I would consider "Yes, but all the same..." to be a reaction or response to Wittgenstein's unbolded remarks that immediately precede it, which I believe are made in a different voice — Luke

I'm not saying I'm necessarily right, but it does force one to be very careful when reading Wittgenstein.

My reading of PI 246, where Wittgenstein is unbolded and the interlocutor is bolded

1) In what sense are my sensations private?
2) Well, only I can know whether I am really in pain; another person can only surmise it
3) In one way this is wrong, and in another nonsense. If we are using the word "to know" as it is normally used (and how else are we to use it?), then other people very often know when I am in pain.
4) Yes, but all the same not with the certainty with which I know it myself I
5) It can't be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in pain. What is it supposed to mean—except perhaps that I am in pain?
6) Other people cannot be said to learn of my sensations only from my behaviour,—for I cannot be said to learn of them. I have them.
7) The truth is: it makes sense to say about other people that they doubt whether I am in pain; but not to say it about myself.

I agree that 2) is the interlocutor and 3) is Wittgenstein. I agree that 4) is a disagreement with what came before it. However, both 2) and 3) came before it.

Reading whereby 4) disagrees with 2) rather than 3)
Then 3) is also Wittgenstein, where he is saying that the idea that another person can only surmise that I am pain is wrong. In fact, they don't surmise it but know it, although with less certainty than myself. This agrees with the normal use of the word "to know", when we say "I know you are suffering at the moment", accepting that one cannot know another person's suffering with the intensity that one knows one's own.

This all hangs on your assumption that he is linking certainty with knowing in PI 246. — Luke

Whether Wittgenstein is linking certainty with knowing depends on whether 4) is that of the interlocutor or Wittgenstein.

If my reading is correct, then Wittgenstein is linking certainty with knowing.

Wittgenstein indicates that it does not make any sense to say "I know I am in pain". — Luke

Wittgenstein attacks the idea of a private language
Wittgenstein in PI 246 includes the idea that to say "I know I am in pain" may only be said as a joke:
PI 246 It can't be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in pain. What is it supposed to mean—except perhaps that I am in pain?

In which situation is Wittgenstein thinking about whereby to say "I know I am in pain" would be nonsense?

If I said either "I am in pain" or "I know I am in pain", either I am having a conversation with myself or a conversation with others.

If I am having a conversation with myself, the statement "I am in pain" is sufficient, as no justification is possible nor needed. Any justification would be self-referential, along the lines "I know I am in pain because I know I am pain". In this situation, when conversing with myself, to say "I know I am in pain" would be nonsense.

Referring to SEP Private Language, Wittgenstein in PI 244 to 271 attacks the idea of any private language, as any such private language would be unintelligible not only to the originator but also to any listener. Therefore the only situation where "I know I am in pain" may be said as a joke is in a private language, which Wittgenstein attacks as unintelligible.

One therefore concludes that the sentence in PI 246 has been spoken by the interlocutor, not Wittgenstein.

Wittgenstein's Language Game
However, if I am having a conversation with others, then to say "I know I am pain" is no longer nonsensical, but an accepted and reasonable normal part of language. It is normal to say "I know I am in Paris", "I know it is time to leave" or "I know governments are necessary".

As one can say in normal language both "I am in Paris" and "I know I am in Paris", it is surely acceptable to say both "I am in pain" and "I know I am in pain".

Within the language game, the word "pain" refers to a general concept contained within the language game rather than any particular sensation within a person.

In PI 293. Wittgenstein discusses a beetle in a box, where the beetle has no place in the language game at all and drops out of consideration as irrelevant. The particular private sensation of pain is the beetle in the box, and as such cannot be talked about. Within the language game the word "pain" is a concept, something general rather than particular, and refers to a general concept rather than a particular sensation .

"I am in Paris" is a belief. Whether true or not depends on whether one is in Paris.

"I know I am in Paris" is a belief that in order to be true needs to be followed by a justification that one is in Paris, such as "because I can see the Eiffel Tower".

"I am in pain" is a belief. Whether true or not depends on whether one is using the word "pain" correctly.

"I know I am in pain" is a belief that in order to be true needs to be followed by a justification that one is using the word "pain" correctly, such as "because others say they are in pain when in the same situation as I am"

The above are justified beliefs. Knowledge requires them to be true. What makes propositions such as "I know I am in Paris"or "I know I am in pain" true? They cannot be made true by facts in the world, such as I am truly in Paris or I am truly in pain, as within Wittgenstein's language game, the object, the beetle in the box, drops out of consideration and cannot be talked about.

Wittgenstein's Hinge Propositions
This takes us into On Certainty, notes on knowledge, doubt, scepticism and certainty.

Referring to Wikipedia Here is one Hand, the book's starting position is GE Moore's A Proof of the External World. Wittgenstein asks how Moore knows he is holding up a hand, as any knowledge claim can be doubted.

