What is my concept? — bert1

I'm not a mind reader. Spell it out, sir.

What is my concept? — bert1

yea, didn't think you knew.

.. which is only a "problem" for philosophers and not for neuroscientists. — 180 Proof

I'd say that's exactly why it's a problem, because they don't see it as a problem. If a person notices one's own deficiencies and incapability's, the person will have a healthy respect for those weaknesses, and work around them, knowing that they are weaknesses (blind spots). But when a person does not recognize one's own weaknesses, that person will forge ahead in blind confidence toward inevitable mishap.

Of course there is no appearance of a problem for the person forging ahead in blindness, at that time of forging ahead in blindness, the problem is only apprehended by the observer who understands what's going on.

Tell me then in what way "the hard problem ..." is a scientific problem particularly in neuroscience.

I explained in the last post. The problem is when the incapacities (blind-spots, to use the term introduced by Wayfarer) of the science are not recognized by the scientist. So for instance, a neuroscientist who believes that neuroscience is giving a representation of consciousness, such that the neurological activity being studied is equivalent (or something like that) to consciousness, would be a problem. Look back to this analogy:

In case anybody's interested in illusionism:

And then it's interesting to compare Frankish's thinking to that of Penrose:

a neuroscientist who believes that neuroscience is giving a representation of consciousness, such that the neurological activity being studied is equivalent (or something like that) to consciousness — Metaphysician Undercover

Can you give me an example of a neuroscientist you think is committing this error?

If that's what you mean, bert, I admitted that I don't. — 180 Proof

What we have is different theories. I'm a panpsychist. You, at various times have been a functionalist, enactivist, probably one or two other things I forget. The question is, do our theories compete? Are they theories of the same thing? That's what I'm trying to get at.

I'll put the question another way that doesn't involve you reading my mind, or even reading any of my posts (I gave my definitions a few posts ago in reply to Banno).

Please state, in your own words, what the hard problem is. I know you think it's nonsense, but that doesn't stop you stating it. I think that the flat-earth theory is wrong, but I can still state what it is.

You seem quite adamant that the concept is there, but some are 'missing' it, yet you don't seem to be able to provide the necessity that would set it apart from, say, ether, or humours, or phlem...loads of concepts which we made use of at one time, but turned out just not to refer to anything at all. — Isaac

That's a good question. Ether was proposed to solve a problem, namely a medium to carry electromagnetic radiation, or something. Humours were a way of explaining illness. These were crappy scientific theories, but scientific and somewhat testable, so were eventually abandoned for better theories. Consciousness isn't like that. It's just a name for something we know exists, namely whatever it is in us by virtue of which we can have experiences. And this definitely exists, unless you want to deny that we have experiences, which you might. The concept of consciousness in this sense is non-committal. It might turn out to be a ghostly ectoplasm. Or it might turn out to be a brain state. It might turn out to be a brain function. It might turn out to be integrated information. It might turn out to be a soul. It might turn out to be space. It might turn out to be a property of the quantum field. It might be an illusion caused by how we use language. Whatever. The point is, before we can start disagreeing about these theories, we have to agree on what it is these theories are theories of. That's the definition part. That's what, as usual, we are stuck on.

Concepts, unhelpfully, often contain a mixture of theory and definition, which makes things harder. It's helps if we ca separate them out.

the obvious fact — Wayfarer

Ahem...

This is my theory: we have a worldview that says individual humans possess qualities like creativity, initiative, depression, joy, etc. This developed out of an ancient worldview which populated the universe with living, conscious beings who expressed themselves through human action, as in the Homeric myths. It was like the psyche turned inside out

Some people have a double dose of our present worldview in which all the elements of the psyche are squashed into individual humans heads.

The fact that this worldview doesn't work in the extreme version of hyperindividualism, was pointed out by various philosophers including Wittgenstein.

Yet some people, like Dennett and Frankish, think that everyone looks at the world this way. I'm guessing that's because they look at themselves that way. They don't realize that some people don't really understand what it means to say that phenomenal consciousness is internal. It's not an object that has a location, so how could it be internal to something?

See what I mean?

