What you're describing is epistemic egoism. It's the ideal of epistemic autonomy.
Given that we're not living in a vacuum, epistemic autonomy is not possible. — baker

Ego is an undeniable aspect of being human so it’s no surprise that it will influence personal beliefs.
If an individual is nefarious and they have power and influence then they can insist their personal beliefs are more important than the beliefs of some alternate mass or group of people with less power and influence. But, all tyrants are eventually overthrown, even those who seem to have total power. The combined belief of a large majority that they are not being treated in an acceptable way that makes their lives worth living is often the reason why those who think their beliefs/legacy will ‘stand for a thousand years,’ gets overthrown relatively quickly.

So if I'm walking down a flight of stairs and I have a propensity to act as if the next step is the same dimentions as the previous steps but I trip because it's not, did I have a mistaken belief or a prediction error?
— praxis

Both are the same thing. — Isaac

I’m curious where the line is drawn. If consciousness isn’t a prerequisite then it would be correct to say that my phone (specifically the calculator app) believes that two plus two equals four. If that’s correct then, following the rules of gravity, perhaps gold believes that it’s heavier than aluminum.

If consciousness isn’t a prerequisite then it would be correct to say that my phone (specifically the calculator app) believes that two plus two equals four. — praxis

That seems an odd leap to take. If a belief is a relation between a state of mind and a proposition, then it would seem, by definition, to require a mind.

When a group of people are together, we might call them a crowd. When a group of balloons are similarly clustered it would be wrong to use the word 'crowd' despite their arrangement meeting exactly the same threshold criteria.

We often use different terminology for humans. I don't see anything ontological we need derive from that, it's just cultural.

If a belief is a relation between a state of mind and a proposition, then it would seem, by definition, to require a mind. — Isaac

A mind is conscious, so it appears you’re drawing the line there and subconscious processes do not entail beliefs.

A mind is conscious, so it appears you’re drawing the line there and subconscious processes do not entail beliefs. — praxis

I think there are subconscious aspects to our minds. It appears we have yet another disagreement over definitions.

An example of contemporary use https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2440575/

… action precedes reflection.

Prediction precedes belief?

Prediction precedes belief? — praxis

A prediction is a belief. But we're not getting anywhere just disagreeing about definitions. What is the consequence of a distinction between that which we're aware of holding to be the case and that which we hold to be the case but are unaware that we do? Whatever word we give those two categories, how does their differentiation bear on the question?

A prediction is a belief. — Isaac

Not necessarily. I might predict (in the sense of bet on) inflation will continuing to rise based on that seeming to be, at a guess, the most likely of three possibilities, without believing that it will rise, but just taking a punt.

It looks like belief is not tied in any way to logic/rationality (re faith); we can believe whatever the hell we want (screw contradictions and ex falso quodlibet).

Of course believing falsehoods (lies) is gonna hurt and hurt real bad, but sometimes it's sane to be insane.

I suppose the idea of belief sans justification is baked into, is part and parcel of, rationality - to avoid an infinite regress we must decide on a starting point (postulates, axioms). True that there's an attempt to make postulates/axioms as obvious/self-evident as possible; nevertheless, we're not completely satisfied with the arrangment, we instinctively recoil against flat assertions of any kind.

So, let me try to understand where the line is for you.

"I believe there is a God" is a statement of belief, right?

What about "I believe there's a 50% chance the coin will land on heads"? That's not a belief, according to you, right? (working on your example above - holding there to be a greater than 50% chance of inflation is not a belief)

What about "I believe there is a 99.999999999% chance there is a God"? Still not a belief? Or have we crossed into belief territory yet?

So, let me try to understand where the line is for you.

"I believe there is a God" is a statement of belief, right?

What about "I believe there's a 50% chance the coin will land on heads"? That's not a belief, according to you, right? (working on your example above - holding there to be a greater than 50% chance of inflation is not a belief)

What about "I believe there is a 99.999999999% chance there is a God"? Still not a belief? Or have we crossed into belief territory yet? — Isaac

Of course ""I believe there is a God" is a statement of belief. You don't believe, you know, that there is a 50% chance, statistically speaking and assuming a perfect coin, that the coin will land on heads. It's true by definition.

I haven't said that, in the example, the speculator holds anything definite to be the case about the likelihood that inflation will continue to rise, but merely that she bets on that since inflation is currently rising, and she goes with the idea that it will continue..

I'm not claiming that belief is impossible, or that there is no such thing as belief. All I've been saying is that if someone believes something to be true, then it follows that they feel sure that its true. On the other hand if they don't feel sure that it's true and only believe it's likely to be true, then they don't believe it's true, and they don't even have to believe it's likely to be true to bet on its being true or to act as if it's true..

:roll: What a mess.