Moore argued against scepticism in favour of common sense by making the following argument: i) here is one hand, ii) and here is another, iii) there are at least two external objects in the world, iv) therefore, an external world exists.

Wittgenstein says that propositions such as "here is a hand" should not be thought of as empirical statements open to doubt, but rather as a "hinge proposition" that cannot be doubted. Hinge propositions are part of the framework of a logical language, on which other propositions are built. The proposition "here is a hand" is establishing how "hand" is to be used within a coherent language game, not making an empirical claim about the existence of a hand in the world.

Hinge propositions are the foundation of a language game, thereby creating a coherent whole that cannot be doubted. The truth of a proposition within the language game comes from such hinge propositions, not facts in the world, not whether or not I am truly in Paris or truly in pain.

Knowledge is justified true belief. Moore believes that the external world exists. He justifies his belief by pointing out that at least two objects exist in the world and founded on the hinge proposition that here is a hand that exists in the world. Moore can then say that "I know the world exists because here is a hand" rather than make the unjustified statement that "the world exists".

Wittgenstein in PI 244 writes about words as replacing rather than describing pain-behaviour
A child has hurt himself and he cries; and then adults talk to him and teach him exclamations and, later, sentences. They teach the child new pain-behaviour. "So you are saying that the word 'pain' really means crying?"— On the contrary: the verbal expression of pain replaces crying and does not describe it.

Summary
Similarly, I believe that pain exists. I justify my belief by pointing out that I cry when suffering from pain and founded on the hinge proposition that one cries when suffering pain. I can then say that "I know I am in pain because I cry when suffering" rather than the unjustified "I am in pain".

Within Wittgenstein's Language Game, it makes sense to say "I know I am in pain".

Does it make sense to say "I don't know if I'm in pain"?

Does it make sense to say "I don't know if I'm in pain"? — Fooloso4

In a private language it wouldn't make sense, as either "I am in pain" or "I am not in pain". Adding the word "know" would be redundant.

However Wittgenstein in PI 244 to 271 attacks the idea of any private language. He argued that any such private language would be unintelligible not only to the originator but also to any listener.

Wittgenstein in PI 293 uses the beetle in the box analogy to show that words such as "pain" in the language game are disconnected from whatever unknown thing there is in the mind of the individual, whether a sensation of pain or anything else, as such an unknown thing has no place in the language game at all.

Therefore in the language game of everyday conversation, it does make sense to say "I don't know if I'm answering the question", "I don't know if I'm in Nevada" or "I don't know if I'm correct".

It also depends on how the word accurately describes one's sensations, such as "I don't know if I'm in pain or just discomfort", "I don't know if I'm in pain or emotionally tormented", "I don't know if I'm in pain or extremely sore".

Or perhaps the speaker doesn't have a complete understanding of the meaning of the words, such as a speaker of a foreign language. Perhaps a Spaniard who doesn't know how to translate the word "dolor", or a German who wants the nearest equivalent to "schmerzen".

There are many occasions within the language game when it makes sense to say "I don't know if I'm in pain".

My reading of PI 246, where Wittgenstein is unbolded and the interlocutor is bolded

2) Well, only I can know whether I am really in pain; another person can only surmise it
[...]
5) It can't be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in pain. What is it supposed to mean—except perhaps that I am in pain? — RussellA

These two bolded sentences - which you believe are both said by the interlocutor - contradict each other. I don't see why the interlocutor would say both that "only I can know whether I am really in pain" and "It can't be said of me at all...that I know I am in pain".

Why do you think the interlocutor would contradict himself?

It is more likely that the second sentence is not the interlocutor's.

In a private language it wouldn't make sense, as either "I am in pain" or "I am not in pain". — RussellA

As you say, either I am in pain or not, but whether it is the one or the other does not depend on language. If it were something that I can 'know' then it is something I might not know. If it makes no sense to say that I do not know if I am in pain then it makes no sense to say that I know I am in pain.

If I don't know if I am in pain then perhaps I should take an aspirin just in case. But then again, I might not be in pain so perhaps I don't need an aspirin after all.

PI 246.

This much is true: it makes sense to say about other people that they doubt whether I am in pain; but not to say it about myself.

It is more likely that the second sentence is not the interlocutor's...5) It can't be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in pain. What is it supposed to mean—except perhaps that I am in pain? — Luke

It seems to me that there can be no definitive reading of Wittgenstein because of inherent ambiguities with his text

I am partly repeating myself, but I think PI 246 does illustrate why many people dislike Wittgenstein, mainly because of the ambiguities in the text. PI 246 does illustrate that there cannot be one definitive reading of Wittgenstein, although his text is invaluable as a foundation for one's own ideas. Reading in context cannot solve the problem, only exacerbate the problem by increasing the number of ambiguities.

