:up: :cool:

Behold the *Jihad of Estrogen* :strong: — 180 Proof

:lol:

Now that's the spirit!!!

I hope you’re right. I’m not so convinced about the senate though.

I would think so too. — AmadeusD

We definitely agree on this point so I will try to synthesize the debate so far as well as transcribe some key passages of MacIntyre.

My position is essentially MacIntyre's position except with a Kantian "boost" as it were to upgrade some of his claims to categorical imperatives.

For example, MacIntyre doesn't like manipulative social relationships, I would simply upgrade that not-liking to a categorical imperative: we can disagree, we can be at odds, we can compete in different contexts, we can try to convert each other to our own view, we can fight, we can come to blows, maybe even kill each other to resolve our differences, but I view it as a categorical imperative not to manipulate you; i.e. deceive you into acting against your own objectives by making you believe falsehoods (which is not required for coercion, which I still view as necessary for society to function, but we can be coercive without being manipulative), which of course is Kant's central thesis: treat people as ends in themselves, as echoes in many religions: do onto others as you would have them do onto you.

That being said, MacIntyre's description of contemporary Western society and how we got here and where it's headed, and his own proposed program I fully agree with; it's all quite brilliant so I will try to do my best in finding the best passages to present it.

As I don't know A.Ms work, I'll take your word for it - but this actually exemplifies exactly what Im talking about. Taking a moral framework pigeon-holes the positions you're allowed to take, and what consittutes a virtue under it. I take no such position so it's somewhat Hard to respond. It all seems incoherent to me without first accepting that Morality is invented and obtains only between the margins of those frameworks. — AmadeusD

I have not yet really presented MacIntyre's argument, but his starting point is exactly that you need a moral tradition in which moral ideas and decisions even have meaning, and it only from the standpoint of one tradition that it is even possible to comprehend the claims of another tradition; one can not be traditionless. I'm not sure that's exactly compatible with "obtains only between the margins of those frameworks", but we can get into that when I make a thread presenting MacIntyre's After Virtue positions.

I'm unsure this has to do with my position. I would, in general, agree, but the social consequences have v little to do with my moral position. My intuitive reaction to them is what informs my moral position on any given act. I couldn't predict what I would think morally correct in a novel situation, for example. My intuitive reaction might include some consideration of the social consequences, but that doesn't support my moral, let's say, claim. The claim is just that it makes me uncomfortable, so I wouldn't do it and prefer others didn't. Because It makes me uncomfortable. No other reasons. — AmadeusD

As mentioned, the purpose of developing the social consequences is claritive.

All these sorts of questions are with the purpose of understanding your position.

As you may appreciate, a significant amount of moral-relativists (whether emotivist or straight nihilists or some other flavour) essentially operate by "grandfathering in" a long list of moral rules and social opinions that they take for granted. The fact that in normal situations it's "off limits" to advocate those positions (such as torturing children) they take to mean it's therefore off limits as criticism (i.e. that they are only defending what is already socially acceptable); however, if someone makes the claim "there are no moral obligations whatsoever" of then "all moral positions are as good as another" what's entailed by that is there is no moral obligation to not torture babies nor interfere with someone so engaged.

Agreed. I largely reject the usefulness of thought experiments for this reason, within moral discussions. — AmadeusD

I strongly disagree here; thought experiments are the primary tool of developing a moral theory.

Of course, I understand you would want to avoid that if you're theory is simply based on spontaneous emotional reaction to situations that arise ... but one such situation that arises is someone putting to you a thought experiment in which you'll have an emotional reaction too.

However, the examples I've provided are not even really thought experiments, they are real examples: people really do torture, murder, rape, extort and take bribes.

It has. But the mistake in the previous seems to still be live, despite your acknowledgement. But, as with the bit you quoted, I could just be misunderstanding, so it's not too important. — AmadeusD

It is not a mistake if a question is honest and not a criticism.

It is not a gotcha. If you propose no moral claim is better than another and are willing to "pay the cost" as MacIntyre says about people who take this to it's logical conclusion, then the debate would proceed from there.

Of course, in normal society a debate is "won" when a proponent (from their point of view of course) leads a position to a conclusion which society already disagrees with (at least in their opinion), ideally some taboo (such as Nazis and pedophiles and so on). But of course, even if those premises are all correct, it simply begs the question of whether "society" really is correct about that moral position. Maybe Nazis were right after all.

An authentic criticism would thus require an actual justification that society is correct on that particular point to form a sound and valid argument.

Which I have not done yet, as I want to fully understand your position before critiquing it.

I'm unsure this has to do with my position. I would, in general, agree, but the social consequences have v little to do with my moral position. My intuitive reaction to them is what informs my moral position on any given act. I couldn't predict what I would think morally correct in a novel situation, for example. My intuitive reaction might include some consideration of the social consequences, but that doesn't support my moral, lets say, claim. The claim is just that it makes me uncomfortable, so I wouldn't do it and prefer others didn't. Because It makes me uncomfortable. No other reasons. — AmadeusD

Well this is quite important to know in order to understand your point of view.