It's just a name for something we know exists, namely whatever it is in us by virtue of which we can have experiences. — bert1

Do we know there's something by virtue of which we have experiences? Can't we just have them, does some additional factor need to 'allow' it?

unless you want to deny that we have experiences, which you might. — bert1

I wouldn't want to deny we have experiences, but this doesn't touch on the 'hard problem'. The hard problem has, as a foundational axiom, the notion that the things we talk about - experiences, awareness,... - ought to be causally connected to the objects of empirical sciences. That it's in some way odd that there's no direct connection. I reject that premise. It seems to me that we can talk of all sorts of things from consciousness, to god, to pixie dust... We all know what each other is talking about to some extent in each case (enough to get by) but it doesn't require any of those objects to correlate with something empirical science might reify.

Like 'Orange'. It's definitely a colour, and it's constrained in some ways by the actions of photons (objects of empirical science), but nothing in empirical science could ever say where orange ends and red begins, not because of some deficiency on empirical science, but because 'orange' just isn't that kind of a thing.

Do we know there's something by virtue of which we have experiences? Can't we just have them, does some additional factor need to 'allow' it? — Isaac

No particularly, I was just trying to relate the words 'consciousness' and 'experience' in a sentence such that they are linked in meaning, which I think they clearly are.

The hard problem has, as a foundational axiom, the notion that the things we talk about - experiences, awareness,... - ought to be causally connected to the objects of empirical sciences. — Isaac

Yes, I think that's sort of right. Of course, people who like to go on about the hard problem (me for instance) tend to use this a sort of reductio:

1) Assume that consciousness is caused/realised/instantiated/whatever by some physical processes
2) Figuring out exactly how seems impossibly hard
therefore 3) It's probably not the case that consciousness is caused/realised/instantiated/whatever by some physical processes

But this only has any force if we have a particular definition of 'consciousness'. If we define consciousness as a physical function, for example, the hard problem disappears. That's why definitions are absolutely crucial.

We all know what each other is talking about to some extent in each case (enough to get by) but it doesn't require any of those objects to correlate with something empirical science might reify. — Isaac

Sure, that';s true with things except consciousness. To put it in Cartesian terms, it is coherent to doubt the existence of pixies, God and phlogiston, but it is incoherent to doubt consciousness. Because doubting itself (arguably, I guess) entails consciousness. To doubt is the act of a conscious thing. So there is certainty attached to consciousness in a way that doesn't attach to invisible unicorns.

If we define consciousness as a physical function, for example, the hard problem disappears. That's why definitions are absolutely crucial. — bert1

Yeah, which we can, of course. Hence my invoking the Glasgow coma scale earlier. We can (and do) use the term sometimes in a perfectly 'physical function' kind of way. There's no one thing 'consciousness' is. It's just a word. Like most words, it's used in all sorts of ways with all sorts of degrees of success.

Yeah, which we can, of course. Hence my invoking the Glasgow coma scale earlier. We can (and do) use the term sometimes in a perfectly 'physical function' kind of way. There's no one thing 'consciousness' is. It's just a word. Like most words, it's used in all sorts of ways with all sorts of degrees of success. — Isaac

Indeed. Banno insists the Glagow coma scale is the only definition. Or at least all definitions are really aspects of one sense of consciusness, and that is a public, functional one.

it is incoherent to doubt consciousness. Because doubting itself (arguably, I guess) entails consciousness. — bert1

This only works if you define consciousness circularly as 'that without which its impossible to do things like doubt'.

The thing is, consciousness, in this sense, is not an empirical object which means we're not 'discovering' facts about it, were determining them. We don't 'find out' consciousness is required for doubting, we declare it to be so.

Banno insists the Glagow coma scale is the only definition. — bert1

Does he? What a twit. :roll:

we're not 'discovering' facts about it, were determining them. — Isaac

I was just saying this same thing. Worldview comes into play in the assumptions people make about it.

My old tutor at university, Stephen Priest, once said to me "Some of my colleagues haven't noticed they are conscious." I didn't take him seriously at the time. I thought it was absurd, these guys were smart guys. But I'm reluctantly coming to the view that he was right. It seems like the only realistic explanation for what is happening. — bert1

Are you saying 180 proof and I lack awareness, or lack the concept of awareness, or what? And how do you know this? What basis do you have for your claim? — Banno

It's sounding and playing out a bit like a discussion about religious faith from where I am sitting.

