• spirit-salamander
    268
    I am referring to the German philosopher Gerold Prauss, who, in my opinion, not only greatly improved Kant's ethics and made it plausible, but also put together the most convincing ethics ever.

    Prauss wants to give us an ethical standard which should become a guide for the common cultural history of all people, i.e. a cross-cultural standard for the present and distant future.

    The development of such a standard begins in the history of philosophy with Kant. Before Kant, one might say, there was no proper, or rather convincing, secular and at the same time objective ethics. With the famous thought, however, that man must not be treated merely as a means, but must always be treated as an end in itself, Kant succeeded in making a great impact on the secular movement of the European Enlightenment.

    Now Kant does not explain, Prauss argues, why human beings are identified with ends in themselves. According to Prauss, we should stop dealing only with the perspective of the agent in the realm of morality and law, as Kant does. The notion of an end in itself or self-end becomes much more understandable for morality and law when the objective perspective of an action is taken into account as well, namely, the perspective of the person being dealt with. Accordingly, morality and law are not "solipsistic" matters. They each occur fundamentally as a particular interpersonal relationship.

    Kant thinks that the moral consists in treating someone as both an end and a means, while evil involves only the latter. But why not explain moral good in the intuitively more obvious way that it means treating someone only as an end without any trace of treating as a means?

    Here is a quote that summarizes Prauss in this regard:

    "The categorical imperative, in the formula of humanity as end in itself, demands to use every person always at the same time as end, never merely as a means. According to Gerold Prauss, Kant should have distinguished more carefully between ‘not merely as a means, but at the same time as end’ and ‘not as means at all, but only as end’. Whereas the first formula describes a legal relationship between two self-determining subjects who mutually recognize one another, the second formula applies to situations in which I face a rational being that depends on my help. For Prauss, only in the second case the ethical duty deserves to be called moral." (
    https://www.herder.de/thph/hefte/archiv/85-2010/2-2010/gerold-prauss-ueber-moral-und-recht-im-staat-nach-kant-und-hegel/)

    According to Prauss - and this is the philosophically new thing - we can deal with people in three ways: only as a means, which would be the epitome of evil (e.g. in the case of lying, fraud, bodily harm, grave insult, theft, robbery and murder); both as a means and as an end in itself, which should characterize normal and legal dealings between people (in trade, shopping, at the hairdresser's etc. ), and finally only as an end in itself, which would come into question when a person is no longer able to help herself in an encounter - for example, due to an accident. One cannot then simply walk past this person in need of help completely indifferently and unconcernedly. For this person has the ability to understand herself as a free creator of goals, which in turn leads to the fact that she can make herself (knowingly) an end in herself and therefore automatically also an end in herself for all other persons. An end in itself simply is an end in itself, I can't ignore that. And only the capacity for self-knowledge makes something an end in itself.

    A demand is made by the injured person to the person present, who can no longer evade this demand without moving to the moral sidelines. The demand does not have to be articulated. It only has to be accepted as a possibility or potential. The person present is thus de facto morally obligated to help. And this rendering of help is then the morally good (and required) action in that particular situation. Prauss thinks here of the parable of the Good Samaritan from the Bible as a, or rather the, model example of a morally good act.

    Thus, if we fail to help someone in need, we not only prove ourselves to be lacking in merit, but we commit an evil. The duties of virtue, then, are not to be regarded as a kind of moral luxury that we might neglect.

    Prauss manages to establish self-knowledge (the ability to conceive of oneself as an end in itself and thus to make oneself an end in itself) and interpersonality as cornerstones of ethics.

    Therefore, there can be no moral or legal relationship with a stone or a fly. Neither the stone nor the fly are ends in themselves, they cannot make themselves an end, which only a reflective consciousness can make possible.

    We usually have no problem at all swatting a fly to death. Why is that? Prauss makes an answer understandable. If the still living fly would magically obtain self-knowledge and a reflective consciousness and thereby it would become a conscious and knowing purpose for itself, then we as humans would have a problem and reservations to kill this particular fly. For the fly would have the potential to somehow signal to humans that it does not want to die.

    Morality, according to Prauss, is not something that exists fixed and predetermined in some ontological third realm, but arises spontaneously in encounters between rational beings as a relation.

    Each one of us humans is a potential knowing/conscious will or a knowing/conscious end in itself. And because everyone knows this about herself/himself as well as about everyone else, she/he is then also a knowing/conscious demanding, a knowing/conscious claim against everyone else, for whom this must, therefore, become an obligation. For everyone who in this sense is a conscious end in itself wants to be treated as such by everyone else: at least also as an end in itself or even only as an end in itself, depending on whether she/he is capable or incapable of self-help. That is, in a nutshell, rational agents (can) issue imperatives all the time. But only in certain interpersonal contexts do these imperatives give rise to objectively binding moral obligations. The ability to help oneself is the decisive moral criterion.

    Prauss also gives a plausible derivation of the practical ought.

    You can derive a practical ought only from a will, to put it more precisely, from another will, a will different from one's own. The foreign will is to be understood as a (potential) request, claim, requirement, demand or command, all of which only another (rational) person can do. Since Prauss is German, his reasoning comes from the logic and semantics of the German verb "sollen", which translates to ought or should (shall) in English. Almost all grammars of German explain "sollen" by saying that there must be another personal agent who wants something from you (who insists that you do something). I think the German language is in this case more precise and clearer in meaning than the English. So, if A ought to do X, this implies that someone wants A to do X. For example: I go to the doctor and he tells me to take two pills twice a day. Then I later tell my wife I ought to take two pills twice a day.

    The ethical question that now arises is, how can I distinguish a morally binding ought from a morally non-binding ought? Because not everything that people ask me to do is really binding.

    As Prauss says, I can recognize the morally obligatory ought by the criterion of whether the other is still capable of helping him or herself. You have to commit to cases where it's a matter of life and death. Thus, the moral ought always becomes binding when the other person will surely soon die without immediate assistance from others. And the injured person's claim cannot go beyond their own injury.

