section here. https://docs.google.com/document/d/14_KGMPbO2e_z8icrjuTmxVwGLxxUA0B_CqNT-lF6SXo/edit?pli=1

Its only a few double spaced pages, but it addresses the questions you've been asking. I may post this in the reserved post I made as optional reading.

You haven't really shown it has defeated radical skepticism, I keep saying you're making a bunch of assumptions. Even the fact I experience isn't certain, I could be wrong in some wacky and EXTREMELY paradoxical or whatever way. — Darkneos

If you can disprove that people discretely experience, then yes, I will just have an assumption. Until then, its both distinctively and applicably known. If you discretely experience, then of course you experience. Being able to doubt or invent a plausibility such as, "What if I don't actually experience?" is fine. But if you've experienced at least once, which you would need to even ask the question, then its possible that you experience. So once again possibility is more cogent than plausibility, and the plausible question can be dismissed as a less rational induction to believe and explore.

Also, while there may have been assumptions made to think through the theory, I can go back to each assumption and apply the theory to it. Many theories of knowledge fail when this is done. Mine doesn't. If you think it does, please demonstrate where it does.

Well no, we don't understand the concept of discretely experience, again this is just a you thing. Get out of your own head. It is very much circular. — Darkneos

I meant if you understand the arguments that lead to proving that you discretely experience. From my point, if you don't understand the argument, it still makes you a discrete experiencer.

Here's the point which needs to be countered:

Discrete experience is the ability to part and parcel the full set of experience you have. Discrete experience allows us to observe parts of experience. Go back to the camera which merely splashes light on a piece of paper versus that which can interpret sections such as a sun, a field, and a sheep on the paper. As a very simple point, can you see a difference between letters and words? Can you ignore the letter and simply focus on a black piece on your screen? That's discrete experience.

Can you understand concepts apart from the totality of what you experience? That's discrete experience. Because I can form this concept in my head, and I find that simply challenging the idea, "I don't discretely experience" necessitates that I discretely experience, I have a claim that cannot be contradicted by reality. Thus, my first set of distinctive knowledge. This is not an assumption or circular. The very negation of it proves that it must be.

And example of a circular argument is, "The bible tells me God is real. God tells me the bible is truth. Therefore God is real." This cannot be proven by contradiction. If I state, "The bible isn't true" we have a situation in which God doesn't have to be real. The negation does not create a contradiction. I do not see this with discrete experience.

Lastly it's not really induction that all will, it's just a fact. — Darkneos

No, that is an induction. Has every single idea been proven to devolve into the M Trilemma? Of course not. Feel free to prove it if so. An induction is a conclusion that does not necessarily occur from the premises. If you have not proven that all ideas devolve into the M Trilemma, then it is an induction.

Everything is built on language that only makes sense in a social setting and that we made up to be self referential in order to talk to each other. So off the bat you're on shaky ground. — Darkneos

I agree within a social context. The paper starts with a single context for a good reason. We must first have an understanding of knowledge as individuals, then it evolves into knowledge between more than one person. We can address this more once you read the section I posted.

For your theory to even get off the ground it has to take things as a given, just like everything else. Chiefly the axioms listed in the video I posted, faith in your observations and that you can know things. — Darkneos

No, I do not assume faith in my observations or even that I can know things. I build that up from assumptions, yes. But then I try to disprove those assumptions afterward. The thing about the theory is once you understand it, you can apply it to every single one of the prior assumptions. Starting with assumptions is not illogical as long as you can go back and prove those assumptions must be. The M Trilemma in specific is about claiming that all ideas devolve into one of three fallacies, circular, dogmatic, or regressive. You've made a claim that the argument is circular, but you have not proven so. If you can prove that the theory devolves into one of those 3, then you would be correct. Can you do so?

Good comments Darkneos!

Yes, because you answered my question. To answer my question you would have had to read. If you read, then you're able to part existence out. Can you differentiate between letters? Then you discretely experience. Your very denial that you discretely experience leads to a contradiction, therefore you discretely experience. — Philosophim

Nope. Still doesn’t mean I discretely experience. I could just be a bot after all, or just smacking the keys and yielding this. Can I know the letters, maybe, you don’t know that. My denial doesn’t lead to a contradiction, it’s more like you’re just really wanting to be what is a maybe to be a certainty. It’s not proof by contradiction, it’s wishful thinking at best.

Example: As a very basic test, put an animal in a room. Have an open exit. See if the animal ever tries to leave. A non-discrete experiencer would not be able to recognize there is an exit just like a camera cannot recognize anything about the picture it is taking. — Philosophim

You’ve obviously never seen an animal trying to leave.

Depending on a person's context, yes, it might be more rational to believe God will do it. But they must applicably prove so within their context. Do they have distinctive knowledge of a God that's non-synonymous with another identity? Have they ever applicably known this God? Have they applicably known God to change a lottery ticket before? If not, then its merely a plausibility. Compared to the known probability, its still more rational for them to choose the probability.

Also, we can evaluate other people as being rational, as being rational is objective. I can ask a person all of these questions, and if they give answers that do not align with actually applicably knowing these questions, then we can tell them they did not actually applicably know, and were not being rational. Their feelings or disagreement is moot. — Philosophim

They don’t have to prove anything. Your questions aren the right ones either. Being rational isn’t objective though, it’s subjective. Maybe to you they aren’t rational because YOUR questions aren’t satisfied but that doesn’t mean anything besides you being upset about it.

No, that is an induction. Has every single idea been proven to devolve into the M Trilemma? Of course not. Feel free to prove it if so. An induction is a conclusion that does not necessarily occur from the premises. If you have not proven that all ideas devolve into the M Trilemma, then it is an induction. — Philosophim

I’d argue yes since all ideas eventually have to start from axioms without exception. There is no branch of philosophy without axioms.

Discrete experience is the ability to part and parcel the full set of experience you have. Discrete experience allows us to observe parts of experience. Go back to the camera which merely splashes light on a piece of paper versus that which can interpret sections such as a sun, a field, and a sheep on the paper. As a very simple point, can you see a difference between letters and words? Can you ignore the letter and simply focus on a black piece on your screen? That's discrete experience.

Can you understand concepts apart from the totality of what you experience? That's discrete experience. Because I can form this concept in my head, and I find that simply challenging the idea, "I don't discretely experience" necessitates that I discretely experience, I have a claim that cannot be contradicted by reality. Thus, my first set of distinctive knowledge. This is not an assumption or circular. The very negation of it proves that it must be.

And example of a circular argument is, "The bible tells me God is real. God tells me the bible is truth. Therefore God is real." This cannot be proven by contradiction. If I state, "The bible isn't true" we have a situation in which God doesn't have to be real. The negation does not create a contradiction. I do not see this with discrete experience. — Philosophim

This is still circular as it’s just operating on the definition you say it is. You have a claim that can be contradicted by reality because all you’re doing is just saying that you do this, you haven’t shown that you do. It’s all just words. Also I’m pretty sure monks in Buddhism don’t discretely experience either and Buddhism seems to be against such a view of the world calling it illusion.

Try as you might it’s still an assumption you are making rooted in the faith of your senses.

If you can disprove that people discretely experience, then yes, I will just have an assumption. Until then, its both distinctively and applicably known. If you discretely experience, then of course you experience. Being able to doubt or invent a plausibility such as, "What if I don't actually experience?" is fine. But if you've experienced at least once, which you would need to even ask the question, then its possible that you experience. So once again possibility is more cogent than plausibility, and the plausible question can be dismissed as a less rational induction to believe and explore.

Also, while there may have been assumptions made to think through the theory, I can go back to each assumption and apply the theory to it. Many theories of knowledge fail when this is done. Mine doesn't. If you think it does, please demonstrate where it does. — Philosophim

Yours still doesn’t make it past the starting block. It’s not know other people experience, you just assume that. You can’t even know if you do, it’s just assumed. Nothing you have said so far shows me that you or I do, not even me replying to you.

No, I do not assume faith in my observations or even that I can know things. I build that up from assumptions, yes. But then I try to disprove those assumptions afterward. The thing about the theory is once you understand it, you can apply it to every single one of the prior assumptions. Starting with assumptions is not illogical as long as you can go back and prove those assumptions must be. The M Trilemma in specific is about claiming that all ideas devolve into one of three fallacies, circular, dogmatic, or regressive. You've made a claim that the argument is circular, but you have not proven so. If you can prove that the theory devolves into one of those 3, then you would be correct. Can you do so? — Philosophim

You do, we all do, because without that ground faith nothing else is possible same with that you can know things. You cannot prove these assumptions must be without being circular, like using sensation to prove sensation.

Nope. Still doesn’t mean I discretely experience. I could just be a bot after all, or just smacking the keys and yielding this. Can I know the letters, maybe, you don’t know that. My denial doesn’t lead to a contradiction, it’s more like you’re just really wanting to be what is a maybe to be a certainty. It’s not proof by contradiction, it’s wishful thinking at best — Darkneos

I've never encountered a bot with your level of sophistication. Its plausible, but that doesn't outweigh the possibility you're a person. Same with the random slapping of keys. Probability wise, I already know that's nigh impossible, so this argument doesn't work either. So its most rational for me to believe you're a human being. So no, your arguments aren't enough. The fact that you typed, "I don't discretely experience", means you do. Since the inductions failed, try to look at the argument as it is and see if you can refute it.

You’ve obviously never seen an animal trying to leave. — Darkneos

I have. That isn't really considering the points or a refutation.

They don’t have to prove anything. — Darkneos

They do if they are to claim they are being rational under this theory.