I am not. I am invoking the (probably, largely ignored) fact that the surgeon has taken on the patient's emotional position. If they have not, and are a sociopath, your point would be apt for them. In this way, my personal moral position is just don't hire sociopaths as surgeons to avoid this problem. But that's mechanistic, not moral. The problem is moral and only exists in that I, personally think it sucks the surgeon did that. — AmadeusD

We certainly agree it is better to avoid the situation, but the issue is what duty does the surgeon have to the patient.

In a world of no duties, then the surgeon has no duty to perform the surgery to the best of their ability and obviously until completion.

Obviously in our society the surgeon would be convicted of gross negligence and likely murder, but that process is completely predicated on society's existing belief the surgeon has a duty to perform the contractual engagement, perform as best he can, and certainly "do no harm". However, if the truth is there is no duties then there's no foundation upon which society could legitimately demand any of this and no way to maintain a system (with detectives, prosecutors, judges all performing their duties) to enforce accountability to those demands.

No, there is not. I don't invoke one. There is no duty. There is the fact that, upon hte patient's emotional state, completing the surgery successfully would be preferable. If the surgeon actually didn't go in sharing this state, then fine. Walk away. I don't care. — AmadeusD

Obviously we both prefer no one to be needlessly harmed, so we agree on what is preferable.

The disagreement is on whether what's preferable can also be morally obligatory.

Your view is quite clear on this topic.

It will take another thread to actually critique your view.

I don't understand this passage, or it's genesis apparently. Suffice to say, I disagree. It might be another discussion, once I get across what you're doing with this part of your response.
that society might end. And that might be good. — AmadeusD

Not at all. The quote you present immediately after this is my denying that it matters, or that there would be a 'crisis'. The society would end. So what? — AmadeusD

Again, just trying to understand your position.

All the duties I will argue along with MacIntyre are real actual duties ultimately aim to continue humanity.

If you're ambivalent to the continuation of humanity then that is likely the very heart of the difference.

If people choose, collectively to do things, Great. I don't ascribe any duty to it at all. Society is cool. I have no other thoughts on it really. — AmadeusD

My points were derived from what many moral relativists do which is to deny there are any moral truths (in one way or another) but then continuously argue that society will continue on being "good", which makes no sense if there is not good and bad.

All points of mine on this theme is not only in relation to what moral relativists usually do, but also people in general in Western society: moral relativists language is used to avoid criticism of one's own actions ("don't criticize my diet I can eat what I want!! It's my life!!"), while moral absolutist language is used to criticize opponents ("I condemn my political opponents!! This is a violation!!").

Now clearly this doesn't apply to you, but I spent some time on this post to be sure of it as well as for the benefit of anyone following our discussion.

I would say so, as all these objections sit well with me. I'm not a Libertarian. — AmadeusD

We definitely agree here.

Yep. I also 100% disagree with your framing of the situations you refer to. But, obviously, this is not hte place Apt for it**. I did anticipate this type of disagreement :P — AmadeusD

We definitely will need to go deeper in another thread, so we can maybe return to this point and contrast framings.

This is a bit bad-faithy-sounding. I said nothing of the kind, and intimated nothing of the kind. I spoke about hte emotional undercurrent of the discussions. Obviously it 'has to do' with past colonialism. Heydel-Mankoo covers this from the perspective of a colonised minority (maybe not hte right kind, though ;) ). — AmadeusD

Again, I'm asking a question to better understand.

But as with above, if you're not arguing for some sort of market utopia but we just ignore the initial distribution of wealth, then this isn't too relevant to you.

I've argued a lot with libertarians so all these points are easy to retrieve from memory. However, if you're not a libertarian then markets, today or in the past, isn't really a core issue of contention. However, I have also been thinking of a thread critiquing Western imperialism (as a lot of the differences in other political threads basically come down to "Western imperialism good or bad"), so taking up Heydel-Mankoo would perhaps be more relevant there.

I disagree ;) Particularly that these issues aren't really philosophical. He's ignoring empirical facts about the political state of most countries - the majority of people take no part, and are not involved. But, as I've not read him, I await your thread/s to discuss that bit further ** — AmadeusD

Yes, you may reevaluate your position on MacIntyre after debating the specifics.

MacIntyres historical account is not one of individual political agency, in which case definitely most people have very little and certainly don't perceive themselves as involved in politics (although I would strongly disagree they are not actually involved); he is more concerned with how the moral frameworks in which the political debate of the day occurs develop and are changed. These more fundamental moral changes are mostly a critical mass issue, often happening against the will of the elites; an example of this sort of major change is the reformation.

