Morality as Cooperation Strategies is complementary to consequentialism

Mark S

Two simple forms of consequentialism are “Behaviors that increase well-being are moral” and “Behaviors that minimize suffering are moral.” These claims define what is moral based on its consequences - what the ‘ends’ of moral behavior are. They are silent about the ‘means’ by which well-being is to be increased or suffering minimized.

Morality as Cooperation Strategies (MACS) summarizes the empirical observation that all past and present cultural moral norms are parts of strategies that solve cooperation problems (see https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/13929/what-if-cultural-moral-norms-track-cooperation-strategies/p1). For example, when people follow the Golden Rule and “Do not lie, steal, or kill” they are following heuristics (usually reliable, but fallible rules of thumb) for initiating the powerful cooperation strategy indirect reciprocity. MACS is silent about the ‘ends’ of the cooperation these strategies enable (silent about the ultimate goals people are cooperating to achieve).

So consequentialism proposes what ‘ends’ are moral and MACS observes what ‘means’ are moral. Ends and means are different categories of things. Perhaps they could be combined in a complimentary fashion?

Combining them, the new consequentialist/cooperation morality claims become:

“Behaviors that increase well-being by solving cooperation problems are moral” and

“Behavior that minimize suffering by solving cooperation problems are moral.”

The remainder of this post will argue that these combined forms provide better reasons for judging them as normative (what everyone ought to do) than the bare consequentialist forms. For purposes of this discussion, I will take what is morally normative to be “what all well-informed, rational people would advocate as moral regarding interactions between people” (similar to Gert’s SEP definition of normativity https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2020/entries/morality-definition/ ).

I will argue that including MACS is complimentary because doing so reduces or eliminates classic problems with consequentialism.

First, bare consequentialism has an implied over-demandingness feature: that it is moral for one person to suffer a huge penalty, of either increased suffering or reduced well-being, so many can gain a tiny benefit. The new consequentialist/cooperation morality requires moral behaviors to be parts of cooperation strategies and “cooperation” implies a lack of coercion. The absence of coercion in moral behavior implies that the over-demandingness as so-called ‘moral’ behavior has been eliminated. Moral principles without over-demandingness are more likely to be judged morally normative as “what all well-informed, rational people would advocate as moral regarding interactions between people”.

Second, bare consequentialism can lack innate motivational power because it is an intellectual construct. But the moral ‘means’ of the new consequentialist/cooperation moral principles are innately harmonious with our moral sense because these cooperation strategies are what shaped our moral sense. This innate harmony provides motivating power to incline us to act morally even when we have reasons not to.

The presence of innate motivating power in the MACS part of the new consequentialist/cooperation moral principles provides a second reason that these claims are more likely than bare consequentialism to be judged normatively moral.

Third, the problems that MACS solves are as innate to our universe as the simple mathematics that define them. Everywhere those mathematics hold in our universe, from the beginning of time to the end of time, intelligent beings must solve the same problems in order to form highly cooperation societies. MACS’ feature of cross-species universality and application could be intellectually satisfying and attractive for rational people. MACS cross-species universality provides a third reason that the new consequentialist/cooperation morality claims would be more likely to be judged normative than bare consequentialism.

I have not attempted to make a tight argument here that either of the new consequentialist/cooperation moral principles are normative by the above definition. I have argued only that the proposed consequentialist/cooperation morality is more likely than bare consequentialism to be judged as “what all well-informed, rational people would advocate as moral regarding interactions between people”.

Could MACS and either form of consequentialism be contradictory? I have not yet seen how they could be, but this looks like new, unplowed ground to me. There may be many surprises out there.

180 Proof

Two simple forms of consequentialism are [ ... ] They are silent about the ‘means’ by which well-being is to be increased or suffering minimized. — Mark S

I think the categorical goal implies, or constrains, every hypothetical means. To wit: reducing 'suffering' by any means which does not increase or exacerbate 'suffering'; increasing 'well-being' by any means which does not descrease or impair 'well-being'. "MACS" is possibly one such "means" in either case depending on, I think, how it is practiced with respect to 'minimizing suffering' or 'maximizing well-being'.

PhilosophyRunner

Could MACS and either form of consequentialism be contradictory? I have not yet seen how they could be, but this looks like new, unplowed ground to me. There may be many surprises out there. — Mark S

There is no contradiction as they are operating in categorically different spheres. But I think you also said this, so no disagreement here.

