Typically, we don't each play our own individual language-games. It isn't that I have my own concept of slab and you have yours. — Luke

How can you know my concept of Slab? How do you know that our concepts of a "slab" are the same? My Form of Life has been unique to me, the jobs I have had, the countries I have visited. This is the point of Wittgenstein's family resemblances, in that there is no one standard example of a "slab" sitting in a Government Building ready for inspection.

We can agree to the dictionary definition of a slab as i) a large, thick, flat piece of stone or concrete, typically square or rectangular in shape ii) a large, thick slice or piece of cake, bread, chocolate, etc, iii) an outer piece of timber sawn from a log, but many don't see the value in definitions. Definitions can end up circular and change with time.

You wouldn't get very far in the builder's language-game if you repeatedly fetched a hammer in response to the command "Slab!". — Luke

I feel the same in the philosopher's language game.

You are talking about us each having our own private language. Wittgenstein took issue with that idea. — Luke

If concepts didn't exist in the mind, but only in a community, such a community would be a community of zombies, none having a private concept or private sensation.

Cavell in The Later Wittgenstein makes the point that Wittgenstein never denied that we have private thoughts and feelings

Other philosophers, I believe, are under the impression that Wittgenstein denies that we can know what we think and feel, and even that we can know ourselves. This extraordinary idea comes, no doubt, from such remarks of Wittgenstein's as: "I can know what 70 * MUST WE MEAN WHAT WE SAY? someone else is thinking, not what I am thinking" (II, p. 222); "It cannot be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in pain" (§5!46). But the "can" and "cannot" in these remarks are grammatical; they mean "it makes no sense to say these things" (in the way we think it does); it would, therefore, equally make no sense to say of me that I do not know what I am thinking, or that I do not know I am in pain. The implication is not that I cannot know myself, but that knowing oneself-though radically different from the way we know others--is not a matter of cognizing (classically, "intuiting") mental acts and particular sensations.

Having private thoughts and feelings is not the same as having what is called "a private language".

As the analogy of the beetle in PI 293 illustrates, private sensations do drop out of consideration within the language game, not that private sensations drop out of consideration.

The next step in improving the theory that the meaning of a word is its use in language is to begin to incorporate the principles of Linguistic Idealism, and to clarify the consequences to language of the distinction between Indirect and Direct Realism. — RussellA

I guess defining Linguistic Idealism as saying that language is what shapes our understanding more than pre-linguistic or meta-linguistic faculties (like cognitive frameworks that might be posited in a Kantian philosophy let's say), then I would imagine that is the case. However, I would argue there are things that need to be in place for language to even be a thing for Witt- social arrangements of humans, the ability to have language in the first place, perhaps even intentionality, a history of human evolution leading to the ability to use language as humans do. So in this sense, I would say that leads to a sort of "realism" that gets to a world that has preconditions for his Language Idealism to be a thing. I am not sure what that really means for a theory of idealism, realism, or something else.

@Bano @Sam26

You are talking about us each having our own private language. Wittgenstein took issue with that idea. - @Luke

RussellA: Cavell in The Later Wittgenstein makes the point that Wittgenstein never denied that we have private thoughts and feelings… Having private thoughts and feelings is not the same as having what is called "a private language".

As the analogy of the beetle in PI 293 illustrates, private sensations do drop out of consideration within the language game, not that private sensations drop out of consideration. — RussellA

This makes me understand a lot of what you have been saying. You may have been butting heads with people (and with understanding the Investigations) because you are saying the word “private” for two things. One is Wittgenstein’s specific philosophical sense of “private” as having some “thing” in your mind for all of language, every “thing” you say. What is important for you, I think, is better expressed as something personal (which is not all the time either, as I will discuss below). So your ownership of your inner life is: a secret; not that there is some thing always there that is unknown to others, “unknowable”, which is what Wittgenstein means by “private”). So a “secret” is just kept from others, because it is unexpressed, you have to let it out, it is hidden (not “private” in Witt’s sense)—this is the way our inner life works, in the sense of: is judged as meaningful (not, as it is misunderstood, knowing the science of our brain), what matters to us about being a self. If you look at the Index of the PI under expression it is a core idea to understand in this context.

So you have been correct to insist that we do have individual feelings, and even experiences that are inexpressible to others entirely (the awe of a sunset)—though ordinary language is perfectly capable of making us intelligible (for us to agree we are like others), and so it is our choice not to, and so ethically our duty or responsibility to be understood (not start as different, individual). The fact of our inner life is what Wittgenstein means when he asks us to look at why we think he wants to deny that (#308) (in his investigating and deconstructing why we want something pure, certain in us, continual, always known).

