.

Aren't we--as you point out with global warming--strictly talking about the use of the scientific method and the limits upon that (or, as it were, the treatment of its objects)? Only to ask, is there anything that would change the method itself? As you say: with anyone (competent) running the same experiment, we get the same results (or is there something I'm missing about science, which could easily be true). And then what would be a specific example of a change in the method? I ask for clarification as my understanding (from Cavell) is that it is the consistency of science based on its method that gives a fact its stature, its certainty, its ability to be predetermined, its reliability, its foundational structure to build upon, in short, its "objectivity" (rather than the measuring of a thing-in-itself--as shown by, for example, Thomas Kuhn's exceptions undermining the traditional concept of an object). That it is the consistency of the fundamental process which is paramount.

This leaves us simply with limits on what we can experiment on and what acts we can conduct, which is interesting nevertheless, and still leaves us with the disappointment of being kept from knowledge, closed off from part of the world (imagined as existing beyond or outside morality). Science being constrained by moral considerations seems unfair, or, unscientific (its method being without the need for any particular human, or, it then seems, humanity entirely).

But, as in most moral considerations, we have concessions. We have waivers and volunteers in medicine, and, I only imagine, consent of authority to damage the natural world if it is returned to its previous state; as a war could be deemed just to allow someone to kill without being judged to have broken an oath not to. By analogy, the importance (necessity) of the knowledge would outweigh the cost. And perhaps the thing is that our modern moral judgment doesn't allow for this wider calculus (economics?); we now narrowly judge the act alone removed from any context, which modern moral philosophy (Nietschze, Wittgenstein, etc.) would say actually removes the (messy) "human"--in a sense, attempting to turn morality into a kind of science. And, I take it, another concern would be the (arbitrary or all-encompassing) framing of the subject, making it rarified without equal weight given to what might exempt the act (and actor) from judgment.

The way I see it, the subject matter of science is such that consciounsness, hence pain & joy, is irrelevant. You don't get special treatment from gravity because you can suffer.

Zoom down now to the quantum world (Martin Reese) and consciousness becomes important or so they say.

A Theory of Everything (a union of the micro & macro world) is when subjectivity and objectivity are reconciled!