1) In what sense are my sensations private?

Ignoring the given text, what would be a sensible topic? For example, I have private sensations such as pain and hunger, and the question is, can anyone else ever know my private sensations. On the assumption that Wittgenstein is a sensible person, this infers that 1) is Wittgenstein.

2) Well, only I can know whether I am really in pain; another person can only surmise it
3) In one way this is wrong, and in another nonsense. If we are using the word "to know" as it is normally used (and how else are we to use it?), then other people very often know when I am in pain.

Ignoring which is the interlocutor and which is Wittgenstein, what do we already know from our personal experience. We know that it is common in everyday conversation to say "I know you are in pain over the death of your relative" rather than the less personal "I surmise you are in pain over the death of your relative". Therefore, 3) agrees with what we already know regardless of the given text. If we make the assumption that Wittgenstein is a sensible person, this infers that 3) is Wittgenstein. As 3) says that 2) is wrong, this infers that 2) is the interlocutor.

4) Yes, but all the same not with the certainty with which I know it myself

It is not immediately obvious whether Wittgenstein is referring to 2) or 3).

If he is referring to 2), then he would be saying "Only I know that I am pain, whilst others surmise it with less certainty than I know it myself ". But this clearly does not make sense as a sentence. Therefore 4) cannot be referring to 2).

Therefore he must be referring to 3). What he is saying in everyday language is that I can say "I know I am in pain" and someone else can say of me "I know he is in pain", but I know I am in pain with certainty and they know I am in pain with less certainty. IE, in everyday language, in the language game, the word know can be used to imply certainty, such as "I know it is raining", or to imply some uncertainty, such as "I know it will rain".

As 4) is a sensible thing to say, and assuming that Wittgenstein is a sensible person, this infers that 4) is Wittgenstein.

5) It can't be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in pain. What is it supposed to mean—except perhaps that I am in pain?

Ignoring the text, what would be a sensible topic? As regards my private language, the word "know" in the phrase "I know I am in pain" is redundant and serves no useful purpose, and therefore would only make sense if said as a joke. As regards the language game, to say "I know I am in pain" would make sense, and therefore wouldn't be considered as being used as a joke.

Therefore if 5) refers to a private language, then it would be a sensible thing to say, and assuming Wittgenstein to be a sensible person, then 5) would be Wittgenstein. But if 5) refers to the language game, then it wouldn't be a sensible thing to say, and assuming Wittgenstein to be a sensible person, then 5) would be the interlocutor

As it is unclear whether 5) is referring to a private language or the language game, it is unclear whether this is Wittgenstein's opinion or the interlocutor's

6) Other people cannot be said to learn of my sensations only from my behaviour,—for I cannot be said to learn of them. I have them.

Ignoring the text, in everyday conversation it would be a sensible thing to say that if someone saw my crying, and had never experienced pain themselves, then they couldn't learn the sensation of pain just from observing someone else's pain-behaviour. On the other hand, if I feel a pain and then cry, I am not learning the sensation of pain from my crying.

Assuming Wittgenstein to be a sensible person, as 6) is a sensible thing to say, 6) must be Wittgenstein.

7) The truth is: it makes sense to say about other people that they doubt whether I am in pain; but not to say it about myself.

Ignoring the given text, as regards my private language, as with the word "know", the word "doubt" in the phrase "I doubt that I am in pain" is redundant and serves no useful purpose. If I am in pain, there is no doubt in my mind that I am in pain. However in the language game, as another person can only judge my private sensations from my outward pain-behaviour, it makes sense that they should doubt whether I am in pain or not.

The problem within 7) is that Wittgenstein seems to be mixing up references on the one hand to a private language, ie, "myself", and on the other hand to other people and the language game, ie "other people".

Overall however, accepting that Wittgenstein is mixing up his references, 7) seems to be Wittgenstein.

How can Wittgenstein in PI 246 use examples from a private language whilst arguing that private languages are unintelligible?

My problem with PI 246 is that part refers to a private language and part refers to a public language game, yet in PI 244 to 271 Wittgenstein attacks the idea of any private language as unintelligible not only to the originator but also to any listener.

For example, item 7) The truth is: it makes sense to say about other people that they doubt whether I am in pain; but not to say it about myself.

The phrase "it makes sense to say about other people that they doubt whether I am in pain"
makes sense within a language game, involving not only me but other people.

But the phrase "but not to say it about myself" initially seems to be within a private language, but as Wittgenstein says that private languages are unintelligible, this infers that even to say "I am in pain" is within the language game.

Then if all our talk about our own pain is within the language game, then it is more than acceptable to say "I know I am in pain".

