In other words , that each era of scientific theory embodies a metaphysical worldview that usually remains unarticulated by the scientists themselves but is nevertheless implicit in their thinking. This view of metaphysics would reveal it not as something ‘beyond’ physics or empirical science in general but as implicit within its thinking. — Joshs

Yes, that is one traditional perspective with which I would concur. Popper for example. In this sense, all philosophy (and science) is inherently metaphysical, which is what I think is being argued. Kuhn's idea of paradigm shifts also fits.

We do not see the entanglement of existence. It is a judgment about what the real looks like; a conceptualization about the whole of existence is metaphysical. Those concepts might be derived from empirical sciences, but if employed to describe what 'existence' itself is, they are put to metaphysical use. — Tobias

That's fine, as long as we recognize that use of "entanglement" in any context beyond quantum mechanics is metaphorical and not literal. Quantum mechanics does not manifest at human-scale.

Quantum mechanics does not manifest at human-scale. — Clarky

Maybe not. But we don't see the objects of science no matter what the model is. We see things, not physical particles.

I am not sure to what extent people think there is one way of seeing reality. — Jack Cummins

I base my opinion, at least partly, on what I see here on the forum. There are a lot of big arguments about which ontological way of seeing things is correct - realism, materialism, idealism, pragmatism.... As Collingwood says, metaphysical positions are not true or false. They have no truth value.

As Collingwood says, metaphysical positions are not true or false. They have no truth value. — Clarky

Perhaps. But I think all people have a metaphysic whether they articulate to themselves or not.

Maybe not. But we don't see the objects of science no matter what the model is. We see things, not physical particles. — Jackson

On the other hand, we see baseballs and ham sandwiches. They behave consistent with classical mechanics. I think it's fair to say, at least metaphorically, they represent reality as we define it on a day to day basis.

Perhaps. But I think all people have a metaphysic whether they articulate to themselves or not. — Jackson

Perhaps. But I think all people have a metaphysic whether they articulate to themselves or not. — Jackson

Agreed, but the question at hand is whether or not most people think "...there is one way of seeing reality rather than the plurality of possibilities." In my experience, most people think their metaphysic is factually correct, if they think about it at all.

On the other hand, we see baseballs and ham sandwiches. They behave consistent with classical mechanics. I think it's fair to say, at least metaphorically, they represent reality as we define it on a day to day basis. — Clarky

We see baseballs, not physical particles. The difference is important.

In my experience, most people think their metaphysic is factually correct, if they think about it at all. — Clarky

I see your point. But I think we act on our metaphysics not because we take it to be true, but because it is all we have.

Funny how metaphysics never stays dead and buried — Jackson

I suppose we could argue the same about religion.

I suppose we could argue the same about religion. — Joshs

Indeed.

That's fine, as long as we recognize that use of "entanglement" in any context beyond quantum mechanics is metaphorical and not literal. Quantum mechanics does not manifest at human-scale. — Clarky

Well, the 'new materialists' are concerned with 'more than human worlds'. It is actually about decentering human experience and human agency from metaphysics. The term purports to do exactly what you intuit, postulate that what occurs on a different scale than that of humans, is what is actual. I do agree with you though, in a human context - and metaphysics in my view happens to be a human endeavour - it can only be metaphorical. That is exactly my critique, the mistakes the metaphorical for the real and jump from the level of presuppositions to the ontological nature of reality. We are not in disagreement.

We see baseballs, not physical particles. The difference is important. — Jackson

I don't think I understand.

I see your point. But I think we act on our metaphysics not because we take it to be true, but because it is all we have. — Jackson

Agreed.

I don't think I understand. — Clarky

We deduce from seeing a baseball that it is comprised by particles. We do not see the particles.

The term purports to do exactly what you intuit, postulate that what occurs on a different scale than that of humans, is what is actual. — Tobias

This is what I find troublesome. To me, reality can only sensibly be what normal humans interact with on a day to day basis. What a few scientists and philosophers know or believe doesn't change the essence of reality. It would be absurd to say that reality is somehow inaccessible to most people.

