The time lag argument for idealism

Bartricks

First, it is basic principle of rational inquiry that appearances enjoy default justification. That is, if something appears to be the case, then we are default justified in believing it to be the case. To put it another way, if something appears to be the case, then we have reason to believe it is the case, other things being equal.

Don't deny that principle. If you do, you won't be able to argue for anything. And that's dumb. It'd just be another way of inanely responding 'but how does anyone know anything?' So don't. You will. But don't.

Anyway, there appear to be events occuring now. That is, there appears to be a present in which events are occurring. There are events that appear to have present-ness, then.

The default is that they are indeed occurring now. That is, that which appears to be happening now, really is happening now.

If a theory about reality implies that a whole load of our appearances are actually false, then that's a black mark against that theory. It is evidence - default evidence - that the theory is false.

Imagine my theory is that everything is made of Edam cheese. Well, very little appears to be made of Edam cheese. That's good default evidence that my theory is false. If I insisted that the appearances are all faulty because they conflict with my theory, then I'm just a dogmatist who is more convinced that everything is made of Edam than I am that following evidence is a way to find out what's true.

So, if a theory about reality implies that all our impressions of presentness are false, then that's a big black mark against that theory. It is default evidence that the theory is false. The job of theories about reality is to respect the appearances, not ignore them. (Having said that, it is not reasonable to think that 'all' appearances are accurate - it is reasonable to expect that some will be false. But if a theory implies that most or all appearances of a certain sort are false, then that's a black mark).

Now, bearing all this in mind, if materialism is true, then given what we know about how our brain responds to the world it inhabits, all our impressions of presentness are going to be false. For on the materialist view our sensations are caused by an external material world interacting with our brains. But although simultaneous causation is surely possible, the simple fact is that the events in the brain seem to lag behind the events they are responses to. So it takes time for an impression to be created in our minds. And surely that means that no impression of presentness is going to be accurate, for by the time it has been created the events it is representing to be occurring are no longer present. Thus if materialism is true then the evidence shows that our sensations are of a past state of the world. Yet they represent the state to be present, not past. So the presentness they represent the events to have is not there. We are, it seems, prey to a systematic hallucination of presentness if materialism is true.

A lot of people are so wed to the idea that materialism is true they can't help but simply conclude that this is indeed the case: that everything we perceive to be happening now, in fact happened a split second ago. But they're just dogmatists. They're always with us and in the past they would have been religious bigots. Now they're materialism bigots. Different worldview, same characters.

But it is default evidence that materialism is false. And pretty powerful evidence too.

Note, the same problem does not afflict immaterialism. For by hypothesis our sensations of presentness are not created in us by some material process. And so there is no problem supposing that things are as they seem, temporally speaking. That is, immaterialism does not imply that our sensations of presentness are false, for it does not imply that they are the product of a process that takes time to occur.

Luke

if materialism is true, then given what we know about how our brain responds to the world it inhabits, all our impressions of presentness are going to be false. For on the materialist view our sensations are caused by an external material world interacting with our brains. But although simultaneous causation is surely possible, the simple fact is that the events in the brain seem to lag behind the events they are responses to. — Bartricks

I don't consider it to be an issue of materialism vs idealism, but an issue of how to define the present moment. Is the present moment defined as the time at which - as you say - we respond to events? Or, is the present moment the earliest time at which those events we respond to can be measured/recorded?

I believe that one can be a materialist and still define the present moment as the time at which we respond to events; the time at/of which we find ourselves conscious.

Bartricks

↪Luke

Would you agree that we have an impression of presentness? That is, some sensible events appear to be happening now, whereas there are others that appear to have pastness (and then we say that we seem to be remembering them).

Luke

↪Bartricks

Yes.

