No, not literally. — Constance

So we are talking about fantasies?

There are an infinite number of facts. — Constance

This is not true. Our world is quite limited. I know it may seem like we know, or can know, everything about the world but trust me, we don't, and I highly doubt that we have the capacity to know everything.

With value, there is something else, once the facts are exhausted for their content. there is the "non natural" property of good and bad. — Constance

There's nothing unnatural about the experience or concepts of 'good' or 'bad'.

This finds its justification in the pain or joy itself--these serve as their own presupposition, as I have said. — Constance

Our conditioning does not require justification.

They are not things that defer to other things for their meaning; — Constance

Everything requires context to have meaning.

... the expressed principle issues from the world, not just some arbitrarily conceived bit of pragmatic systematizing of our affairs called jurisprudence. — Constance

Arbitrarily conceived laws? :lol: But you're right of course, they don't issue from jurisprudence.

So we are talking about fantasies? — praxis

No. Someone extracts your tooth without analgesic: not a fantasy. In fact, far more ethically emphatic than any rule can possible be.

This is not true. Our world is quite limited. I know it may seem like we know, or can know, everything about the world but trust me, we don't, and I highly doubt that we have the capacity to know everything. — praxis

No, no. Facts. How far is London from your house? In fractions of an inch. In infinitesimally diminishing quantities? How many numbers are there?

There's nothing unnatural about the experience or concepts of 'good' or 'bad'. — praxis

Then you take issue with this, as do I, because the demarcation between what is natural and unnatural is arbitrarily drawn. But then the "goodness" in this sense taken up in ethical matters is sui generis. It is not like a good knife, say. A good knife is sharp, well balances, and so on. But say you want to use it for a production of Macbeth. Now the sharpness is not good at all; it is fact, bad. This is contingency, or relativity. There is nothing that cannot be recontextualized to change what it is. But then meta ethical judgments like pain is bad: these do not change. This is important: Conditions in whcih the judgment takes place can change, and this does make our ethical issues so ambiguous; but in cases where the entanglements are minimal, and the value as such is clear, even pure, as when you stick your hand in a fire, value is an absolute. Consider: your are given the choice to torture one child for an hour or a thousand children for eternity. Most would go the utilitarian way, and opt for the one child, but note: choosing this one child, because it is preferred on sound moral grounds of utility, in no way mitigates the suffering; indeed, unlike the the knife example in which a good quality changed to a bad one, here, it is impossible to mitigate the suffering. This is what is meant by the ethical bad (and good) being an absolute. It is not that it does not diminish here or there; rather, it cannot be mitigated. Nothing can undermine the badness, to speak awkwardly, of torture. Pain is apodictically bad.

And because this matter is not about logic's apodicticity, logic being the form merely of judgment, but about actuality, this absolute is existential. God's essence is her existentially absolute goodness. So called, "The Good".

Our conditioning does not require justification. — praxis

Talk about something being its own presupposition is to say it has no explanatory ideas the reference to which is required to explain what it is. It is stand alone what it is.

Everything requires context to have meaning. — praxis

And there you have it for all things, save ethics. Ethics' injunction to do or not to do in the matter of a phenomenologically pure case is indeed, stand alone. The justification for this claim s lies solely on the evidence the issues form the pain itself. If you have an issue with this claim, take a lighted match and apply it to your finger. Do you not "know," thereby, this injunction not to do thiszzzzzzzz/ to deny this would be disingenuous.

Arbitrarily conceived laws? :lol: But you're right of course, they don't issue from jurisprudence. — praxis

Legal matters are embedded matters, and the engine that drives ethics, value, is made ambiguous. Most of our moral thinking is ambiguous, but the issue here is God, and, as I said, God is a metaphysical idea, and so the embeddedness of the usual moral thinking is suspended, for this embeddedness is a construct of facts.

Someone extracts your tooth without analgesic: not a fantasy. In fact, far more ethically emphatic than any rule can possible be. — Constance

You seem to believe that sensations, like the sensation of pain, have a moral quality. Do believe that an unpleasant smell, for instance, is evil?