First, bare consequentialism has an implied over-demandingness feature: that it is moral for one person to suffer a huge penalty, of either increased suffering or reduced well-being, so many can gain a tiny benefit. The new consequentialist/cooperation morality requires moral behaviors to be parts of cooperation strategies and “cooperation” implies a lack of coercion. The absence of coercion in moral behavior implies that the over-demandingness as so-called ‘moral’ behavior has been eliminated. Moral principles without over-demandingness are more likely to be judged morally normative as “what all well-informed, rational people would advocate as moral regarding interactions between people”. — Mark S

I don't think MACS achieves what you claim it achieves. MACS is just as susceptible to the problem you outline. MACS would show human coorporation often has an out group that is excluded. It does not rule out causing massive harm to a few in order for the many to coorporate - this has been pointed out to you in the previous thread I think.

Second, bare consequentialism can lack innate motivational power because it is an intellectual construct. But the moral ‘means’ of the new consequentialist/cooperation moral principles are innately harmonious with our moral sense because these cooperation strategies are what shaped our moral sense. This innate harmony provides motivating power to incline us to act morally even when we have reasons not to. — Mark S

I don't think this holds. In fact my observations of "what is" recently, suggests that MACS would motivate those already motivated, and not motivate those already not motivated. Try to motivate an anti-vaccine person by bringing out more scientific studies. I think you will fail more often than succeed. And that failure would be because the motivation is values driven rather than technocratic.

Janus

The more important moral norms are, in my view, pretty much universal for merely pragmatic reasons and this ties in with Kant's deontology (which is a kind of non-particular consequentialism writ large). Any society that condoned lying, theft, rape and murder could not survive, let alone thrive.

180 Proof

↪Janus

:up:

PhilosophyRunner

The more important moral norms are, in my view, pretty much universal for merely pragmatic reasons and this ties in with Kant's deontology (which is a kind of non-particular consequentialism writ large). Any society that condoned lying, theft, rape and murder could not survive, let alone thrive. — Janus

This is true for how the in group is treated in different societies. But many societies that thrived had no problem murdering, stealing and raping their outsiders.

Which is one reason among many others that I find it problematic to base morality on an observation of what society did.

The other obvious problem is the is/ought difference, but even ignoring that sledgehammer throws up the above issue - many societies survived and even thrived with some moral values you or I would find abhorrent.

Edit - i am not even sure this is true for the ingroup. Here is an excerpt from wikipedia about a society that was very successful, and yet murdered their children:

"The Inca culture sacrificed children in a ritual called qhapaq hucha. Their frozen corpses have been discovered in the South American mountaintops. The first of these corpses, a female child who had died from a blow to the skull, was discovered in 1995 by Johan Reinhard.[9] Other methods of sacrifice included strangulation and simply leaving the children, who had been given an intoxicating drink, to lose consciousness in the extreme cold and low-oxygen conditions of the mountaintop, and to die of hypothermia. "

I wouldn't want to base my morality on that.

Banno

This thread seems to fall to the same criticism as the other - deriving an ought from an is, but not in a good way.

Such scientistic thinking seems oddly tone deaf; it entirely misses the question of what we are to do, how we are to act, while advocates appear either not to see this or not to think it important.

But thanks, @Mark S, as at least this is a topic with some merit. There's been a dearth of decent topics of late.

Janus

This is true for how the in group is treated in different societies. But many societies that thrived had no problem murdering, stealing and raping their outsiders. — PhilosophyRunner

Yes, we are no different, on the group level, from animals in that regard.

It is much more posiible now to develop a global notion of humanity than it has bee in the padt. It is arguable that our survival depends on it.

Here is an excerpt from wikipedia about a society that was very successful, and yet murdered their children: — PhilosophyRunner

That's an anachronistic and tendentious way of framing it; they would not have thought of it as murder

Mark S

↪180 Proof

To wit: reducing 'suffering' by any means which does not increase or exacerbate 'suffering'; increasing 'well-being' by any means which does not descrease or impair 'well-being'. "MACS" is possibly one such "means" in either case depending on, I think, how it is practiced. — 180 Proof

To reduce suffering (or increase well-being) for all as an end, I have been thinking that moral means will sometimes include a cost to be paid by those who are suffering less, or who have higher well-being. That is, a cost to those who can afford it that benefits the worst off.

I am not comfortable agreeing that a means can be found that “does not decrease or impair 'well-being'” or “increase or exacerbate 'suffering'” for anyone, ever.

That said, I like MACS for this task of regulating the means to morally achieve consequentialist goals for two reasons.