Bartricks

↪Luke

Well that impression of presentness is had of the events that our sensations are giving us an awareness of, rather than of the sensations themselves (though it can be of them too when we introspect). That is, at time t2 I have a sensation. The sensation is of event p. And it has presentness - that is, it represents the event to be now. But if that event actually occurred at t1, then the presentness that I sensed it to have, it would not have. My sensation was present, but what it represented to be present was not.

Luke

That is, at time t2 I have a sensation. The sensation is of event p. And it has presentness - that is, it represents the event to be now. But if that event actually occurred at t1, then the presentness that I sensed it to have, it would not have. My sensation was present, but what it represented to be present was not. — Bartricks

Have you heard that seeing stars (or starlight) is looking back in time? So when you look at the stars you might be seeing light that was reflected from a star millions or billions of years ago. Does that situate the (i.e. our) present moment at millions or billions of years ago? I don't think so.

I don't think you're saying anything different to what I am. I acknowledge that an event can occur at t1 and that the earliest we can be aware of it is at t2. But you have ignored or misunderstood my point that we need not define the present moment as being at t1. It can also be defined as being at t2 - even by a materialist.

Bartricks

↪Luke

My point was that if my sensation represents the event p to have presentness, then for that sensation to be accurate the event - not my sensation of it - would need to have presentness. But it wouldn't have if it was actually present at t1, not t2.
If you say that presentness is when the sensation of presentness occurs, then it is not 'of' presentness but is the presentness.

180 Proof

↪Bartricks

Describe how "immaterialism" – contra perceptual time-lag – accounts for the e.g. doppler effect or light-velocity constant. Thanks. :roll:

Luke

My point was that if my sensation represents the event p to have presentness, then for that sensation to be accurate the event - not my sensation of it - would need to have presentness. But it wouldn't have if it was actually present at t1, not t2. — Bartricks

To determine that your sensation falsely represents the event p as being in the present (at t2) presupposes that t1 is the present, not t2. My point is: don't presuppose this, since either t1 or t2 could be defined as the present. If t2 is defined as the present instead, then your sensation truly represents the event p to "have presentness".

If you say that presentness is when the sensation of presentness occurs, then it is not 'of' presentness but is the presentness. — Bartricks

If t2 is the present, then you could (possibly) say that your sensation is the present, or you could say that your sensations represent event p to be in the present. I would say it's the latter.

Bartricks

↪Luke

If we have a sensation of presentness, then actual presentness will be that which is capable of rendering it accurate. But only something that is actually present - that has actual presentness - can render accurate an impression of presentness.

If event p occurs at t1, then it is present at t1, not t2. Otherwise it would not be correct to say it occurs at t1.

If I have a sensation that represents even p to be present, then in order for that sensation to be accurate p would need to be present.

But if event p occurred at t1 and my sensation of its presentness occurs at t2, then my sensation is inaccurate. For at the time of the occurrence of my sensation the event it represents to be present does not have presentness but pastness.

So, we do not decide in advance when the present moment is. We look to our appearances to tell us, for that is how we're aware of it. But if materialism is true, then they tell us it is where it isn't.

Luke

If event p occurs at t1, then it is present at t1, not t2. — Bartricks

Only if you define presentness, or the present, in that way.

I am not denying that an event occurs at t1 and that we are aware of it at a later time t2. I am only denying that we must situate the present at t1 instead of t2.

Bartricks

↪Luke

I am not denying that an event occurs at t1 and that we are aware of it at a later time t2. I am only denying that we must situate the present at t1 instead of t2. — Luke

So you think that present determines the past?

Bartricks

↪Luke

I am not denying that an event occurs at t1 and that we are aware of it at a later time t2. I am only denying that we must situate the present at t1 instead of t2. — Luke

What I mean is, if the event of p occurs at t1, would you admit that it is present at t1? It seems to me that you want to say that despite p occuring at time 1, it is present at a later time.....that, to my mind, makes no sense.

Bartricks

↪Luke

My view is that the present moment is when our sensations tell us it is.