Being rational isn’t objective though, it’s subjective. — Darkneos

Is this an objectively rational conclusion? Claiming rationality is subjective contradicts itself. At that point I can claim from my subjective viewpoint that rationality is objective. And to hold onto your claim, you have to agree with me. Holding onto a claim which leads to a paradox or contradiction is of course, not objectively rational.

Maybe to you they aren’t rational because YOUR questions aren’t satisfied but that doesn’t mean anything besides you being upset about it. — Darkneos

No, they simply aren't rational under the theory. Its like someone saying 2+2=5. They can believe it all they want, it doesn't mean that they've objectively solved the math problem correctly.

No, that is an induction. Has every single idea been proven to devolve into the M Trilemma? Of course not. Feel free to prove it if so. An induction is a conclusion that does not necessarily occur from the premises. If you have not proven that all ideas devolve into the M Trilemma, then it is an induction.
— Philosophim

I’d argue yes since all ideas eventually have to start from axioms without exception. There is no branch of philosophy without axioms. — Darkneos

The M Trilemma issue has nothing to do with axioms. You also did not address my point where I noted the axioms I start with can be tested with the final theory and confirmed. I invite you to try to use the theory and find one of the three logical fallacies that is what the M Trilemma notes.

This is still circular as it’s just operating on the definition you say it is. You have a claim that can be contradicted by reality because all you’re doing is just saying that you do this, you haven’t shown that you do. — Darkneos

No, this is not circular. If you re-read the section I apply this notion of discrete experience to reality. Its my own reality. Again, if you are a human replying to me, you do the same. If you are able to read these words, you're able to see the black on the screen as something which you can ascribe an identity to. Your ability to make any sense of it requires you to discretely experience those words as something separate from the white nearby. You cannot deny that you do this. For to even attempt to deny that you do this, means you must have discretely experienced a concept that you're trying to deny.

Try as you might it’s still an assumption you are making rooted in the faith of your senses. — Darkneos

Its not an assumption, its an inescapable reality.

You cannot prove these assumptions must be without being circular, like using sensation to prove sensation. — Darkneos

That's not a circular argument. If I have the definition of a dog, find a dog and demonstrate that the thing is a dog, that's not a circular argument. Same with sensation.

I have. That isn't really considering the points or a refutation. — Philosophim

My point is that animals will try to leave but don't see there is an exit, I've seen it many times before (in fact I have to catch them and put them out otherwise they just fly around). Not to mention it's still an assumption you are making.

That's not a circular argument. If I have the definition of a dog, find a dog and demonstrate that the thing is a dog, that's not a circular argument. Same with sensation. — Philosophim

That is circular though because you're pretty much saying a dog is a dog.

Its not an assumption, its an inescapable reality. — Philosophim

Except it isn't as I have said and shown.

No, this is not circular. If you re-read the section I apply this notion of discrete experience to reality. Its my own reality. Again, if you are a human replying to me, you do the same. If you are able to read these words, you're able to see the black on the screen as something which you can ascribe an identity to. Your ability to make any sense of it requires you to discretely experience those words as something separate from the white nearby. You cannot deny that you do this. For to even attempt to deny that you do this, means you must have discretely experienced a concept that you're trying to deny. — Philosophim

Again no it doesn't mean that, this is just you trying to force your definition on reality.

The M Trilemma issue has nothing to do with axioms. You also did not address my point where I noted the axioms I start with can be tested with the final theory and confirmed. I invite you to try to use the theory and find one of the three logical fallacies that is what the M Trilemma notes. — Philosophim

Not really, axioms can't be tested, they have to be taken as true in order to get off the ground. Trying to prove the axioms is akin to assuming the conclusion.

No, they simply aren't rational under the theory. Its like someone saying 2+2=5. They can believe it all they want, it doesn't mean that they've objectively solved the math problem correctly. — Philosophim

"under the theory" which is pretty much just saying "according to me". They have solved the math problem correctly if according to them 2+2=5. We agree that 2+2=4 but if someone doesn't you can't really convince them otherwise.

Is this an objectively rational conclusion? Claiming rationality is subjective contradicts itself. At that point I can claim from my subjective viewpoint that rationality is objective. And to hold onto your claim, you have to agree with me. Holding onto a claim which leads to a paradox or contradiction is of course, not objectively rational. — Philosophim

Again, according to you.

I've never encountered a bot with your level of sophistication. Its plausible, but that doesn't outweigh the possibility you're a person. Same with the random slapping of keys. Probability wise, I already know that's nigh impossible, so this argument doesn't work either. So its most rational for me to believe you're a human being. So no, your arguments aren't enough. The fact that you typed, "I don't discretely experience", means you do. Since the inductions failed, try to look at the argument as it is and see if you can refute it. — Philosophim

Well, no. You know none of these things, these are all just assumptions you are taking on. There is no reason to think that this is a human being after all if you break it down. Typing "i don't discretely experience" is evidence enough that I don't unless you're claiming to have knowledge of the inside of my mind and subjective experience to verify this, which you can't.

Like I keep saying, your theory fails before it gets off the ground. You can't see (or won't admit) the things you take on faith in order to get it to work.

Even your starting chain of "I discretely experience" is little more than an axiom. It doesn't demonstrate and I or experiencer or that you break things apart as you say you do. I can't get inside your head to confirm it so it's just something I have to take your word for.

Try as you might your theory falls to strong skepticism.

I have. That isn't really considering the points or a refutation.
— Philosophim

My point is that animals will try to leave but don't see there is an exit, — Darkneos

Oh, I don't mean like a human. If that test isn't satisfactory to you, the test is just to see if an animal can separate X from Y. Food vs not food would probably have been a better example.

That's not a circular argument. If I have the definition of a dog, find a dog and demonstrate that the thing is a dog, that's not a circular argument. Same with sensation.
— Philosophim

That is circular though because you're pretty much saying a dog is a dog. — Darkneos

No, because if I find a cat and try to say its a dog, I'm wrong. If I claim something is a dog, I must prove its a dog. Matching identities to objects is not a circular argument.

Again no it doesn't mean that, this is just you trying to force your definition on reality. — Darkneos

You'll need to prove that, not just say it. I have given an argument in the paper that is far more than that, and your statement shows me you're not referencing the actual argument. If you want to argue against some generic idea of what you think I'm saying, that's fine, but its not going to be anything valid against the actual paper.

Not really, axioms can't be tested, they have to be taken as true in order to get off the ground. Trying to prove the axioms is akin to assuming the conclusion. — Darkneos

Right, you assume axioms to be true to start. In logic you might start off with A => B, then assume A. Of course, if later in your logic you show that A cannot be assumed, the argument fails. My point is that my initial assumptions are consistent within the later discoveries of the theory. Did you try? Go back to the original axioms now that you understand the theory and see if you can or cannot. Having an opinion is fine, but I'm asking you to do more at this point if I'm going to take the point into consideration.

"under the theory" which is pretty much just saying "according to me". They have solved the math problem correctly if according to them 2+2=5. We agree that 2+2=4 but if someone doesn't you can't really convince them otherwise. — Darkneos

If you're going to dismiss the theory without going over the points and showing why they're wrong, then of course there's nothing to talk about. I'm asking for serious approaches, not dismissals. No, according to the theory 2+2=5 would be wrong. If you're going to not try, then that's fine, I'll just let the conversation end. If you want the potential at actually exploring a theory of knowledge that could be useful in your own life, lets be more serious.

Is this an objectively rational conclusion? Claiming rationality is subjective contradicts itself. At that point I can claim from my subjective viewpoint that rationality is objective. And to hold onto your claim, you have to agree with me. Holding onto a claim which leads to a paradox or contradiction is of course, not objectively rational.
— Philosophim

Again, according to you. — Darkneos

No, according to the paper. I asked you to bring radical skepticism, not teenage angst. :)

Typing "i don't discretely experience" is evidence enough that I don't unless you're claiming to have knowledge of the inside of my mind and subjective experience to verify this, which you can't. — Darkneos

I don't have to see inside of your mind to verify this. If you want to take the conversation seriously, please re-read to understand what discrete experience is, and the proof for why it is also applicably known.

Try as you might your theory falls to strong skepticism. — Darkneos

No, this is just lazy analysis Darkneos. Which look, if you're not interested in addressing the actual argument, that's fine. I don't care about convincing you. I care about having a discussion over the paper. If you're just going to blanket state that everything I've done is an opinionated assertion without demonstrating that you understand the vocabulary of the argument or the reasoning, then this is just removing yourself from the discussion, not skepticism.

No, because if I find a cat and try to say its a dog, I'm wrong. If I claim something is a dog, I must prove its a dog. Matching identities to objects is not a circular argument. — Philosophim

you don't prove something is a dog so much as say it is one. Matching IDs to objects is circular because it all comes down to saying it is that "because I said so". Which is fine, I mean that's what definitions are.

No, this is just lazy analysis Darkneos. Which look, if you're not interested in addressing the actual argument, that's fine. I don't care about convincing you. I care about having a discussion over the paper. If you're just going to blanket state that everything I've done is an opinionated assertion without demonstrating that you understand the vocabulary of the argument or the reasoning, then this is just removing yourself from the discussion, not skepticism. — Philosophim

Because it is and all you're really doing is just asserting that it isn't. And I don't know how much I can repeat that point for you to understand it.

I don't have to see inside of your mind to verify this. If you want to take the conversation seriously, please re-read to understand what discrete experience is, and the proof for why it is also applicably known. — Philosophim

I don't have to reread it, that's why I said what I said.