If concepts didn't exist in the mind, but only in a community, such a community would be a community of zombies, none having a private concept or private sensation. — RussellA

So if we reframe not having a “private language” (not having a thing inside us, like a “concept” in our “mind”) and look at it as the fear of not having an inner life, then: yes, we might be a “zombie”, a puppet, speaking only others opinions, etc. Emerson will call this “conformity”. Wittgenstein speaks of us as being blind (to others, but also ourselves). The article I offered points out well that philosophy in this sense measures not what we ought to do, but how much we find, know, and are ourselves in contrast to “community”.

However, community does allow the easy ordinary flow of our lives together; most of the time your “experience” is just like mine (#253); we both just “went shopping” or “have a headache”—to preserve our individuality is a different thing than saying my feelings, experience, “consciousness” are always different than yours. But sometimes we need to take a stand, differentiate our experience (our lives). But this is the exception. Only sometimes, Wittgenstein says, we are lost, do not know how to continue, say, a concept into a new context, or from the failure or disappointment with our ordinary criteria (what matters to us, how things usually go). This is when he is saying classical philosophy abandons our responsibility to ourselves by abstracting to ensure myself, my relation to the world, to others.

I think and have hope this will allow you to make great strides in being able to talk about what concerns you here while understanding what Wittgenstein is getting at.

This is when he is saying classical philosophy abandons our responsibility to ourselves by abstracting to ensure myself, my relation to the world, to others. — Antony Nickles

But do all "philosophies" really do this, or just some? There are some that are all about the immediate, personal, social, etc.

But do all "philosophies" really do this, or just some? — schopenhauer1

What Wittgenstein is looking at is one of classical philosophy’s responses to skepticism: trying to solve skepticism (deny the fact that Wittgenstein’s investigation finds about our human condition; the truth it records Cavell will say); some also try to accept its conclusion but work around it (most of modern philosophy); or give up and abandon philosophy (which some people say Wittgenstein is doing). I would say the battle with skepticism, “moral relativism”, etc., has been the crux of “analytical” philosophy. I can’t think of examples that don’t other than what people call “continental” philosophy, which I would categorize as: accepting the world and just investigating how it is (Foucault, Arendt, Rousseau, Machiavelli, Confucius, etc.)—more of just a social commentary.

I would say the crux of analytical philosophy has been the battle with skepticism, “moral relativism”, and the like. I can’t think of examples that don’t other than what people call “continental” philosophy, which I would categorize as: accepting the world and just investigating how it is (Foucault, Arendt, etc.)—more of just a social commentary. — Antony Nickles

This seems a bit dismissive... But I will grant you analytical philosophy. But look at someone like Schopenhauer.. His philosophy though somewhat technical and architectonic, is also very much about the everyday human condition, and one's own individuation in reality. I think his philosophy is one whereby Witt's ideas on philosophy don't quite fit.

I’ll admit I have not read Schopenhauer (which is long overdue given my interest in both Witt and Nietzsche), but I am claiming that the Investigations is specifically about our “human condition” (in relation to knowledge) and “one’s own individuation” (thus the importance of how a certain picture obscures how individuation actually works—see my response to RussellA just above.) I am not trying to dismiss anything; I am just trying to show how strong the fear of it is, thus how pervasive the issue, and how multi-faceted the responses are. I am not trying to say this is the only issue in all of philosophy of course. Just that people don’t usually realize that what they are theorizing about and for, falls under this banner, and thus is based on the same fears and desires that Wittgenstein uncovers, along with the attempt to have knowledge or intellectualization solve our separation, ignore the limitations of knowledge.

[reply

That last quote is a good one for Fooloso4. — schopenhauer1

Thank you for that information. It reinforces my suspicion that:

Your practice and experience with interpretation seems to be quite removed from mine. — Fooloso4

I have often quoted the following:

Working in philosophy -- like work in architecture in many respects -- is really more a working on oneself. On one's interpretation. On one's way of seeing things. (And what one expects of them.)

(CV, 24)

In this compact statement he touches on three things that are central to my work in philosophy:

Working on oneself
Interpretation
One's way of seeing things

I don’t see that at odds.

I don’t see that at odds. — schopenhauer1

What is 'that' and what is it not at odds with?

Perhaps I misunderstood what your point was in saying the quote was a good one for me.

This may or may not apply, but if not in this case then in others. I think there may be some here who think that interpretation is just gathering and giving information, which is assumed to occur without thought or insight.

Baking a cake is more than getting the ingredients together.