So, if I sense that p is present, that is default evidence that p is present.

But if won't be present if materialism is true. It'll be past.

You, if I have understood you correctly, want to say that this is not true for the materialist can simply insist that an event can be present at a time later than that at which it occurs. Which I think is incoherent.

Luke

My view is that the present moment is when our sensations tell us it is. — Bartricks

That's what I'm saying, too.

What I mean is, if the event of p occurs at t1, would you admit that it is present at t1? It seems to me that you want to say that despite p occuring at time 1, it is present at a later time.....that, to my mind, makes no sense. — Bartricks

I assume we have been using t1 and t2 as follows:

t1 = the time that an event occurs
t2 = the time that we become aware of, sense, or respond to that event.

You've just said in the first quote above that the present moment is the time that we are aware of - "when our sensations tell us it is" - which means the present moment is at t2. However, you are also saying in the second quote here that situating the present moment anywhere but t1 makes no sense to you?

Bartricks

↪Luke

That's what I'm saying, too. — Luke

Good, so we agree that in order for my sensation that p is present to be accurate, p needs actually to have presentness.

I assume we have been using t1 and t2 as follows:

t1 = the time that an event occurs
t2 = the time that we become aware of, sense, or respond to that event. — Luke

Yes.

You've just said in the first quote above that the present moment is the time that we are aware of, which means the present moment is at t2. — Luke

No, I said that in order for an impression of presentness to be accurate, the event it represents to be present would have actually to be present.

So, if at t2 I get the impression that event p - an event that occurred at t1 - is present, then that impression will be inaccurate.

I'm not a materialist. I'm trying to refute it. So we both agree that my sensation that p is present is accurate. I think that's incompatible with materialism though. Or at least, incompatible with our best materialist explanation of how the world interacts with our brains. FOr if an event occurs at t1 then it is present at t1.
An event can't occur earlier than it is present, can it?

Merkwurdichliebe

Would you agree that we have an impression of presentness? That is, some sensible events appear to be happening now, whereas there are others that appear to have pastness (and then we say that we seem to be remembering them). — Bartricks

I would call it immediacy. But we mostly relate to the other in the realm of recognition and recollection (mediation).

Luke

Good, so we agree that in order for my sensation that p is present to be accurate, p needs actually to have presentness. — Bartricks

No, that's not that same as what you said here:

My view is that the present moment is when our sensations tell us it is. — Bartricks

If the present moment is "when our sensations tell us it is", then p is present when our sensations tell us it is, not whenever p actually occurred.

I'm not a materialist. I'm trying to refute it. So we both agree that my sensation that p is present is accurate. I think that's incompatible with materialism though. — Bartricks

And I'm saying it doesn't have to be. A materialist can also agree that the present moment is when our sensations tell us it is, and not when event p actually occurs. It's just about defining when to situate the present moment.

Marchesk

My view is that the present moment is when our sensations tell us it is.

So, if I sense that p is present, that is default evidence that p is present.

But if won't be present if materialism is true. It'll be past. — Bartricks

Someone yells across the canyon. You can hear the voice echoing off the walls. Do you think the experience of the echoes convinces you the sound was produces immediately?

Or, you see the lightning, then hear the thunder several seconds later?

Merkwurdichliebe

Someone yells across the canyon. You can hear the voice echoing off the walls. Do you think the experience of the voice convinces you the sound was produces immediately? — Marchesk

The moment you recognize the sound as originating from an external source, the immediacy is lost.

(Edit). Simply recognizing the experience as sound destroys the immediacy.

Bartricks

↪Luke

If the present moment is "when our sensations tell us it is", then p is present when our sensations tell us it is, not whenever p actually occurred. — Luke

But I also said that I am not a materialist. I think materialism is false partly because I think the present moment is where our sensations represent it to be. WHich is not where it would be if materialism were true. So:

1. If materialism is true, the present moment is not where our sensations say it is.
2. The present moment is where our sensations say it is
3. Therefore materialism is true

So you need to argue that if materialism is true, the present moment is where our sensations say it is.