From this perspective, normal people under feudalism would perceive themselves and be perceived as having even less political involvement that normal people now in Western society, but then they start to rebel against the Catholic Church and consequences are profound. The reformation was certainly not the Catholic Church's idea, nor would it have worked if it was just "an idea" a few intellectuals and nobles had; normal people getting involved, taking significant risks, was absolutely fundamental. This sort of change is what MacIntyre is more concerned with.

No. This is, exactly, what is actually happening as has happened for the majority of definitely Western Culture - perhaps, all culture. — AmadeusD

Certainly has happened until now.

What I am claiming is bold is that ridiculous levels of political stupidity do not now pose an existential risk to humanity. Of course, if you are unconcerned about humanity continuing, as you say above, then seems an irrelevant point to you either way.

Im not sure why you're asking this. I don't think society 'succeeds' or not. It seems odd that your next passage is somehow a reductio to this position. It's not absurd at all. There is no objective measure of success, and I don't have the (socio-political) framework in place to assess the same way you do. Simple :) I could "simply" be wrong about that. — AmadeusD

These points are in relation to your criticism of my claim that Western society is failing.

There is definitely an objective measures of social success, such as people having enough to eat and society at least continuing.

Objective and quantifiable.

You may have no problem with society ending, but I don't see why you wouldn't agree that would indeed be society failing in whatever it was trying to do.

;) You'll need to figure out where I assessed 'success' in moral terms. I can't see it! If i have implied that, please explicitly point it out because I am uncomfortable with that, if it's the case. — AmadeusD

Then you are using the word success in pretty unusual way.

In its usual meaning, success requires some goal which requires some moral framework to formulate.

Your intuitive-spontaneous moral framework is still a moral framework from which you derive your objectives.

This is wrong in terms of my position. I think it is. It isn't successful or unsuccessful. There is no ultimate goal or aim of Western society. It continues to move (forward, backward, whatever). Maybe you can use that as a yardstick in which case my position holds anyway. But that's not me. That's just a suggestion. I don't think it success or doesnt succeed. It just is, or isn't. I admit, entirely, that my asking your view on this was more a poke-the-bear than anything. Defend it failing. I don't think you did, on your own terms. But, that's because I don't recognise what would constitute success or failure in your account/s thus far. — AmadeusD

Seems incongruous to laud Western society in one place and then claim is has no goal or aim in another.

But again, if society destroys itself that is clearly failing.

Your position seems to be that you're fine if it fails as well as humanity as a whole, simply fails and comes to an end.

To argue the more fundamental point that we have a duty to try to avoid humanity failing, will of course take another more dedicated thread to elaborate the argument.

However, my point here is that the assumption that Western society, humanity as a whole, will simply muddle on is a false one; society can end and so cease to muddle.

Yep. I've not called you 'wrong'. I think you're making a mistake in moral reasoning. That doesn't make you wrong - and in fact, could only be true if you were convinced of my position - which would negate that conviction :P This is why my position is consistent. It doesn't apply to anything but me and my actions. — AmadeusD

It's good to see you are advanced enough in understanding your own position to realize it is inconsistent.

And this would be the fundamental moral duty I would put forward: a duty to try to be consistent.

Now, if you are committed to an inconsistent position there is not "arguing against you" per se as you can simply be comfortable with any inconsistency, comfort is your guide, and so there is no problem.

So, perhaps at best we can exchange views, but you clearly like to argue so with enough of it perhaps you simply become uncomfortable with inconsistencies and so convert to my avoid-inconsistencies moral code.

If no one is willing, and it's morally right to defend the country and you're not inferring that conscription is morally acceptable there... then... What are you suggesting? That seems a dead end.

I take the rest of that passage to be incoherent in light of the above, so I wont touch it yet. Could entirely be me. — AmadeusD

Since we've already established you aren't concerned with social consequences, these considerations aren't so relevant.

However, in your framework people can obviously conscript other people and force them to fight at the end of a gun, if they're comfortable doing that.

My goal here is not to debate conscription (I happen to be also against conscription, though not against taxing people who do not server higher for life, to avoid the free rider problem), but again to simply understand your position.

The underlying purpose of questions on this theme is your view of the state. Seems clear you're ambivalent, and don't really care what happens to the state, which is very much compatible with being ambivalent to what happens to society as such.

What I'm reading as childish, is that it seems your passionate responses presuppose your moral framework. It seems your framework has to take account of your emotional positions. It seems you are enacting the exact same, let's say, discontinuity in your position, that you outlined about moral relativists near the top of the post. — AmadeusD

My questions and examples are the logical enquiries.

If someone says they don't view any act as morally better than another, then before debating first principles I want to be sure they really are taking that view.

If you're ambivalent to anyone doing anything at all, just more comfortable with some happenings over others but that's just you're own feeling of comfort and doesn't give rise to any moral claims (including claims about conscription for example), then I want to be sure you really are ambivalent.