I mean this is essentially what I’m saying I just add that one can synthesize one’s own philosophy, using one’s own ideas or ideas from others too. All of this equals insight. It’s not just that one gets the “right” interpretation but how you integrate and or use it and evaluate it to then synthesize it and weigh and evaluate underlying ideas about the world using your own reasoning and against other ideas etc.

Purely interpreting the author means nothing to me other than you understood the authors idea (although this opens up bigger ideas of if this can be the case or even if this should be the case…Depending on genre).

“Students and scholars of all kinds and of every age aim, as a rule, only at information, not insight. They make it a point of honour to have information about everything, every stone, plant, battle, or experiment and about all books, collectively and individually. It never occurs to them that information is merely a means to insight, but in itself is of little or no value.” - Schopenhauer — schopenhauer1

This mirrors Wittgenstein’s insights about the limits of knowledge, and our desire to have knowledge be everything, that knowledge might equal virtue, will be an answer in place of us, of our responsibility to see for ourselves, to expand our vision; that the value of philosophy is an insight beyond what can be told. This is why I’ve been saying we have a desire to have knowledge (purity) replace our other relations to the world (and others) beyond it, apart from it.

Every man takes the limits of his own field of vision for the limits of the world.” - Schopenhauer — schopenhauer1

I can see this as an analytic statement; perhaps as an insight into our misplaced myopathy out of fear of our lack of control of the world. Even if I haven’t read this right just yet, I still think he is trying to get at the reasons and desires we have that hold us back, just as Wittgenstein is with the interlocutor (that Schopenhauer’s “students” and “every man” share the same fear of skepticism). So I would say they have a similar interest, project. That Wittgenstein uses a different method I would say is because of the specific and entrenched tick he has to dig deep to—that because of his path he is closer to it, has to walk us through it as he undergoes his own insight; though now I think I better understand your preference for Schopenhauer’s style.

How can you know my concept of Slab? How do you know that our concepts of a "slab" are the same? — RussellA

In the context of this discussion about PI and language-games, I presume that your concept of "slab" is the same as mine, referring to one of the builder's building materials. Did you have something else in mind?

My Form of Life has been unique to me, — RussellA

Form of Life is not relative or unique to individuals.

The SEP article on Wittgenstein gives the following account of Form of Life:

What enables language to function and therefore must be accepted as “given” are precisely forms of life. In Wittgenstein’s terms, “It is not only agreement in definitions but also (odd as it may sound) in judgments that is required” (PI 242), and this is “agreement not in opinions, but rather in form of life” (PI 241)...Forms of life can be understood as constantly changing and contingent, dependent on culture, context, history, etc.; or as a background common to humankind, “shared human behavior” which is “the system of reference by means of which we interpret an unknown language” (PI 206); or as a notion which can be read differently in different cases – sometimes as relativistic, in other cases as expressing a more universalistic approach.

Form of Life may allow for some relativism between different cultures or time periods, depending on your reading, but it does not allow for relativism between individuals. An individual does not have their own unique Form of Life, just as (and for the same reasons that) an individual does not have their own unique language.

We can agree to the dictionary definition of a slab as i) a large, thick, flat piece of stone or concrete, typically square or rectangular in shape ii) a large, thick slice or piece of cake, bread, chocolate, etc, iii) an outer piece of timber sawn from a log, but many don't see the value in definitions. Definitions can end up circular and change with time. — RussellA

Is the first definition, i), your concept of slab (i.e. the concept you claimed ownership of when you asked: "How can you know my concept of Slab?"? If so, then it is the same concept as mine (in this context). This shouldn't come as a surprise.

If concepts didn't exist in the mind, but only in a community, such a community would be a community of zombies, none having a private concept or private sensation.

Cavell in The Later Wittgenstein makes the point that Wittgenstein never denied that we have private thoughts and feelings

Other philosophers, I believe, are under the impression that Wittgenstein denies that we can know what we think and feel, and even that we can know ourselves. This extraordinary idea comes, no doubt, from such remarks of Wittgenstein's as: "I can know what 70 * MUST WE MEAN WHAT WE SAY? someone else is thinking, not what I am thinking" (II, p. 222); "It cannot be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in pain" (§5!46). But the "can" and "cannot" in these remarks are grammatical; they mean "it makes no sense to say these things" (in the way we think it does); it would, therefore, equally make no sense to say of me that I do not know what I am thinking, or that I do not know I am in pain. The implication is not that I cannot know myself, but that knowing oneself-though radically different from the way we know others--is not a matter of cognizing (classically, "intuiting") mental acts and particular sensations.