That is exactly my critique, the mistakes the metaphorical for the real and jump from the level of presuppositions to the ontological nature of reality. We are not in disagreement. — Tobias

I think maybe we do disagree. For me, the ontological nature of reality is a presupposition.

We deduce from seeing a baseball that it is comprised by particles. We do not see the particles. — Jackson

I agree.

This is what I find troublesome. To me, reality can only sensibly be what normal humans interact with on a day to day basis. What a few scientists and philosophers know or believe doesn't change the essence of reality. It would be absurd to say that reality is somehow inaccessible to most people. — Clarky

Welcome to the phenomenological school of thought! ;) I am not sure though. We do not interact with the ground structure of reality of a day to day basis. At least even us do not consider being, nothngness, essences and properties as our daily fare. I tend to look at this sort of questions historically and I think we are in an epoch in which our metaphysics is indeed changing. Just like the metaphysics of the middle ages held that the truly real was a transcendental power that is infinitely above us and barely comprehensible, we may soon hold that the truly real is an immanent power (nature) that is infinitely stronger and richer than we may fathom and who's workings are purposive but ultimately ineluctable to us puny and destructive humans. I am an anti-metaphysical metaphysician though. Ultimately all such truth claims are speculative and the only thing we can do is trace the historical, social and political processes of their emergence. In that sense I still hold on to the Kantian admonition that we cannot know the thing in itself, we can however trace the historical movement its conceptualization and re-conceptualization (Hegel, maybe Rorty)

I think maybe we do disagree. For me, the ontological nature of reality is a presupposition. — Clarky

I agree... so I truly do not think we disagree, but hey, it needs two to agree, so if you still disagree, then we disagree! :D

Welcome to the phenomenological school of thought! — Tobias

Much of what I think and believe is based on introspection, i.e. observation of my personal experience. Since phenomenology is "...the philosophical study of the structures of experience and consciousness," it would seem to be right up my alley. But intentionality, aboutness, embodiment, what-is-it-like, qualia; is completely different than the language I use when I talk about my own or other people's experience gained through introspection or empathy.

We do not interact with the ground structure of reality of a day to day basis. — Tobias

I'm trying to decide whether or not I agree with this.

At least even us do not consider being, nothngness, essences and properties as our daily fare. — Tobias

As I said before, for me, reality is puppies and chocolate chip cookies, not essences and properties. That isn't to say I don't believe what physicists say about what happens at subatomic scale, just that it isn't sensible to think that's all there is to reality.

I tend to look at this sort of questions historically and I think we are in an epoch in which our metaphysics is indeed changing. — Tobias

I think you're right. I've done some thinking, and I need to do more, about what those changes are and should be.

I am an anti-metaphysical metaphysician though. Ultimately all such truth claims are speculative and the only thing we can do is trace the historical, social and political processes of their emergence. — Tobias

I'm with Collingwood - metaphysics has no and makes no truth claims.

Did anyone mention Siddhartha Gautama, the light of Asia?

He dealt with metaphysics by, well, inducing analysis paralysis (thought block) using the much-studied Nagarjuna's tetralemma (hic sunt dracones).

Vide The Parable of the Arrow.

The Buddha was in fact switching off the mind, probably before it imagines a lethal cocktail of ideas that could destroy us all (re God is not great - Late Christopher Hitchens).

:snicker:

the question at hand is whether or not most people think "...there is one way of seeing reality rather than the plurality of possibilities." In my experience, most people think their metaphysic is factually correct, if they think about it at all. — Clarky

So would you extend this observation to the ‘facts’ of an empirical science as well? That is, is it a problem that people believe factual correctness in science asymptotically approximates ( through Popperian falsification) an ultimately true reality?

Quantum mechanics does not manifest at human-scale. — Clarky

10 Examples of Quantum Physics in Everyday Life

even those committed to perspectivism and the notion of there being no correct viewpoint - no totalizing metanarrative - seem to elevate this evaluative framework as somehow true, in itself a kind of totalizing metanarrative. — Tom Storm

This would not be the case for authors like Nietzsche , Heidegger, Derrida, Merleau-Ponty, Deleuze, Foucault and Wittgenstein because their starting point a fact, frame or truth but self-reflexivity itself.