    How does this logic of action look more precise in an idealized fashion? The first step would be something like this: A person, for example, demands help from me by turning to me and saying, "Help me, please" which means "I want you to help me". Of course, I immediately understand that I should help her. So we have gone from a will/demand of another person to a should or ought which is inside of me. I have to translate a will of another as an ought to for myself.

    Without the additional presence of a "rational being facing me", there simply is no ought possible, let alone a moral one. A possible deliberate demand of another person is, in fact, the essential condition for the realization of an ought in my mind.

    So there is a possibility of deriving an ought, namely from the self recognized will of someone else (it is also clear that the human will is always conscious, but not always self-aware). And I think it’s the only possibility to get an ought.

    This is how Prauss sums it up, as I translated with a web translator:

    "And it is obvious that such an “ought” is therefore nothing but the synthetic result of the encounter of subjects, each of whom, as a conscious end in itself, is a conscious willing in relation to the other, and thus also a conscious demanding." (Gerold Prauss - Moral und Recht im Staat nach Kant und Hegel, Morality and Law in the State after Kant and Hegel)

    There is also another normativity from which a pressure to act emanates, which presupposes one's own personal will. I'll give an example: I want to be home at ten o'clock in the evening, so I must (normative must or have to) take the bus at half past nine.

    So, if you want y to happen, then you "must" do x, provided you really want to. There must be a strong interest in what is wanted or willed and not just a desire or wish. But this must is not moral.

    There is as according to Prauss (1) legal and moral normativity, which comes about through another person, and (2) a purely logical normativity, which I have towards myself. That is, according to Prauss, there is contra Kant no (direct) moral self-duty or moral duty against oneself.

    As a further aid to understanding:

    Pavlos Kontos sums up Prauss in a review (Kant-Studien 2009). I hope the passages are somewhat understandable:

    "The author draws inspiration from an extremely challenging idea, according to which we should abandon the Kantian triple distinction between actions ‘from duty’, ‘contrary to duty’, and ‘according to duty’, and substitute for it another triple schema which, whilst formulated in Kantian terms, has not been acknowledged as such by Kant, namely the schema: ‘only as a means’, ‘not “only” as a means but “also” as an end in itself’, and ‘not only “also” as an end in itself, but “only” as an end in itself’. Needless to say, the brilliance of this original reconstruction is principally owed to the introduction of this third pure alternative that Kant, and even the whole Kantian literature, has neglected."

    "As a matter of fact, it is more or less eagerly conceded that the Kantian distinction between actions ‘from duty’, ‘contrary to duty’, and ‘according to duty’ is a puzzling one. However, Prauss’ analysis is much more elegant and resolute (699ff.). The terms ‘from’, ‘according to’ and ‘contrary to’ are disapproved of to the extent that they are formally-logically dependent upon what follows them, that is, upon the notion of duty; furthermore, they are not mutually exclusive since, for example, an action which is not contrary to duty might be either ‘according to’ or ‘from’ duty. The apogee of these perplexities is that the categorical imperative of humanity will equate morality and right, by grounding both of these realms on the obligation to “use humanity […] always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means” (Groundwork, 4: 429). Consequently, Prauss is entitled to state: “to confuse morality for right is a catastrophe” (707)!"

    "The very case of an action that handles another person ‘only as an end in himself’ is [...] meant to exclusively define what morality is about; by contrast, the order of right emerges once we encounter other persons at the same time as means and as ends in themselves. These two real practical alternatives describe the difference between moral good and right (morally and rightly good), whence the negative alternative of handling someone ‘only as a means’ mirrors what is morally and rightly evil.

    Prauss proceeds by dealing with the exclusively moral alternative, that is, with an action that handles other persons only as ends in themselves. It proves to be the case that this action, and hence the order of morality in general, is conditioned by a very peculiar situation: a claim to morality is grounded only “when the person handled is precisely not in a position to help himself and as long as he remains in this position” (711). “This self-help represents then the decisive criterion” in order for the realms of right and morality to be distinguished from one another and, consequently, this very distinction depends upon the emergence of such a particular case (711f., note). The rationale of the argument suggests that whoever cannot assure his own life cannot therefore represent a means for our subjective purposes (1117f.).

    [...]

    1. Morality emerges as a relation between an actor (able to help himself and others) and a
    person in need or, according to the Samaritan example, a “verwundetes [wounded, injured] Subjekt” (1111f.).


    Thus, Prauss is obliged to subscribe to two further claims: in addition to the claim that there is no morality possible between persons who are not in need, there is no morality possible between persons in need, since they have nothing to offer or, in the terms that the author will later introduce, they can give no life (not even to themselves). Hence, morality is conditioned by situations that are exclusively restricted to interpersonal relations between non-injured and injured persons.

    [...]

    […] Prauss reconstructs the notion of ends in a long argument that we might reformulate as follows: Human will is not auto-referential but by essence directed to the success (and not to the failure) of the actions in which it is implicated. Due to this intentionality, good and evil are attributes we ascribe to actions, insofar as they respect the normativity (whatever its kind might be) that the agent has adopted and thereby freely ‘incorporated’ as his actual incentive (759). Every kind of normativity presupposes a claim raised by the Behandelte [patient, being treated, being acted upon] (that is, stemming from the objective side of action) and a kind of Befolgung [observance] (that is, the readiness of the agent to act according to the principles he has subscribed to).

    [...]