Having private thoughts and feelings is not the same as having what is called "a private language".

As the analogy of the beetle in PI 293 illustrates, private sensations do drop out of consideration within the language game, not that private sensations drop out of consideration. — RussellA

I don't see what any of this has to do with language, or with your earlier suggestion that we each play our own individual language-games rather than partaking in communal ones, namely:

The meaning of the word "slab" derives from its context in the language game being used by the speaker.

When I say "bring me the slab", my concept of "slab" is part of from my language game. When you say "bring me the slab", your concept of "slab" is part of your language game. — RussellA

You may have been butting heads with people (and with understanding the Investigations) because you are saying the word “private” for two things. — Antony Nickles

I appreciate your pointing out that as I don't understand the Investigations, I should be learning from people wiser than me.

The word "private" has many uses, as shown in the Merriam Webster Dictionary. As an adjective:
1a: intended for or restricted to the use of a particular person, group, or class
1b: belonging to or concerning an individual person, company, or interest
1c (1): carried on by the individual independently of the usual institutions, also, being educated by independent study or a tutor or in a private school
1c (2): restricted to the individual or arising independently of others
1d: not general in effect
1e (1): accommodating only one patient
1e (2): staying or recovering in a room accommodating only one patient
2 a (1) not related to one's official position
2a (2) not holding public office or employment
2b: being a private
3a: not known or intended to be known publicly
3b: preferring to keep personal affairs to oneself: valuing privacy highly
3c: withdrawn from company or observation
3d: unsuitable for public display or use
4: not having share that can be freely traded on the open market

So you have been correct to insist that we do have individual feelings, and even experiences that are inexpressible to others entirely (the awe of a sunset)—though ordinary language is perfectly capable of making us intelligible (for us to agree we are like others),..........most of the time your “experience” is just like mine — Antony Nickles

I have a friend who is colour blind. How would you describe to them in words your personal experience of the colour violet?

If it is the case that neither of us can describe in words our personal experience of the colour violet, then how do we know that my personal experience is just like your personal experience?

yes, we might be a “zombie”, a puppet, speaking only others opinions, etc. — Antony Nickles

From Wikipedia Philosophical Zombie: "A philosophical zombie is a being in a thought experiment in philosophy of mind that is physically identical to a normal person but does not have conscious experience." A philosophical zombie is not someone who doesn't have their own opinions.

I presume that your concept of "slab" is the same as mine, referring to one of the builder's building materials. — Luke

Is the first definition, i), your concept of slab a large, thick, flat piece of stone or concrete, typically square or rectangular in shape.................If so, then it is the same concept as mine (in this context). — Luke

As definition i) is your definition of a slab but not mine, then we don't agree as to the definition of a "slab". For me a "slab" can be "a large or small, thick or thin, flat or uneven piece of stone or concrete, typically square or rectangular in shape".

I find it hard to believe that two people can have the same concept of any word. For example, in the form that my life has taken, I have designed reinforced concrete slabs, supervised their construction, overseen their movement and have built them with my own hands. Even if you have lived a similar form of life to me, which is probably unlikely, I doubt your concept of slab would be the same as mine.

Form of Life may allow for some relativism between different cultures or time periods, depending on your reading, but it does not allow for relativism between individuals. An individual does not have their own unique Form of Life, just as (and for the same reasons that) an individual does not have their own unique language. — Luke

Even assuming that in the world there is one Form of Life that encompasses everything within it, whether nature, animals or humans, then the Form of Life will be external to each individual living within it.

It may be true that each individual is living within the same Form of Life, but no two individuals can ever have the same experience of it. Each individuals experience of the Form of Life will be different and unique to them.

For many years, I have had the concept of a "peffel" as well as its name, part my pen and part the Eiffel Tower. This word I have found useful when thinking about the ontology of relations, and has been part of my private language, and so far, unique to me.

As definition i) is your definition of a slab but not mine, then we don't agree as to the definition of a "slab". For me a "slab" can be "a large or small, thick or thin, flat or uneven piece of stone or concrete, typically square or rectangular in shape". — RussellA

That's just quibbling over the definition. It's not like you meant something entirely different, like a hammer or like definition ii). This is where family resemblance and fuzzy boundaries might enter into it. We could ask how small or thin or uneven it could be before we would no longer consider it a slab. But even then we are still both talking about the same meaning of "slab"; the same "slab" concept.

I find it hard to believe that two people can have the same concept of any word. — RussellA

What about the words in your sentence quoted above? How could anyone else possibly understand what that sentence meant if we didn't have the same concept of those words? Do you think your ordinary use and understanding of the word "two" or "people" or "word" is different to that of any other fluent English speaker?