What a pointless comment!

~~

You don't believe, you know, that there is a 50% chance, statistically speaking and assuming a perfect coin, that the coin will land on heads. It's true by definition. — Janus

That's not how probability works. If I'm 100% certain there's a 50% chance, then there's a 50% chance. If I'm 80% certain there's a 50% chance, then there's a 40% chance (depending on the exclusivity of the other options). Probability is already a measure of uncertainty, you can't have uncertainty about the probability as being some kind of separate measure.

in the example, the speculator holds anything definite to be the case about the likelihood that inflation will continue to rise, but merely that she bets on that since inflation is currently rising, and she goes with the idea that it will continue.. — Janus

Unless she's acting randomly, then betting money one way indicates a belief in the likelihood of that outcome. Obviously, people might act randomly, but it's hardly the normal case, and very difficult to prove in any case.

if they don't feel sure that it's true and only believe it's likely to be true, then they don't believe it's true — Janus

Indeed. They believe it to some degree of certainty below 100%. The most common case. A belief with 100% certainty is rare.

they don't even have to believe it's likely to be true to bet on its being true or to act as if it's true. — Janus

No indeed. They could act randomly or irrationally. It's not common though.

If I'm 100% certain there's a 50% chance, then there's a 50% chance. — Isaac

If I'm 100% certain there's a 50% chance, then I'm 100% correct that there's a 50% chance?

If certain, then correct?

That can't be right.

I can be 100% certain and also 100% wrong.

100% certain there's a 100% chance - with a 0% chance.

If I'm 100% certain there's a 50% chance, then I'm 100% correct that there's a 50% chance? — ZzzoneiroCosm

If depends on from whose perspective. Probability is a measure of uncertainty. From an objective perspective there's just a 100% chance the coin will land on whatever side it will land on (assuming determinism). So saying there's a 50% chance of it landing on heads is just an expression of my degree of uncertainty. A person with a super advanced knowledge of the coin and the air conditions might not say 50%.

I can be 100% certain and also 100% wrong. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Yes. But right and wrong are not about probabilities at all, they're just about whatever model of truth you're using.

What a pointless comment!

That's not how probability works. If I'm 100% certain there's a 50% chance, then there's a 50% chance. If I'm 80% certain there's a 50% chance, then there's a 40% chance (depending on the exclusivity of the other options). Probability is already a measure of uncertainty, you can't have uncertainty about the probability as being some kind of separate measure. — Isaac

That's not what I was saying though. I said that we are one hundred percent certain that there would be a fifty percent chance of the coin landing on heads ( or tails) because it is analytic that if there are two possible outcomes and nothing biasing towards one or the other then there is a fifty percent chance of either outcome.

Unless she's acting randomly, then betting money one way indicates a belief in the likelihood of that outcome. Obviously, people might act randomly, but it's hardly the normal case, and very difficult to prove in any case. — Isaac

I don't agree. She may have no idea whether inflation will continue to rise or not, but simply decides to bet one way or the other. That is not irrational because the chances may be incalculable, in which case it would be rational to suspend belief.

My whole argument has simply been that the term 'belief' is commonly used to refer to a range of different phenomena, which makes it ambiguous. I also think there is a logic to believing that says that if you really believe something then you are convinced of it. You can't both doubt and believe
at the same time regarding the same thing.

if they don't feel sure that it's true and only believe it's likely to be true, then they don't believe it's true — Janus


Indeed. They believe it to some degree of certainty below 100%. The most common case. A belief with 100% certainty is rare. — Isaac

Yes, but they may believe one hundred percent that its likely to be true; if they don't believe that then what would you say they believe? Note; of course I'm allowing that people may across time vacillate between belief (defined as feeling certain) and doubt (feeling uncertain).

they don't even have to believe it's likely to be true to bet on its being true or to act as if it's true. — Janus


No indeed. They could act randomly or irrationally. It's not common though. — Isaac

As I said above I don't think it is always irrational to act without believing anything in particular. In cases where we have no idea what is more or less likely (and there are very many of those) it is rational to simply guess, or to "think with your gut" as to what seems or "feels" most likely and go with that.

Ah, so we are free to "think" that such-and-such is true, free of the yoke of authority? — Banno

We are, but the usefulness of this freedom is yet to be seen. It's right up there with "Everyone is free to buy themselves a private jet."

And again, your distinction of "feels certain" from "is certain" does not make sense.

Wo else makes this distinction? Can you point to a source? — Banno

It's common sense to make this distinction. From what you've said so far, you're making it as well. Otherwise, you couldn't say things like "Faith is unwarranted belief."

If you see yourself as the arbiter of what makes a belief warranted or unwarranted, it means that in a particular case, you determine whether a particular person is certain of x, or, at best, can merely feel certain of x (regardless of what said person claims about their relationship with x).