As I've mentioned, most people who use moral relativist language are not actually moral relativists, they still want to condemn Hitler and assume that's given to them: but obviously it's not, if no one is right or wrong, Hitler is as right as anyone else.

This is the childish mistake you are making. Your underlying point, I would reply to with "Yes. That's correct".
But the fact you've entered a value judgement on the part of your interlocutor is worrisome. I don't think it was laudable, or detestable. It happened. Does it make me, personally, extremely uncomfortable? Even repulsed? Yep. Which is probably what you want to know. But that's nothing but an emotional reaction to hearing certain information. For me that is absolute, in the sense that I can't, currently, feel another way. But that is a state of affairs. Not a moral claim. — AmadeusD

I said "as laudable" to just mean they are equal (which you can say "equally good" or "equally bad").

Which seems very much your position, you have no particular gripe with Hitler and the Nazi project: happened, they were clearly comfortable with what they were doing so doing right by their own comfortableness (certainly comfortable enough to carry out their project).

Again, it's not childish, it's the adult question to ask: when someone says they see no better or worse morality, then clearly the obvious and logical point is make is that entails Nazism is thus no better or worse than any other ism.

Correct. No issues. It makes me uncomfortable. I have nothing to appeal to in telling them no to do it, other than the potential consequences for them - reason with them. Would I bother? Maybe. If i were uncomfortable enough. — AmadeusD

This is exactly why I develop the consequences of society changing its view of right and wrong, that "you shouldn't do X because society will hold you accountable and there will be consequences" is not a valid argument.

When you say "consequences for them" clearly the negative consequences to serial killing personally to the serial killer would be getting caught. But why would anyone catch you if no one thinks serial killing is bad?

I don't. I haven't presented any. You seem to be importing some upper-limit to your conceivable moral behaviour matrix and ascribing those limits to my position. I don't share them. I have limits of my comfort and pursuit of comfort occurs. These are arbitrary, as far as another person is concerned. But, by-and-large people share the same limits of comfort within a society, and so 'getting on with it' can occur without a shared 'moral' framework. This is, probably, what the West does well, compared with many other societies. — AmadeusD

You just rejected, above, any measure of success or failure in evaluating societies, but say here that Western society does something well. You just said Western society has no goal.

However, it's simply wrong that there is no shared moral framework.

There's a shared core moral framework: such as serial killing is evil and justifies a very large effort in stopping, law enforcement shouldn't take bribes and so on.

It is this core moral framework that is overwhelmingly dominant that allows Western society to function (at least until now and certainly for at least some time further).

Obviously you are well aware of the reaction to serial killing or child torturing of the vast majority of people: that their position is that it's an absolute moral wrong, evil, must be stopped and transgressors put away for some time. Likewise, the reaction to a judge taking a bribe.

This is a shared moral framework.

Of course, even if there's an absolutely dominant consensus on some core values that make civil society possible, there can be visceral disagreements on less-core things, such as abortion. Whether abortion is legal or illegal, society does not simply all apart (such as if murder was made legal).

Where society can afford to muddle is in policy choices that are not existential to the formation of civil society or then any society at all.

I don't, other than to say 'Well, this is what's going on". The norms are the norms and tell me about a collective emotional status of the society. — AmadeusD

Your position is getting pretty confusing to me.

In some places you seem to hold a total ambivalence to what happens and are not concerned with the social consequences whatsoever, and not only are you unconcerned for what happens to society but there is no way to measure the success of society as such (you're ambivalent to society succeeding or failing and moreover assert there is no measure of success or failure anyways), and in other places you seem to argue society, in particular Western society, is doing well.

You seem, at least give the vibe, of being pleased with Western social norms.

This one is troublesome because, prima facie, there shouldn't be. At least not beyond social consequences - which are pretty much arbitrary - and policy is just this, after collective deliberation. BUT, i would freely let you know that the idea of there being no consequences for certain actions makes me uncomfortable. Again, that's just a state of affairs. Not a moral claim. So, I dislike this, and it makes me uneasy, but I take it wholesale to be the case. Legal and social consequences are arbitrary, other than that they meet a collective emotional benchmark. — AmadeusD

Again, arbitrary is a strong word, even your framework is not arbitrary but founded on your spontaneous sense of comfort.

Social consequences are also clearly even less arbitrary. The consequence of going to prison for murder is not arbitrary; if you can just get what you want by killing who you want when you want, then society quickly ceases to function much at all (certainly nothing remotely close to Western society is feasible if murder is permissible).

Likewise, claiming "other than that they meet a collective emotional benchmark" is another way of saying they aren't arbitrary.

Now, it will take another thread to develop an alternative position to your view. To broadly describe it, I will be arguing that emotions are not foundational. For example, even in your own system you are clearly making the claim that "you should do what you're comfortable with"; there's a logical moral structure you're ignoring that takes emotions as inputs and is not therefore by definition itself emotional. However, this would be simply a starting point.

There is not enough space here even to finish responding to your points, so I will have to in another comment.