As you say, either I am in pain or not, but whether it is the one or the other does not depend on language. — Fooloso4

As the pain you are referring to cannot be the beetle in the box, as the something in the box drops out of consideration in the language game, the pain you are referring to must be part of the language game, and therefore does depend on language.

PI 293 - If I say of myself that it is only from my own case that I know what the word "pain" means—must I not say the same of other people too? And how can I generalize the one case so irresponsibly? Now someone tells me that he knows what pain is only from his own case!——Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a "beetle". No one can look into anyone else's box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle.—Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box.

If it were something that I can 'know' then it is something I might not know. — Fooloso4

Yes, if the something is "the distance from the Earth to the Moon", then this is something that I may know or may not know.

If it makes no sense to say that I do not know if I am in pain then it makes no sense to say that I know I am in pain. — Fooloso4

"Pain" is a word that has a meaning in the language game, and there is no guarantee that I am using all my words correctly. For example, within the language game it makes sense to say "I do not know if I am in pain" if this means "I do not not know if I am in pain, it may be extreme soreness or just discomfort"

It makes sense to say in the language game "I do not know if I am in pain" if there is any doubt about my understanding of the word "pain".

the pain you are referring to must be part of the language game, and therefore does depend on language. — RussellA

I may use language to refer to pain, but neither the experience of pain nor the expression of pain depend on language.

"Pain" is a word that has a meaning in the language game — RussellA

Pain and the word "pain" are not the same. We can know that a baby is in pain even though she has no words to express her pain. Her being in pain does not depend on a language game. It makes no sense to say that she is in pain but doesn't know it.

You have said a lot, but you did not address my previous post or answer my question, namely:

Why do you think the interlocutor would contradict himself? — Luke

Do you acknowledge that your numbered sections 2 and 5 contradict each other? I don't understand why you would attribute two contradictory statements to Wittgenstein's interlocutor. If you aren't going to address the content of my posts, then I have little interest in responding further.

I will just point out where I think you are going wrong in your latest post:

4) Yes, but all the same not with the certainty with which I know it myself

It is not immediately obvious whether Wittgenstein is referring to 2) or 3). — RussellA

It is immediately obvious.

At the end of 3, Wittgenstein says: "other people very often know when I am in pain". The interlocutor responds at 4 with: "Yes, but all the same not with the certainty with which I know it myself". Wittgenstein then corrects them at 5 with: "It can't be said of me at all...that I know I am in pain."

As regards my private language, — RussellA

What do you mean by your "private language"? Do you mean talking to yourself in English? Because that is not a private language.

As regards my private language, the word "know" in the phrase "I know I am in pain" is redundant and serves no useful purpose, and therefore would only make sense if said as a joke. — RussellA

To say something redundant(ly) is not to say something senseless. One can still make sense by saying something redundant. Wittgenstein does not say that "I know I am in pain" is redundant. He says "It can't be said of me at all...that I know I am in pain." It is senseless to say "I know I am in pain"; it is not merely redundant.

The problem within 7) is that Wittgenstein seems to be mixing up references on the one hand to a private language, ie, "myself", and on the other hand to other people and the language game, ie "other people". — RussellA

I don't understand what you mean by "a private language, ie. "myself"". Are you saying that you are a private language?

But the phrase "but not to say it about myself" initially seems to be within a private language — RussellA

I don't think you understand what is meant by a private language. At 243, W states: "The words of this language are to refer to what only the speaker can know — to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language."

Wittgenstein repeatedly attacks the assumption that a private language is possible (or is a coherent concept).

We can know that a baby is in pain even though she has no words to express her pain. — Fooloso4

Wittgenstein discusses pain-behaviour in PI 244, 282, 302, 304 and 393.

How can the word "pain" refer to a sensation pain.

We know a rock is not in pain because it expresses no pain behaviour, whereas we know a living human being can be in pain because it expresses pain-behaviour. Yet how do we know that a rock, even though not expressing pain-behaviour, is actually in pain, and how do we know that a child, expressing pain-behaviour, is not actually in pain. Does an actor on the stage need the private sensation of fear and loathing to be able to express the sensations of fear and loathing.

What is the function of language and words such as "pain". Perhaps not to convey thoughts about things such as houses, pains, good and evil, but rather, taking the case of pain, as a replacement for pain-behaviour, where the word "pain" replaces the pain-behaviour of crying rather than describing any unknown cause of the pain-behaviour.

How do you know someone is in pain, when all you know is pain-behaviour. When you say that you know someone is in pain, isn't all you saying that you know that they are expressing pain-behaviour. The word "pain" in the language game is replacing the observed pain-behaviour rather than describing an unknown something.

Is this not the same situation as for the direct Realist, who would say that if one observes something green in colour, then in the world is also something green in colour. The Direct Realist conflates effect with cause, equating what has been observed with an unknown cause of that observation. The Direct Realist would equate pain-behaviour, replaced in the language game by the word "pain", with the unknown something that is assumed to have caused such pain-behaviour, whether a beetle or a pain.