What you're describing is epistemic egoism. It's the ideal of epistemic autonomy.
Given that we're not living in a vacuum, epistemic autonomy is not possible.
— baker

Ego is an undeniable aspect of being human so it’s no surprise that it will influence personal beliefs.
If an individual is nefarious and they have power and influence then they can insist their personal beliefs are more important than the beliefs of some alternate mass or group of people with less power and influence. But, all tyrants are eventually overthrown, even those who seem to have total power. The combined belief of a large majority that they are not being treated in an acceptable way that makes their lives worth living is often the reason why those who think their beliefs/legacy will ‘stand for a thousand years,’ gets overthrown relatively quickly. — universeness

I wasn't thinking about epistemic egoism in such socially dramatic terms. I was speaking in reference to your claim "I am advocating for some rigorous background checking to make sure YOUR conviction or belief it’s true is justified to YOU".

The epistemic egoist maintains that one must possess positive reasons in favor of other people's reliability or trustworthiness before their beliefs and testimony offer prima facie social evidence.

https://compass.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/phc3.12184#:~:text=The%20epistemic%20egoist%20maintains%20that,offer%20prima%20facie%20social%20evidence.

Also see Ethical and Epistemic Egoism and the Ideal of Autonomy.

Yeah, interesting. I suppose that's more true than it might at first seem if one considers social as well as economic power relationships. I do think it's surmountable though, but I agree the temptation makes it difficult to be sure. — Isaac

Could you sketch out how exactly, or point me to a source?

I think, one difficulty here is that there's two aspects to these types of discussion that people are interested in. The 'beliefs' we find most interesting are those like god, socialism, transgenders, etc... But these are a tiny minority of beliefs.

We all believe, for example, that larger objects cannot fit inside smaller ones.

It's not clear this would generally even be considered a belief, but rather, knowledge, common sense, something that isn't up for dispute.

The former type of beliefs I think are held almost entirely for reasons of social relationships. The latter type more for pragmatic or biological reasons. The forces which act on each type will be different.

I agree. I find that often, the former are attempted by many people to be advocated as the latter. For example, "All men are created equal" or "Those who refuse to get vaccinated against covid are selfish" are sometimes advocated as being as equally true, objective, self-evident as "2 + 2 = 4".

Prediction precedes belief?
— praxis

A prediction is a belief. But we're not getting anywhere just disagreeing about definitions. What is the consequence of a distinction between that which we're aware of holding to be the case and that which we hold to be the case but are unaware that we do? Whatever word we give those two categories, how does their differentiation bear on the question? — Isaac

One consequence is in learning. If I’m reading you right, you seem to be saying that in everything thing we do, we always believe that we’re doing it correctly. If that were the case then we would not be able to learn.

For example, I could watch an expert basketball player shoot hoops perfectly. I could try it myself but I would fail to perform nearly as well. I would not believe that I was doing it correctly. Maybe some of the predictions that my mind made while trying were closer than others, but I would know that many were way off. I wouldn’t hold all of my predictions to be true or false. Comparing performance to goals seems to requires awareness.

Could you sketch out how exactly, or point me to a source? — baker

Basically, stories. We're quite easily fooled by stories, so whilst a social group seems indispensable for the construction of many complex beliefs, those social groups don't have to be real.

It's not clear this would generally even be considered a belief, but rather, knowledge — baker

Since knowledge is considered to be justified (true) belief, if would seem that still makes it a kind of belief.

I find that often, the former are attempted by many people to be advocated as the latter. For example, "All men are created equal" or "Those who refuse to get vaccinated against covid are selfish" are sometimes advocated as being as equally true, objective, self-evident as "2 + 2 = 4". — baker

Lately this has been a trend, yes. The stuff in the '2+2=4' category changes with cultural fashions. It used to be God. Now questioning God is allowed but questioning scientific orthodoxy isn't. It depends on the dominant social narratives around at the time.

If I’m reading you right... — praxis

You're not.

I can't think where you've read such a thing into what I've written when I've mostly been arguing the exact opposite - that belief is dynamic and usually held in degrees of certainty.

we are one hundred percent certain... — Janus

...is always contradicted by...

if ...nothing biasing towards one or the other — Janus

...this is something we can never know but be absolutely sure exists. Something absolutely must be biasing one side or the other, that's why it lands on one side or the other. We just don't know what that something is, nor what its effect might be. The probability, then, is a measure of our uncertainty.

She may have no idea whether inflation will continue to rise or not, but simply decides to bet one way or the other. That is not irrational because the chances may be incalculable, in which case it would be rational to suspend belief. — Janus

Well, betting one way and not the other isn't suspending belief, unless she's acting randomly. I agreed random action is possible, but it's not common.