Can a brutha get an AMEN?! :sweat: :up: — 180 Proof

No amen yet. Still hoping for a different Dem ticket. "Surge the Border Biden" deserves defeat.

We definitely agree on this point so I will try to synthesize the debate so far as well as transcribe some key passages of MacIntyre.

My position is essentially MacIntyre's position except with a Kantian "boost" as it were to upgrade some of his claims to categorical imperatives. — boethius

Yeah, good.. and fair enough. I reject the categorical imperative, which will do some heavy lifting in justifying my responses further down the post. This is not to say that I think employing hte categorical imperative is erroneous. I think it is inadequate and necessarily simplistic - to a level lower than required to cover actual behaviour.

but I view it as a categorical imperative not to manipulate you; i.e. deceive you into acting against your own objectives — boethius

I do not. People can have objectives against their own interest, and I do not think any obligations prevents us from acting on our own intuitions around that. I don't think we have any obligation to do so, but if someone who suffers from sexomania (lets assume that's a real thing) is going around 'harming' others, my discomfort with seeing that happen will motivate me to stop them. This is me enacting a private moral opinion publicly.
But, I accept that if humans were on-the-whole less capable of assessing this, viz we had some chaotic, inconsistent system of analysis whether mentally ill people should handle their own affairs, and this resulted in huge amounts of 'harm' in the way noted above, my position might be different. To me, the facts matter. There aren't principles that can be universally applied.

we can be coercive without being manipulative — boethius

Personally, coercion seems on the whole a worse way to deal with things. At least lying to someone accepts what you're doing on it's face. I can't see how these would be morally different on a Kantian framework. But, he accepted lying is possibly acceptable in some circumstances, but wasn't too direct about it.

his starting point is exactly that you need a moral tradition in which moral ideas and decisions even have meaning, and it only from the standpoint of one tradition that it is even possible to comprehend the claims of another tradition; one can not be traditionless. — boethius

This is, to my mind, someone pretending their doing something other than trying to convince others of their own values. One can certainly be traditionless on my view. Assuming the bolded is to me read "It is only from..." I think thats absurb, on its face, and upon reflexion. We can understand the solar system from teh confines of the surface of hte Earth.

As you may appreciate, a significant amount of moral-relativists (whether emotivist or straight nihilists or some other flavour) essentially operate by "grandfathering in" a long list of moral rules and social opinions that they take for granted. — boethius

I tend to not see this in anyone who has reviewed their positions, but in the general population, yes, that's pretty common.

what's entailed by that is there is no moral obligation to not torture babies nor interfere with someone so engaged. — boethius

absolutely. And, i think the important aspect in the problem you're outlining is a lack of review/reflection. I think it would be hard to miss these complete contradictions upon reflection.

I strongly disagree here; thought experiments are the primary tool of developing a moral theory. — boethius

My view is that they are helpful in getting the discussion going, but serve no real purpose in ascertaining the 'real' moral position one might have. One can make whatever claims they like when not faced with the position their advocating for in real life.

However, the examples I've provided are not even really thought experiments, they are real examples: people really do torture, murder, rape, extort and take bribes. — boethius

They do. I take those as thought experiments, nonetheless. I accept that they aren't particularly interesting in terms of 'experiment' but giving real-life examples that do not pertain to me is still, I think a thought experiment. I have to think about it, not remember.

are real actual duties ultimately aim to continue humanity. — boethius

I'm unsure these two can go together. Duties in pursuit of that aim? IF that's the inference, yes, sure, that's the position I am essentially saying morality comes down to. Choose an aim, and run with it from there. This is the 'one free miracle' i've, other places, spoken of. Choose your aim, and the math works from there.

It is not a mistake if a question is honest and not a criticism. — boethius

Hmm, perhaps i'm not quite getting how you mean mistake. I think you have erred. Dishonesty not required for that. Just, mistake heh.

Obviously we both prefer no one to be needlessly harmed, so we agree on what is preferable. — boethius

Yes. I think this agreement is viable as a means for organising society. There's no obligation to do so , but when most people agree on the above, we can come to terms, as they say and write legislation. When everyone agrees, it seems irrational rather than 'wrong' not to do what everyone is agreeing to. It seems natural, not obligatory. I think this is hte real reason for the success of society, in self-survival as it were. To that aim, we're going pretty well by my lights.

But of course, even if those premises are all correct, it simply begs the question of whether "society" really is correct about that moral position. Maybe Nazis were right after all. — boethius

Precisely why I think the above is the case.

In a world of no duties, then the surgeon has no duty to perform the surgery to the best of their ability and obviously until completion. — boethius

I agree, and think this is true. However, I am quite happy most people share the same sort of discomfort with neglect as I do. I have no right to will others do so, though, and if this were not the case I do not believe I could change my moral position that people should share that position. But, I like it, as is.