As Wittgenstein says, the beetle in the box is not a something but it is not a nothing either, meaning that even though everyone's beetle may be different, it is not a nothing.

I don't know where you are trying to go with any of this.

Do you acknowledge that your numbered sections 2 and 5 contradict each other? — Luke

2) PI 246 Well, only I can know whether I am really in pain; another person can only surmise it

5) PI 246 It can't be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in pain. What is it supposed to mean—except perhaps that I am in pain?

We both agree that 2) is the interlocutor

You believe that 5) is Wittgenstein. I am unsure.

As I wrote in my last post:

If we make the assumption that Wittgenstein is a sensible person, this infers that 3) is Wittgenstein. As 3) says that 2) is wrong, this infers that 2) is the interlocutor.

As it is unclear whether 5) is referring to a private language or the language game, it is unclear whether this is Wittgenstein's opinion or the interlocutor's

I don't understand what you mean by "a private language, ie. "myself"". — Luke

I agree when you say: "Wittgenstein repeatedly attacks the idea that a private language is possible"

I agree when you say "He (Wittgenstein) says "It can't be said of me at all.........that I know I am in pain" It is senseless to say "I know I am in pain""

Wittgenstein agrees in PI 304 that we can have private inchoate feelings, ie, sensations, but argues that no one else can ever know what these private feelings are. He is not just saying that a private language understood only by the speaker is impossible, but that the very existence of a private language is impossible. These private inchoate feelings can only be given form within a community of other minds using a language game, thereby breaking the problem of solipsism. Within the language game, when I say "I am in pain", I am not taking about my private personal experience, but rather talking about the concept of pain that exists in the minds of the community of which I am part.

In a private language, to say "I am in pain" requires no justification, other than "I know I am in pain because I am in pain", in which event the word "know" has no function.

However, in the language game, to say "I am in pain" does require a justification. For example, "I know I am in pain because I am experiencing both localized and generalized unpleasant bodily sensations causing me severe physical discomfort and emotional distress". In the language game, the word "know" does have a definite function.

5) PI 246 It can't be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in pain. What is it supposed to mean—except perhaps that I am in pain?

I interpret 5) as meaning that it would be unreasonable for me to say that "I know I am in pain", as this means no more than "I am in pain".

But the only situation where to say "I know I am in pain" requires no justification is in a private language, but as Wittgenstein attacks the idea of the possibility of a private language, 5) cannot be Wittgenstein's position but that of an interlocutor.

I don't know where you are trying to go with any of this. — Fooloso4

You said "We can know that a baby is in pain even though she has no words to express her pain."

How can you know the private sensations of another person just from their behaviour?

How can you know the private sensations of another person just from their behaviour? — RussellA

The baby has been crying nonstop. Her fists are clenched, she cannot settle down, her breathing is not normal, and her facial expression is the same as it was that time I accidentally dropped her, and that time her brother hit her. But I try to ignore this. I am busy reading philosophy and have become convinced that I cannot know from the baby's behavior that she is in pain. I try feeding her but she won't eat. I change her diaper but that does not help.

It gets to the point where I can no longer ignore the crying. I call a friend who suggests I look online for signs that a baby is in pain. The description of a child in pain closely matches the behavior of my child, but I think: "How can you know the private sensations of another person just from their behaviour?" I concludes you can't. I cannot know the baby is in pain so do nothing. She'll stop eventually.

You believe that 5) is Wittgenstein. I am unsure.

As I wrote in my last post:

If we make the assumption that Wittgenstein is a sensible person, this infers that 3) is Wittgenstein. As 3) says that 2) is wrong, this infers that 2) is the interlocutor.

As it is unclear whether 5) is referring to a private language or the language game, it is unclear whether this is Wittgenstein's opinion or the interlocutor's — RussellA

It seems very clear to me that 5) is not referring to a private language, and I don't understand how it possibly could be. What makes you think that it is?

He is not just saying that a private language understood only by the speaker is impossible, but that the very existence of a private language is impossible. — RussellA

There is no distinction here. A private language understood only by the speaker is (the very existence of) a private language.

Wittgenstein agrees in PI 304 that we can have private inchoate feelings, ie, sensations, but argues that no one else can ever know what these private feelings are... These private inchoate feelings can only be given form within a community of other minds using a language game, thereby breaking the problem of solipsism. Within the language game, when I say "I am in pain", I am not taking about my private personal experience, but rather talking about the concept of pain that exists in the minds of the community of which I am part. — RussellA

The point of 304 (and elsewhere) - at least, on my reading - is that the concept of "pain" is not based on the private feeling that nobody else can perceive, but on the expression of the sensation; on the behaviour (that others can perceive). I take this to be the point of 307, for example.