To follow a rule, to make a report, to give an order, to play a game of chess, are customs (usages, institutions).
To understand a sentence means to understand a language. To understand a language means to have mastered a technique. — PI 199

Even if you have lived a similar form of life to me — RussellA

As I mentioned in my previous post, you are using "form of life" incorrectly.

Each individuals experience of the Form of Life will be different and unique to them. — RussellA

Individuals (humans) don't experience Form of Life differently; it's who we are. It's the shared human
behaviours and judgements that are common to all humans; our human form of life.

For many years, I have had the concept of a "peffel" as well as its name, part my pen and part the Eiffel Tower. This word I have found useful when thinking about the ontology of relations, and has been part of my private language, and so far, unique to me. — RussellA

As @Antony Nickles mentioned recently, what Wittgenstein means by "private" in relation to a private language is that the words of this language can, in principle, be understood by one person only and that nobody else can understand the language. Since you were able to explain the meaning of the "peffel" concept, then I don't believe this qualifies as a private language.

Language is just a representation of the mind and thought of an individual, therefore it will never replace the content of thought or mind.

One will never know what slab you are talking about, when you say to your assistant "Bring me a slab." over the phone or in a text message out of blue.

However, if you and your assistant are talking facing the piles of slabs in the site, and when you point to a slab from distance "Bring me that slab.", he will know exactly what slab you are referring to.

So language can be used to talk about objects at a conceptual level without having to have the physical objects it is referring to, and it can also be used to point to real objects existing in the world.

You don't need to have exactly the same concept of slab, when you are talking about slab. Because there is no such thing as exactly the same concept of object. At this level the meaning of slab is also words and thoughts about a slab, not the real physical slab.

One will never know what slab you are talking about, when you say to your assistant "Bring me a slab." over the phone or in a text message out of blue. However, if you and your assistant are talking facing the piles of slabs in the site, and when you point to a slab from distance "Bring me that slab.", he will know exactly what slab you are referring to. — Corvus

Yes, if me and my assistant are talking facing a pile of things on the site, when I point to one of them and say "Bring me that", he will know exactly what I am referring to.

When pointing to something, I don't even need to name it.

The next day, over the phone, when I tell my assistant "bring me the same thing that you brought me yesterday" he will know exactly what I am referring to.

Once something has been pointed out, it can be referred to without needing to name it again.

Pointing at something in the world is a key aspect in our ability to use language.

Once something has been pointed out, it can be referred to without needing to name it again.

Pointing at something in the world is a key aspect in our ability to use language. — RussellA

What if today assistant doesn't remember which slab he brought to you yesterday, because he delivered so many different type of slabs - square one in large size, hexagonal shape in medium size, small size, and different finish (buff, sand, grey, brick red ...etc )??

I guess defining Linguistic Idealism as saying that language is what shapes our understanding more than pre-linguistic or meta-linguistic faculties........However, I would argue there are things that need to be in place for language to even be a thing..............a history of human evolution leading to the ability to use language as humans do................. So in this sense, I would say that leads to a sort of "realism" that gets to a world that has preconditions for his Language Idealism to be a thing — schopenhauer1

I agree that in today's terms, a pre-language Neanderthal would surely be a Realist, with an instinctive belief in the reality of the world with all its present and real dangers.

But the Neanderthal would quickly realise the disconnect between their perception of the world and the reality of the world. In looking for a straight stick, the Neanderthal would initially ignore the stick in the water that appeared half-bent, but would later discover that because a stick is perceived as bent does not mean it is bent in reality. They would also quickly realise that the world didn't disappear when they closed their eyes. They would conclude that things in the world are not perceived immediately or directly. IE, they would not be Direct Realists.

From a review of Dilman Ilham's book Wittgenstein's Copernican Revolution: The Question of Linguistic Idealism one reads the following about Linguistic Idealism

Linguistic Idealism is a philosophical concept that explores the relationship between language and reality. It posits that our language is not founded on an empirical reality with which we are in contact through sense perception. Instead, it suggests that our language determines the kind of contact we have with such a reality and our conception of it. Linguistic Idealism is not a form of realism or idealism, but rather an attempt to undermine certain presuppositions of the realist/idealist debate.

In observing the world, we perceive different colours when looking at different wavelengths of light. For some inexplicable reason, even though we perceive the colours from the wavelengths 620 to 750nm as different, we find some similarity between them, and arrive at the concept that can be named "red". This is in a sense Idealism, as our concept only exists in the mind. But in another sense is Realism, as our concept depends on real examples of wavelengths existing in the world. As with Linguistic Idealism, the word "red" is a function of both concepts that only exist in the mind and examples that only exist in the world.