I'm allowing that people may across time vacillate between belief (defined as feeling certain) and doubt (feeling uncertain). — Janus

I don't understand why you've disallowed 'quite certain of...', or 'a slight inclination toward...', or ' I'm not sure but I'm inclined to believe...' ... or any other such expression of moderated doubt. It seems to me that we quite often have a slight inclination toward one state. For example, I'm pretty sure it's not going to rain today, but I wouldn't be surprised if it did. My belief that it will not rain is neither certain, nor in doubt. I'm 'pretty sure'.

they may believe one hundred percent that its likely to be true — Janus

'Likely to be true' is already a measure of uncertainty. So saying I'm 100% certain that it's 50% likely is just exactly the same as saying I'm 50% certain.

As I said above I don't think it is always irrational to act without believing anything in particular. — Janus

I agree, which is why I included 'random' in there too. I don't think either case is common though.

we are one hundred percent certain... — Janus


...is always contradicted by...

if ...nothing biasing towards one or the other — Isaac

We are 100% certain that, absent biasing factors, there is a 50% chance of either outcome. Are you 100% certain that "is always contradicted"? The point there is that if one is sensible one does not believe there is actually a 50% of either outcome, and one really has no idea, other t5han that the probability is roughly 50 %.

I don't understand why you've disallowed 'quite certain of...', or 'a slight inclination toward...', or ' I'm not sure but I'm inclined to believe...' ... or any other such expression of moderated doubt. — Isaac

I don't disallow any of that, I just recommend a more nuanced way of speaking about what we are doing when our conviction is not 100%. For example if I say I believe God exists, I would mean that I have no doubt God exists. Or if I believe the butler did it then I would be 100% convinced that the butler did it, but if I was merely 100% convinced that it is most likely, to the point of being beyond reasonable doubt that the butler did it, then I would say I beleive the butler did, but that it most likely that he did, and so on.

'Likely to be true' is already a measure of uncertainty. So saying I'm 100% certain that it's 50% likely is just exactly the same as saying I'm 50% certain. — Isaac

Sure, 50 % certain of either outcome, but that contradicts nothing I've said.

I agree, which is why I included 'random' in there too. I don't think either case is common though. — Isaac

It might be random, or it might be based on a gut feeling, or just a preference, or wishful thinking. I agree that it is not rational in the sense of 'measured..

We are 100% certain that, absent biasing factors, there is a 50% chance of either outcome — Janus

No. Absent biasing factors the coin will not land at all. Some force has to cause it to land. That force will be biased to one side or the other. We just don't know which.

I just recommend a more nuanced way of speaking about what we are doing when our conviction is not 100%. For example if I say I believe God exists, I would mean that I have no doubt God exists. Or if I believe the butler did it then I would be 100% convinced that the butler did it — Janus

Why 100? If you want to reserve a special word for when one considers the probability 100%, why not another for 99%? One for 51%, one for 32%... What is it about 100% that warrants it's own word? I can't see the advantage of what you're advocating.

it might be based on a gut feeling — Janus

...and a 'gut feeling' is different to a belief, how?

I just recommend a more nuanced way of speaking about what we are doing when our conviction is not 100%. For example if I say I believe God exists, I would mean that I have no doubt God exists. Or if I believe the butler did it then I would be 100% convinced that the butler did it — Janus


Why 100? If you want to reserve a special word for when one considers the probability 100%, why not another for 99%? One for 51%, one for 32%... What is it about 100% that warrants it's own word? I can't see the advantage of what you're advocating. — Isaac

I believe, Isaac, I am on your side of this one. I don't see that believing something to be true entails 100% certainty. Further i don't see how one could even ransack oneself, let alone others, to determine, then, if one met that criterion. It would mean, in my case, that I have no political beliefs at all. I would suddenly lack all sorts of beliefs about my family and friends and certainly people I know less well. Jimmy is kind. Hm, well, I don't know what he is like when he is abroad. Scientists, given their epistemology and methodology, would have to refrain from believing pretty much everything. From saying they believe X. Since they would have to admit that perhaps what seems obvious today may be revised by further research. It's not like a light switch, even one with a third position (half lit). If we say we believe something it means that is our position on something with varying degrees of certainty. But it is the position we take, the conclusion we have drawn, some with greater certainty that others. Sure, some people are damn certain about nearly all their beliefs or at least they think they should feel that way and present themselves that way. I don't see them as the role model for a definition of belief.

I can't think where you've read such a thing into what I've written when I've mostly been arguing the exact opposite - that belief is dynamic and usually held in degrees of certainty. — Isaac

I don’t see how they can change unless we are aware of them. If I have a belief that I’m unaware of it would never change.