First, it advocates cooperation strategies which are positive-sum games. These strategies offer the possibility that no reduction in well-being or increase in suffering will be required of anyone – the best result.

Second, coercion is ruled out since the means are cooperation strategies. Ruling out coercion implies any reduction in well-being or increase in suffering is accepted willingly to help other people who are worse off – an intuitively morally acceptable means.

Mark S

↪PhilosophyRunner

I don't think MACS achieves what you claim it achieves. MACS is just as susceptible to the problem you outline. MACS would show human coorporation often has an out group that is excluded. It does not rule out causing massive harm to a few in order for the many to coorporate - this has been pointed out to you in the previous thread I think. — PhilosophyRunner

MACS begins as an observation about all past and present cultural moral norms (including the nasty exploitation of outgroups you mention) being parts of cooperation strategies. I agree, we cannot include the exploitation component of these norms that create cooperation problems as objectively moral means. (The morality of simple exclusion without exploitation is a more complex issue I want to do more work on.)

MACS as I envision it in the above consequentialist/cooperation moral principle defines 1) moral means as solving cooperation problems and 2) immoral means as creating cooperation problems. This evolved form rejects as immoral the exploitation component of domination moral norms.

I can see I need to do a better job of explaining how that evolution happens. Thanks for pointing that out.

I don't think this holds. In fact my observations of "what is" recently, suggests that MACS would motivate those already motivated, and not motivate those already not motivated. Try to motivate an anti-vaccine person by bringing out more scientific studies. I think you will fail more often than succeed. And that failure would be because the motivation is values driven rather than technocratic. — PhilosophyRunner

Science can tell us about the motivating emotions produced by the biology underlying our moral sense.

These motivating emotions can be taken to be empathy, gratitude, anger (at moral violations), shame, guilt, and elevation (a mix of pride, satisfaction, and optimism in the cooperative company of friends and family). All of these motivate either components of cooperation strategies or, in the case of elevation, are pleasurable biological rewards for cooperation.

Since these motivating emotions, like past and present cultural moral norms, were selected for based on their ability to solve cooperation problems, moral norms that solve cooperation problems can be innately motivating by our moral sense. A norm to initiate or maintain indirect reciprocity can be motivated by empathy and gratitude. A norm about punishing moral norm violators can be motivity by righteous anger (regarding others) and by shame and guilt (regarding ourselves). Elevation can motivate cooperation as a way of life.

Thus, I am confident that MACS components are innately motivated for everyone with a normal moral sense. Obviously, it would not be innately motivating for a rational psychopath.

180 Proof

↪Mark S

:ok:

Mark S

Janus
13.2k
The more important moral norms are, in my view, pretty much universal for merely pragmatic reasons and this ties in with Kant's deontology (which is a kind of non-particular consequentialism writ large). Any society that condoned lying, theft, rape and murder could not survive, let alone thrive — Janus

I agree. As I said in the OP regarding why this is true:

the problems that MACS solves are as innate to our universe as the simple mathematics that define them. Everywhere those mathematics hold in our universe, from the beginning of time to the end of time, intelligent beings must solve the same problems in order to form highly cooperation societies. MACS’ feature of cross-species universality and application could be intellectually satisfying and attractive for rational people. — Mark S

Isaac

they would not have thought of it as murder — Janus

Right.

So all you've demonstrated is that all societies have social mores.

You've not shown any unity regarding the content of those mores.

If 'murder' is just the word given to killings society thinks are wrong, then all societies are going to prohibit murder aren't they? It's the definition of the word - 'those killings which we prohibit'

Janus

↪Isaac

The point is that all societies will prohibit anything which is detrimental to their harmonious functioning. I haven't claimed that all societies would have exactly the same conceptions of murder, rape, lying and stealing. I believe that broadly speaking all societies would prohibit acts that they interpreted to be of those four kinds because broadly speaking no one wants to be raped, murdered, stolen from or lied to.

It's the definition of the word - 'those killings which we prohibit' — Isaac

The killings which will be prohibited are the ones that will cause social disharmony or at least unmanageable social disharmony; it's just pragmatism at work.

Janus

↪Mark S

Right, but I'm not convinced it is something which has evolved by natural selection, at least in human societies, so much as something which is simply chosen for pragmatic reasons.

Of course I could be wrong, especially if humans have evolved from earlier anthropoid species which acted more on instinct than rational choice, like other social animals presumably do. I also don't want to diminish the role of empathy, fellow feeling, in moral choices.