If you're going to dismiss the theory without going over the points and showing why they're wrong, then of course there's nothing to talk about. I'm asking for serious approaches, not dismissals. No, according to the theory 2+2=5 would be wrong. If you're going to not try, then that's fine, I'll just let the conversation end. If you want the potential at actually exploring a theory of knowledge that could be useful in your own life, lets be more serious. — Philosophim

Your theory is just your say so. This is a serious approach and you just keep reasserting your points like they've been shown to be the case. I still don't know if there is an "I" that is experiencing anything. Just like Descartes you assume the conclusion. You're reasoning follows only if you get past the starting point , so far you just insist otherwise. Your theory still requires the same leap of faith every philosophy starts off on. That's the point of axioms, you can never prove them and yet without them you get nothing.

Oh, I don't mean like a human. If that test isn't satisfactory to you, the test is just to see if an animal can separate X from Y. Food vs not food would probably have been a better example. — Philosophim

See my previous statement.

you don't prove something is a dog so much as say it is one. Matching IDs to objects is circular because it all comes down to saying it is that "because I said so". Which is fine, I mean that's what definitions are. — Darkneos

Did you read the paper or just a summary Darkneos?

Because it is and all you're really doing is just asserting that it isn't. And I don't know how much I can repeat that point for you to understand it. — Darkneos

I understand your opinion, you just haven't proved your opinion. Which is fine. If you're not interested, we'll call the conversation done and we'll chat over something else some other time.

I don't have to reread it, that's why I said what I said. — Darkneos

You do if you're going to critique the theory. I see you're not referencing the paper's ideas, just a general opinion. I'm not interested in general opinions, but someone who's willing to discuss the paper's ideas seriously.

Your theory is just your say so. This is a serious approach and you just keep reasserting your points like they've been shown to be the case. — Darkneos

I'm just repeating the point in hopes you'll understand it or see where you could critique it. Your note that I'm just saying so, is just saying so. You haven't been able to overcome the proof by contradiction, so I'm not going to take your opinion as anything more than that.

Looks like we're about done here Darkneos, thanks for the initial curiosity.

Did you read the paper or just a summary Darkneos? — Philosophim

I did read it, but in the end it still feels like the "I" is being assumed there.

I am not sure it can be made more accessible, though, without losing its inherent strength. At least that is something I am pondering whilst reading my earlier comment. It made an impact on me, but I imagine that was also due to it being outside my regular way of thinking, but also because of the specific instructions about how to go about reading it. Without both, it might just end up being mislabeled and added to other categories, without the growth in mindset it can have (More at the end). — Caerulea-Lawrence


Thank you for the valuable feedback. I have written and rewritten this over a long period of time. The first iteration was 200+ pages, more like a rough draft of ideas. Slowly I pared it down to what I felt was absolutely essential due to feedback from other people. It is nice to hear from someone else that it seems like there's not much else that could be cut without losing something.

To your point about the instructions, those came about because of responses in previous attempts to post this. You are correct. Without those, many people do not understand how to approach a discussion like this. To your point, tackling something outside of your normal line of thinking is difficult. It can be fun with the right mindset, but without that, its easy to let our emotions get the better of us and we look for surface level reasons to escape having to read it.

If there is a small nit-pick I can mention, I do not like the word Irrational... It has some bad connotations, and made it harder to focus on the content and remember it. — Caerulea-Lawrence


I appreciate this feedback as well. My intent was to use inductive terminology that was positive at best, neutral at worst. All four of the induction types have value in certain situations in life. Originally I used the word 'faith', but later stepped back from it because I was worried it would evoke an undue response from some people. I wanted people to focus on the logic first, so eventually I settled on a logic word. However, I agree with you that "irrational" still has more of a negative connotation. Any suggestions on what word you would rather it be named?

God-damn, I am so pleased about understanding the "secret" to the Evil Demon example. Well played by you, too, on that one. There were some hints there that made me question it a bit more, not sure how you did it. Like you subtly 'forced' the meaning or something, not sure. — Caerulea-Lawrence


It wasn't a secret or a trick, you simply used the internal logic of the argument and came to the correct conclusion! It makes me happy to hear that you concluded this yourself, as it lends credence to the internal consistency of the system.

The growth from reading this — Caerulea-Lawrence


That's the greatest compliment I could receive. Good philosophy should enable a person to enhance their life. If you feel you are better able to comprehend the world of ideas, then I am very glad. I use this theory myself in my daily life, so it is gratifying to see it help another.

And in that sense, maybe it is true to say that science is underestimating consciousness a bit too much, and talking about NDE's this way is a kind of backlash to a certain unwillingness, on the flip side, to bother with acknowledging Distinctive Knowledge at all. — Caerulea-Lawrence


Consciousness is sort of the hot topic of the boards recently. I highly encourage people to look to neuroscience over philosophy first, as I believe it is more up to date and necessary to know modern facts about the brain to have a discussion of any validity.

Thank you again for reading and contributing! — Philosophim

Hello again @Philosophim,

my take on self-understanding is more based on intuition, and as such I have had a keen interest in differentiation, questioning and reflecting upon our 'experiences, evaluations and judgements'. Instead of neuroscience, I have read psychology, social sciences, and consequently done a lot of interrelational and intrarelational work, as well as looked at concepts like having inner "parts", how different cognitive functions might affect what/how we see, and also the biological aspects of our consciousness. 'We' "are" a lot of different fungi, bacteria, virus and parasites, after all.

I do believe that there is a place for what I care about in the theory you have devised, but I must admit that I find it quite the daunting task to combine the two outlooks, or to just push them a tiny bit closer to each other.

So, instead of waiting way longer till I circle back, I wanted to at least try my hand at something. And instead of a big and filling response, what if it is more of a dialectic process where we sharpen things and cooperate to see if there is any way to bridge the gap?


I'll start with this one:

1.

I see, hear, smell, taste and touch. And yet this is still not basic enough. I sense. But even if I did not sense, “I” would be different from “everything else”. In recognizing a self, I am able to create two “experiences”. That is the self-recognized thinker, and everything else.

Why should I have this capability? I cannot answer this. What I can realize is I may sense, but I find I can focus on different parts of that sensation. I can see a field of grass. Now I create the identity of a blade of grass. Now a piece of that blade of grass. I part and parcel my sensations as I wish. I do not know what “I am”, or “everything else” is, but I do know that reality cannot contradict my ability to focus, create identities where I wish, and essentially “discretely experience”. — Philosophim

In the first paragraph, I want to recognize that there was a time the 'I' felt indistinguishable from the rest, for example when we were children. And if we add in the time we were a fetus, and even the history and time before that; all the forces that have shaped our DNA to be what it is, to the positions of the planets in our Solar system and the building blocks of our bodies, to me it makes sense to acknowledge this. The measurable 'time' when we felt 'indistinguishable' from the rest, is a much bigger part of our history than the time of the conscious, self-recognized thinker.

Your claim works well as it is, so why 'complicate it'? Well, like I postulate, our 'lives' have been spent mostly as simple consciousnesses or impulses. And so I wonder if this basic tenant of these two experiences would do better if contrasted with their opposites: The 'simple, interconnected subconscious' and the 'indistinguishable whole'.

I do not argue against these experiences being 'personal', just that these 'experiences' might not be directed and differentiated in the same way as with the 'discretely experiencer'.

Damn, I feel a bit overwhelmed already... How did you do this? :)

Somehow I see that there could be an 'indiscrete experience' as a complementary piece here. And this circles back to what I said about the category "irrational". I guess the reason is that the most 'out there' beliefs, border or cross the border to the 'indiscrete experience'. When they bleed into our conscious mind, they aren't fully 'translated', so to speak.

To me it seems to fit better to look at the irrational beliefs as echos of unconscious 'beliefs'. And even when they are seemingly erroneously or 'irrationally' applied in the discrete experience realm of reality, that is also not the realm of reality they are usually applied to, and as such to understand them would need a different set of parameters and procedures to be able to accrue useful knowledge.

I'll stop here for now. Understanding how hard this is by how long I have used to be able to write these scarce sentences, I further appreciate and am humbled by the work you have put into your original post. Even when it is not my modus operandi, I still want to see if maybe I can contribute something, even when it might be more on the sporadic side.

Let me know how this lands with you.

Kindly,
Caerulea-Lawrence

@Caerulea-Lawrence

My apologies again that I missed this! For whatever reason, I seem to miss your replies. If you're still around, I'll do my best to give some meaningful conversation back.

The measurable 'time' when we felt 'indistinguishable' from the rest, is a much bigger part of our history than the time of the conscious, self-recognized thinker. — Caerulea-Lawrence

True. I believe what you're talking about is the "Emergence of the I". At the end of the day we are at its most basic, a combination of matter and energy like everything else in the universe. And yet, with a certain combination, an ability to discretely experience, and "I" emerges. If this "I" did not exist, the matter and energy of the universe would still be. But "I" would not exist. Being an "I" is a pre-requisite for knowledge, so we cannot know what things are like before the "I" exists.

Your claim works well as it is, so why 'complicate it'? Well, like I postulate, our 'lives' have been spent mostly as simple consciousnesses or impulses. And so I wonder if this basic tenant of these two experiences would do better if contrasted with their opposites: The 'simple, interconnected subconscious' and the 'indistinguishable whole'. — Caerulea-Lawrence

No, this is not a complication. This is seeking, questioning, and exploring! As I noted, we discretely experience. We do not know why. This is necessary to understand what the I is, and how it can know. What you're asking is, "What makes up the I? How does the I function?" As much as I would love intuition to have the answer, it is neuroscience that will answer this.