    Freedom bears practical relevance only insofar as it represents the object of conscience: normativity presupposes the knowledge of freedom, not just freedom itself (799). However, this factual knowledge is not sufficient to explain why human beings are regarded as ends in themselves. Thus, a second level of self-recognition is required, namely a level grounded upon a further fact: upon the fact that human beings, bestowed as they are with Vernunft [reason] and not simply with Verstand [understanding], achieve a thematization of their conscience of freedom (840). Hence, Vernunft makes possible a self-knowledge, i.e. a self-recognition, of human beings as free creators of ends, namely, as self-creators (817). It follows that the first kind of causality recognized by a human being bestowed with Vernunft is free causality as the vehicle of his selfrealization. It is only afterwards that a human being recognizes that other beings might also operate as causes, either as natural causes or even as free animals and human subjects. Prauss’ conclusion thus leaves no mystery: “free causality constitutes from the outset the necessary precondition of natural causality” (865). The synthesis of freedom (self-realizing will) and necessity (the claims raised by others), conditioned as it is by this mutual dependence of the two aforementioned facts upon one another, admits of three modalities: ‘to be only as a means’, ‘to be not only as a means but also as an end in itself’, and ‘to be not only also as an end, but only as an end in itself’. If one replaces being with will-to-live, he easily concludes that this synthesis allows for three modalities of action: “only life-to-take”, “not only life-to-take but also life-to-give”, and “only life-to-give” (1099). And if one further substitutes time for life (by which Prauss means Geistesleben), he will realize why these three modalities are not susceptible to any quantitative approach, since life-time can neither be augmented nor be re-gained and exchanged in any possible way, assuming that time is adequately apprehended as life-time [...]. Precisely because lifetime resists any quantitative approach, good and evil are categories proper to morality and right; that is to say, they are independent of any reference to goals evaluated according to the categories of utility. Hence, to ground morality and right on mere facts by emphasizing their formal (transcendental) implications is tantamount to resisting utilitarianism. Within transcendental philosophy, self-realization and inter-personality (although they represent mere facts and, qua facts, they resist any eventual reduction to further grounds) constitute both the ontological ground and the “Sinn of morality and right” (1089).

    [...]

    Morality and right [...] represent a game that we are factually obliged to play, given the facts of self-knowledge and interpersonality; good and evil are attributes assigned to actions that directly or indirectly concern other human beings and are evaluated in light of their impact upon the lifetime of these human beings and, hence, morality and right do not dwell within our internal maxims or intentions."
  • Mww
    4.5k


    Pretty good philosophizing. That being said, I rather think the title might be better said as completion of Kant’s ethical approach, insofar as his moral philosophy is a complete approach in itself.

    I say this because even in “The Metaphysical Elements of Ethics”, a purely subjective moral disposition is given as antecedent, which tends to make me think Kant meant the moral and the ethical to be two separate doctrines, interconnected only under certain conditions.

    I see where the first sentence says “Kant’s ethics”, so maybe that’s what you had in mind anyway.

    Just my opinion, of no particular consequence, so....carry on and good luck with your discusssion.
  • chiknsld
    285
    The person present is thus de facto morally obligated to help.spirit-salamander

    Ah, that's natural law. How can you prove that there is a categorical imperative other than through rationalization?

    Moral dilemmas are proof that a categorical imperative does not exist:

    You are an eyewitness to a crime: A man has robbed a bank, but instead of keeping the money for himself, he donates it to a poor orphanage that can now afford to feed, clothe, and care for its children. You know who committed the crime. If you go to the authorities with the information, there's a good chance the money will be returned to the bank, leaving a lot of kids in need. What do you do?

    https://www.buzzfeed.com/tracyclayton/moral-dilemmas-that-will-break-your-brain

    This is a pretty rotten situation because you would have to take the bread from the mouths of little children due to your "categorical imperative" that you say exists.

    You are walking by a woman who needs help so you are obligated to help her? Hmm, what if you help her but the next day there is another woman laying on the side of the road needing help? And you help her as well? And the next day there is another woman, and everyday for the rest of your life there will be a woman on the side of the road that needs your help?

    Eventually you are going stay inside the house for a day, because you simply do not feel like helping whatever woman will be on the side of the road that day. Are you morally obligated to go outside that day? I mean, you've already helped 20 women for the past 20 days in a row, you have the energy to do it for a 21st day, but you are not morally obligated to do it. But the reason you are not morally obligated does not come from the fact that you previously helped women 20 days in a row. You do not have a moral obligation on the 21st day just as you do not have a moral obligation on the first day.

    A moral obligation has to be rationalized.
  • 180 Proof
    14k
    Moral dilemmas are proof that a categorical imperative does not exist ...chiknsld
    :chin:
  • chiknsld
    285
    Moral dilemmas are proof that a categorical imperative does not exist ...
    — chiknsld
    :chin:
    180 Proof

    Insert emote here ___. :)
  • spirit-salamander
    268


    You're probably right. I didn't think that precisely about the title and simply identified the ethical and moral, which in the Kantian context, as you say, is at least problematic.
  • spirit-salamander
    268
    Ah, that's natural law. How can you prove that there is a categorical imperative other than through rationalization?chiknsld

    Prauss would deny that his theory is natural law because no ought arises from nature. But if one understands very generally the ability of consciousness to be self-aware as nature, then one could speak of a kind of natural law. But Prauss does not do that, because for him nature is that which lacks the capacity of consciousness for self-awareness.

    In principle, Prauss denies that there can be a categorical imperative in the strict sense. The moral imperative of Prauss is conditioned by a situation where there is someone who is not able to help himself.

    Yes, the moral imperative does indeed arise through rationalization as the understanding of self as an end in itself.

    Moral dilemmas
    chiknsld

    You are walking by a woman who needs help so you are obligated to help her? Hmmchiknsld

    Your examples may draw attention to problems and difficulties in grasping what needs to be done, but they do not attack the basic idea of Prauss.

    Just imagine yourself in the situation that you walk by a person in distress and in urgent need of help. You would feel obligated to help, wouldn't you? Why would that be? In my opinion, Prauss gives a plausible explanation.
  • chiknsld
    285
    Just imagine yourself in the situation that you walk by a person in distress and in urgent need of help. You would feel obligated to help, wouldn't you? Why would that be? In my opinion, Prauss gives a plausible explanation.spirit-salamander

    I've already addressed this. Let's broaden the scope since you seem to not be understanding my point...