You seem to believe that sensations, like the sensation of pain, have a moral quality. Do believe that an unpleasant smell, for instance, is evil? — praxis

Careful about the connotative value of words. You say evil and we think we are in a dramatic moral conflict between God and Satan, and this is precisely what bad metaphysics does, the kind of thing that sends women to a fiery death and the spiritual sanitization of social rules. Rather, life goes on as it always has, and the sense of what is good, bad, right wrong, and everything in between continues as it is, for there are no stone tablets and God is not a person who speaks, judges, lays down the law. God is the insistence that moral nihilism is impossible. On the positive end, God is love. Why love? Because being in love is a powerful affirmation of our affectivity; no better reason than this. Love is the summum bonum.
But on the other hand, there is a point in this: If value is now to be cast as an absolute, then what of the plain regularities of our moral lives? Closer to Buddhism than anything else. In the Abhidamma, there are methods for achieving detachment from desires that include eating terrible tasting foods, and subjecting the body to a variety of discomforts (reminds me of the self flagellating Christians in a ritual renouncement of the world's and its original sin). The kind of thing that drove Nietzsche crazy (literally).

Careful about the connotative value of words. You say evil and we think we are in a dramatic moral conflict between God and Satan, and this is precisely what bad metaphysics does, the kind of thing that sends women to a fiery death and the spiritual sanitization of social rules. ... God is love. — Constance

You advise care in connotative phrasing and in the same breath demonstrate recklessness. "God is love" is rather emotive. Rules for thee but not for me, it seems.

How can you know God so well, btw, to know that "God is not a person who speaks, judges, lays down the law"? Do you believe that you are a God?

Getting back to your beliefs about sensations, I think evil is the correct term to use because you seem to be saying that sensations like pain have inherent moral qualities. I'm curious where you believe the moral quality exists. Is it somehow in the sensation itself or in what causes a sensation? For example, is the sensation of an unpleasant smell evil or is what causes the smell evil? A rotten apple will have an unpleasant smell and the cause of that smell could be determined to be bacteria. So does that mean bacteria is inherently bad or evil?

You advise care in connotative phrasing and in the same breath demonstrate recklessness. "God is love" is rather emotive. Rules for thee but not for me, it seems. — praxis

Emotivity is reckless? This does move into another part of the thesis. You mentioned unpleasant smells and the suggestion that these are elevated to a level of ridiculous prominence, and I thought there was certainly something to this. After all, talk about the apodicticity of value draws no exceptions, and does this not make the trivial absurdly grand? this kind of question pushes thinking into a clearer look at value-in the-world. So what makes a smell less grand than, say, Ravel's Mother Goose suite or Brahms's second piano concerto? Or being in love? There are caveats all over this, and this is where arguing, which depends on shared understanding, will not find the desired traction, for emotivity's attachments are not the same for us all.

Arguing that love is a value "phenomenon" (is it this? Phenomena are there, in the appearances of the world, after all. Does the "good" appear?), the desideratum and worldly consummation of which has existential "properties" that far exceed olfactory "properties" (and here we refer to something like Moore's non-natural properties; the "good" of the experience) is something of a fool's errand, for if it is not manifestly true, then forget it. But then, thee is a reason love is sung about, poetized about, and has been for centuries. there is this sublime dimension to it, and the desideratum of love exceeds, as Levinas would say, the desire. But one has to witness this to agree. Alas.

How can you know God so well, btw, to know that "God is not a person who speaks, judges, lays down the law"? Do you believe that you are a God? — praxis

Keep in mind that God has been reduced only what is evidenced here in the world. God is, I have said, the response the the radical metaethical indeterminacy of the world, and it is reduced out of the standard metaphysics that gives us these problematic features. God is not a person, a creator, a judgment, a principle, a kind old man, and should not be conceived in the traditional way as something impossible remote. God is an embodiment of the extrapolative possibilities built into the world at the level of meta-inquiry. I witness love and suffering (as terms of general subsumption) and these possess their own meta-dimension. I infer God from these, if you like.
So, when you ask, "Do you believe you are God," you are drawing upon what I call bad metaphysics, a medieval Christian (and other) ontology.