Think of a car for example. You don't need to know how a car works to use it if its functioning properly. With experience and intuition, you can learn to drive it in new and masterful ways. But no amount of intuition can tell us how the car works itself. It can't teach us that combustion generates a magnetic field which rotates the drive shaft. We can even study our car and get a general idea of how it works, but we won't really understand it fully without breaking it down, testing, and studying in depth.

It is not that your questions are invalid or uninteresting. It is that your questions cannot currently be answered by philosophy. We can speculate, and have fun doing so, but without the underlying science of the brain, its all hypotheses. This paper attempts not to speculate, but to answer. And in regards to the "I", I think its done well. That being said, I can most certainly speculate with you and see if we can come up with outlooks that fit within our sensibilities and wonder at the world!

Somehow I see that there could be an 'indiscrete experience' as a complementary piece here. And this circles back to what I said about the category "irrational". I guess the reason is that the most 'out there' beliefs, border or cross the border to the 'indiscrete experience'. When they bleed into our conscious mind, they aren't fully 'translated', so to speak. — Caerulea-Lawrence

This is fantastic. Yes, to conclude an irrational belief there must be something else besides logic at work. If you applicably know your belief is incorrect, but insist on it, you are being driven by something else unconscious. Lets speculate as to what that can be, and if it is useful to us.

One of the things I did not have space to cover was that all four types of inductions, including irrational ones, are all useful tools. Probability is useful for predicting odds of known outcomes. Possibility is essential for us to believe that the world will continue as we know it in the next tick of experience. Plausibility incites our wonder and curiosity about the world to discover new things. But what about irrational inductions?

Recall that knowledge, whether distinct or applicable, must be deductive. Lets break down two useful terms of deductions. Validity and soundness. Validity is a deduction that is correct in form.

A necessarily leads to B. Assume that you have A. Therefore deductively, you have B. This is valid.

Soundness is when all of the premises and conclusions of your deduction are true. Take our valid argument above, but discover that while we applicably knew that A existed, new information shows us that we were mistaken. Therefore the deduction might have been valid, but not sound.

One can hold applicable knowledge that is valid, and seems to be sound. Yet there is an old question in epistemology, "How do I know, that what I know, is actually true?" The answer is, "You can't". Meaning that we can hold a deduction that is both valid and appears to be sound from everything we can observe, but in the end is false.

This is where irrational beliefs come into play. While our conscious mind may see that certain claims seem valid and sound, there may be something in our unconscious that we are processing that cannot quite be verbalized. The ability to not be completely bound to logic in these cases, can be quite useful. As always, inductive beliefs carry an element of risk to them, and if used irresponsibly or unintelligently, can be detrimental. But used responsibly, they can be incredible boons.

For instance, lets think about someone in a precarious situation. Everyone in their life has declared them to be worthless. They've been abused, mistreated, and miserable. This is what they applicably know. The probability they will continue to be abused is near 99%. The possibility is there. The plausibility is there. The idea that life could get better with the information they have is completely irrational. And yet in this case, this is the belief that will save them.

The encapsulation of knowledge and an inductive hierarchy does not address morality. Morality being what we "should" do, despite what we know. I have not yet written my take on morality, but it is nearing the time. I hope this was something to think about that also addressed your idea!

I read through your first two posts. I'm afraid I am skeptical of your account of inductive reasoning, or at least it doesn't seem to fit well with the way I see my cognitive processes working. I'm more inclined to view things along the lines of this article:

https://evolvingthoughts.net/2013/01/27/pattern-recognition-neither-deduction-nor-induction

So what happens when we classify in the absence of theory? We aren’t yet inductively constructing theory, and we aren’t able to deduce from theory (since there isn’t any yet) the classes of objects in the domain we are investigating. We argue that what is happening here is pattern recognition (Bishop 1995). We are classifier systems. It is one of the distinguishing features of neural network (NN) systems such as those between our ears that they will classify patterns. They do so in an interesting fashion. Rather than being cued by theory or explanatory goals, NNs are cued by stereotypical “training sets”. In effect, in order to see patterns, you need to have prior patterns to train your NN.

I read through your first two posts. — wonderer1

By two posts, did you mean the two posts of the actual argument, or the first post on how to approach the argument and the first post of the argument? This is important because the topic of induction is the last post of the argument and essential to read if you have issues with induction.

I'm afraid I am skeptical of your account of inductive reasoning, or at least it doesn't seem to fit well with the way I see my cognitive processes working. — wonderer1

As noted in the intro, that is not how to approach a paper like this. Its ok to have an intuition or feeling of disagreement, but you need to post what specifically is wrong in the writing of the paper, and some logic or argument as to why what I've expressed is wrong. From you statement, I don't know specifically what your issue is with my notion of inductive reasoning, as I do not even use the phrase "inductive reasoning". Is it that you have an issue with what I've written, or simply misinterpreted what I've written? I can't tell unless you point it out clearly.

I read the article you linked and did not see how this applied to the argument. Again, point out the idea that you disagree with so that way I know specifically what the issue is, and how you're interpreting it. Then contrast this with a point in the article so I can see where you believe another approach would work better.

Hello Philosophim,

Good. So, to clarify something first - I'm not looking for anything un-philosophical. I might use words, expression, jargon and terminology from elsewhere, and talk about that - But in your reply you said 'this isn't philosphy'.
To that I hope you can remind yourself in our interactions that 'nothing' of what I'm looking for 'is/should' be outside the realm of Philosophy. It is about piecing together something that I believe is, or should be there, either as bits and pieces; or we will simply have to indiscretely experience some knowledge about it.

So if something I write or say isn't quite meaningful, remember that I am not trying to bridge a gap between philosophy, psychology, neuroscience, social sciences etc. Yes, this complementary way of looking at things should be able to help with understanding things, but it is more of a general pursuit, than a 'theory of everything'. And it must compliment your model, and not diverge from it.

Since I'm not well-versed in philosophy, I went to the library and looked up some of the famous problems or questions in Philosophy, to see if I could come closer to understanding my own intuitions about this.

There is of course so much more I could delve into, but to me it's a start, and I wanted, again, to reply to you before weighing everything too much. I'm better at solving singular problems - I have a hunch, and will find it if I have enough materials before me.

From reading the very short introduction to many famous problems, there were several that seemed relevant.
Sorites Paradox,, Hume's problem of induction, Karl Poppers critique of Freud/psychoanalysis, Thomas Kuhn's paradigms, Ship of Theseus, Plato’s Allegory of the Cave, Hegel's Dialectics and a quote from the Bible for good measure. (Luke 11;47-52)

Of course, I have only skimmed this, but they all seem to point at the same things - I just struggle to spell it out - even when to me it is 'obvious'. As I might have mentioned before, intuition 'feels' like that, and so when I am right about certain things over time - I increase my trust in my intuition, even when I haven't been able to explain how it works directly.

I'll do my best here, but it is of course not exhaustive enough to fit perfectly, but here goes.

First and foremost, all the pieces above are mutually connected. There are of course many, many more, too.

Sorites Paradox. To me it speaks to the point that things can 'read' in two different directions. The first one, that a heap can become smaller/bigger, the second that a single grain of sand can point towards the existence of a heap.

Hume's problem is relevant in that I like the word infer. I believe this is very relevant somehow for what we are looking at with intuition/indiscrete experience. I just don't think focusing on 'why/how' we can infer something is that relevant.

Karl Poppers Falsification. Especially how he distanced himself from Psychoanalysis. To me, this is a very, very important thing. Karl Popper didn't find a way to better explain human actions - he did something that I find curiously reductionist - namely to dismiss the thought process of Adler, and brand it as unscientific.
Which I find quite sad, in a way. I hope we might have more luck bridging the gap than they did.

Thomas Kuhn's paradigms. There is a bit of a paradox in this. To me it seems like Thomas Kuhn is talking about 'paradigms' as only applying in Science. Similar to Popper, I find this curious. The theory of spiral dynamics, I would argue, at least doesn't look at knowledge through such a reductionist lens as such. But it is still relevant here. The point is that 'Knowledge' is not one, linear thing. It isn't like measuring a tree with a ruler, and when you got every spec, you know 'everything' about the tree. You will never understand photosynthesis from measuring the leaves - but you might 'infer' that there is something going beyond your current paradigm of Measurement.

Ship of Theseus. I'm not sure why I added this. I believe it is relevant, but not why quite yet.

Plato's allegory of the cave. Now, this allegory is simple, in that it only talks about one 'type' of cave, a binary choice of being 'blind' or 'seeing' freely. When I first heard about Plato's cave, it was presented in the context of 'Knowing what is true'. That all knowledge we humans have, might simply be shadows on the wall. In other words, not the 'truth'.
A similar example down this lane is the brain in the vat.. It is presented as an 'either/or' of truth.

But, as might be seen in Hegel's Dialectics, progress it is more of a process towards sophistication, than finding the 'one' door to 'omniscience'. It is a step-by-step process that gradually includes and solves paradoxes and inconsistencies, to reach a higher level of complexity.

Luke 11:47-52. Jesus compares the current situation he is in, with that of the Prophets. The Pharisees are the ones doing 'real science', but he points out the paradigmatic irony that even whilst they are honoring the old Prophets by building them graves - they are themselves acting in the exact same ways that killed the Prophets in the first place.

