If they were recognized and enforceable within a particular legal system then they would be limited by jurisdiction. Natural rights are supposed to be universal, but there is no universal legal system. In any case, natural rights are supposed to precede and transcend legal systems. — NOS4A2

I know that's the claim made about them. But a "right" that isn't a legal right is merely what someone believes should be the case. Someone who believes we have the natural right to do X believes that we all should be able to do X, for whatever reasons used to maintain that it is "natural" that we be able to do it. What if we cannot do it (for whatever reason)? In that case, those believing we have such a natural right claim only that we should be able to do it.

Such is the case with legal rights as well. Someone believes they should have a legal right to do X. Rather than appeal to nature, though, they appeal to those in power. The difference is that legislation is designed to let one man or group of men arbitrarily dictate to all other men what they may or may not do, not unlike slavery, which is contrary to natural law.

Such is the case with legal rights as well. Someone believes they should have a legal right to do X. Rather than appeal to nature, though, they appeal to those in power. The difference is that legislation is designed to let one man or group of men arbitrarily dictate to all other men what they may or may not do, not unlike slavery, which is contrary to natural law. — NOS4A2

Legal rights already exist. Why or when they came into existence is another matter. The law is the law, regardless of its merits, regardless of why it became law. One might claim a legal right is a natural right, but whether it is or not is immaterial to its status, its function, its enforceability.

Natural Law, I think, doesn't necessarily entail Natural Rights,although it isn't law, properly speaking. The Roman jurist Ulpian said of slavery that it is "contrary to nature." The ancient Stoics taught we should live "according to nature." Whether Roman jurisprudence accepted what we call "rights" is debatable. Roman citizens had a "right" to appeal to the Emperor (that's what Paul did, not that it did him much good, though it kept him alive for a time). A trial was required in certain cases, so perhaps that may be said to be similar to the "right to trial," but I think it was more a prohibition of certain conduct than a positive right, e.g. a citizen cannot be punished with death until a trial is held doesn't mean that he has a "right" to trial.

The ancient Stoics, as far as I know, never spoke of the "rights" of individuals. Instead, their ethics focused on proper conduct, virtuous conduct "according to nature." So, e.g., we shouldn't steal not because there is a right to private property, but because coveting and taking someone's property isn't virtuous--such things aren't important to the Stoic Sage.

So a woman is raped in a nation where the positive law permits it because she is the possession of the man who has committed this act.

Was this "act" a violation? If it was a violation, what was it a violation of?

What does it mean to be in accord with or contrary to nature? What this meant for the ancients, and for the philosophers of Liberalism, and contemporary thinkers is not the same.

What does it mean to be in accord with or contrary to nature? What this meant for the ancients, and for the philosophers of Liberalism, and contemporary thinkers is not the same. — Fooloso4

If I asked if it were moral to murder, would it be relevant to your analysis whether an ancient civilization found it moral? That is, why is it important to review now rejected concepts?

... why is it important to review now rejected concepts? — Hanover

Rejected? This may be an accurate reflection of your opinion but does not reflect what is going on in political think tanks and academic research.

So a woman is raped in a nation where the positive law permits it because she is the possession of the man who has committed this act.

Was this "act" a violation? If it was a violation, what was it a violation of? — Hanover

The people in that nation might be appalled that Americans let women with children languish in poverty, working multiple jobs trying to make ends meet until they end up in the emergency room with pneumonia, panicking because they can't stay home in bed. Is this neglect a violation?

The question ends up depending on what sort of foundation you put under your morality. How do you look at that?

So a woman is raped in a nation where the positive law permits it because she is the possession of the man who has committed this act.

Was this "act" a violation? If it was a violation, what was it a violation of? — Hanover

Are you asking me?

The law in effect wasn't violated, clearly. But no non-legal right must be violated in order for an act to be immoral. The rape was reprehensible regardless of any right or law.

The law in effect wasn't violated, clearly. But no non-legal right must be violated in order for an act to be immoral. The rape was reprehensible regardless of any right or law. — Ciceronianus

Something makes rape wrong. Whatever that is, we call it X.

1. Under both positive and natural law, it is a violation of X to rape.
2. Under positive law, X is the law of the legislature.
3. Under natural law, X is the law of morality.

If we changed the word "law" in #3 to "rules" or "theory" we'd have no disagreement. The quibble is over the term "law."

Is this a correct summation?

If we changed the word "law" in #3 to "rules" or "theory" we'd have no disagreement. The quibble is over the term "law."

Is this a correct summation? — Hanover

I think so. It seems I'm a legal positivist. I think the use of the words "law" and "rights" result in confusion, and the law is distinct from morality. I favor legal rights as I think they serve to put limits on governmental power. But rights which aren't legal rights are what people think should be legal rights if they're not already.

I favor virtue ethics and other ethics which aren't based on concepts of individual rights. People claim so many rights.

I think so. It seems I'm a legal positivist. I think the use of the words "law" and "rights" result in confusion, and the law is distinct from morality. I favor legal rights as I think they serve to put limits on governmental power. But rights which aren't legal rights are what people think should be legal rights if they're not already.

I favor virtue ethics and other ethics which aren't based on concepts of individual rights. People claim so many rights.

The words do cause confusion. The idea that nature or God confers rights is untenable. Only men confer rights. As a play on words, it is man’s natural right to confer rights; or in Spinoza’s terms, conferring rights is coextensive with his desires and powers.

But if this is the case, the idea that man can only confer rights or develop laws so long as he does so in some official form is equally untenable. Who gave them the right to do so? Neither God nor Nature, of course. But if positive law gives positive law the right to develop laws then my law gives me the right to eschew them. Positive law is ungrounded. It can appeal only to its own tradition, not unlike the Bible.

This is why the Nuremberg trials appealed to natural law and human rights, for instance. The Nazis were following the law, such as they were. Of what are they guilty? Of not being virtuous enough?

It is the case that we confer rights based on principles developed through a general understanding of universal human nature, whatever that may be. Some positive laws, too, have developed from this understanding.

The idea that nature or God confers rights is untenable. Only men confer rights. — NOS4A2

Another option is to regard certain rights as inherent. No one confers on us the right to not be murdered or enslaved.

But rights are not boundary markers separating us off. We are bound together in the recognition and protection of our rights.