The concept does not exist only "in the minds of the community", but also in their behaviour. One may demonstrate that they don't understand a concept by what they say or do.

In a private language, to say "I am in pain" requires no justification, other than "I know I am in pain because I am in pain", in which event the word "know" has no function. — RussellA

If a private language can be understood only by the speaker, then to whom is one saying "I am in pain" (in English)? The English language is not a private language, so I don't understand what you mean.

However, in the language game, to say "I am in pain" does require a justification. — RussellA

I don't believe that it always, or even often, requires a justification. I think the only time it might require justification is if others didn't believe you were actually in pain or if you had to prove it for some reason.

For example, "I know I am in pain because I am experiencing both localized and generalized unpleasant bodily sensations causing me severe physical discomfort and emotional distress". — RussellA

Have you ever said this? Has anyone?

In the language game, the word "know" does have a definite function. — RussellA

I agree with you on that much.

But the only situation where to say "I know I am in pain" requires no justification is in a private language, — RussellA

I agree that one does not need to justify one's sensation of pain to oneself.

as Wittgenstein attacks the idea of the possibility of a private language, 5) cannot be Wittgenstein's position but that of an interlocutor. — RussellA

What does 5) have to do with a private language?

A private language can only be understood by its speaker. "I know I am in pain" is an English phrase and the English language is spoken by over a billion people on Earth. Therefore, "I know I am in pain" is not part of a private language.

Since I don't follow your connection between 5) and a private language, I see no reason to accept that 5) is said by an interlocutor.

On the one hand:

We can know that a baby is in pain even though she has no words to express her pain. — Fooloso4

On the other hand:

I am busy reading philosophy and have become convinced that I cannot know from the baby's behavior that she is in pain. — Fooloso4

How to resolve this quandary?

The second statement was intended to be ironic. Skepticism in the service of negligence.

I am busy reading philosophy and have become convinced that I cannot know from the baby's behavior that she is in pain — Fooloso4

The second statement was intended to be ironic. — Fooloso4

I am sure that Wittgenstein didn't intend Philosophical Investigations, of which a significant feature is about not being able to know another person's inner sensations from their outward behaviour, as irony.

The irony refers to the consequences of your interpretation. I read the following:

If we are using the word “know” as it is normally used (and how else are we to use it?), then
other people very often know if I’m in pain. (PI 246)

as a statement of fact. As we normally use the word "know" it does not mean that I cannot be misled or mistaken. Whether it is the pre-linguistic behavior of a baby or the verbal expression of pain, doing nothing and pleading ignorance won't hold water.

I read the following as a statement of fact.........PI 246 If we are using the word “know” as it is normally used (and how else are we to use it?), then other people very often know if I’m in pain — Fooloso4

Yes, Wittgenstein does say that we can know something with more or less certainty.
PI 246 - Yes, but all the same not with the certainty with which I know it myself

Yes, I can know something with more or less certainty, but what exactly is it that one is knowing. Is one knowing the other person's sensations, or is one knowing the other person's behaviour.

Wittgenstein included PI 293 about the beetle in the box to point out that the word "pain" as it is normally used in language, in the language game, is not describing the other person's sensations, but is replacing a particular behaviour.

Yes, in the language game, we can say "I know they are in pain", but what does that mean exactly. According to the beetle in the box analogy, as the word "pain" is replacing a particular behaviour, the expression means "I know they are exhibiting a particular behaviour, and I know that this particular behaviour has been replaced by the word "pain"".

Yes, I can know something with more or less certainty, but what exactly is it that one is knowing. Is one knowing the other person's sensations, or is one knowing the other person's behaviour. — RussellA

One knows from the other's behavior that they are in pain.

Wittgenstein included PI 293 about the beetle in the box to point out that the word "pain" as it is normally used in language, in the language game, is not describing the other person's sensations, but is replacing a particular behaviour. — RussellA

Wittgenstein included PI 293 about the beetle in the box to point out that:

...if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of ‘object and name’, the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant.

(293)

When I use the word "pain" when referring to another person I am not replacing a particular behavior, but when they complain that they are in pain they are replacing some other form of behavior that expresses their pain, such as crying, with a verbal expression of pain.

What does 5) have to do with a private language? — Luke

5) PI 246 It can't be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in pain. What is it supposed to mean—except perhaps that I am in pain?

I interpret 5) as meaning that it would be unreasonable for me to say that "I know I am in pain", as this means no more than "I am in pain".

I agree when you say: "I agree that one does not need to justify one's sensation of pain to oneself." and the word "know" has a definite function in the language game.

Knowledge is justified true belief.

Suppose my belief is that I am in Paris, and my justification is that I can see the Eiffel Tower. If it is true that I am in Paris, then I know I am in Paris.