Getting back to your beliefs about sensations, I think evil is the correct term to use because you seem to be saying that sensations like pain have inherent moral qualities. I'm curious where you believe the moral quality exists. Is it somehow in the sensation itself or in what causes a sensation? For example, is the sensation of an unpleasant smell evil or is what causes the smell evil? A rotten apple will have an unpleasant smell and the cause of that smell could be determined to be bacteria. So does that mean bacteria is inherently bad or evil? — praxis

And so, if you take that rotten apple and rub it in someone's face, is this not by default (defeasibly) wrong?
It is easy to confuse categories of thought, so you have to be more careful. Bacteria being bad is not at all on the table. I won't review the argument already there. You see by now that such a thing is, frankly, remote from the discussion.

Here, again with some jargon, the moral precept is its own presupposition! Meaning, to witness the pain IS the precept! This, as you say, is the "Godly (I add the capital letter) approach to ethics." I think this right! But how is it Godly? — Constance

Exactly Constance. I ought to explain my choice of the word "Godly" you're right. The reason I use this word despite it being a heavily loaded term open to infinite and largely variable interpretations is that everyone worships something. Everyone has a "god".

What we worship - what we strive for, as in our personal "ideal" is a core value, some belief or set of beliefs that we hold as those of the greatest value to the self when we navigate and interpret the world and try to decide what it means and also what we ought to do to/for or through it (reality).

For some what they worship is capital/wealth (the purely capitalistic amongst us). For others it may be more humanitarian in nature, but really it can be anything: our partner whom we love at the deepest level, music, art, fame, knowledge. All very worthy pursuits in their own self contained directive.

But what some people value at their core is likely to face more issues - ethical and rationally arguable, than other possible gods - sources of reverence/worship/love. Generally the more strict, dogmatic and defined our object/concept of worship is, the more vulnerable it is to being logically or ethically/morally opposed by others, defeating our core values and thus purpose, agenda and means to form meaning in life. This is very unpleasant indeed as it leaves you in somewhat an existential crisis when others don't agree with nor condone what one worships, what one fundamentally values.

That leaves us with a simple question. What ought we worship that others can get on board with? What ideal is the most superior ideal that others can support and enjoy and accept as reasonable or ethical or preferably, both.

For me such an ideal/source of worship ought to be something self evident, its reason to exist is simultaneously why it exists - or as you said the precept (adjustment of behaviour in accordance with it) is its own presuppositions (inherent reason to do so).

For me the only thing that can justify itself as a source of worship is fundamental truth. Because to know it is to have vast knowledge of its applications, truth pertains to actual knowledge, not just falsity/delusion but something better - the relationship between the two, what's true is logical, its reasonable and it can be used to make the most potent arguments as to why it is indeed true.

Furthermore, to communicate it to others is to be ethical because telling the truth is a good thing, it leads to education instead of ignorance, and abolishes arrogance in place of understanding and empathy of one anothers point of view. To know the truth of how we individually perceive reality as well as what that true reality actually is - in essence to know everyone's individual hang ups (paradoxes and contradictions between them as well as the fundamental truth of it all) is a most useful tool/device to increase awareness of it.

And many in the past have with varying success described that dynamic - Buddhism with the cycle of samsara, karma and nirvana (the peaceful bliss of knowing that what you believe is both correct personally and in reality at large) etc, taoism with their universal "flow", abrahamic religions with their prophets and the word of god (the truth).

A fundamental truth would be flawless - both moralistically and rationally. If one worshipped say money instead - then they have to justify why they ought to be wealthier and more privileged than another. They have to justify every issue to arise from the personal acquisition of wealth and the impoverished which naturally arise as a necessary opposite.

This is why I used the term "God", the "logos", the fundamental principle/law behind science, spirituality, trial and error, change, free will, etc. Something with ultimate explanatory power. Now that is something worth pursuing regardless of what we name it. But I would call it God.

Emotivity is reckless? — Constance

I don't think so, or rather I might think it is under particular circumstances.