Isaac

I believe that broadly speaking all societies would prohibit acts that they interpreted to be of those four kinds because broadly speaking no one wants to be raped, murdered, stolen from or lied to. — Janus

But that's what the example of the Incas disproves. No one wants to be left on a hillside to die. Yet it was not proscribed.

The killings which will be prohibited are the ones that will cause social disharmony or at least unmanageable social disharmony — Janus

On what grounds do you claim this. It could just as easily be that the killings which are prohibited will be those which most harm the powerful.

Agent Smith

Jannat = Summa Cooperante!

:rofl:

PhilosophyRunner

I can see I need to do a better job of explaining how that evolution happens. Thanks for pointing that out. — Mark S

Yes, and I'll be happy to read your expanded explanation.

At the moment, this is what I see you doing, in order:

1. Observing what "is" through scientific methods
2. Pruning what you observed to remove the things you don't like and leave only those you like based on your values.
3. Presenting this as what "is" and claiming scientific methods. However it is not a scientific observation, it is a pruned version filtered by your values. You have already introduced imperative oughts here, but done so through the back door.
4. Deriving an "ought" from what you presented as an "is" in step 4. This runs into the is/ought problem

So really I see you making 2 mistakes. What you present as an "is", is not actually an "is." And then you try to derive an ought from an is.

If I may make an almost facetious analogy:

1. You take a raw chicken
2. You cook the chicken
3. You present this cooked chicken as a raw chicken
4. You blow on the chicken
5. You say that blowing on the chicken has cooked the raw chicken.

The thing is blowing on the chicken did not cook the chicken, and what you presented as a raw chicken was not a raw chicken in the first place.

Mark S

↪PhilosophyRunner

We profoundly disagree. I'll post a response in a day or two.

PhilosophyRunner

↪Mark S

I look forward to it. I will be busy for a couple of weeks, but I will read it with interest.

Incidentally, this kind of topic is the reason I got into philosophy during the pandemic in the first place. So even though I think your analysis is flawed, it is a topic I am interested in - how we can use moral philosophy to practically affect changes for the better, and how science can be used as an effective tool in this aim. I think science has an important role, but not in the way you describe.

Janus

But that's what the example of the Incas disproves. No one wants to be left on a hillside to die. Yet it was not proscribed. — Isaac

Such acts are only performed in a ritual context when what is seen as some overarching context trumps what individuals want. Besides I am speaking broadly, an exception or a few exceptions, even if they were not religious exceptions, would not disprove the general rule.

On what grounds do you claim this. It could just as easily be that the killings which are prohibited will be those which most harm the powerful. — Isaac

Then why are rape, murder, theft and lying generally prohibited in most societies? Sure it may be the case that those who have entrenched themselves in power can transgress such prohibitions, or make a special exception from the rule for themselves, without completely undermining social harmony, but so what?

Your points seem so trivial and carping that sometimes I think you just like to argue for the sake of it.

Banno

↪Mark S

I noted your previous use of heuristics. It seems to me that heuristics are a central part of virtue ethics, and that their use follows more directly there than from either consequentialism or deontology.

Both consequentialism and deontology seek an algorithmic approach to ethics, as if such things were calculable. The enormous complexity of event the most simple decisions weighs heavily against such an approach.

While cooperation is not itself a virtue, it is implicit in friendliness and magnanimity.

Isaac

Your points seem so trivial and carping that sometimes I think you just like to argue for the sake of it. — Janus

Of course you do. Because the alternative would require you to entertain the possibility that you might actually be mistaken.

Joshs

↪Mark S

Two simple forms of consequentialism are “Behaviors that increase well-being are moral” and “Behaviors that minimize suffering are moral.” — Mark S

I’m wondering how you would respond to Jesse Prinz’s moral relativist argument, which grounds moral values in innate emotional responses which become culturally conditioned to form an endless variety of moral values across the cultural landscape.

“Reason cannot tell us which facts are morally good. Reason is evaluatively neutral….moral judgments are based on emotions, and reasoning normally contributes only by helping us extrapolate from our basic values to novel cases. Reasoning can also lead us to discover that our basic values are culturally inculcated, and that might impel us to search for alternative values, but reason alone cannot tell us which values to adopt, nor can it instill new values….

We can try to pursue moral values that lead to more fulfilling lives, but we must bear in mind that fulfillment is itself relative, so no single set of values can be designated universally fulfilling. If my goals come into conflict with your goals, reason tells me that I must either thwart your goals, or give up caring about mine; but reason cannot tell me to favor one choice over the other.”