    Let's say that we give you infinite energy and time for the following example and you cannot come up with alternatives (as you tried to conveniently imply when you stated this...

    ...difficulties in grasping what needs to be done.)spirit-salamander

    So again, to reiterate, you will have infinite energy and time, but you have no option for alternatives (just as your very premise provides no alternative ;) ). You can't have your cake and eat it too, anywho, let's continue just to finish up this simple thought experiment.

    You see a woman and you feel the need to help her. Now, in the previous example I stopped at 20 times.

    Let's say that you help this woman 1 billion times (big enough number I hope). Now you have infinite energy but the problem is that we have not given you any other superpower other than the infinite energy and infinite time. So now you have lived for 1 billion days, helping 1 billion women, eventually you're gonna get bored. You have infinite energy but you do not have infinite relief from boredom. Eventually you are totally not going to care about waking up and helping another woman.

    I'm sorry but you can't defeat boredom. You can't defeat "not caring". Therefore on that day you will say, "I have helped 1 billion women, and I just don't care anymore, let someone else help her". You no longer have a moral obligation to help her.

    But the issue (as I have already stated to you) is that the reason you are not morally obligated to help her is not because you helped 1 billion other women for 1 billion days in a row. You do not have a moral obligation on day 1 billion just as you did not have a moral obligation on day 1.

    If you respond again with argument of empathy...

    Just imagine yourself in the situation that you walk by a person in distress and in urgent need of help. You would feel obligated to help, wouldn't you? Why would that be? In my opinion, Prauss gives a plausible explanation.spirit-salamander

    Then I know you just want to believe in something and it's not about figuring out the truth. In which case I will say, whatever you want to believe is right! :)
  • spirit-salamander
    268
    Moral dilemmas are proof that a categorical imperative does not exist:chiknsld

    I'll try to be more precise about your points now. To help me better understand your position, you seem to take the role of a moral nihilist (nothing is morally right or wrong) when you say there is no categorical imperative, since there are moral dilemmas. And by such an imperative is to be understood a morally objectively binding imperative.
    My post was aimed at an improvement and completion of Kant's ethical position, which, after all, represents an objective ethics, a moral realism. Discussing with a moral nihilist on my raised topic is, after all, far more difficult than with someone who somehow believes in prescriptive morality. However, an ethical nihilism will probably not be free of dilemmas and inconsistencies either, but I do not want to discuss that.

    Perhaps you will admit that Prauss's position is better than Kant's, but still fails. And therefore your objections might be justified, and I try as best I can to give an answer to them.

    This is a pretty rotten situation because you would have to take the bread from the mouths of little children due to your "categorical imperative" that you say exists.chiknsld

    The imperative I am talking about would "demand" that the money go back to the bank and that the children be saved from starvation. Both. The bank employees were merely used as a means, which is immoral, and not helping the children is equally immoral, who should be treated solely as an end. The question is, of course, legitimate as to who is now called upon to help the children. This may not be easy to determine, but the basic idea that the children must be helped in the first place remains unaffected. If I, as a European, hear about starving children in Africa, am I directly obliged to help? Is it a question of proximity or the means of being able to help? Am I being addressed as an individual, or is a collective being addressed, etc.? These are all legitimate questions, but, as I said, they do not undermine the core of Prauss's concept.

    due to your "categorical imperative" that you say exists.chiknsld

    You cannot deny that imperatives exist in general. If I ask you to go for a walk or whatnot, I have created an imperative addressed to you. You won't deny that, right? So there are, what you can't deny, imperatives. The question is only whether there are morally binding ones. I would say that people's being an end in themselves is a good criterion for there to be some.

    You are walking by a woman who needs help so you are obligated to help her? Hmm, what if you help her but the next day there is another woman laying on the side of the road needing help? And you help her as well? And the next day there is another woman, and everyday for the rest of your life there will be a woman on the side of the road that needs your help?chiknsld

    This is not yet a challenge to Prauss' ethics. After all, it's enough if I always call the ambulance or emergency services, and that's no big deal. If I leave my house and always encounter a person in total distress, then I am obliged to help. Perhaps there is a cause that people are always in need near my house, then I would possibly be obliged to follow up on it, to prevent it, to contact the authorities, to encourage other people to help.

    Eventually you are going stay inside the house for a day, because you simply do not feel like helping whatever woman will be on the side of the road that day. Are you morally obligated to go outside that day? I mean, you've already helped 20 women for the past 20 days in a row, you have the energy to do it for a 21st day, but you are not morally obligated to do it.chiknsld

    Why should I be obliged to leave my house the next day? Why should I assume that another person needs help? There are no obligations. I do not see the objection. There would have to be, as I already mentioned, a reason that again and again people are in need. I would have to counteract this reason, as good as I can and as far as the possibilities are given to me therefore.

    You do not have a moral obligation on the 21st day just as you do not have a moral obligation on the first day.chiknsld

    This is not correct. I have to know that someone is in need, and that was the case the first day I left the house. But why should I assume that on the 21st day I have to leave the house to help. That people were in need was a fortuitous and random circumstance.

    A moral obligation has to be rationalized.chiknsld

    I don't know what you mean exactly by rationalization.

    Let's say that you help this woman 1 billion times (big enough number I hope).chiknsld

    Eventually you are totally not going to care about waking up and helping another woman.

    I'm sorry but you can't defeat boredom. You can't defeat "not caring". Therefore on that day you will say, "I have helped 1 billion women, and I just don't care anymore, let someone else help her". You no longer have a moral obligation to help her.
    chiknsld

    The ethics I start from do not take into account feelings such as caring and boredom. It is only a matter of bare duties. If by care you mean no feeling, but only an ethic of responsibility, then one must say the following. I am responsible only if I know one hundred percent that there is someone in current need in the immediate vicinity. Otherwise, no. And if it is certain that there are always people in need, then they cannot demand that I sacrifice myself for them like a saint and lay down my life for them. Because holiness goes beyond what Prauss understands by morality.