God is not a person, a creator, a judgment, a principle, a kind old man, and should not be conceived in the traditional way as something impossible remote. — Constance

There are all sorts of conceptions, I imagine. You seem to believe very strongly in your conception so naturally I'm curious how you could have such strong beliefs. I speculate that in order to believe that you know God this well is to believe that you are a God or Godlike yourself. Is that not a reasonable speculation?

if you take that rotten apple and rub it in someone's face, is this not by default (defeasibly) wrong? — Constance

As far as I can see the only way it could be wrong by default is if there were somehow an inherent moral quality to the sensation or specific actions involved, in which case it could not be possible for rotten-apple-rubbing-in-the-face to be right in any way. I can imagine several ways that rotten-apple-rubbing-in-the-face could be seen as good. Perhaps the apple is moldy, for instance, and contains penicillium which could act as an antibiotic to help prevent the infection of a wounded face. Or it could be part of a hilarious slapstick bit. I love slapstick. Or it could be a punishment and seen as good because it may help to correct poor behavior of some kind. I also imagine that it may be possible that someone could simply, and perhaps inexplicably, enjoy having a rotten apple rubbed in their face.

But then meta ethical judgments like pain is bad: these do not change. This is important: Conditions in whcih the judgment takes place can change, and this does make our ethical issues so ambiguous; but in cases where the entanglements are minimal, and the value as such is clear, even pure, as when you stick your hand in a fire, value is an absolute. — Constance

Dewey had a good argument against utilitarian ethics based on pain-pleasure, as explained by Hilary Putnam.

“The assumption that people act only on self-interested motives was sometimes defended on the basis of the hedonist psychology of Jeremy Bentham, the father of utilitarianism, which held that everyone ultimately "really" desires only a subjective psychological quantity (called "pleasure" by Bentham) and that this "quantity" was a purely subjective matter. As John Dewey put it long ago,

"When happiness is conceived of as an aggregate of states of feeling, these are regarded as homogenous in quality, different from one another only in intensity and duration. Their qualitative differences are not intrinsic, but are due to the different objects with which they are associated (as pleasures of hearing, or vision). Hence they disappear when the pleasure is taken by itself as an end."

This disappearance of the qualitative differences is (as far as importance to the agent's "happiness" is concerned), of course, just what makes it possible for the utilitarian to speak of "summing pleasures, "maximizing" them, and so on. But if Dewey's alternative view is right (as I believe), and if

“agreeableness is precisely the agreeableness or congruence of some objective condition with some impulse, habit, or tendency of the agent,"

then

"of course, pure pleasure is a myth. Any pleasure is qualitatively unique, being precisely the harmony of one set of conditions with its appropriate activity. The pleasure of eating is one thing; the pleasure of hearing music, another; the pleasure of an amiable act, another; the pleasure of drunkenness or of anger is still another."

Dewey continues,

"Hence the possibility of absolutely different moral values attaching to pleasures, according to the type or aspect of character which they express. But if the good is only a sum of pleasures, any pleasure, so far as it goes, is as good as any other-the pleasure of malignity as good as the pleasure of kindness, simply as pleasure.”

This is why I used the term "God", the "logos", the fundamental principle/law behind science, spirituality, trial and error, change, free will, etc. Something with ultimate explanatory power. Now that is something worth pursuing regardless of what we name it. — Benj96

Of course, I have to nit pick a bit, you know, philosophy. How is it that the logos can confer value agreement? We can argue, and I think this right (in fact, I think philosophy's mission is to replace religion, and philosophical argument will replace religious dogma; and this is something of an inevitability ...in a few hundred years or so, if we're lucky) but a bringing people together will require either a very liberal attitude that accepts what is really not agreeable or appreciated in the comportment of others who are different; or an agreement in values, such that everybody lives comfortably with others because they are essentially the same. The former is a tall order. Really, nobody wants to live with others who are so morally and aesthetically remote.
The logos refers to ideas, and rationalists tend to hold that the world will unfold in agreement is we could only "discover" the logical foundation of all things. They think there is a fabric of reason(in one way or another) that binds all things together, an if we could just see this for what it is, it would be like a revelation!
But I don't think this is right, simply because the logos is generally not conceived as a value-bearing concept, and what really separates us is our value differences.
So, I agree, this dialectic process of reasoning things through to their conclusions is the way things should be; but I don't think the world is that Hegelian (not that Hegel was an abstract rationalist. I'd actually have to look at what he says on this. His idea the "the rational is the real" is more complicated than this. I need to put aside three or four months and do just Hegel), that it is in reason's agreement in the end that will bring all things and people together. I think, rather, that, instead of a kind of logical hierarchy (ideas yielding better ideas) of the world, there is a value hierarchy. Look at this from a point of view of evolution (which I generally don't do): Here we are, and have come a long way from the primordial soup of things. What is the most salient feature of this journey? All that can be said in response this will beg a significant question, which is the value question. We have arrived at a place where there is music and art and this thing called happiness and misery and culture taken up in a human agency that is intensely engaged.