Similarly the Neanderthal must be both a Realist, with an instinctive belief in the reality of the world with all its present and real dangers, and an Idealist, in realising the disconnect between their perception of the world and the reality of the world.

What if today assistant doesn't remember which slab he brought to you yesterday, because he delivered so many different type of slabs — Corvus

I would sack him for incompetence.

Linguistic Idealism is a philosophical concept that explores the relationship between language and reality. It posits that our language is not founded on an empirical reality with which we are in contact through sense perception. Instead, it suggests that our language determines the kind of contact we have with such a reality and our conception of it. Linguistic Idealism is not a form of realism or idealism, but rather an attempt to undermine certain presuppositions of the realist/idealist debate.

In observing the world, we perceive different colours when looking at different wavelengths of light. For some inexplicable reason, even though we perceive the colours from the wavelengths 620 to 750nm as different, we find some similarity between them, and arrive at the concept that can be named "red". This is in a sense Idealism, as our concept only exists in the mind. But in another sense is Realism, as our concept depends on real examples of wavelengths existing in the world. As with Linguistic Idealism, the word "red" is a function of both concepts that only exist in the mind and examples that only exist in the world. — RussellA

Got it. Yeah, I was looking at it this way:

Language Idealism presumably means that language shapes reality for humans. That humans in a way, "can't escape it" as the mediator for how they view the world. But evolution, and pre-linguistic considerations point to perhaps a "way out" of that. That is to say, there are fundamental things underlying language that means that language might not be the foundational way humans interact with the world. Or perhaps, looked at only by way of what we do now with language it is, but on further investigation, is not the case.

Perhaps, for example, with linguistic anthropology, or investigations into cognitive neuroscience, we see how human intentionality, human sociability, and the like, tool use, shared intersubjectivity (or alternatively, if Chomsky is somehow correct, "self-talk") and the like are more foundational ways humans interact with the world. These are shaped by forces that our species demanded in evolutionary terms. In the sense that it is very much a part of the "great outdoors" of the world outside our minds, it is "real" and not just all "in our linguistic use" that is the case for how we interact with the world.

Even more interesting, perhaps "use" has foundations in a sub-layer of "use". Imagine that for example, our ancestors "used" tools or gestured to the mouth for "food". Thus, we have a direct correlation of object with its "use". This is more than just inter-contextual language as we know it now. This is directly correlated with "the world".

Embodied embedded cognition (EEC) is a philosophical theoretical position in cognitive science, closely related to situated cognition, embodied cognition, embodied cognitive science and dynamical systems theory. The theory states that intelligent behaviour emerges from the interplay between brain, body and world.[1] The world is not just the 'play-ground' on which the brain is acting. Rather, brain, body and world are equally important factors in the explanation of how particular intelligent behaviours come about in practice. — Embodied embedded cognition Wiki

That's just quibbling over the definition — Luke

Similar and same mean different things. "The Eiffel Tower is similar to the Blackpool Tower" is true. "The Eiffel Tower is the same as the Blackpool Tower" is false.

Individuals (humans) don't experience Form of Life differently; it's who we are. It's the shared human behaviours and judgements that are common to all humans; our human form of life. — Luke

How can a thirteen year old girl living in Dzivarasekwa, Harare experience the same Form of Life as a sixty year old lawyer living in Bel Air, Los Angeles?

I wrote: Even assuming that in the world there is one Form of Life that encompasses everything within it, whether nature, animals or humans, then the Form of Life will be external to each individual living within it. It may be true that each individual is living within the same Form of Life, but no two individuals can ever have the same experience of it. Each individuals experience of the Form of Life will be different and unique to them.

What is the correct use of Form of Life ?

Since you were able to explain the meaning of the "peffel" concept, then I don't believe this qualifies as a private language — Luke

According to Wikipedia Private Language
In order to count as a private language in Wittgenstein's sense, it must be in principle incapable of translation into an ordinary language – if for example it were to describe those inner experiences supposed to be inaccessible to others. The private language being considered is not simply a language in fact understood by one person, but a language that in principle can only be understood by one person.

I can define the word "peffel" as "part my pen and part the Eiffel Tower", and I can define "pen" and "Eiffel Tower", but I cannot put into words what the words "pen" and "Eiffel Tower" mean to me, as my concepts of "pen" and "Eiffel Tower" have grown and developed over a lifetime of unique multiple experiences.