    If you choose to act out your boredom when someone is in need, and therefore do not help, then that is an immoral, evil act or omission.

    I don't think your reductio ad absurdum or argumentum ad absurdum works.

    If you respond again with argument of empathy...chiknsld

    This is an inaccuracy on my part. For Prauss, feelings such as empathy play only a subordinate role in ethics:

    Morality and right [...] represent a game that we are factually obliged to play, given the facts of self-knowledge and interpersonality; good and evil are attributes assigned to actions that directly or indirectly concern other human beingsspirit-salamander

    Then I know you just want to believe in something and it's not about figuring out the truth. In which case I will say, whatever you want to believe is right!chiknsld

    I have given many arguments in my post. Therefore, it seems to me that it is not just a matter of belief. There is already the ambition to get on the track of objective truth.
  • chiknsld
    285
    If you choose to act out your boredom when someone is in need, and therefore do not help, then that is an immoral, evil act or omission.spirit-salamander

    So if you help a billion women for a billion days in a row you are not allowed to eventually get tired and simply not care. I suppose that's an interesting ethics that you have. I would argue that eventually just by understanding basic human psychology that eventually you will become completely indifferent and with an infinite tolerance. In other words, the sight of suffering will no longer be a stimulus.

    You also taking no consideration to the feelings of that person and the history of them helping a billion people for a billion days in a row is extremely insensitive and judgmental. But if you want to have a black and white ethics then you can't have all these conveniences that you constantly espouse. I will label it with a (C) for convenience when they come up.

    The imperative I am talking about would "demand" that the money go back to the bank and that the children be saved from starvation. Both.spirit-salamander

    "Both" is a convenience. The dilemma automatically assumes that you only have two options. That is the very premise that makes it a dilemma and you cannot change the premises or else it becomes C.

    The question is, of course, legitimate as to who is now called upon to help the children.spirit-salamander

    Convenience.

    You cannot deny that imperatives exist in general. If I ask you to go for a walk or whatnot, I have created an imperative addressed to you. You won't deny that, right?spirit-salamander

    Hmm, no I honestly do not see how this is the same as a moral obligation existing objectively. Such as natural law. Maybe you are saying that it exists by way of rationalization? This would be subjective.

    Ahh, that's why you use all these conveniences, you are rationalizing a subjective moral imperative. I always looked at the word "categorical" in Kant's categorical imperative as implying an objective deontology; deontos meaning "duty".

    I mean if it's not objective then of course you can rationalize anything that is subjective, hehe. :)
    And I have no issues with that, which is what I said from the beginning, it's merely a rationalization. I think that's at the heart of the issue here, but I will continue just to complete the response.

    This is not yet a challenge to Prauss' ethics. After all, it's enough if I always call the ambulance or emergency services, and that's no big deal.spirit-salamander

    Convenience? I suppose that if there is going to be a woman there everyday then you could just let the hospital know ahead of time. Or at the very least the news will find out about this strange paradox of women needing help everyday in this particular region of town, on the side of the road. :)

    I thought the premise was that no one else could help, you have to help her. Basic stuff. Get down on your knees, pick her up. Bring her to the hospital or wait for an ambulance with her. Show empathy towards her, console her, etc. The basic stuff. Not just make a phone call and go about your day. Again, you might just want to let the hospital know this will be occurring on a daily basis.

    If this is just a one shot scenario, then it is not enough to establish a categorical imperative (that's just basic statistics). Which is why you need to do this over a period of time, thus time would be the independent variable (IV).

    Why should I be obliged to leave my house the next day? Why should I assume that another person needs help? There are no obligations. I do not see the objection. There would have to be, as I already mentioned, a reason that again and again people are in need. I would have to counteract this reason, as good as I can and as far as the possibilities are given to me therefore.spirit-salamander

    Right, you're using conveniences to avoid the statistical test. This is all subjective rationalization for you. I got it. :)

    This is not correct. I have to know that someone is in need, and that was the case the first day I left the house. But why should I assume that on the 21st day I have to leave the house to help. That people were in need was a fortuitous and random circumstance.spirit-salamander

    That's correct, but the point of the statistical test is to eliminate randomness, so that (in this case) a categorical imperative can be established.

    You're absolutely right, you're trying to take a random occurrence and establish an objective rule with zero testing.

    I don't know what you mean exactly by rationalization.spirit-salamander

    It means that your premises are subjective. Wherever you choose you will subjectively input conveniences, thus moving the goalposts. Rationalization is never-ending. Which again, is perfectly fine just don't expect to ever have the work published in an soft sciences journal.

    This was really my error, because I didn't realize just how scientifically I think, and you can blame academia for that. I have nothing against rationalization. But it is the reason why things like capital punishment and abortion will never be resolved. Natural law would settle such disputes, but natural law does not exist.

    The ethics I start from do not take into account feelings such as caring and boredom. It is only a matter of bare duties.spirit-salamander

    Actually you do. Once you bring labels such as "evil" into the mix then you are addressing such things as "intention" and "self-autonomy". Unless that is, you think for instance, an advanced robot smarter than human beings, is capable of being "evil" (moral agency does not belong only to humans). If that's the case then I would view that as another convenience, haha! Sorry! :)

    If any entity can be a moral agent then this entire scenario falls to shambles. But that's just my rationalization! :) Objectivity is at this point, out the window.

    I suppose that at least in this scenario, my views are that moral agency, human moral culpability, is thus dependent upon human rationalization. A robot could theoretically behave morally according to human morality, but I suppose the robot would have "robot" culpability? Rather than human, culpability. In other words, I view "human" essence as preceding our "categorical" objective imperative.