Hume once said that if it were up to reason as reason, reason would just as soon wipe out all humanity, for there is here nothing of value-meaning-content in reason. Reason is an empty vessel of logical structure, and possess none of this dimension of ethical shoulds and shouldn'ts and rights and wrongs. But value, now there is something palpable: the feels and feelings of the world! But they are unwieldy to agreement.
I do agree that there is in all of our affairs there someting as you say, science, spirituality, and all the rest of what we are, but the "behind" is a very mysterious idea. Keeping in mind that, as Wittgenstein understood, the logos cannot apprehend itself; it cannot say what the logos is, for the saying presupposes the logos. This "behind" is elusive; and yet: what is elusive really is possessed in[/, the existence we witness all the time. This is the key to penetrating into this mysterious "behind" of metaphysics. It is not to look behind or beyond and the like; rather, it is to realize that what is manifest IS the behind of things.

The most fundamental attachment is knowledge of the world. — Constance

This is a very important point, and it should also be emphasized that knowledge of the world is not lived experience.

of course, pure pleasure is a myth. Any pleasure is qualitatively unique, being precisely the harmony of one set of conditions with its appropriate activity. The pleasure of eating is one thing; the pleasure of hearing music, another; the pleasure of an amiable act, another; the pleasure of drunkenness or of anger is still another."

Dewey continues,

"Hence the possibility of absolutely different moral values attaching to pleasures, according to the type or aspect of character which they express. But if the good is only a sum of pleasures, any pleasure, so far as it goes, is as good as any other-the pleasure of malignity as good as the pleasure of kindness, simply as pleasure.” — Joshs

But this kind of thinking denies that there can be a category of aesthetics, denying that each occasion of aesthetic experience is a kind of sui generis. I can't say I understand this in light of his Art as Experience which makes the aesthetic into a generalized pragmatic consummatory event. Art is "wrought out" of the art object's coming to being in the pragmatic struggle to produce it, and so, it has been said that this makes the well placed punch in the boxing ring inherently aesthetic. This sound to me like an attempt to conceive of the aesthetic homogeneously under a pragmatic interpretation of experience.

This is a very important point, and it should also be emphasized that knowledge of the world is not lived experience. — Janus

Buddhists are certainly attached to their system of beliefs.

You seem to be in love with generalizing.

I was hoping the comment might inspire you to be less general. It seems to have failed.

I'm being very specific in saying that you seem to be in love with generalizing, that is I am referring only to you. Are there generalizations I've made, that you'd have me reconsider?

I’m not in a tooth pulling mood at the moment so if you’d care to say more about the comment of yours that I responded to with my beloved generalizations that would be great, or you can just ignore me.

This is a very important point, and it should also be emphasized that knowledge of the world is not lived experience. — Janus

A tough cookie in that one: what is "knowledge of the world"? And what is "lived experience"?

Maybe the goal is to have maximal vitality of mind, which experiences helps nurture. Emotionalized rationality keeps us always moving forward. One drawback of Buddhism *seems* to be that the excitement for the future, wherever that may be, may perhaps be considered maya. Buddhist say they want to extinguish desire, but perhaps this is yet another paradox. Mustn't we desire to extinguish?

A tough cookie in that one: what is "knowledge of the world"? And what is "lived experience"? — Constance

I meant discursive knowledge; the point is that such knowledge is always in the form of subjects knowing objects, or knowers knowing what is known, or objects analyzed in terms of their predicates, Lived experience is prior to that and not given or apprehended in such terms.