Even if I defined "The Eiffel Tower" as "a 300-metre tower built almost entirely of open-lattice wrought iron in Paris", I would then have to define "tower" as "a tall, narrow building". I would then have to define "building" as "a structure with a roof and walls", where a "structure" is "a building constructed from several parts". Definitions are problematic in deciding meaning.

Even in Wittgenstein's terms, as my personal concept of "peffel" is inaccessible to others, it is part of my private language.

@Banno @schopenhauer1 @Corvus

The word "private" has many uses, as shown in the Merriam Webster Dictionary. — RussellA

I'm not sure what you are getting at here, but, just because a word has many different definitions does not make it impossible for it to be one of its specific senses when said at a particular time within a particular context--just because there are many uses (amongst all its ordinary possibilities) does not allow that it can mean any of them all the time. What I meant to clarify was that there is Wittgenstein's basically technical sense of "private" and then there is the ordinary sense of private as in personal, secret (among all the other senses it can have), most closely definition 3b: "preferring to keep personal affairs to oneself" though a definition does not draw out the workings of a use (sense). So personal and private (as Wittgenstein terms it) are two different things, and you are using the word "private" in the place of both, which is confusing others (particularly @Luke), and I think getting in the way of your understanding Wittgenstein.

If it is the case that neither of us can describe in words our personal experience of the colour violet, then how do we know that my personal experience is just like your personal experience? — RussellA

But "your personal experience of colour" is not the way identifying color works, by which I mean the criteria we use to judge the identity of colors. I would review his discussion of color starting at #275: "...without philosophical intentions—the idea never crosses your mind that this impression of colour belongs only to you." As with pain (#253), we don't get into distinctions of "my" impression of color unless we are taking into account other interests than its identity (discussed below)--we have concrete ways of identifying color. For example: "Grab the purple ball" (from a ball pit with many other colors). If there is no other purple-ish ball, we do not continue to distinguish that it is actually violet (if you said, "you mean the violet one" we would say your are being obtuse, or a know-it-all). But if we are examining someone's house in order to replicate its color, and I say "that's a nice purple" it might be important for you to point out that it is actually violet, say, given that we need to be able to tell the paint shop. And here (in this case, instance) we can make distinctions even without our input, regardless of our judgment at all, as the creation of color can be broken down empirically, e.g., taking a sample and having it matched. The point being, if two objects are "red" (based on the context), the color is the same, and not because our personal experiences match up (or that we "agree").

It is this context of the importance of (our interest in) distinguishing and the necessity based on the situation that drives the identification of color, not my "personal experience", however, that is not to say that we do not have personal experiences with color. Green can remind me of my childhood home. A Rothko painting is meant to be evocative in many ways. Also, there are rational ways to discuss the use of color for effect, the aesthetics of it. (I'm sure there are other cases where our experience with color matters, but they escape me. Thus the admonition to read Witt's discussion.) Even here, where my personal reaction matters, it is not to say we can't talk about it; that we can't share that experience, though, as I said, this does not preclude the instance of the ineffability to express (even metaphorically, poetically, etc) my experience of, say, a magnificent sunset--but this is the exception, not always the case. This is a step above, but the desire for there to always be something of mine is the desire to hold onto a fact of myself, something ever-present, unique, "individuating" as @schopenhauer1 put it.

I have a friend who is colour blind. How would you describe to them in words your personal experience of the colour violet? — RussellA

"Color blind" as used in philosophy is a hypothetical case based on the same picture that in every case each one of us always has a unique experience of color (it is usually called an "impression" of color). The philosophical imagined case is that when I see red, you see blue. However, imagine the ordinary case that I am no good at color, and my wife says I'm "color blind". That is just because I call blue, green (what she "calls" green--but I've learned she's... right (that was hard to say). That is because she has authority (as color matching could be), so this is just a matter of labels, names. Even in the philosophical fantasy, the color-blind person still knows what color is, how it works. If you say it is red, and I say it is blue, you defer to me about the label because I am not color blind. The point being that identifying color still works the same way as the cases above (what matters about having the "same" color in a specific case). This is totally separate from the science of color, and actual color-blindness, which does not resolve the skeptic's picture of color, which is to actually record that we can refuse the other person, be blind to them, their experience: as in their input, authority, importance.