Now, I guess I need to clarify some things. Firstly, paradigms are interesting, but the model I'm looking at should match yours, and not try to 'understand' progress in general. At the same time, the ability to infer seems to link with making the kinds of discoveries and asking the kinds of questions that might lead to this kind of progress.
Thirdly, there are abilities that seem to match more with applying the current worldview to further its use.
One side cares about increase in complexity - to elevate the possible venues of things/ways to explore and see the world. The other cares about increasing the amount of knowledge that is gained through applying the methodology rigorously.

This has implications for the model. I found what you wrote very fascinating, but also incredibly hard to read. And you also seem to 'misunderstand' me to such a degree, that I wonder if you are able to see me as someone who actually does something very similar to you, in a very rigorous manner, but through a process I might call Indiscrete experience/Inferring.

One interesting thing about Jesus and Platon's cave is 'why would they try to change people's minds?' However, when we look at the interactions, at least between Jesus and the Pharisees, it doesn't look like he understood that they didn't 'get it'. If one person went out of the cave, and had their life changed, why 'wouldn't' the second one do it once told about it? But it seems neither of them were aware of the Typical Mind Fallacy

To me, this is more of a question of inferring, than deduction or induction. It is of course possible to induct in these instances, but you need some kind of 'weighing' process. Similarly to how you gain distinctive knowledge and applicable knowledge through different kinds of actions, the same should be true for the complementary piece I intuit.

You say that in philosophy you can't know if something is true, and I agree with that. But in the inferring realm, it doesn't matter if things are 'true'. What is important is if they are more 'complete' and 'complex'. That means that people might be right about things, right about there being something like a God - but their description is less complete and complex than someone describing a view that can incorporate different beliefs, and so on.
The brain in the vat might be seen like a binary choice, but it is less complete and complex than a view that incorporates the possibility that we are real and imaginary simultaneously, for example.

I'll stop here for now. It is hard to stay coherent, and focus on things. Maybe it would have been better if we texted/chatted, but I'm not sure. Delving into this is hard - not because I am unsure of the direction, but simply because 'pointing at' inference is like trying to freeze time. You might show a person in the Cave 1000 pictures, but similarly to Zenos Paradoxes, you can't, you explain 'movement', 'time' and 'space' from the pictures alone? There is no movement, you can't 'see' time and there is no space (it is 2D).
I know that I am doing something that works, and points to reality, and that gains me knowledge - I just find it incredibly elusive - and it doesn't help that there seems to be this odd rift between intuition and 'science'. That really needs to go.

Hopefully you can bounce off this somehow.

Kindly,
Caerulea-Lawrence

In recognizing a self, I am able to create two “experiences”. That is the self-recognized thinker, and everything else.

Why should I have this capability? I cannot answer this. — Philosophim

What I can realize is I may sense, but I find I can focus on different parts of that sensation. I can see a field of grass. Now I create the identity of a blade of grass. Now a piece of that blade of grass. I part and parcel my sensations as I wish. I do not know what “I am”, or “everything else” is, but I do know that reality cannot contradict my ability to focus, create identities where I wish, and essentially “discretely experience”. — Philosophim

A discrete experience is not a claim about the truth of what is being experienced. It is the act of creating an identity within the sea of one’s experience. A camera can take a picture, but cannot attempt to put any identity to any of the colors it absorbs. I can — Philosophim

It is the ability to part and parcel within the totality of one’s experience as one chooses. — Philosophim

Three things: ability to parcel; the totality of experience; as one chooses.

I must be able to experience discretely to comprehend the idea of “discrete experience.” — Philosophim

Therefore, I know that I discretely experience. — Philosophim

This is pivotal to the argument so I am adding support here. You are basically saying “there is discreet experience”. And such a thing entails knowing identities, it entails identifying with discretion. Before one can have a discreet experience, one must identify; or, before one can identify, one must have a discreet experience; now take the before out of it, and see that discreet experience is a product of reality (experience) being known in identity (the discreet). Or just “there is discreet experience”. This is pivotal, because it purports to unify our knowledge of experience over here in the experience of being me, with reality, over there, that any mind would have to see. Logically, this unifies the deductive with the inductive; or better said, we can induce “there is discreet experience” and we can deduce “there is discreet experience.”

Can I deductively believe I have memories without contradiction? A memory is a thought of a prior discrete experience. — Philosophim

When I am remembering, recalling, I can say this is like I am recalling “a memory”, but then now I have created “a memory” as discreet from remembering and recalling. But remembering and recalling are mysterious in the first place, so to carve out a discreet “memory” away from this mystery and use this memory as an ontologically discreet object…treacherous. We have to speak about memory. It is deeply unified with knowing and discreet experience, but I don’t think we need to go here.

While these distinctions are known at their time of creation, I cannot know that if I discretely experience something that resembles these distinctions, that the experience correctly matches the identities I have created without contradiction by reality. — Philosophim

You made the distinctions out of your experience of the new shep. Then detach them from experience and call them the “known”. Then you create an issue out of the gap you just created by detaching knowledge, where you say “I cannot know that if I discretely experience something that resembles these distinctions, that the experience correctly matches the identities I have created without contradiction by reality.”

This is a lot. You have a discreet experience, your knowledge of that experience, and you have correctly matching. Or you have the identities, you have without contradiction, and reality.

This is Aristotle and Descartes. Want to see where it goes.

There does not need to be a word, only a recognition of a distinction separate from another distinction. “‘This’ is separate from ‘that’”. — Philosophim

This quote is essential. It’s why Aristotle came to the law of non-contradiction instead of “there is discreet experience” as fundamental. You are playing in the same playground here.

I am not merely claiming the knowledge of the identities, memories, and experience I have. I am stating that these identities, memories, and experiences I have represent something apart from the experience itself. So I can distinctly know that I am attempting to match identities to an experience. — Philosophim

1. My discrete experience matches all of my created essential properties of what I consider a shep.
2. I cannot reasonably match the discrete experience to another known identity.
3. My belief that this creature is a shep is by deduction.
4. Reality does not directly or indirectly contradict the claim at the moment of conclusion.

Conclusion: Therefore I know by application this thing is a shep. — Philosophim

This argument would almost be better without premise 4, because premise 4 introduces a gap between discreet experience and reality. This is a second gap. You already had a gap between discreet experience and all of the created essential properties. You can unify your discreet experience to your knowledge, bridge that gap, but this diesnt necessitate (by deduction) that you’ve bridged the gap between discreet experience and reality. So I think you would be better to take reality out of it, or admit that discreet experience is reality; reality produces the discreet experiences you create into essential properties. But maybe you dispense with reality where you include it as “not directly or indirectly”, meaning there is no need to put a gap between experience and reality whether you look for contradiction (directly) or are forced into initially invisible contradiction(indirectly) because neither appears anyway.

The specifications of my essential properties determine the essential differences I can apply, and it is entirely my choice. — Philosophim

The choice. So you have experience, with discretion yielding known essential properties. The choice is why there is a gap between experience and reality. We create a gap between experience and the essential properties we make of it for sake of knowing these discreet experiences, but because we have to chose the properties or carve them out of the field as a shep ourselves, we can make wrong choices that may or may not allow my knowledge to map through the experience I’ve carved directly to the reality I’ve experienced.

I agree with all of the moving parts you identify. I agree with the way your are talking about them. I think you are clearly describing how experience works, how we know. I see this as a phenomenology, and maps a bit to Hegel, as well as Aristotle.

Thus, a hierarchy of inductions seems to be a better way to evaluate inductions than evaluating what is more cogent within the particular hierarchy set. — Philosophim

This quote is about evaluating induction. You evaluate induction against other inductions. You don’t evaluate induction against what can be deduced within one induction (cogent within).

I like it.

Probability to possibility to plausibility - needed distinctions.

Irrational belief. I get the object you have identified. I see it discreetly, to borrow a phrase, from the others. And as I said I like the overall method of evaluating induction this way. But I think there is a much smaller space between probable, possible and plausible, than compared the space between all three and the irrational. There is a similar discreet experience that leads to judgements among probable and merely plausible inductions, and rationality needed to make the distinctions. Once you introduce the irrational, even though it is tied to belief through knowledge of a discreet experience, I find new substance is distinguished that might threaten the whole method. Irrationality has to be dealt with, but it might not be containable, identifiable, discreet enough, to be dealt with like the others.

But I’m just trying to give you something to think about as you have done for me. Some great lines I’ve quoted in there. Thanks for sharing this.

I'm glad to see you've enjoyed it!

Or just “there is discreet experience”. This is pivotal, because it purports to unify our knowledge of experience over here in the experience of being me, with reality, over there, that any mind would have to see. Logically, this unifies the deductive with the inductive; or better said, we can induce “there is discreet experience” and we can deduce “there is discreet experience.” — Fire Ologist

A great assessment. The next step after this is to ask, "What is doing the discrete experiencing?" And the answer is, "The I".

This quote is essential. It’s why Aristotle came to the law of non-contradiction instead of “there is discreet experience” as fundamental. You are playing in the same playground here. — Fire Ologist

Interesting! I was unaware. I have found that this area of knowledge is shared by many other epistemological philosophies. There's a very similar level of conclusion which then takes off in different directions.

This argument would almost be better without premise 4, because premise 4 introduces a gap between discreet experience and reality. — Fire Ologist

It is not necessarily that there is a gap between discrete experience and reality. The discrete experience you have is real. The gap is whether your judgement that your discrete experience represents more than the experience itself. So for example, its real that if I'm hallucinating, I'm seeing a pink elephant. What's questionable is whether that discrete experience is an accurate representation of reality without contradiction. Its taking the step beyond the experience to say, "But if I fully apply the totality of what a pink elephant entails, will I find its still a pink elephant?"