But it isn't.

SO far as I can tell, what you're doing is insisting that the materialist can say that event p is present if our sensations say it is, even if it occurred earlier. That doesn't make any sense, does it?

If event p occurred at t1, then it was present at t1, not t2.

Luke

1. If materialism is true, the present moment is not where our sensations say it is. — Bartricks

Why not?

If event p occurred at t1, then it was present at t1, not t2. — Bartricks

Why?

Bartricks

↪Luke

1. If materialism is true, the present moment is not where our sensations say it is.
— Bartricks

Why not? — Luke

Because my sensation that event p is present will occur at t2, yet event p occurred at t1.

If event p occurred at t1, then it was present at t1, not t2.
— Bartricks

Why? — Luke

Because if an event occurs at time t1, then it is present at t1, not t2.

Luke

Because my sensation that event p is present will occur at t2, yet event p occurred at t1. — Bartricks

That doesn't answer why t1 must be the present moment. Why must the present time be equated with the occurrence of event p instead of when I am aware of it or sense it?

Because if an event occurs at time t1, then it is present at t1, not t2. — Bartricks

Present to who?

Bartricks

↪Luke

That doesn't answer why t1 must be the present moment. Why must the present time be equated with the occurrence of event p instead of when I am aware of it or sense it? — Luke

Well it does, because if the present is that which can render the impression of the present accurate, and the impression of the present occurs at t1, then that which can render that impression must occur at t1 as well.

Note, I have never ever identified the present moment with our sensation of it. Our sensations represent something to be the case - in this case the presentness of p is what they are representing to be the case.

What could render that impression accurate? A past event? No. For it is an impression of presentness, not pastness.

So only a present event can render an impression of presentness accurate.

Hence why p needs to occur when the sensation of p's presentness occurs if the sensation of p's presentness is to be accurate.

Can you explain to me how your view - that an event can occur at t1 yet be present later than it occurs - makes any sense at all?

Does it make sense to wonder "hmm, well, I accept that p occurred at 3 o clock - but when was it present?'

Marchesk

Because if an event occurs at time t1, then it is present at t1, not t2. — Bartricks

That obviously happens in many situations, so it would seem to be a problem for idealism, not materialism. The materialist would just say our sensations are delayed because it takes time for an event to reach our senses and register in our brains as a sensation.

What is the idealist explanation for various time lags? We know these lags exist. We can measure them!

Luke

Our sensations represent something to be the case - in this case the presentness of p is what they are representing to be the case.

What could render that impression accurate? A past event? No. For it is an impression of presentness, not pastness.

So only a present event can render an impression of presentness accurate.

Hence why p needs to occur when the sensation of p's presentness occurs if the sensation of p's presentness is to be accurate. — Bartricks

Your conception of accuracy is entirely based on the presupposition that the present time is equated with the occurrence of the event at t1.

Can you explain to me how your view - that an event can occur at t1 yet be present later than it occurs - makes any sense at all? — Bartricks

If you'd stop presupposing that the present moment coincides with the occurrence of the event, and entertain the possibility that the present moment coincides with our awareness of the event, then the present moment can be later than the occurrence of the event.

Agent Smith

The OP argues that for present to be true present, idealism hasta be true for it's not limited by the temporality of materialism.

Why does the present havta be true present?

Bartricks

↪Luke

So, to be clear, you think that if an event occurs at time t1, it can be present later? Again: that makes no sense. You seriously think an event can be present later than when it occurs?
You are welcome to materialism if that's something you think is coherent. It's not - it's mental.
When did it occur? T1
But when was it present? T2
Mental.

Bartricks

↪Marchesk

What? Read the OP

Bartricks

↪Merkwurdichliebe

What point are you making?

The time lag argument for idealism

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