    And if it is certain that there are always people in need, then they cannot demand that I sacrifice myself for them like a saint and lay down my life for them. Because holiness goes beyond what Prauss understands by morality.spirit-salamander

    Exactly! That has been my entire point! But what you do not realize is this applies to the very first "fortuitous and random circumstance". :)

    Again, this is all just rationalization at this point. But I would argue that anything approaching an infinite series of "fortuitous and random circumstances" proves that there is no moral obligation, hence, no categorical imperative. Oh yea, and moral dilemmas, hehe.

    Sure, I think it sucks that there are rotten people out there, but we can't prove that they are rotten. We can only rationalize that they are rotten.

    If you choose to act out your boredom when someone is in need, and therefore do not help, then that is an immoral, evil act or omission.spirit-salamander

    I think there are other cases where it is more obvious that someone is "evil". If you are desensitized to people in need of help I do not think that makes you evil. Not caring does not make you evil, in my opinion.

    This is an inaccuracy on my part. For Prauss, feelings such as empathy play only a subordinate role in ethics:spirit-salamander

    I don't know, I'd have to talk to him, hehe. :)
  • spirit-salamander
    268
    Would you admit that Prauss is at least a scintilla more convincing here than Kant? Or what do you think of Kant's idea of the universalizability of maxims as a moral criterion? To appreciate Prauss' idea, one must acknowledge the Kantian idea of man as an end in himself. Otherwise, Prauss is not really interesting.

    Hmm, no I honestly do not see how this is the same as a moral obligation existing objectively.chiknsld

    This was not meant as an objective moral obligation. But rather a necessary preliminary stage of it. That is, there are non-objective and amoral and non-binding imperatives, such as the "command" to go for a walk, and perhaps there are objective moral imperatives that are further binding.

    I thought the premise was that no one else could help, you have to help her. Basic stuff. Get down on your knees, pick her up. Bring her to the hospital or wait for an ambulance with her. Show empathy towards her, console her, etc. The basic stuff. Not just make a phone call and go about your day. Again, you might just want to let the hospital know this will be occurring on a daily basis.chiknsld

    I think the idea is that you have to help to the best of your ability. There is a personal assessment where self-deception must be avoided. So to the best of our knowledge and conscience. And a phone call may be the only sensible thing to do.

    It means that your premises are subjective. Wherever you choose you will subjectively input conveniences, thus moving the goalposts. Rationalization is never-ending. Which again, is perfectly fine just don't expect to ever have the work published in an soft sciences journal.chiknsld

    I still need to think about that, to what extent conviences play a factor with Prauss. Because to accidentally encounter someone in distress, like a child drowning in a lake on a cold day, is always an inconvenience. I can't rationalize anything away when the child is crying out for help. Help is objectively required.

    I must admit, however, that I am not a native English speaker, so I don't quite understand your implications and allusions. Maybe that's why I can't quite understand your points.

    For Prauss, it's all about the very rough and simple basic idea for the time being. You have, I think, complicated the matter, and so I don't know exactly how to respond to that. But anyway, thanks for your participation in the discussion. It seems that only a few people are interested in it so far.
  • spirit-salamander
    268
    And if it is certain that there are always people in need, then they cannot demand that I sacrifice myself for them like a saint and lay down my life for them. Because holiness goes beyond what Prauss understands by morality.
    — spirit-salamander

    Exactly! That has been my entire point!
    chiknsld

    To avoid misunderstanding. I mean this, that one literally dies for the other, as in martyrdom. Because in a certain sense, one certainly has to sacrifice something of oneself with Prauss. Namely, your own lifetime.
  • chiknsld
    285
    To appreciate Prauss' idea, one must acknowledge the Kantian idea of man as an end in himself.spirit-salamander

    That's very interesting, but I do believe that I always treat myself as a means, trying to gain small goals all of the time. :)

    Would you admit that Prauss is at least a scintilla more convincing here than Kant? Or what do you think of Kant's idea of the universalizability of maxims as a moral criterion?spirit-salamander

    Unfortunately I do not think that a categorical imperative exists, at least not in an objective sense. For me, an objective morality would be the same as "natural law". What do you think makes it different from "natural law"?

    I think the idea is that you have to help to the best of your ability. There is a personal assessment where self-deception must be avoided. So to the best of our knowledge and conscience. And a phone call may be the only sensible thing to do.spirit-salamander

    Ah, I see. I think this is quite reasonable.

    For Prauss, it's all about the very rough and simple basic idea for the time being. You have, I think, complicated the matter, and so I don't know exactly how to respond to that. But anyway, thanks for your participation in the discussion. It seems that only a few people are interested in it so far.spirit-salamander

    I find it interesting. Thank you for starting the discussion. :)

    To avoid misunderstanding. I mean this, that one literally dies for the other, as in martyrdom. Because in a certain sense, one certainly has to sacrifice something of oneself with Prauss. Namely, your own lifetime.spirit-salamander

    How do you decide what is worth the sacrificing of your own life for? Certainly you would first have to care about other people. If you did not care about other people then how could a categorical imperative apply to you? Would that just make the person evil?
  • spirit-salamander
    268
    What do you think makes it different from "natural law"?chiknsld

    That is a good question. To answer it, I would have to read Prauss in more detail. As far as I know, Prauss says that one cannot derive an ought from a natural (static somatic or physical etc.) being. But one can do this from a certain mental being. Nature is, for Prauss the empirical, and the mental would be something like a non-empirical apriori given dynamic "culture". Prauss wants to say, I think, that morality is not anchored in unconscious nature, but is a (potential) positing of reflective consciousness, which nevertheless has an objective validity, because the moral scheme: only as means, both as means and as end, and only as end is logical and unambiguous.

    But perhaps these are all mere semantic stipulations and one could therefore speak of a kind of natural law, though Prauss would probably prefer the term mental law.

