What do you think lies at the heart of the distinction between the logical positivist's approach and Wittgenstein's? — Tom Storm

Pretty much that the Logical Positivists took on the logical analysis of the Tractatus, using it as a scimitar to slash away vast areas of philosophical humbug, only to find that they had by that act rid themselves of what is most important - what to do.

So during the second war Wittgenstein left Cambridge to work as a hospital orderly.

Maybe that's why some of his immediate successors converted to Roman Catholicism. — Wayfarer

Because of a love of wet blankets? They are adept at putting out fires.

Anscombe's conversion preceded her meeting Wittgenstein. Others were in the main already converts.

Of course logical operations are not logical operators, — Janus


How's that? — Banno

I was thinking along the lines of relations, insofar as they are actual and not merely conceptions, as logical operations ("logic" there pertaining to the logical possibility which constrains what relations can obtain), and the symbols via which we conceive them as logical operators. Again, the distinction between states of affairs and our representations of them.

Why does "on certainty" receive little to no mention? I found it fascinating? — Merkwurdichliebe

As did I.

I surmise that the rejection of the Tractatus' simples, of logical atoms, sits behind On Certainty. The certainties in the Tractatus are tautologies.

I don't see what you are getting at.

The question this seems to beg is whether there any relation-less predicates, and whether relations are any different than logical operations. Of course logical operations are not logical operators, but the connection there would seem to tie in to the idea that facts are both states of affairs and the true propositions that represent those states of affairs. — Janus

Are you puzzling over what logical operators correspond to in states of affairs?

Are you puzzling over what logical operators correspond to in states of affairs? — Banno

Not really. it seems to me that they correspond to actual (which I'm saying are also logical) relations.

So what could a "relation-less predicate" be? The predicates of the Tractatus just are relations: aRb

:cool: That's pretty much what I'd been thinking. Although I wasn't sure about W's take on that since I haven't studied the Tractatus.

The net result is that, whilst it's all well and good to gesture towards 'action not words', Wittgenstein often becomes a wet blanket to throw over the suggestion of anything whatever that is profound in philosophy. — Wayfarer

I think it depends on how you conceive philosophy. I understand W mostly from secondary sources and a couple of courses at Uni; I've dipped into, but never systemically studied, or read cover to cover either the Tractatus or the PI. I have read On Certainty, but that was nearly 20 years ago. In any case, as I understand W, he doesn't at all denigrate religion or religious faith or ideas; his claim is that metaphysical knowledge is not possible, but that does not rule out metaphysical ideas, and their possible affective power. Such are often the inspirations for literature, music and works of art.

To my way of thinking this is similar to a part of Kant's project; to establish the limits of knowledge, although W would put it as establishing the limits of what can be said. It also bears similarity to Heidegger's destruction of "onto-theology", which I take to be a critique of the tendency to objectify, reify, ideas as real entities. Heidegger also, though, had great regard for poetry in particular. Whitehead's "fallacy of misplaced concreteness" also springs to mind.

It seems there are common threads in Post-Kantianism, Logical Positivism and phenomenology, and other modern philosophical streams; an odd one out being Hegel and his followers, insofar as they tried to reincorporate intellectual intuition and absolutize it in the dialectical movement of Spirit..

That's my take, for what it's worth; I acknowledge I could be way off, being no scholar, and I'm very happy to be corrected by anyone who knows the subject better than I do.

What is the difference between Russell's and Wittgenstein's logical atomism? — Banno

I know there is a difference, as you do, because Wittgenstein challenges both Russell and Frege's views. You're right, it's a matter of exegesis, and there is a lot of disagreement over the details. I know that Wittgenstein had a different view of logic, and a different view of propositions, but I'd have to do some reading to review the material. This goes into much more depth than my little mind is prepared to go right now. People are having a hard enough time just trying to understand what W. meant by object and name, among other things.

At this point one will have a perfect logical language that sets out how things are by setting out the relationships between objects.

Is that a correspondence theory of truth? Yes. — Banno

I think he moves from a correspondence to a coherence view in Investigations. However, all of these terms are like counting angels on a pin for me. I'll engage, but why.. I don't know. I guess this language game is just one I don't play very much :wink: so I'll give it a go. But I'll go ahead and do a neologism (but not a private language thing) and say it's like "fuzzy coherence". Words rely on the uses with other words and the contexts of the uses, but they can never be defined perfectly once the context is known. It is always rough boundaries, not rigid ones for definitions.

what W. meant by object and name, among other things. — Sam26

Did W know what he meant :lol: Maybe he built himself a nice private language :rofl:

Cheers. Let me know of any further thoughts.

I think he moves from a correspondence to a coherence view in Investigations. — schopenhauer1

Well, I don't think that right. But we might do better than exchange mere opinions. But your comments so far lead me to believe that you are, as kinder teachers are want to say of a recalcitrant child, , "unavailable for learning".