We certainly agree it is better to avoid the situation, but the issue is what duty does the surgeon have to the patient. — boethius

Whatever one he has internally assented to. I think you are able to oblige yourself to your own intentions. This doesn't seem to me the same thing as expecting something from someone else. I expect that I will not tap out simply because I'm out of breath in a Jiu jitsu round. I stick to this. It's a obligation i put on myself. If i do not meet this obligation, I deal with it. There's no moral valence imo.

However, if the truth is there is no duties then there's no foundation upon which society could legitimately demand any of this and no way to maintain a system (with detectives, prosecutors, judges all performing their duties) to enforce accountability to those demands. — boethius

Agree. And think this is the case. We are mistaking common agreement, for obligation.

If you're ambivalent to the continuation of humanity — boethius

ambivalent is probably an unfair framing here. I care. It matters to me (though, in an expected way im sure) - but I don't think anyone else should, or needs to share my opinion (for their sake, it may be better that they dont (this will make sense if you ask what my position is lol)).

so taking up Heydel-Mankoo would perhaps be more relevant there. — boethius

For sure. That's almost all he's relevant for, publicly speaking.

then this isn't too relevant to you — boethius

I will forego responding to all of what this relates to, but yes, I think that's the case. Nonetheless, really appreciate your elucidations.

What I am claiming is bold is that ridiculous levels of political stupidity do not now pose an existential risk to humanity. Of course, if you are unconcerned about humanity continuing, as you say above, then seems an irrelevant point to you either way. — boethius

I may be missing a trick - the underlined seems to imply this issue is irrelevant to any moral outlook? Was there a typo there?

These more fundamental moral changes are mostly a critical mass issue, often happening against the will of the elites; an example of this sort of major change is the reformation. — boethius

For sure, and I suppose this would be 'my version of moral progress' in action, in that its purely a mechanism of common agreement. You could, here, employ 'empathy' as the guiding light. But due to trauma, and the way my mind works, I suffered from sociopathy for several years. I could not accept the above, at that time, and it would be very very strange to say that the rest of society had a right to enforce that norm on me. Apart from anything, 'ought' always has to imply ' could' - and I 'couldn't'. I was lucky in that it was transitive. Most sociopaths are not this lucky.

There is definitely an objective measures of social success, such as people having enough to eat and society at least continuing.

Objective and quantifiable. — boethius

That (and others, obviously) parameter is measurable, and if the bold is your aim it measures success. But consider a society with an aim that can be completed. To reforest a certain portion of hte Earth's surface. What's the use of society beyond that completion? I think it is irrational to have an aim which is forever changing, unless we're going to accept that morality has nothing to do with it. More below..

Then you are using the word success in pretty unusual way. — boethius

I havent used it. That's what Im asking you to point out. THis response seems to be senseless in terms of what I've said to you here.

You may have no problem with society ending, but I don't see why you wouldn't agree that would indeed be society failing in whatever it was trying to do — boethius

Consider, again, a society with a time-restricted aim. The World Lover's Society of 1999. Once it flips over to 2000, the aim is complete, and society no longer has a moral, or practical aim. And it seems to me irrational to claim that a society can have a indeterminate aim, yet be beholden to it. If you're saying merely survival of the society is the aim, how you do deal with evolution of societies? Is British society now inherently different in a way that matters from British society circa 1823? It is the same society, no? But wait... they had entirely different Moral precepts to current British Society. Heck, that's true of 1920s British society vs now. How does this sit? I'm not trying to imply much here. Just curious.

It's good to see you are advanced enough in understanding your own position to realize it is inconsistent. — boethius

This is wrong. And you seem to have misread the quote you have used.

This is why my position is consistent. It doesn't apply to anything but me and my actions. — AmadeusD

I believe it is. This, though, In light of the fact I actually reject something I said earlier. Once that's taken into account, no inconsistencies that I can ascertain.

Your position seems to be that you're fine if it fails as well as humanity as a whole, simply fails and comes to an end. — boethius

Roughly, but obviously I wont be 'fine'. I'll just 'not be'. No valence, again, to have a moral view on. Things end all the time. Humanity is not special.

Your intuitive-spontaneous moral framework is still a moral framework from which you derive your objectives. — boethius

It is quite alright to claim this. I don't think I can argue with it as stated. But it is a non-static framework, if so. This is novel, and so I find it hard to believe it could be consider among other frameworks. It doesn't operate the same way. I reject that there are moral facts, or propositions apt for truth claims.