But as regards my thought that I am in pain, this needs no justification as it is true. Thinking I am in pain is sufficient. Thinking that I know I am in pain would be redundant .

But this is the same idea as expressed in item 5), inferring that item 5) is referring to one's inner thoughts rather than any public language game. In other words, to one's private language.
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There is no distinction here. A private language understood only by the speaker is (the very existence of) a private language. — Luke

It is the difference between keeping a diary in PI 258 and the beetle in the box in PI 293.
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The point of 304 (and elsewhere) - at least, on my reading - is that the concept of "pain" is not based on the private feeling that nobody else can perceive, but on the expression of the sensation; on the behaviour (that others can perceive). — Luke

Agree.
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If a private language can be understood only by the speaker, then to whom is one saying "I am in pain" (in English)? — Luke

I have the thought "I am in pain". Following on from the Tractatus, para 4: A thought is proposition with a sense, for Wittgenstein, thoughts are "sentences in the head".

As no one else can know my inner thoughts, no one else can know my inner language. This inner language is a type of a private language. If I am saying "I am in pain" in my inner language, only I can hear it. If I am saying "I am in pain" in the language game, then others can hear it.
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I don't believe that it always, or even often, requires a justification. I think the only time it might require justification is if others didn't believe you were actually in pain or if you had to prove it for some reason. — Luke

In the language game, every word needs to be justified if the language has to have any coherent meaning.

For example, if I said "Yesterday, I visited the xxyx", without any justification for the inclusion of the phrase "xxyx", the sentence would be meaningless.

If I said "I am in dolor", again the sentence would be meaningless until I had justified the inclusion of the word "dolor" by explaining that it meant "experiencing both localized and generalized unpleasant bodily sensations causing me severe physical discomfort and emotional distress"

If speaking to an audience not knowing the meaning of "dolor", I would need to say "I am experiencing both localized and generalized unpleasant bodily sensations causing me severe physical discomfort and emotional distress"

If speaking to an audience who already know the meaning of "dolor", it would be sufficient to say "I am in dolor"

Either way, every word being used in a language game needs a justification for its use, whether or not the audience already know its meaning.

5) PI 246 It can't be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in pain. What is it supposed to mean—except perhaps that I am in pain?

I interpret 5) as meaning that it would be unreasonable for me to say that "I know I am in pain", as this means no more than "I am in pain". — RussellA

Wittgenstein says at 5) that "I know I am in pain" might mean "I am in pain", which is how you read it. But you are ignoring the first part where he says that "I know I am in pain" can't be said of him at all. The point is that "I know" is being misused here. One cannot know they are in pain because being in pain is not something that can be doubted or learned; it is not something that one can come to know or that one can satisfy themselves is true or false. That one is in pain lies outside the scope of knowledge; it is non-epistemic. It's different to those facts that we can doubt or learn or come to know or satisfy ourselves is true or false, such as the capital city of China or the length of the Nile.

This is why it can't be said of me at all that "I know I am in pain", and that all it could possibly mean is that I am in pain.

But this is the same idea as expressed in item 5), inferring that item 5) is referring to one's inner thoughts rather than any public language game. In other words, to one's private language. — RussellA

As I've said several times now, a phrase spoken in English to oneself (or thought in English in "one's inner thoughts") does not constitute a private language. 5) is written in English, not in a private language. "I know I am in pain" is also written in English, not in a private language. 5) does not refer to a private language.

There is no distinction here. A private language understood only by the speaker is (the very existence of) a private language.
— Luke

It is the difference between keeping a diary in PI 258 and the beetle in the box in PI 293. — RussellA

No, it's not. A (private) language understood only by the speaker is the definition of a private language.
Besides, the beetle in the box has no place in the language game and a private language speaker has no language game to play.

As no one else can know my inner thoughts, no one else can know my inner language. This inner language is a type of a private language. If I am saying "I am in pain" in my inner language, only I can hear it. — RussellA

"I am in pain" is an English phrase, and is not part of a private language, by definition. Again, Wittgenstein tells us at 243 (my emphasis):

But is it also conceivable that there be a language in which a person could write down or give voice to his inner experiences — his feelings, moods, and so on — for his own use? —– Well, can’t we do so in our ordinary language? — But that is not what I mean. The words of this language are to refer to what only the speaker can know — to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language. — Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 243

It must not be possible, in principle, for another person to understand the language. Saying to yourself in your inner language "I am in pain" is something that any English speaker could understand.

One knows from the other's behavior that they are in pain. — Fooloso4

One knows that are exhibiting pain behaviour, not that one knows they are in pain.

PI 304 "But you will surely admit that there is a difference between pain-behaviour accompanied by pain and pain-behaviour without any pain?"—Admit it?