"unavailable for learning". — Banno

Indeed that is just your opinion. Show me the error of my ways.. I honestly don't care if it's coherence theory or not.. There was a "resemblance" there.. you can say something like coherence is the complete opposite of Wittgenstein because of X, Y, Z.. something with all propositions must be true or whatnot.. I was just throwing an idea out there that struck me at the time. Sometimes I play speed chess, so made a move to further that thought..

Anyways, besides things like language game, private language, family resemblances, etc. Is there any real content in Wittgenstein? Not really. He had an aversion to theory, so we really can't say he supported much other than language is imprecise and based on how words are used in a particular context. All of which by the way, are pretty common sensical.. It's like he was sucked into Logical positivism and then rejected it and found somehow this rejection as profound when most people are already there in their everyday thinking of language. It's like telling me shit that I already know. I gave you a much more elaborate version of what I thought above that you gave not much of a response to. Not agreeing with the profoundness of the conclusions shouldn't be grounds for hating on ole schopy.

Sure, objects are simples. But...

↪Sam26

The question here is on of exegesis, not ontology. — Banno

My initial post:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/717045

Sam's post is in agreement with what I had posted prior to him.

For Wittgenstein, the atoms are relations between objects. — Banno

The German is:

2 Was der Fall ist, die Tatsache, ist das Bestehen von Sachverhalten.

The Pears/McGuinness translation:

What is the case—a fact—is the existence of states of affairs.

is more accurate. There is no term that in the German that corresponds to atomic facts. It is the Sachverhalten, the states of affairs, the facts that are relations between objects.

what is the point of 3.1432 — Banno

3.1432 Instead of, ‘The complex sign “aRb” says that a stands to b in the relation R’, we ought to put, ‘That “a” stands to “b” in a certain relation says that aRb.’

The statement that follows clarifies this:

3.144 Situations can be described but not given names.

'R' is not the name of the relation between 'a' and 'b'. What that relation is is determined by 'a' and 'b'. Simple objects contain within themselves the possibilities of their combinations.

Hmm. I am no longer clear as to what you are saying. From what you wrote, we agree that objects and names are not what folk mean when they talk of the atoms in Wittgenstein's logical atomism. I suggest that, whereas in Russel the atoms are things and predicates, the atoms in Wittgenstein's logical atomism are the relations, aRb. Russel built his account on objects and predicates, Wittgenstein built his on relations, and so had a simpler system.

Now I don't see what it is you are contending in this regard.

Did you get the chance to review Russell's comments in the introduction? What do you take to be the difference between Russel's and Witti's accounts?

Where exactly are Wittgenstein's facts

1.1 The world is the totality of facts, not of things
1.13 The facts in logical space are the world
1.2 The world divides into facts
2 What is the case, the fact, is the existence of atomic facts
2.01 - An atomic fact is a combination of objects (entities, things).
2.0121 - Just as we cannot think of spatial objects at all apart from space, or temporal objects apart from time, so we cannot think of any object apart from the possibility of its connexion with other things
2.021 - Objects form the substance of the world

Do external relations exist in a mind-independent world

Wittgenstein's "facts" depend on the reality of external relations in a mind-independent world. If external relations don't exist in a mind-independent world, neither can Wittgenstein's "facts".

The proposition "the tree is 3m tall" exists in the mind.

If external relations do exist, it could be a fact that there is a 3m tall tree existing in a mind-independent world, thereby allowing the expression "the tree is 3m tall" is true iff the tree is 3m tall.

If external relations don't exist, the proposition "3m tall tree" still exists in the mind, as well as the thought that the tree is 3m tall. The expression "the 3m tall tree" is true iff the tree is 3m tall is then analytic rather than synthetic.

I have never come across a persuasive argument that external relations do ontologically exist in a mind-independent world, and am persuaded, in particular, by F H Bradley's regress argument against external relations.

IE, for me, the main argument against Wittgenstein's theory of "facts" is the fact that they cannot exist in a mind-independent world in which external relations don't exist.

Wittgenstein's "facts" depend on the reality of external relations in a mind-independent world. — RussellA

Did he specify or imply mind independence?

I have never come across a persuasive argument that external relations do ontologically exist in a mind-independent world, — RussellA

I don't think relations "reside" somewhere. They're properties, aren't they? The apple's property of redness doesn't have a location. If the apple is red, that's a fact. It's a true proposition. It's an abstract object.

Abstract objects are not residents of time and space. They don't move or age.

From what you wrote, we agree that objects and names are not what folk mean when they talk of the atoms in Wittgenstein's logical atomism. I suggest that, whereas in Russel the atoms are things and predicates, the atoms in Wittgenstein's logical atomism are the relations, aRb. — Banno

"Atomic facts" and "atomic propositions" are Russell's terminology. Wittgenstein did not use this terminology. He refers to "elementary propositions" "Elementarsätze". An elementary proposition is a combination of simple or elemental names.