This is what separates a full deduction, from a partial induction. Honestly, we make very few deductions in our day to day as doing so would be woefully inefficient. But we have to determine what a fully applied aspect of knowledge entails first before we can more accurately assess inductions.

You can unify your discreet experience to your knowledge, bridge that gap, but this diesnt necessitate (by deduction) that you’ve bridged the gap between discreet experience and reality. — Fire Ologist

Correct. And its never claimed that we do. That's why applied knowledge is not an affirmation. It is a test of avoiding contradiction. Thus if I am a person in the middle ages I can look up at the sky and I applicably know that the Sun rotates around the Earth. For me to say the Earth rotates around the sun would be a contradiction, just look at it! Later when knew information enters in, the previous deduction no longer applies. I applicably knew as a person ignorant of astronomy that the Sun rotated around the Earth. With knew information, I now applicably know the Earth rotates around the Sun.

I agree with all of the moving parts you identify. I agree with the way your are talking about them. — Fire Ologist

Thank you, I am humbled by such agreement.

Probability to possibility to plausibility - needed distinctions. — Fire Ologist

Here is a simple breakdown.

Probability - an induction based off of applied knowledge and logical limitations. I know there are 52 cards, and four of them are jacks. I do not know what the result of a random shuffle will be. Logically, its a 4/52 probability that I'll draw a jack if we keep repeating this over time. This is applicably confirmed over time.

Possibility - an induction based off of applicably knowing that 'x' at least one time. No one has ever discovered a unicorn, therefore it is not a possibility. I have applicably known a horse, therefore its possible to applicably know one again. However the likelihood and frequency of expected experience is unknown.

Plausibility - A combination of distinctive knowledge that has no outright logical denial that it could be applied. It has either not been applied yet, or cannot be applied by its definitions. For example, a unicorn as a horse with a horn on its head, no magic. It doesn't seem like there's anything which would deny that this could happen, but no one has ever applicably known such a creature to exist. So a unicorn defined in this way is not possible, only plausible.

And you are right, the gap is a little large. I'll introduce another term to see what you think.

Faith - A combination of distinctive knowledge that has no outright logical denial that it could be applied. However, upon application, it is found to be false. This is often applied to religion, but this can also be applied to faith in oneself. We can experience a moment of reality that is at odds with our own view of ourselves, yet persist in the belief that the view of ourself still stands.

Irrational - a combination of distinctive knowledge that does not make any logical sense, and once applied and found to be false. Despite this, a person still holds it to be true. For example, a mother believes her son did not commit a crime, despite her knowing her sons troubled past, they're being at the scene of the crime, and eyewitnesses. It is found undeniably that the son committed the crime. Yet the mother persists in believing he didn't commit it. This is a step beyond faith into outright delusion.

Thank you Fire Ologist, it is one of the greatest compliments you can give to tell me that my paper gave you something to think about. I appreciate your feedback and will think about it further.

I've read through the thread. There are some darned good points being made.

My interpretation of your paper is that you have outlined the mechanism for categorisation, applied that categorisation to modes of perception, and organised that categorisation into a hierarchy.

As far as the process is concerned, it seems very reasonable to me. I can see and understand the reasoning behind each step.

Categorisation is a powerful tool. But...

Difference does not imply (hard) distinction.

There are infinite (unlimited) possible categorisations

When spring cleaning and deciding what to throw out you could categorise by one of:

1. Least used in the last year.
2. Least sentimental value.
3. Least functional.
4. ...

You can combine these categories to create a hierarchy. There are infinite (unlimited) hierarchies.

You have chosen a set of categories and placed them in a hierarchy that produces the result you want.

Any conclusions you draw are observations about the categories and hierarchies you have chosen; not conclusions about the individual members.

You may feel that the prejudices that guided you in choosing your categories are justified. Your intuition may be right.

As it stands, all you are saying is "Given my prejudices: my prejudices".

Your prejudices could well be accurate. They are formed as a consequence of your experiences; it isn't like they are completely without foundation.

The trouble is that you are assuming your prejudices and then trying to communicate.

For example, it is obvious to you that there are distinctions. This existence of distinctions doesn't need to be justified or proven: they are right there! Just look! How are we looking at the same world and not instantly agreeing on this!? If I could just force people to understand these words in the way that I understand them...

Edge Cases

Every possible category has edge cases.

When you built your categories you had in mind clear examples that illustrated the nature of the category. A clear vision of an objective, unambiguous scale of thought and perception that everyone could readily see and agree on; that would lead to a renaissance of rational discourse inside a rational framework. (or something like that).

In practice it seems that everyone is going to extremes to define every word in the most perverse manner possible and then using those perverse interpretations to twist your straightforward statements into a knot of incomprehensibility. Suddenly everything is an exception or an edge case and you have to take a step back to even remember what your point was in the first place.

If only someone would invent a rigorous formal language that always held a fixed interpretation for every viewer.

Early Set Theory ran into trouble because some pedantic bastard found an edge case that destroyed the theory. The fix involves everyone agreeing not to do the thing, because if you do the thing everything breaks. So don't do the thing. (Russell's Paradox).

The point being that you are not the first.

The definition of madness is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results

The first (implicit) lesson from philosophy is: If you think you have resolved the problems of communication; you've made a mistake.

Communication itself works (more or less). But when you try to nail it down it squirts out from underneath the nail and leaves a nasty odour behind.

99.9% of theoretical mathematics is an effort to nail down unambiguous meaning. And that effort has been wasted.

Based on your guide to rationality, is it better to ignore the last two millennia of attempts to codify a universal language that is understood equally by all; or should we question why it seems so hard?

The Delusion of a Shared Universe (Why is it so hard?)

The concept of an objective universe is that there is a single, definite, objective universe that is the same for everyone. Given this assumption it seems rational to assume that descriptions of that universe should be the same for everyone.

This is wrong.

On a trivial level, two people regarding the Mona Lisa in the Louvre Museum see different things. One is standing a little to the left of the other and is a little shorter. One has only just arrived from a dazzling bright summer day and their eyesight is still adjusting to the relative dimness indoors. Each has a (slightly) different perception to the other.

In general relativity, two observers in different inertial frames disagree on whether two events are simultaneous or not. They each have accurate measuring equipment and accurately observe the same pair of events. One observes that the events happened simultaneously. The other observes that there was a measurable period of time between the two events.

In Newtonian Mechanics, all observers would observe two simultaneous events as being simultaneous.

In Relativity, two distinct observers will make distinct measurements. A Relativistic universe is fundamentally not an objective universe.

The rich man's perception of poverty bear's little resemblance to the poor man's. Someone who has lived in an abusive environment all their life has no knowledge of any other way to live.

A long, cold drink after being stuck in traffic for four hours with no air conditioning, in the middle of a Florida summer, and you've been contemplating whether it is worth drinking your own pee or if the windscreen washer fluid reservoir is drinkable... is a viscerally different experience to your normal morning cup of generic beverage.

Enough Similarity to be misleading

After a little back and forth we can all agree that 'up' is the direction away from the centre of mass of the Earth.

This could give the impression that 'up' is an objective concept. An idea that is accessible by everyone but ultimately independent of any single person. In actuality, each person has a set of experiences that they associate with the word 'up'. Each and every time a person reads the word 'up' they interpret it based on the sum total of their experiences.

As a rough approximation, it sometimes works to assume that the meaning of words exists outside of people. Common events create an aggregate average experience that might appear universal.

The rarer an event or the more closely examined an event; the less the average experience has any relevance.

First steps

Do you recognise the pattern where you have what seems like a solid, clear idea in your head but the harder you try to set that idea down in unambiguous terms that everyone should understand... the more it slips through your fingers?

I think this pattern is the major motivation behind Axiomatic Mathematics.

I think this pattern is reflected in many (possibly most) philosophical arguments.

A good first step might be to stop repeating the same thing over and over again because all those previous times they just weren't trying hard enough... and realise this is information about the nature of the universe.

Facetious

Of course people have felt that communication is flawed and thought about the problem.

If all that was needed was a slight tweaking of existing concepts the problem would have been solved long ago.

Going all the way back to first principles is daunting. Especially when it isn't clear what those first principles would even be.

On the other hand, I can see that you you put a lot of work into communicating your ideas and... it shouldn't be this hard.

Fortunately I'm available to tell you that it is so hard because you are trying to describe a relativistic universe in objective terms. This is impossible.

Describing a relativistic universe in relativistic (subjective) terms is trivial in comparison.

I've read through the thread. There are some darned good points being made. — Treatid

I appreciate the read and compliment!

Let me address the topic that you pointed out directly and accurately.

There are infinite (unlimited) possible categorisations — Treatid

True. We can create infinite distinctive knowledge. But can we accurately apply them? And if we do, are they useful to us for that particular situation? Taken within the solo context of the paper, this is a description, not a criticism. As long as we can applicably know whatever categorization we create, its objective knowledge.

However, if we include the context of one other person, we suddenly have new challenges. This original post did not address how social context works, as it was a long enough paper as it is. I will post the rest for you in the follow up in the "Reserved for further posts here", as I wasn't sure if readers were going to get that far into it.

Summary:

Social communication requires context, both distinctively, and applicably. The first thing which must be established before communication can occur is to find an agreement of essential properties within a definition. The essential properties of a 'tree' for a casual person may be very different than for a botanist for example. Once the properties are agreed upon by both parties, then applicable knowledge can begin.