Buddhist say they want to extinguish desire, but perhaps this is yet another paradox. Mustn't we desire to extinguish? — Gregory

Unless perhaps the state of peace (lack of desire/ lack of the pursuit of control/ of making demands on others and the self) is equal to a state where contradictions/paradox has dissolved away. A sort of ego death.

Maybe desire is a process of an ego. And ego wants. Selflessness does not want, it simply "is/be's"

Buddhist say they want to extinguish desire, but perhaps this is yet another paradox. Mustn't we desire to extinguish? — Gregory

They believe that it is a desire of a qualitative difference and it extinguishes itself (when accompanied by the practices). But more importantly, I think, there is a dualism at the heart of Buddhism. Accept what is outside you, but don't accept all of what is inside you.

Or...let's cut the limbic system off from the rest of the brain. Isolate it, and then atrophy the pathways there to other sections.

On the surface it can seem accepting (Buddhism) and training us to accept, not fight. But when it comes to emotions and desires, it cuts them off from expression and action. Buddhists may claim that they accept emotions and desires, since they notice them arise and dissappear in consciousness without judgment (supposedly). But in fact they practice (train) NOT allowing emotions to become sounds, be expressed. They train not acting on desires. They train discoupling natural impulses, and their practices and even texts implicitly and explicitly judge and attack them. Of course, Buddhism is not alone in doing this. However they aim to do this totally.

philosophical argument will replace religious dogma; and this is something of an inevitability ...in a few hundred years or so, if we're lucky) but a bringing people together will require either a very liberal attitude that accepts what is really not agreeable or appreciated in the comportment of others who are different; or an agreement in values, such that everybody lives comfortably with others because they are essentially the same. The former is a tall order. Really, nobody wants to live with others who are so morally and aesthetically remote. — Constance

All very good points. Ideally philosophy would subsume religions, perhaps not all of them because religions differ in their degree of dogmatic beliefs. Some are strict, fundamentalist and at times very imposing, therefore very easily reasoned against, others on the otherhand are more intuitive like taoism and Buddhism perhaps and therefore more relatable or approachable because they aren't trying to assert specifics so much, but rather a general idea.

Afterall, all religions, all spiritualities and philosophy and science are all observing and interpreting the same thing - reality. The universe.

I doubt all religion or the concept of religion will ever be dissolved fully by philosophy. My reason for example is that people almost always make the assumption that belief in a God automatically means one is religious. I believe in a god but I'm not religious I'm spiritual. I think intuition and empathy have a place beside reason and objective accounts of logic (as science exemplifies).

But I continously get bombarded with shock and intense debate from people that assume I'm religious. When I said no such thing. Because the idea of a god that they have is not the same as the god I ascribe to so they falsely categorise me. They believe religion is the only mode to perceive a god.

As I said the word "God" is not that useful when it's heavily loaded with abundant assumptions and contradictions. When it means something different to everyone. Even atheists have a belief in a god - the concept which they reject in their minds as non-existent. But presumably that is a religious dogmatic interpretation of "God" that they reject. You can't be atheist towards all possible interpretation of gods both past present and future, because you don't know what they are unless you ask the people who hold those beliefs. Hence why the term seems to persist for eons in human societies - ancient and modern alike.

But my interpretation of the word is apt for me because it includes a basis for consciousness (self/ personhood/awareness) as well as the external reality (universe). Anyone can coin their own term whenever they wish and for whatever purpose.

Hume once said that if it were up to reason as reason, reason would just as soon wipe out all humanity, for there is here nothing of value-meaning-content in reason. Reason is an empty vessel of logical structure, and possess none of this dimension of ethical shoulds and shouldn'ts and rights and wrongs. But value, now there is something palpable: the feels and feelings of the world! But they are unwieldy to agreement.
I do agree that there is in all of our affairs there someting as you say, science, spirituality, and all the rest of what we are, but the "behind" is a very mysterious idea. Keeping in mind that, as Wittgenstein understood, the logos cannot apprehend itself; it cannot say what the logos is, for the saying presupposes the logos. This "behind" is elusive; and yet: what is elusive really is possessed in[/, the existence we witness all the time. This is the key to penetrating into this mysterious "behind" of metaphysics. It is not to look behind or beyond and the like; rather, it is to realize that what is manifest IS the behind of things. — Constance

How artfully expressed. I agree. Reason without ethics (something objectively unprovable outside of consciousness, emotions and feelings) is cold, callous and dangerous. It can get things done but without consideration for how it ought to be done to get there. It's robotic. I feel this is why we often consider Artificial intelligence as sinister.