4.221 It is obvious that the analysis of propositions must bring us to elementary propositions
which consist of names in immediate combination.

Wittgenstein never names the names in elementary propositions. They are assumed a priori. Further, although he states the form of elementary propositions he never identifies an elementary proposition. 'a' stands in relation to 'b', but without identifying 'a' and 'b' we cannot say what the relation is between names or elementary objects.

And yet:

4.26 If all true elementary propositions are given, the result is a complete description of the world. The world is completely described by giving all elementary propositions, and adding which of
them are true and which false. An elementary proposition is simply one that cannot be further analyzed.

Did you get the chance to review Russell's comments in the introduction? What do you take to be the difference between Russel's and Witti's accounts? — Banno

In his introduction Russell says:

Facts which are not compounded of other facts are what Mr. Wittgenstein calls Sachverhalte, whereas a fact which may consist of two or more facts is a Tatsache: thus, for example “Socrates is wise” is a Sachverhalt, as well as a Tatsache ...

Socrates is not an uncompounded fact. 'Socrates' is not the name of a simple or elemental object and cannot be part of an elementary proposition. Russell's atomism maintains no such distinction between Wittgenstein's elementary propositions about unnamed names of simples and propositions about complex things such as Socrates.

Wittgenstein distinguishes between facts and propositions which are representations of facts.

The proposition "the tree is 3m tall" exists in the mind. — RussellA

The proposition, a statement about the height of the tree is true if and only if the tree is 3m tall. There is no measure 3m tall in a "mind independent world', but the height of the tree is not dependent on our measuring it. It may, for example, block the sunlight from trees that are not as tall. The statement "the tree is 3m tall" depends on the use of a standard of measurement, which is not mind independent, and what is measured, the tree, which is as it is independent of the mind.

You might argue that there are no trees or anything else independent of the mind. Certainly there no propositions independent of the mind, but whether this tree blocks the sunlight from shorter trees is not dependent on the mind.

Wittgenstein distinguishes between facts and propositions which are representations of facts. — Fooloso4

Did he really? That's odd.

2 What is the case—a fact—is the existence of states of affairs.

2.01 A state of affairs (a state of things) is a combination of objects (things).

2.141 A picture is a fact

2.15 The fact that the elements of a picture are related to one another in a determinate way represents that things are related to one another in the same way.
Let us call this connexion of its elements the structure of the picture, and let us call the
possibility of this structure the pictorial form of the picture.

Although a picture, that is, a representation or proposition is itself a fact, he makes a distinction between the representation and what is represented. A fact, the existence of a state of affairs shares the logical structure that enables propositions about a state of affairs, but the state of affairs depicted is not the same fact as the depiction.

2.151 Pictorial form is the possibility that things are related to one another in the same way as
the elements of the picture.

2.18 What every picture, of whatever form, must have in common with reality in order to be able to represent it at all—rightly or falsely—is the logical form, that is, the form of reality.

2.21 A picture agrees with reality or fails to agree; it is correct or incorrect, true or false.

Pictures are not the reality, the facts, they represent. There are false picture. They do not correctly represent the facts.

A proposition is not generally considered to be a representation. I'm glad to see that he didn't use that word.

A proposition is not generally considered to be a representation. I'm glad to see that he didn't use that word. — Tate

4.01 A proposition is a picture of reality.

4.021 A proposition is a picture of reality: for if I understand a proposition, I know the situation
that it represents.

Ah, I see. He's using the word in a unique way.

Ah, I see. He's using the word in a unique way. — Tate

It is a common mistake to fail to see when a philosopher, and not just Wittgenstein, is using terms in a unique way.

It is a common mistake to fail to see when a philosopher, and not just Wittgenstein, is using terms in a unique way. — Fooloso4

That causes a lot of confusion.

That causes a lot of confusion. — Tate

Why they do this is an interesting question. To begin to answer it requires looking at specific examples, but this does not yield a single answer that applies to all cases. In some cases it has more to do with language than with deliberate intention. The meaning of words change over time and pick up meanings that were not in use at the time of writing. But I think that in other cases it is deliberate. A philosopher may have a unique way of thinking that is reflected in a unique use of terms. There may also be a rhetorical intention. Begin with what seems familiar. I don't think we should disregard the possibility that the reader is being deliberately misled. Nietzsche, with his disdain for "the idle reader" comes to mind, or something is being hidden from the reader. Wittgenstein is aware of the need for this:

If you have a room which you do not want certain people to get into, put a lock on it for which they do not have the key. But there is no point in talking to them about it, unless of course you want them to admire the room from outside! The honorable thing to do is put a lock on the door which will be noticed only by those who can open it, not by the rest.
— Wittgenstein Culture and Value