And this would be the fundamental moral duty I would put forward: a duty to try to be consistent. — boethius

To me, that's nonsensical. Obviously, I don't accept that there are moral duties. C'est la vie, :)

Now, if you are committed to an inconsistent position there is not "arguing against you" per se as you can simply be comfortable with any inconsistency, comfort is your guide, and so there is no problem. — boethius

I am not. In any way. I have no idea where you've come up with that. That comfort is the guide, in all cases, is what the consistency consists in( Hehe. that was a great sentence). To clear, I care about things, and people. I do not, though, think this matters to anyone else. And morally, I don't think it can. I think people, under their framework, insist this is true. But, that is not true. It is a requirement of their framework only. That choice, though, is arbitrary (or, as I posit, and stand by - it is informed by their comfort level with said framework).

but you clearly like to argue so with enough of it perhaps you simply become uncomfortable with inconsistencies and so convert to my avoid-inconsistencies moral code. — boethius

I like to discuss. Arguments suck. And I already meet you criteria :)

If you're ambivalent to anyone doing anything at all, just more comfortable with some happenings over others but that's just you're own feeling of comfort and doesn't give rise to any moral claims (including claims about conscription for example), then I want to be sure you really are ambivalent. — boethius

This is not quite coherent. Ambivalence has to do with valence, not morality. Ambivalence would indicate i have conflicting feelings about whatever it is. Sometimes, this true. Mostly, it is not. I have a clear feeling and emotional response. This does not give rise to any moral position and they aren't particularly connected, unless you accept that people's emotional response to situations is what, without some intervening reasoning, informs their morals. That is my position, because most people have never even tried to review their moral positions outside of the 'moment'. The 'moment' is clearly an emotional one.

they still want to condemn Hitler and assume that's given to them: but obviously it's not, if no one is right or wrong, Hitler is as right as anyone else. — boethius

He's not to me, but I agree. There is no way to understand that anything he did is actually worse in any objective sense, without a particular aim (not killing people, for instance - which it can be very hard to walk back from, when it is such a deeply-held intuition that one ought not do this. But I do).

I said "as laudable" to just mean they are equal (which you can say "equally good" or "equally bad"). — boethius

If so, fair enough. Laudable infers praise, above ambivalence (hehehe). This is also most often, and most apt applied to aims and desires, not states of affairs. So, I see a number of inconsistencies in your language at this stage.

Which seems very much your position, you have no particular gripe with Hitler and the Nazi project: happened, they were clearly comfortable with what they were doing so doing right by their own comfortableness (certainly comfortable enough to carry out their project). — boethius

This is a little bit misleading. I can have opinions on other people's opinions. But they do not relate to anything but my opinion of those opinions. This may be hard to follow, but it is consistent. I can think what I want. That means nothing about whether those other people are right or wrong in their actions, or thoughts. I am extremely uncomfortable with the Nazi project. I do not believe I have the right to insist they are wrong. I can insist, and attempt to reason with them, that their project is ill-conceived. Luckily, they had specific aims to which I could relate these reasons. This is a mechanistic conversation at that stage, not a moral one. If you have aim A, regardless of its morality, you can do 1, 2 or 3 and they will have different outcomes, corresponding to different degrees of success toward your arbitrary aim. This is not inconsistent with my position.

This is exactly why I develop the consequences of society changing its view of right and wrong, that "you shouldn't do X because society will hold you accountable and there will be consequences" is not a valid argument. — boethius

I can't quite grasp what you're saying here - the sentences don't quite string together - so apologies if I get something wrong:
This would be the only possible public notion I could appeal to in trying to change anyone's behaviour or views. And I might do this, If i were uncomfortable enough. "Oh dad, please don't kill the dog. You will probably be arrested and charged. That would suckfor you". But that is speculation, unfortunately. 50/50 whether anyone would care what I've got to say. Maybe less.

When you say "consequences for them" clearly the negative consequences to serial killing personally to the serial killer would be getting caught. But why would anyone catch you if no one thinks serial killing is bad? — boethius

Because they're uncomfortable, and erroneously think that gives them the right to do stuff to other people. Nothing stopping them either, but this would motivate them to do it.

You just rejected, above, any measure of success or failure in evaluating societies, but say here that Western society does something well. You just said Western society has no goal. — boethius

"getting on with it" is no a goal. It is a fact of the society i am observing. We 'get on with it' to degrees of success higher than other societies. We also produce more single-use plastics. Nothing in that suggests a moral valence or social goal. I also didn't reject that the West has a social goal. I'm trying to tease out what your aim is, in instantiating your moral outlook. It seems you're not able to necessarily lay that out.

However, it's simply wrong that there is no shared moral framework. — boethius

It is not. The quote directly after this shows why. YOu have confused some facts about people's emotional reactions to events, and 'morality'. You are, slowly, sliding into accepting that people's emotions are their moral framework.

Where society can afford to muddle is in policy choices that are not existential to the formation of civil society or then any society at all. — boethius

It can afford it anywhere. It seems this is an indication of where you would become uncomfortable, if society did this. That's fine, and again, exemplifies the above assertion.