10 Examples of Quantum Physics in Everyday Life — Pantagruel

Speaking scientifically, everything in the universe is a result of quantum behavior, but we experience reality as classical. To say that reality as people experience it is not really reality is goofy.

Speaking scientifically, everything in the universe is a result of quantum behavior, but we experience reality as classical. To say that reality as people experience it is not really reality is goofy. — Clarky

I think the more sophisticated version of the question is, can quantum effects manifest within our "classical" framework and I think the answer is that under certain conditions they can. Quantum phenomena are utilized for a variety of technical purposes.

So would you extend this observation to the ‘facts’ of an empirical science as well? That is, is it a problem that people believe factual correctness in science asymptotically approximates ( through Popperian falsification) an ultimately true reality? — Joshs

The claim that "factual correctness in science asymptotically approximates ( through Popperian falsification) an ultimately true reality," is not a scientific fact, it is a metaphysical assertion.

I think the more sophisticated version of the question is, can quantum effects manifest within our "classical" framework and I think the answer is that under certain conditions they can. — Pantagruel

It's not clear to me whether or not you and I are disagreeing with each other.

Metaphysics is how we look at things, not what we see. — Clarky

It seems to me that phenomenological and postmodern approaches recognize the metaphysical and the real, the formal and the empirical, the subjective and the objective, the ideal and the real , the valuative and the factual as two inseparable poles of each moment of experiencing.

Are you saying that quantum reality is somehow divorced from day-to-day reality due to its esoteric nature? Because I would contend (from the earlier example) when we see the baseball, we ipso-facto "see" the particles.

The claim that "factual correctness in science asymptotically approximates ( through Popperian falsification) an ultimately true reality," is not a scientific fact, it is a metaphysical assertion. — Clarky

But in what way can we disentangle the metaphysical from the factual? A fact is what it is by virtue of its role within a value system. But the fact doesnt just reside within this system, it also alters this system. There is a reciprocal dependence between the metaphysical and the factual which allows each to define and change the other. A fact is never simply what is the case, it is at the same time how it is the case, how it is relevant and significant in the present context.

To say that reality as people experience it is not really reality is goofy. — Clarky

Except in cases where there is a disconnect between reality and experience, meaning it's not at all goofy to say that the schizophrenic and the drug addict are seeing something that's not there.

And so then you have to figure out what makes you normal and them not.

And then you have to acknowledge that the shape of your lens varies from mine and you see things differently from me.

And then you have to acknowledge that regardless of the curvature of either of our lenses, the lens is between the object and the perceiver and so it mediates the object and presents it a way peculiar to what mediates it. That is, you are not just experiencing the chair, but you're experiencing the light emanating off the chair through a particular type lens.

And we've not even begun to talk about how your brain might further mediate what you see, making it look different from the way I see it, and very much different from the way a bee might see it.

So what to do? As far as being able to describe the thing without reference to the way we subjectively modify it, we can't. It's not possible. That's the noumena. And that results in some saying let's just jettison all this metaphysical talk because it gets us no where. But I have no desire to abandon the correct answer just because it's troubling.

But in what way can we disentangle the metaphysical from the factual? — Joshs

I don't think it's always easy. Let's take a look:

[1] Observation of the behavior of particles at CERN - science
[2] Interpretation of observation in terms of current theory - science
[3] Standard Model of particle physics - science
[4] Quantum mechanics - science
[5] Scientific method - metaphysics
[6] Physicalism or materialism - metaphysics

Which of these are facts? Item one certainly. What about Items 2, 3, and 4? I'm not sure. Items 5 and 6 are definitely not factual.

A fact is what it is by virtue of its role within a value system. But the fact doesnt just reside within this system, it also alters this system. There is a reciprocal dependence between the metaphysical and the factual which allows each to change the other. — Joshs

You say "value system," I say "metaphysical system." Facts don't necessarily change metaphysics, but metaphysics may have to change in order for us to see reality in new ways. I'm not sure how that works. It's at the top of my list of things to figure out.