When I use the word "pain" when referring to another person I am not replacing a particular behavior, but when they complain that they are in pain they are replacing some other form of behavior that expresses their pain, such as crying, with a verbal expression of pain. — Fooloso4

A person sees a child crying and says "she is crying". The phrase "in pain" replaces the crying behaviour. The person can then say "she is in pain".

A child is in pain and cries. The child learns that the phrase "in pain" replaces crying. The child can then say "I am in pain"

Note that the phrase "in pain" replaces the behaviour, not describe the sensation.

PI 244 How do words refer to sensations?........... On the contrary: the verbal expression of pain replaces crying and does not describe it

It could have been in different circumstances that the phrase "happy" had replaced crying.

The person would then have said "she is happy" and the child would have said "I am happy"

The phrase "happy" would still have replaced the behaviour, not describe the sensation.

We could go round and round again and again, but I won't.

That one is in pain lies outside the scope of knowledge; it is non-epistemic..........This is why it can't be said of me at all that "I know I am in pain", and that all it could possibly mean is that I am in pain. — Luke

I agree, because as you say:"That one is in pain lies outside the scope of knowledge; it is non-epistemic"

As outside the scope of knowledge, such an expression can only be understood by the speaker, and as you also say:"A (private) language understood only by the speaker is the definition of a private language", which I also agree with.

However, the problem arises that we can only discuss a private language using a public language, a language game, as it is also true as you say that:""I am in pain" is an English phrase, and is not part of a private language, by definition"

So we are left with the quandary of how to talk about a private language, something that is outside the scope of knowledge, something non-epistemic, using language, a language game, that is by its nature inside the scope of knowledge, something epistemic.

If that one is pain is outside the scope of knowledge, something that cannot be talked about in the language game, does that mean that item 5) PI 246 It can't be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in pain. What is it supposed to mean—except perhaps that I am in pain? is a meaningless statement?

So we are left with the quandary of how to talk about a private language, something that is outside the scope of knowledge, something non-epistemic, using language, a language game, that is by its nature inside the scope of knowledge, something epistemic. — RussellA

We can talk about it in a public language; I see no issue there. However, the concept of a private language turns out to be incoherent, so the assumption that such a thing is possible should be rejected.

If that one is pain is outside the scope of knowledge, something that cannot be talked about in the language game, does that mean that item 5) PI 246 It can't be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in pain. What is it supposed to mean—except perhaps that I am in pain? is a meaningless statement? — RussellA

That I am in pain can be talked about in the language game. That I am in pain can also be known by others. It is just something that I cannot know. I don't learn of, or doubt, or know my pains. I have them.

That I am in pain can be talked about in the language game. That I am in pain can also be known by others. It is just something that I cannot know. I don't learn of, or doubt, or know my pains. I have them. — Luke

This is important to understand. It reaches into the issue of consciousness itself, and it's why Descartes is wrong about "I think, therefore I am." There is no such conclusion to be drawn. I simply think. Others know that I'm conscious, just as they know I'm in pain, but we as individuals have no such knowledge. It doesn't make sense to doubt one's consciousness or to doubt that one is in pain, at least as an epistemological issue because it's outside the scope of epistemology. Many language-games fall apart when using them to point to these inner conscious experiences. Even the idea that consciousness is an illusion is nonsense. It would be akin to saying that pain is an illusion.

As Feynman said in Names Don't Constitute Knowledge, knowing the name of something is useful if you want to talk about it with someone else, but it does not mean you know what that something is.


One Sunday all the kids were walking in little parties with their fathers in the woods. The next Monday we were playing in a field, and a kid said to me, "What's that bird? Do you know the name of that bird?" I said, "I haven't the slightest idea."He said, "Well, it is a brown throated thrush." He said, "Your father doesn't teach you anything." But my father had already taught me about the names of birds. Once we walked, and he said, "That is a brown-throated thrush. In German it is called the Pfleegel flügel. In Chinese it is called Keewontong. In Japanese a Towhatowharra, and so on. And when you know all the names of that bird in every language, you know nothing, but absolutely nothing, about the bird." And then we would go on and talk about the pecking and the feathers. So I had learned already that names don't constitute knowledge. Of course that has caused me a certain amount of trouble since because I refuse to learn the name of anything. So when someone comes in and says, "Have you got any explanation for the Fitch-Cronin experiment?" I say, "What's that?" And he says, "You know – that long-lived k meson that disintegrates into two pi's." "Oh, yes, now I know." I never know the names of things. What my father forgot to tell me was that knowing the names of things was useful if you want to talk to somebody else – so you can tell them what you are talking about. The basic principle of knowing about something rather than just knowing its name is something that you have stuck to, isn't it? Yes, of course. We have to learn that these are the kinds of disciplines in the field of science that you have to learn – to know when you know and when you don't know, and what it is you know and what it is you don't know. You've go to be very careful not to confuse yourself.