In some places you seem to hold a total ambivalence to what happens and are not concerned with the social consequences whatsoever, and not only are you unconcerned for what happens to society but there is no way to measure the success of society as such (you're ambivalent to society succeeding or failing and moreover assert there is no measure of success or failure anyways), and in other places you seem to argue society, in particular Western society, is doing well. — boethius

This is entirely wrong, and all the reasons why have been canvassed through the above responses.
You've used ambivalence incorrectly. I am not ambivalent. I have levels of comfort and discomfort which I clearly apprehend - making ambivalence not possible. I will ignore this subsequently.
UNderline: Entirely false. Not sure where that's come from. I've been extremely clear that I, personally, care about what happens to society. I think society is nice. It is what it is, and I like how its going (in the West). This does not give you the correct ammunition for the assertions here. The only thing I have said Western society does well, was pursuant to a specific, arbitrary aim. This is not inconsistent in any way with the rest of what i've said.

Likewise, claiming "other than that they meet a collective emotional benchmark" is another way of saying they aren't arbitrary. — boethius

No, it's not. It's just naming hte arbitrary benchmark used. The benchmark is arbitrary. It's results are just so.

For example, even in your own system you are clearly making the claim that "you should do what you're comfortable with" — boethius

Absolutely not. I am saying i should do what I am comfortable with. It does not pertain, or have anything to do with anyone else. This seems to be a misapprehension you are making quite often here. It is wrong.

Some of you responses are really confusing, in the sense that you directly contradict things i've said int he quotes you've used. Interesting... Till the next one!!

Behold the *Jihad of Estrogen* — 180 Proof

:rofl:

Praying for ultra Trump dictatorship.

I have to imagine that some fraction of WWJD evangelical Christians will be asking themselves sooner or later by this Fall:

According to the depiction of Jesus in the NT Gospels, who would it be more reasonable to expect Christ to vote for in the 2024 presidential election: Don Poorleone or Sleepy Joe Biden??

Hint: Who do you think he voted for in 2020? :mask:

Don Poorleone

Haha— never heard that one before. Made me chuckle a little, especially after just watching the Godfather.

I have to imagine that some fraction of WWJD evangelical Christians will be asking themselves sooner or later by this Fall — 180 Proof

I don't think they ask WWJD because they think they know what Trump has done, will do, and what has been done to him. While they may not regard him as The Messiah the do believe his is a messiah and like all messiahs persecuted by the enemies of God.

Biden "Boom" Market (since 2021)

NASDAQ (DJT) :rofl:

26March24 – $57.99 per share :gasp:

15April24 – $26.61 per share :down:

While they may not regard him as The Messiah the do believe his is a messiah and like all messiahs persecuted by the enemies of God. — Fooloso4

Or perhaps the only apparent option to remove the Biden cabal. Don't forget, Joe told immigrants to "Surge the Border", and gave Afghanistan back to the Taliban - where recently the supreme Poohbah stated he is bringing back stoning certain women to death.

Are you predicting Biden will go to war with Iran before the election? Are you also predicting this would help his chances of getting elected? — Relativist

↪Relativist Sure, why not. — Tzeentch

Looks like we're still on.

The US may appear reprehensive about a war with Iran on the surface, but the truth is that they have been planning for such a war since at least 2009.

It wouldn't be the first time Israel drags the US into a war, and I can assure you that Israel has a lot more reason to want to do so today than it had back in 2003.

15April24, Las Vegas, NV:

All across the country ... These are
Trump abortion bans. — Kamala Harris, VPOTUS

Do you remember the "red tsumani" that didn't happen in 2022? :mask:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/895573

There may be some who feel this way, but this does not obviate the fact that there are Evangelical Christians who see him as a messiah in a battle that is playing out on a cosmic scale of the end times.

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/896858

16April24 – $22.84 per share

the truth is that they have been planning for such a war since at least 2009. — Tzeentch

I watched the video, and read the Brookings report. The person in the video grossly misrepresents the report. Brookings does not state a plan, it lists options - and identifies potential negative and positive consequences of each. The author's premise is that there is some secret plan to go to war with Iran, and he interprets points in the Brookings document to in light of this premise. The fact that certain events have unfolded with some of the anticipated consequences is a testament to Brookings' analysis, not an implication that one particularly nefarious path has been chosen by the US, among all the permutations of paths outlined by Brookings.

Oh, how interesting.

I thought he represented the report splendidly.

Don't forget, Joe told immigrants to "Surge the Border" — jgill

Whilst Trump only told the Proud Boys to storm the Capital building. Biden is obviously by far the greater miscreant.

It'll be interesting to see how the funding s***fight unspools on Saturday. 'Moscow Marge' is going all in for Putin. If she rolls Johnson there's a possiblity the house will end up with Hakeem Jeffries as Speaker. That ought to learn 'em. :rofl:

Can someone explain why the level of political discussion, generally, in America, is akin to Twitter users making up funny names for their teachers?

It comes from the same place as confusing a continent's name with a country with a broken identity. New Zealand is heading there, the brain damage can already be seen in England, Canada, and starting in Australia.