    How do you decide what is worth the sacrificing of your own life for? Certainly you would first have to care about other people. If you did not care about other people then how could a categorical imperative apply to you? Would that just make the person evil?chiknsld

    These are fair questions.

    I also have some reservations: According to Prauss, morality presupposes an injured subject incapable of self-help. It seems that he always assumes a physical injury in this (Prauss takes as his only example the parable of the Good Samaritan). But what about a mental or psychological "injury" that weighs heavily on one, such as a nervous breakdown, trauma, or depression? And what about someone who, after careful consideration, wants to die (and can't do so without help)? Or with homeless people who have given up on themselves without wanting to die? Prauss does not address such questions, although I think they are important.

    Nevertheless, of all ethical theories I know so far, Prauss's is, in my opinion, the best out there, because, above all, the normativity necessary for ethics is derived most plausibly.
  • chiknsld
    285
    That is a good question. To answer it, I would have to read Prauss in more detail. As far as I know, Prauss says that one cannot derive an ought from a natural (static somatic or physical etc.) being. But one can do this from a certain mental being. Nature is, for Prauss the empirical, and the mental would be something like a non-empirical apriori given dynamic "culture".spirit-salamander

    This is superb reasoning! An "ought" may not come from the body. So Prauss is a dualist. Very interesting.

    Prauss wants to say, I think, that morality is not anchored in unconscious nature, but is a (potential) positing of reflective consciousness, which nevertheless has an objective validity...spirit-salamander

    :clap: :cheer:

    ...because the moral scheme: only as means, both as means and as end, and only as end is logical and unambiguous.spirit-salamander

    Now this is really starting to make more sense. My initial point was that he cannot prove any of this, but now I see that he would not care about proving this in the first place. He rationalizes a dualistic perspective and assigns "duty" or an "ought" as a mental construct separate from body.

    Now what I would like a better understanding of, is how do you treat other people as an end without sacrificing for basically your entire life? You mentioned earlier that his ethics would require pretty much just that -a lifelong sacrificing. And so, again, if one does not care or for lack of a better word, one is just "lazy" and does not feel like devoting such effort to the cause, does that make the person "evil"?

    And how are we defining evil here? Simply that they do not feel like doing something? Surely being lazy cannot make you evil right? Or simply not caring? What if a person wants to commit suicide? Are they evil for not staying alive to help someone else? What if they are on their deathbed? Should they be setting their priorities to try to live and help others at the same time? A 50/50 notion of trying to survive whilst trying to serve others? Is any form of selfishness evil?

    But perhaps these are all mere semantic stipulations and one could therefore speak of a kind of natural law, though Prauss would probably prefer the term mental law.spirit-salamander

    Yes, and I think you are right. That makes a lot of sense.

    But what about a mental or psychological "injury" that weighs heavily on one, such as a nervous breakdown, trauma, or depression?spirit-salamander

    Exactly! How do we create a barometer for identifying someone in need of help? Every single person on this planet needs help. No one is a true winner. We are all failures.

    Nevertheless, of all ethical theories I know so far, Prauss's is, in my opinion, the best out there, because, above all, the normativity necessary for ethics is derived most plausibly.spirit-salamander

    Okay, but what are you searching for? An ethics that is universal or an ethics that only applies to humans? Or I should say, do you think that a human ethics can be universal?
  • spirit-salamander
    268
    So Prauss is a dualist.chiknsld

    Not a Cartesian Dualist. Rather something like a property dualist, or Aristotelian form-matter dualism. Here is what Prauss thinks about this, though the word subject could be swapped with the dynamic mental (Stream of Consciousness):

    "The subject is an entity and yet not a “res . . . ,” because it is the complete dynamism of that substrate-less absolute change. “. . . extensa” is the entity of the subject only as “. . . temporaliter extensa,” which Descartes did not take into consideration. “. . . extensa” to him means directly “. . . spatialiter extensa,” and with that immediately “res spatialiter extensa” as well. And precisely in that is the reason that a “res . . .” cannot be comprehensible as “. . . cogitans.” However, as one that is only “. . . temporaliter extensa,” an entity can perhaps still be comprehensible as a “. . . temporaliter extensa cogitans” as well. As such, this entity could be related to a “res spatialiter extensa” as the body of a subject in a way in which, according to Aristotle, the anima behaves toward the corpus: as forma corporis. As an entity of time it would then be precisely the form of motion of a body. For as the subject in a form of one, namely, its own body, the subject would be exactly that which through itself as that completely special type of constant motion would place its body in motion or at rest: already as a cognizing, and thus first and truly as an acting subject." (Gerold Prauss - The Problem of Time in Kant)

    Basically, Prauss is a transcendental idealist in the sense of Kant. But that would lead too far here.

    Now what I would like a better understanding of, is how do you treat other people as an end without sacrificing for basically your entire life? You mentioned earlier that his ethics would require pretty much just that -a lifelong sacrificing.chiknsld

    If we start from the real everyday life, and leave extravagant purely invented examples aside, then I don't see the big problem.
    You only have to help if you perceive that someone you happen to meet is in need. But you're right insofar as you watch the news on TV, for example, and find out about those in need of help all over the world. What happens then? Am I personally called upon to help? Or is it enough if I donate something because aid organizations are already on the ground?

    And so, again, if one does not care or for lack of a better word, one is just "lazy" and does not feel like devoting such effort to the cause, does that make the person "evil"?chiknsld

    According to Prauss, you are obligated despite laziness. You must not make your laziness as a driving force the goal of your intention. To live out laziness would indeed be evil according to this ethical system. I think here's where you're disagreeing. Prauss stands on the shoulders of Kant with his ethics of duty (with the corresponding connection and hierarchy of feeling and will). And you have to find this ethics halfway convincing.

    And how are we defining evil here? Simply that they do not feel like doing something?chiknsld

    Evil = Not doing in this case

    Evil = Not Feeling to do

    It is only about the actions and deeds or inaction and neglect: Not about feelings.