For example perfect logic to solve the problems caused by humanity (climate change, poverty, inequality etc) is to destroy humanity. No humans, no human problems. Its entirely rational but it is not the logos (ultimate logic) because that would have to answer to ethical considerations and the value of that.

Similarly ethics by itself (pure emotion/moral urgency) without reason is emotive agency/motivation without a means to apply it. It is erratic, irrational and aimless. No vision for outcomes. Its pure impulse. Trying to do good without knowledge is equally dangerous. The road to hell is paved with good intentions.

So for me it comes down to the Logos (the ultimate logic) being a harmony between ethics and reason. Ethics and reason both address what ought to be done to reach a goal. But without the help of eachother they are both blind in their own ways. Nature shows us that equilibrium is the only way forward. Its the most stable set of affairs for emergent properties (goals).

And nature is built in cycles, frequencies, repetitions. And what is a cycle/circle but the combination of the irrational (Pi - wandering aimlessly ad infinitum and never repeating itself, erratic) and the rational (a discrete line that goes from A to B and is predictable along all of its points). Only when combined do we get something that can change - has the ability to do work/get things done, but ultimately stays the same/is regulated - a cycle.

the logos cannot apprehend itself; it cannot say what the logos is, for the saying presupposes the logos — Constance

Hmm. Well I'm not so sure. I think it cannot apprehend itself when it is biased (too reasoning/rational or too emotive/ethical/irrational). I think the logos perhaps only knows itself through its own inherent equilibrium, when it is balanced, when "all things are considered"). It can only have "revelation" of itself when it "is" itself, its true nature.

Maybe the goal is to have maximal vitality of mind, which experiences helps nurture. Emotionalized rationality keeps us always moving forward. One drawback of Buddhism *seems* to be that the excitement for the future, wherever that may be, may perhaps be considered maya. Buddhist say they want to extinguish desire, but perhaps this is yet another paradox. Mustn't we desire to extinguish? — Gregory

When you say, "excitement for the future, wherever that may be, may perhaps be considered maya,"I think you've hit one the nails in this business squarely on its head. The thought that emotions keep us pushing forward is not just a description of motivational dynamic, it is one of the structure of thought itself. After all (borrowing here rather obviously from a lot of philosophical history), to experience at all is to experience in time, and it is not so much IN time as it IS time. For me, this is one of the most profound things a philosopher can discover about the world: in the perceptual act itself, thought is conditioning experience; it is "always already" there, in the glace, the gaze, in which something appears and is tacitly understood without explicit understanding of the terms of discovery, I mean, the fact that seeing at all in interpretative, and not at all a "seeing" what is before me, for the understanding that is engaged is bound in a temporal dynamic of past/present/future, and it is not as if there really "is" such a thing" as the past or the future. Really, is it even possible to affirm the past AS the past? It cannot be witnessed, for to witness at all is a "present" event; so the past is never the past, really; it is an adumbration (to borrow) of an impossible-to-conceive "real" past. This is a revelation, if you think about it. Past is neither an empirical nor apriori concept. In fact, it is a genuine fiction, as is the future. Rather, past and future are pragmatic terms, useful, obviously; but in an existential setting that is utterly transcendental. What of talk about the historical record of one's education, informing occurrent affairs to anticipate in readiness for the future? This is a staple in experience analysis across disciplines, and it certainly is right to talk like this, but not at the level of basic questions; not here, in the talk of foundations that underlie everyday existence. Here we go as far as analysis will go, and this temporal dynamic falls apart very quickly.