I was just saying this same thing. Worldview comes into play in the assumptions people make about it. — frank

Which renders the 'hard problem' meaningless. Why would empirical objects like neurons match some use of a word embedded in a certain culture? If we're not describing some.empirical object (or event) then it would be weird if some empirical objects matched up with it exactly. The 'hard problem' would emerge if there was a one-to-one correspondence. Then we'd have something odd to explain. That it doesn't is exactly what we'd expect. It's not even an easy problem, its not a problem at all.

It reeks of the No True Scotsman fallacy. Only true Scotsmen will understand Bert.

has yet to provide us with anything like a definition of consciousness. But he says he is a panpsyhist, (), so if he thinks rocks are conscious then it would be best for him not to provide such a definition.

This is a futile thread, flopping around all over the place.

↪Tom Storm It reeks of the No True Scotsman fallacy. Only true Scotsmen will understand Bert.

↪bert1 has yet to provide us with anything like a definition of consciousness. But he says he is a panpsyhist, (↪bert1), so if he thinks rocks are conscious then it would be best for him not to provide such a definition. — Banno

I've offered synonyms. That qualifies as a definition. I have invited you to be aware of your awareness, which you haven't yet done. If you had, that would be a kind of ostensive definition. Unfortunately I don't think it is possible to provide a definition in terms of things other than the thing defined. That's just how it is with foundational concepts.

Note that people who already have the concept have no trouble at all knowing what I'm talking about.

EDIT: can you make sens of my claim: "Rocks have experiences". Does that sentence have any intelligible meaning for you (regardless of whether you think it is true or false)?

I was just saying this same thing. Worldview comes into play in the assumptions people make about it.
— frank

Which renders the 'hard problem' meaningless. — Isaac

Does it? Remember that when gravity was first introduced into physics as a thing to be explained, no one imagined that it's a matter of curved space. The worldview of the time wouldn't allow that.

So as we go to explain phenomenal consciousness, couldn't the same problem exist? That we don't have a worldview that allows the explanation to appear yet? Why not?

:ok: So "the hard problem .." is not a scientific problem like I've stated.

Remember that when gravity was first introduced into physics as a thing to be explained — frank

But gravity was a word for the effect of empirical observations. We'd expect it to have an empirical explanation. Objects we measure seem to be drawn by some force (which we can also measure) so we need an empirical theory for what's going on. There's a gap there to fill.

With 'consciousness' (in the non-coma sense), there's no empirical objects being effected by a measurable force. They just don't share the same worlds at all, there's no gap to fill, no problem to solve.

Some people use 'consciousness' to talk about a possibly loosely connected set of vague feelings they've got. Why would we even want a neurological theory as to why, let alone expect one?

There's no direct neural correlate of angry either, nor fear, nor memory, nor 'idea'... These are all terms which do a job in human cultural interaction. It would be a miracle if they all happen to describe exact brain activities.

They just don't share the same worlds at all, — Isaac

What things don't share the same world? I don't know what you mean.

I'll wait for you to state clearly your "concept" which you claim I and @Banno lack and then I may further elaborate on what I've already written here:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/771417

I've offered synonyms. That qualifies as a definition. — bert1

These?

Equivalently:

- sentience
- the capacity to feel
- the capacity to know
- that in X whereby there is 'something it is like' to be X — bert1

Then:

Well, knowing and feeling and sentience are not each equivalent to the others.
— Banno

They can be equivalent, in this sense I'm trying to talk about. — bert1

Presumably sentience, knowledge and feeling are synonymous for rocks.

I have invited you to be aware of your awareness, which you haven't yet done. — bert1

What utter rubbish:

But I am aware of your post; so that's not right. — Banno

I'm also aware that I am aware of your posts... that's how I can post about them.

Your account is appallingly poor.

Edit: You have a notion that you want to put into words, but when you try, you trip over the expression. Perhaps it's because the notion cannot be made coherent.