So: A tall bush may be applicably known as a 'tall tree' by a group of average people, but that same tall tree is applicably known as "Bushicus tallimax" by botanists.

How do we agree what definitions to use? Through a combination of several factors.

1. Efficiency (Energy and time spent per result)
2. Effectiveness (How useful is it to us. Why do I care that that tree is a bush if I'm not a botanist?)
3. Danger in failure or loss of success (That bear is not friendly. I failed to identify this particular tree can cure cancer)

And of course, once you have established contextual definitions, the group could try for applicable knowledge or use the inductive hierarchy in application. I'm sure you can come up with more on your own as you seem to understand the underlying issues of the topic well. If you read the second part and feel like that did not adequately answer your points, please point them out again and I will address them.

I do not know how I missed your post again. If you're still around, let me know, I will reply to your points!

While optimally, we should use distinctive contexts that lead to clear deductive beliefs, — Philosophim

Could you define 'distinct' for me, please?

Everything I see is connected. Connection seems to me to be one of the fundamental properties of the universe.

This means that everything is an aspect of a single connected whole.

Your use of 'distinct' gives me the impression that you think we can chop off bits of the universe and consider them in isolation.

The idea of 'hard distinction' makes no sense to me. The things we experience are part of the universe. Saying they are not connected appears counter-factual to me.

I do, of course, agree that there are observable differences. Indeed, 'difference' is another fundamental property of the universe.

Given these two fundamental properties, they must both be aspects of the same thing.

So, I see difference and connection as intimately connected concepts that cannot be separated. Each one is part of and requires the other.

Beyond this, I think that every concept we hold is defined by its connection to all the other concepts. The connections a concept has IS the concept.

Remove those connections to other concepts and you are left with nothing.

As it stands, your references to distinctions run counter to my direct experience. Or I don't understand your concept of distinction.

Hi and thanks for reaching out again,

seems I forgot to add @Philosophim to my last message, sorry about that too. *it is what it is, I guess.*

It is fine that it has taken some time, as it isn't really something that is easy to grasp in any way. When I reread my post, and I think about the system you have created, I still notice the hesitation in me, like a hindrance to clarity, simplicity and understanding - so how do I describe it?

In a way, instead of going from 'everything' to 'something', inference is creating a self-evolving association network. And the problem that stumps me even now, but that I am more able to express, is how to put to words a system which, the second you describe it as something, will add that association to its network, which in turn will change, morph and self-reference the system you are trying to describe?

So in a way I want to supersede intuition, but I'm not able to. I am not able to fully understand intuition and inference, as it evolves side-by-side with my own understanding. Which is also one part of what is so fascinating about what you wrote, that it is in some way fixed, but also stable. Whereas in my view there are only various 'tiers' of associations - varying in complexity, intensity and connections - but I find this explanation, even though it does fit to a certain extent - and could work as a starting point - to still be wholly unsatisfactory.

I'll do take kindly to your input on this, if you have any - and I don't mind things taking a lot of time. I am just assuming getting anywhere on this will take a while, and I am not in a hurry.

Kindly,
Caerulea-Lawrence

Could you define 'distinct' for me, please? — Treatid

Something distinct is a discrete experience clearly defined. There is nothing wrong with seeing connections. But connections come from blending discrete experiences together, and are themselves distinctions.

You cannot say, "This and that are connected" without both "this" and "that". What we tend to do in connections is have less emphasis on the individual parts, and instead focus on the new distinction that's formed. A very simple example of this is addition in math. You take two 'ones', and create a new connection or group that we call 'two'. When the connections are small and easily identifiable, we more clearly see the parts that make the connections. When they are numerous and complex like a clock, we may ignore or even hide the complexity underneath to focus on the subject of telling time.

But the ability to focus on the connection and de-emphasize the parts, does not negate the parts themselves.

The idea of 'hard distinction' makes no sense to me. The things we experience are part of the universe. Saying they are not connected appears counter-factual to me. — Treatid

All things can be connected based on our ability to group things together. But they also don't have to be. Connections are built from distinctions, and are simply a complex distinction itself. Skateboard, wheel, plastic, molecule. These things are all parts of a skateboard that are connected, but at any moment, we could disconnect them if we so chose.

Your use of 'distinct' gives me the impression that you think we can chop off bits of the universe and consider them in isolation. — Treatid

Yes. Read the words in this sentence. Think about each word. Now each letter. Now each pixel. Now as a group. You can part and parcel the universe as you see fit. That is our power as observant beings, the ability to discretely experience.

The idea of 'hard distinction' makes no sense to me. — Treatid

A hard distinction is something we can create in our experience. It depends on how you're defining the phrase, 'hard distinction'. If you create a definition that's impossible to experience, then of course the phrase is useless. If you create a definition that is possible to experience, then it is useful.

So, I see difference and connection as intimately connected concepts that cannot be separated. Each one is part of and requires the other. — Treatid

No argument from me. To know that something is 'different' it must be evaluated in relation to 'something else'. We create discrete experiences, and compare them to one another. Thus we have the ability to both create discrete experiences, and relate discrete experiences.

Beyond this, I think that every concept we hold is defined by its connection to all the other concepts. The connections a concept has IS the concept.

Remove those connections to other concepts and you are left with nothing. — Treatid

To have a discrete experience, you must experience like being in a sea. To take a discrete is to remove the surrounding existence from the discrete. Then, we can observe how the discrete behaves within the rest of existence. Adding more discrete existences allows us to observe them in relation to each other in a more specified way. Greater discrete existences up to a point help us navigate the world in a way that allows us to live. "This" is food. "That" will kill you. And so on.

As it stands, your references to distinctions run counter to my direct experience. — Treatid

Do they still at this point?

Glad to see your around still! There's a bit to answer on that post, so I'll need to spend some time gathering answers to your questions. I should have time to post by this weekend.

You cannot say, "This and that are connected" without both "this" and "that". — Philosophim

I see your arguments and they seem well formed given your assumptions. We have enough commonality that we are clearly drawing from similar enough experiences to communicate.

I can see how it would be annoying if you felt I was derailing your thread with my pet theory. Tell me to bugger off if you feel like it.

However, I'm not just nitpicking in order to find a hook. I have some sense of what you are trying to do in presenting a framework of thought and communication. I think others have made similar efforts before and met with lacklustre success because you are (mistakenly) assuming a fundamentally objective universe.

As such, I suggest steering the discussion towards the question of whether it is, in principle, possible for two Cooperative participants to arrive at a definite solution.

Onwards

My disagreement is with your fundamental perception of discreteness.

In the above quote you state that "this" and "that" are requirements for a connection to exist.

I disagree. I think that "this" and "that" are illusions created by the connection.

It is the relationships between 'Left' and 'Right' that define each of them. Similarly with 'Hot' and 'Cold', 'Tall' and 'Short', ....

Distance, time and velocity are meaningless terms without their relationships to each other. We measure time via periodic movement in space.

These examples won't convince you. I'm not trying to convince you (yet).

What I'm interested in is whether you can imagine a relationship centred reality as distinct from your current perception of an object centred reality?

Can you imagine the possibility of some other universe existing with only relationships? Are objects a requirement for a universe to exist?

For my part, I can see your assumption of the primacy of objects over relationships. I'm not in doubt about what it is you believe. I disagree with it.

What type of argument would you present given that we disagree over the indirect part of perception?

We both agree that we directly experience Sensory Data. You perceive that Sensory Data as having been caused by objects (hence you have indirect perception of objects). I perceive Sensory Data and more Sensory Data.

What reason can you give me to believe your indirect perception of objects is an accurate representation of reality?

We both agree that we directly experience Sensory Data. You perceive that Sensory Data as having been caused by objects (hence you have indirect perception of objects). I perceive Sensory Data and more Sensory Data. — Treatid

I wonder if you’re familiar with Wilfred Sellars’s Myth of the Given? It states that there is no non-conceptual perception of sense data, which means that we filter that data through linguistic schemes. Furthermore those schemes are not given a priori as with Kant’s categories. So it doesn’t matter whether we’re talking about seeing object and their relations or just relations of relations, the epistemic meaning of the sense data we perceive is dependent on the nature of our conceptual schemes. Do you agree with this?

the epistemic meaning of the sense data we perceive is dependent on the nature of our conceptual schemes. Do you agree with this? — Joshs

Just to make sure I follow you here. You make three distinctions:
1. Sense data
2. Epistemic meaning
3. Conceptual schemes

Correct?

Just to make sure I follow you here. You make three distinctions:
1. Sense data
2. Epistemic meaning
3. Conceptual schemes

Correct? — Fire Ologist

Pretty much

In the above quote you state that "this" and "that" are requirements for a connection to exist.

I disagree. I think that "this" and "that" are illusions created by the connection. — Treatid

Ok, but in order to make a disagreement, isn’t it “that” illusion being made discrete from “this” connection? You still have this and that. You still make a distinction.

This illusion is only here in distinction from some other that (which other can be an illusion as well, or anything, as in comparison to “this” particular illusion, the other need only be a “that”.)

An illusion is all the content one needs to have a “one”, or a “this”, but now so be it, there is this content just as well.

And I agree that “this or that” can be illusions, or just false, as if there is no truth, just like the “connection” between this and that can be an illusion. I just think these are the predicaments of epistemology. We never stop seeing “this” and therefore “that” as well.

We have a more simple, more immediate need for “this” and “that” not just to be logical, not just to think at all. We wouldn’t think of this or that in the first place without a distinction to be made and that “distinction being made.” We now think, because epistemology has made us all amateur skeptics, that therefore, all thought, all metaphysics, like fantasy, is illusion, like the distinctions and the connections, never was nor will be; but even still, we think this, as opposed to thinking “that”.