Nor does the present survive, for this is a contingent term, meaningless without the past or the future. As I see it, it is important to see that this is not an abstract discussion, for as I feel and think even now, as I write, I am not In this; I am this. So what does a Buddhist do if not literally annihilate the structure of time, what you are calling maya. To meditate is to stop time, but this is not meant as a metaphor. the difficulty in understanding such a thing lies in the abiding foundation of time itself, which is, to speak plainly, the world, or, the world of illusion: this living, and importantly, existential "going along with" the thrust of this past-present-future.

A major theme of existentialism is freedom, and behind this is Husserl's phenomenological reduction which is a "method" (as meditation is a method) of suspending knowledge claims that implicitly tells us what the world is, and the "naturalistic attitude" of the sciences is his primary concern, for antecedent to to such claims, is the intuitional underpinning that provides the givenness of the world that is presupposed by science. Husserl believed inquiry can isolate this horizon if intuitions, and there discover absolute "presence". He has been attacked by almost everyone for this strong claim.

But then, these doing the attacking are philosophers, and not, well, "spiritual" inquirers.

Anyway, time, at the basic level of analysis, is key to an analysis of what Buddhists and Hindus call enlightenment. I am quite clear on this.

I meant discursive knowledge; the point is that such knowledge is always in the form of subjects knowing objects, or knowers knowing what is known, or objects analyzed in terms of their predicates, Lived experience is prior to that — Janus

I would agree, as long as it is clear that "prior to" is understood not to say that one can have an an experience the is free of language and its meanings. Rather, the "lived experience" must be discovered IN this. Language and culture have to suspended in the openness of freedom, and this can be a radical suspension, but it is not that to think (all thinking is inherently discursive) is to cancel its possibility. I recall James' "blooming and buzzing" infant: this is what it would be like to without language.

If Buddhism is metaphysical, maybe it can be classified as absurdism. Accepting contradiction as paradox changes how the mind thinks

If Buddhism is metaphysical, maybe it can be classified as absurdism — Gregory

Not sure if I agree that Buddhism is absurd. Is karma - the idea that if you behave as a d*ckhead (selfish) you naturally precipitate hostility against you not true? Nice people don't like, endorse nor support unkind, self promoting behaviour.
And will make it their agenda not to propagate that - by not supporting those that encourage such poor behaviour. If you take advantage of someones good nature you may benefit temporarily/in the short term, but the next time you encounter problems and need help they will not be so forthcoming to aid you.

On "desire" in Buddhism, the more you want and the less you get the more you suffer. "Greed is the bottomless pit" - never satisfied by what it already has, always in anguish that it doesn't have yet more.

On the contrary, wanting very little material wealth and preferring to Foster/enable good relationships offers security in that your "like-ability" to others ensures that your suffering or lack of a resources is an emotive source for others to aid you/ help you to feel secure and free once again. Your kinship is returned with gratitude and acquisition of the necessary means to provide you basic comforts/sustain you - the sharing of provisions. Good karma.

If I desire everything there is nothing left for my friends/loved ones. It's Egocentric. But if I desire only for my loved ones to thrive, and they recognise that, the karma will be employed to carry me on their successes. A share of the benefits sought and received.

Accepting contradiction as paradox changes how the mind thinks — Gregory

Contradiction and paradox are the same thing. Two assumptions that are irreconcilable with one another. For one to be true the other must be false. But there is always a third option - obtaining the knowledge as to why they are both correct based on their individual self-referential truth.

Imagine two people looking at the numbers 69 from opposite sides. One says its 69 the other says its 96. Both are correct from their individual perspective, the information that has been omitted is their ability to walk around the inscription and view it from one anothers perspective.

They can then realise that context (from what angle they apply meaning) is essential. But contexts can be changed.

the understanding that is engaged is bound in a temporal dynamic of past/present/future, and it is not as if there really "is" such a thing" as the past or the future. Really, is it even possible to affirm the past AS the past? Past is neither an empirical nor apriori concept. In fact, it is a genuine fiction, as is the future. — Constance

Husserl believed inquiry can isolate this horizon if intuitions, and there discover absolute "presence". He — Constance

For Husserl , the past, in the form of the retentional , and the future, in the form of the protentional phase, belong to the present. The immediate ‘now’ is inseparably all three phases. This a priori tripartite structure of the now is no fiction.