If we take the case of someone actually being blind, philosophy would say they have never "experienced" color. But we can still explain the experience of color. We would just describe what matters about (our interests in) the experience of seeing color, what color does for us, as humans. It would be things like: color makes us feel alive, it allows us to organize things, it's a means of personal expression, etc.

yes, we might be a “zombie”, a puppet, speaking only others opinions, etc.
— Antony Nickles

From Wikipedia Philosophical Zombie: "A philosophical zombie is a being in a thought experiment in philosophy of mind that is physically identical to a normal person but does not have conscious experience." A philosophical zombie is not someone who doesn't have their own opinions. — RussellA

Again, just because there are alternative uses of "zombie" does not mean I was not being clear about something specific, and that you can take it anyway you want, or point out its multiplicity as some sort of critique of my point. I was obviously not using it "philosophically", and not in its sense as a fantasy of their actual existence, but in its metaphorical sense: that we can be mindless, unthinking, compelled by a force that is not our own, dead inside (as we can be a "ghost" of ourselves); as you even said, a "community of zombies" which is to say, conformists without individuality. This is how "Dawn of the Dead" can be seen as a social commentary.

I would sack him for incompetence. — RussellA

Pointing at objects seems not a key ability to use language. Pointing at objects is primarily for learning words for children. They point at flowers viz. say flower and keep repeating trying to learn the word.

But when one is pointing at slabs saying "Bring me a slab.", that is to confirm that you want the slab brought to you (not a hammer or bucket), not because you didn't know what slab meant, or for any other reason.

I was unsure of your claims that pointing at objects is our key element to use language. I was not sure if it was your serious claim to mean it, or was it just a metaphor or rhetoric for something else.

Our key ability to use language is, from my point of view, not just uttering simple words, and simple sentences pointing at the object, but also being able to explain the situations, problems as well as trying to solve the problems by giving out some kind of verbal instructions or more information on the object depending on the situation that you are asking to bring, throw away, or make, and even be able to give out instruction how to get to a destination e.g. Paris from London by train or driving (book the ticket, go to the Channel Tunnel, and take the ferry ...etc) etc.

Language can deal, explain, describe, instruct a lot more complicated and abstract situations, scenarios, full stories of a novel or fiction by outlining or summarising, explain know-hows on making or repairing something etc.

Simply pointing to an object and uttering simple words sound like a limited elementary ability of language use by young children just starting to learn languages rather than key ability for the general language users.

I would sack him for incompetence. — RussellA

Instead of sacking him, would it not be better for you to give him descriptive hints to recall his memory, or verbal instructions on where the slabs you are looking for are located in the site with details of what properties the slab has i.e. a small hexagonal slab in buff finish, because this is what language uses allow us to be able to do? Our memories are bound to fail time to time. :)

As Antony Nickles mentioned recently, what Wittgenstein means by "private" in relation to a private language is that the words of this language can, in principle, be understood by one person only and that nobody else can understand the language. — Luke

Just to clarify for @RussellA, my understanding of that section of the PI is an exploration of philosophy's fantasy that there is some fact about me, some thing about me, that I put into language (or try to), and the fact that it sometimes fails would only be that I didn't correctly or adequately paint the picture of my "meaning" or "intention" or "private" experience, and not that communication and understanding involves (at times, say, because of something unexpected in a situation) a continuing process of distinguishing, clarifying, expounding, etc. And the point is not about language, but to find out why we are compelled to (want to) look at ourselves this way.

I'm not going to go into any great detail here, the conversation doesn't much warrant it. @RussellA seems incapable of stepping aside from reference, having moved full circle from "slab" getting its meaning form the thing in the world to it's getting it's meaning by referring to private concepts. He seems constitutionally incapable of considering the implications of meaning as use.

And the Wittgenstein I have read and read about is unrecognisable in 's version.

But the builder game can be pressed further. It does not matter if the word "slab" refers to the slab, or to this or that "concept" of slab, or even to some transcendent, universal, absolute form of "slab". What matters is that when the builder calls "slab", the assistant brings a suitable piece of stone.

Many things follow from this, but two are central here. The first is that we do not need a theory of the meaning of "slab" in order to do the task at hand - to build the structure. All we need is the activities involved in calling for a slab and having one brought. The meaning of "slab" is not important so long as the activity proceeds.

We don't need a theory of meaning, since we have the way the word is being used.

And the second is that there are slabs to bring. Whether the slabs are material objects or ideal forms or transmogrified souls is irrelevant, so long as the assistant brings them and the builder stacks them.

The great thing here is the cleaving of the analysis of meaning away from all the metaphysical paraphernalia associated with it by millennia of philosophical speculation.

And the Wittgenstein I have read and read about is unrecognisable in ↪schopenhauer1's version. — Banno

I was commenting on Linguistic Idealism there, not so much Wittgenstein proper.

And within Linguistic Idealism topic, I was offering an alternative idea, contra Linguistic Idealism...