• Bartricks
    With great difficulty.
  • Agent Smith
    0 isn't divisble. where x is real.

    What follows? Any ideas?
  • Daniel

    Maybe with the help of a taxidermist.
  • Daniel

    0 = the mind; or the mind and 0 belong to the same category of things?
  • Agent Smith
    0 = the mind; or the mind and 0 belong to the same category of things?Daniel

    That feels right!
  • praxis
    With great difficulty.Bartricks

    I imagine that a hemispherectomy ain’t no walk in the park either.
  • 180 Proof

    I imagine that a hemispherectomy ain’t no walk in the park either.praxis
    One side-effect of split-brain surgery is two distinct minds (i.e. phenomenal self models) with personalities which can diverge over time. Also, split personality disorder demonstrates the "divisibility" of human mind.
  • unenlightened
    I struggle to see what can be meant by the suggestion that mind is indivisible. Clearly @Bartricks' mind is completely separate from everyone else's and of a much finer construction; and each of our minds are divided from the others. The nearest I can get would be to say that mind is like water; each of us has their separate cup of water, some muddy and some salty and so on, but the separation is temporary, and somewhere is the Great Sea of Mind whence we all came and to which we all return.

    Those that recall MarsMan, will be familiar with the idea of mind as a 'noncount noun', and in this way it makes sense to me that the mind of a mouse is complete as the mind of any human; big or small the cup is always filled with water and water is everywhere the same and in that sense indivisible.
  • Isaac

    Interesting. What's the cup, in this analogy?
  • unenlightened
    A life, a brain, I suppose. and the mud is personality and identity.
  • Isaac
    A life, a brain, I suppose.unenlightened

    Mmm. I asked because I happened to be reading this thread in the middle of a conversation I was having with @Janus about mental events. It struck me that it's odd to assume mental events are different to brain activity in one sense (in the sense that phenomenology can give us true statements about mental events without being constrained by neuroscience), but then have one's concept of the mental constrained again by science in it's 'en-cuppedness' (to use your analogy).

    Why the cup? Why not just the great sea of minds? As I said on the other thread, it sometimes seems to me that my wife knows what I'm thinking. It's only science that tells me she can't. So if science doesn't restrict what mind is (only brain), then why not ditch the idea that minds are private at all, or singular, or anything.

    Maybe it's a colander?
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