When we are thinking, we are the distinctions, this is true; but we are still really thinking, because thinking really is a distinct way of being in a world of other distinctions like “flying” or “swimming”. Birds make nests, we construct philosophical critiques. Experience is as real as the experience-able.

The distinctions we construct are as real as we are real distinction constructors. Like stems making flowers and thorns, we use words to say “this” is not “that” at all times.

Can you imagine the possibility of some other universe existing with only relationships? Are objects a requirement for a universe to exist?

For my part, I can see your assumption of the primacy of objects over relationships. — Treatid

I imagine this world, this universe, is one where relationships cannot be without their objects, AND where objects cannot be without their relationships, AND neither can take primacy because neither ever is where the other is not equally present. Identity and relation are equally fixed and in motion as both cause and have the effect of the other.

Paradox is. So I don’t agree that objects take primacy over relationships. Just as I don’t agree relationship is the real basis.

These can be boiled down to stillness and motion. The stillness of objects is sustained against the motion of relationships. Motion is as ubiquitous as the stillness it moves against and neither objects nor stillness nor relationships nor motion is first, or last, or the essence, or the true being. Because they are all at once in the paradox, which is the being, the substance, the related ones.

I see your arguments and they seem well formed given your assumptions. We have enough commonality that we are clearly drawing from similar enough experiences to communicate. — Treatid

Thank you! Yes, I agree that we're both observing and thinking along the same lines, but with different viewpoints.

I can see how it would be annoying if you felt I was derailing your thread with my pet theory. Tell me to bugger off if you feel like it. — Treatid

No, your contribution is more than fine. We are here to explore the topic, and your polite and passionate viewpoint are valuable.

I have some sense of what you are trying to do in presenting a framework of thought and communication. I think others have made similar efforts before and met with lacklustre success because you are (mistakenly) assuming a fundamentally objective universe. — Treatid

Let me clarify. You'll notice in the paper I do not use the words "objectivity" or "subjectivity". We did have another conversation going in another thread, and that might have been crossed here (no worry). Let me see if I can summarize the points again.

--Summary begin
The point is to create a foundation of knowledge. Not a foundation of truth. If you recall I never claim "This is true." Knowledge and truth are not the same thing. Truth is what is. Knowledge is a logical attempt at trying to ascertain that truth, but cannot prove that it does indeed hold the truth. What is more important than subjectivity or objectivity are deduction and induction.

The initial build up is demonstrating that an individual can deduce they discretely experience. What you discretely experience, is what you experience. See a pink elephant in the room? That is what you see. It is not an attempt to claim, "Everybody else see that too." or "It is true that there is an actual pink elephant dancing in my room and causing a mess".

Combined with the ability to discretely experience, we have memory, and the ability to recall that experience, and subdivide discrete experience. So I see an elephant as a whole, but also that its pink as a subdivision. This experience and memory is distinctive knowledge.

But individuals go one step further. We try to apply that memory to a future discrete experience and claim that our memory matches what the new discrete experience is. This is applying our memories and identities. And this application has a chance of being wrong. Recall or reread the goat and sheep example I gave. An attempt to claim that one's distinctive knowledge applies to the new discrete experience is a belief. Distinctive knowledge which can be applied without contradiction is applied knowledge. That which is contradicted is an incorrect belief. That which cannot be quite ascertained, but can be induced based on previous knowledge is an induction, and can be placed in a hierarchy to measure cogency of that induction.
--Summary end

As you see, I don't assume an objective universe. I don't assume that knowledge represents the truth. I note that its a tool, and the most reasonable tool we have to understand the universe. It could very well be that the universe is not objective. There's no reason that the rules of physics need to stay the same tomorrow. But this theory of knowledge does not care. It can adapt to that.

As such, I suggest steering the discussion towards the question of whether it is, in principle, possible for two Cooperative participants to arrive at a definite solution. — Treatid

As long as you understand the former, we can build upon that to discover the later. And your criticism here is on point: I did not address knowledge between more than one person, only knowledge of the self in the original paper due to not wanting to overburden the reader.

My apologies if this will be a little long to get to your point, but its important to understand the whole theory. The identity we'll be using when two people interact with each other is context. You can have distinctive context, and applicable context.

Distinctive context is what each person's distinctive knowledge entails. A botanist and a generalist are walking along in the woods and spy a tree-like plant. The botanist has two competing definitions "treeicus shorticus" and "bushimus maximus". The generalist has the definition of "tree" and "bush". The botanist has very particular essential attributes while the generalist has "trees are tall, bushes are short".

Before any applicable beliefs are made, we can see that their definitions are different. If they do not communicate and agree upon these definitions, they will come to very different applicable conclusions. Both would applicably know the treelike plant as different things, and would be correct within their own distinctive contexts. To agree on application, they both must come to an agreement on distinctive contexts first.

So they hash it out, like we are on the definition of what a discrete experience is. It could be that the botanist and generalist cannot agree. The generalist finds the nitpicky distinction useless to their own life, so just keeps calling it a bush. Perhaps the botanist will relent and note, "Since we're not in a lab, it doesn't matter. Call it a bush if you want. But if you're ever in a botanist convention, remember that its actually "treeicus shorticus" so you don't embarrass yourself. Or maybe the generalist is curious, finds the nitpickiness fascinating, and desires to add the botanists context to their applicable reference material.

It is always a choice. That choice may be based on several things. Time and effort needed to confirm and use the terminology based on the perceived benefit is a high priority for most people. Risk of loss if one uses a poor term is another. But in many cases, terms are going to be very middle ground for most people, and they'll find the most efficient term that works in most general cases.

So then, back to your points.

My disagreement is with your fundamental perception of discreteness.

In the above quote you state that "this" and "that" are requirements for a connection to exist.

I disagree. I think that "this" and "that" are illusions created by the connection. — Treatid

What I am pointing out is primacy. A connection by definition is a relation between two things correct? So one cannot have a connection without the concept of two things. But to your point, can one have two things without the ability to relate? As I noted earlier, to have a discrete experience within existence, one must separate 'this' experience from 'that' sea of existence around us. So as a fundamental, we can say that for one thing to be discretely experienced, it must be in relation to what is not being discretely experienced. I don't know if I would call it a relationship, but I can see that fitting what you're going for.

As to the primacy of how a discrete experience is formed, its not that important to me for the following reason. The process of correct application is still the same. Back to the tree/bush example! No matter what the two agree on in the end, once they do agree on it, they can apply it. If they go with the botanist's definition, they pour over the plant for an hour and determine conclusively that it is in fact a "treeicus shorticus". If they use the generalists' term, they determine conclusively in five seconds that its a bush.

So to with our discussion of detailing discrete experience. If you discretely experience something and feel that every part of that discrete experience is a relationship with another experience, that's fine. That's your definition. Now the question is a matter of application. Can you consistently apply that definition repeatedly as you got about your day with minimal induction? How much time does it take you to applicably know it? How useful is it to you in relation to viewing something as an object? Is your definition more useful than others, and are others willing to enter into your distinctive context?

Its a tool, not an expression of truth. Tools are judged on their simplicity, usefulness, consistency, and ease of use. My point will be that your use of relationships comes in handy in particular contexts where the identifies essential properties are the relationships. We may have a general wrench, but maybe we need a slightly altered wrench for a different job.

It is the relationships between 'Left' and 'Right' that define each of them. Similarly with 'Hot' and 'Cold', 'Tall' and 'Short', .... — Treatid

In this instance, these discrete experiences cannot be divorced from relationships, as they are the discrete experiences of relationships themselves.

But if we think in terms of abstracts like "The number one" which is merely the abstract idea of what a discrete experience is, does bringing relationships into it help us with math? Not so much. So here it seems unimportant, and we don't bring that property in as it doesn't serve us in our applicable needs.

What I'm interested in is whether you can imagine a relationship centred reality as distinct from your current perception of an object centred reality? — Treatid

As you can see, yes. That is one of many contexts we can think in.

For my part, I can see your assumption of the primacy of objects over relationships. I'm not in doubt about what it is you believe. I disagree with it. — Treatid

Hopefully you'll see now my point was more that we need the fundamental ability to create a 'this' and a 'that'. We're nitpicking on whether this is a fundamental relationship, or a fundamental object that becomes a relationship, but we don't seem to be disagreeing on the fundamentality of discrete experience and its application. (Feel free to disagree :) )

We both agree that we directly experience Sensory Data. You perceive that Sensory Data as having been caused by objects (hence you have indirect perception of objects). I perceive Sensory Data and more Sensory Data. — Treatid

No, I actually don't claim that in the paper. You probably understand this now after reading the above.

What reason can you give me to believe your indirect perception of objects is an accurate representation of reality? — Treatid

Like any application of distinctive knowledge, I must demonstrate that its application is not contradicted by reality. So if I believe that eating fresh apples will not kill me, and I eat fresh apples without dying, then I applicably know eating fresh applies will not kill me. Feel free to create a set of definitions that do not require there to be objects. Nothing is stopping you distinctively. The question will be its applicability. Can you create a system that is easy to understand, apply, consistent, and helps people better understand and interact with the world then a system that relies more on objects? Is your system of relations always good, or is it only sometimes good based on context?

My point is that we can invent an infinite number of distinctive ways of viewing and analyzing the world. The proof comes in its application. I hope this lengthy reply answered your questions and added a little more clarity to my points. Let me know what you think!