Applying this thinking to a specific example, Prinz would
argue that no cooperative meta-theory could bridge
the gap in values between core Trump supporters and social leftists. The best that could be hoped for is the use of rational argument to persuade both parties that neither side’s values are THE objectively correct values, and therefore each side’s perspective needs to be tolerated and even respected.

Do you think that MACS can achieve some better mutual understanding than this?

Andrew4Handel

It seems like we'd be better off with the ten commandments because they are less ambiguous.

Law seems to have replaced morality. We just need to enforce the law which already prohibits a lot of harmful behaviour but the law needs to prohibit even more harmful behaviour and then people vote on it.

I think it is harmful to try and manipulate moral behaviour from people because this makes people pray to ideas they wouldn't accept without coercion. It will just prove that social scientists can coerce a range of behaviour from people.

I think we just have to rely on people having spontaneous moral intuitions and emotions concerning harm and exploitation.

180 Proof

It seems like we'd be better off with the ten commandments because they are less ambiguous. — Andrew4Handel

Only 4 out of 613 "Commandments" concern morality, which are not unique to any 'peoples' at any time, so this statement doesn't make much sense.

Andrew4Handel

↪180 Proof

I was just referring to the lack of ambiguity in the 10 commandments.

As I have said elsewhere I think morality needs truth value and one reason for that is so that one feels compelled to be moral.

An ambiguous theoretical morality seems good for nobody. In the end we want compliance to some compelling rules.

I think we are probably actually stuck with perpetual moral disputes.

Tom Storm

↪Andrew4Handel

You shall have no other gods before Me.
You shall make no idols.
You shall not take the name of the Lord your God in vain.
Keep the Sabbath day holy.
Honor your father and your mother.
You shall not kill.
You shall not commit adultery.
You shall not steal.
You shall not bear false witness against your neighbor.
You shall not covet.

You'll note of the famous ten only four cover off on morality. And here's the problem. These commandments are pretty ambiguous, you need commentary or legislation to make them intelligible.

Ask Bill Clinton what adultery consists of. Is it oral sex or penetration? Is an open marriage adultery?
What is murder? Is killing in war ok? Self defence? How do we tell? Is abortion allowable?
Is taking land from First Nations people stealing? Is the way capitalism is structured and wage slavery a form of stealing?

Coveting? Isn't the entire model of capitalism and the Western way of life based upon wanting to enhance our status based on seeing the status others can achieve if they work hard?

The ten commandments are inadequate - where are the commandments on slavery, or environmental destruction, or war, or child labour, or the treatment of animals?

Andrew4Handel

The ten commandments are inadequate — Tom Storm

I wasn't advocating them seriously.

I was advocating commands over suggestions and theorising which is what people want from morality. for it to work like a command. Just tell people it is wrong to kill and theoretically no more killing.

I am a moral nihilist anyway. The more threads I read about morality the less convinced I am by it.

Are people saying there are things we should feel compelled to do? Are people saying there are objectively good and bad phenomena? I don't know what people are saying anymore.

Life is extremely complex and I don't believe most of it could be subject to moral type calculations.

Tom Storm

Life is extremely complex and I don't believe most of it could be subject to moral type calculations. — Andrew4Handel

I hear you and that's understandable.

I just pointed out the commandments and their lack of clarity as part of the general thrust of the conversation. It amuses me that when they ask Christians to name the commandments they often struggle to recall more than 2 or 3.

Are people saying there are things we should feel compelled to do? Are people saying there are objectively good and bad phenomena? I don't know what people are saying anymore. — Andrew4Handel

Yes, those are two of many choices. It's a veritable cornucopia of moral systems out there in the marketplace. I'm happy to sit with acts being assessed in terms of the impacts they have on conscious creatures and the environment. We can build oughts and ought nots from there, subject to debate and discussion. Morality, (even the 'god given' stuff) has never been much more than a conversation about how we treat others (and animals). Pragmatically we have no choice but to build 'codes of conduct' with each other. Well, the other choice is, of course, living in a failed state, where chaos and violence determine all the moves.

Janus

Of course you do. Because the alternative would require you to entertain the possibility that you might actually be mistaken. — Isaac

I accept the idea that I might be mistaken, but you have given me no good reason to think that I am. Do you accept that you might be mistaken?

Morality as Cooperation Strategies is complementary to consequentialism

Welcome to The Philosophy Forum!

Categories

More Discussions