    Surely being lazy cannot make you evil right?chiknsld

    If you are isolated at home and never go out and are just lazy, then that is not evil. But if you go out in a sluggish and lazy mood, and in front of your door someone is just bleeding to death, then you have to help in spite of your laziness and sloth, because that injured person is an end in itself, which your mind registers (or can reasonably assume that this is the case, no mumbo jumbo is supposed to be in play). The injured person sends an imperative to you, so to speak, an imperative to help, and this is morally binding. Why? Because the person is an end in itself. You intrinsically want to do justice to ends in themselves. This would not be the case with a large stone in front of your front door, nor would it be the case with an injured fly. They can not be ends in themselves and therefore are not able to convey it. But towards the suffering children in Yemen who I see on the news, for example, I may have the right to be lazy.

    What if a person wants to commit suicide? Are they evil for not staying alive to help someone else?chiknsld

    That's a fair question, if I understand you correctly. You mean if I go out and try to kill myself and happen to run into someone who is in need. I would not know how to answer that. Prauss would perhaps say that suicide should be postponed for the time being because I see someone in need. The question is also whether I want to kill myself out of desperation. Then I would be a help-seeker myself, I would be in need.

    What if they are on their deathbed? Should they be setting their priorities to try to live and help others at the same time?chiknsld

    The answer to your two examples:

    Thus, Prauss is obliged to subscribe to two further claims: in addition to the claim that there is no morality possible between persons who are not in need, there is no morality possible between persons in need, since they have nothing to offerspirit-salamander

    Every single person on this planet needs help.chiknsld

    Though Prauss would say that in a sense most are still capable of self-help, but I agree that one can argue about what exactly that means.

    Okay, but what are you searching for? An ethics that is universal or an ethics that only applies to humans? Or I should say, do you think that a human ethics can be universal?chiknsld

    An ethics that is universal. Self-knowledge is the highest thing a living being can be capable of, and this ability makes ethics and morality possible.

    My initial point was that he cannot prove any of this, but now I see that he would not care about proving this in the first place.chiknsld

    Prauss definitely has the claim to support every step in his ethics argumentatively, i.e. to really derive everything instead of just giving mere assertions and posits. Kant, for example, simply postulates a moral ought. Prauss explains how such an ought comes about.

    I admit that one can have reservations about Prauss. It is best to compare him with another ethical system, with any one, and so you may see his strength. In the end, I agree with Schopenhauer: "Preaching morals is easy, grounding morals hard". Personally, I still find Prauss' grounding the most successful. Which ethical theory do you find most plausible, even if you are not completely convinced of it?

    I have the feeling that you look at Prauss with an absolute view without comparisons, then it is clear that his ethics has weaknesses, as Schopenhauer already says for the justification of every ethics. But everyone still moralizes somehow, you probably do too. Therefore, one should look for grounds.
  • chiknsld
    285
    Which ethical theory do you find most plausible, even if you are not completely convinced of it?spirit-salamander

    I actually completely disagree with Kant's deontological ethics and take the completely opposite side with Aristotle's teleological ethics.

    I think that duty and intention no matter how good one may think their intention is, can result in terrible consequences for someone else (victim) and therefore I think that what is important is that the consequences of any action be good. If you always make sure that the consequences of your actions are good I do not think it matters if you are a bad person on the inside.

    I do not care if you are a good person on the inside and your intentions are good but you cause negative consequences for others. To me, I would feel like a bad person because the consequences were negative.

    For instance, I myself might not be a great person on the inside, but If I keep it to myself and instead make sure that my actions help others, then that is all that matters.

    And I just really can't stand people that always have the best intentions but constantly cause problems for other people unintentionally. In other words, I do not like when people are clumsy, get into accidents, are not careful with their words, etc. Consequences are all that matter to me, not intention or internal duty.

    Aristotle's virtues modify behavior directly, whereas Kant's virtues modify behavior indirectly by creating moral feeling which, in turn, represses the temptations of the natural inclination.

    https://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/MPsy/MPsyCox.htm

    Not a Cartesian Dualist. Rather something like a property dualist, or Aristotelian form-matter dualism. Here is what Prauss thinks about this, though the word subject could be swapped with the dynamic mental (Stream of Consciousness):spirit-salamander

    Nice :)

    "The subject is an entity and yet not a “res . . . ,” because it is the complete dynamism of that substrate-less absolute change. “. . . extensa” is the entity of the subject only as “. . . temporaliter extensa,” which Descartes did not take into consideration. “. . . extensa” to him means directly “. . . spatialiter extensa,” and with that immediately “res spatialiter extensa” as well. And precisely in that is the reason that a “res . . .” cannot be comprehensible as “. . . cogitans.” However, as one that is only “. . . temporaliter extensa,” an entity can perhaps still be comprehensible as a “. . . temporaliter extensa cogitans” as well. As such, this entity could be related to a “res spatialiter extensa” as the body of a subject in a way in which, according to Aristotle, the anima behaves toward the corpus: as forma corporis. As an entity of time it would then be precisely the form of motion of a body. For as the subject in a form of one, namely, its own body, the subject would be exactly that which through itself as that completely special type of constant motion would place its body in motion or at rest: already as a cognizing, and thus first and truly as an acting subject." (Gerold Prauss - The Problem of Time in Kant)

    Basically, Prauss is a transcendental idealist in the sense of Kant. But that would lead too far here.
    spirit-salamander

    :sparkle: :sparkle: :clap:

    According to Prauss, you are obligated despite laziness. You must not make your laziness as a driving force the goal of your intention. To live out laziness would indeed be evil according to this ethical system. I think here's where you're disagreeing. Prauss stands on the shoulders of Kant with his ethics of duty (with the corresponding connection and hierarchy of feeling and will). And you have to find this ethics halfway convincing.spirit-salamander

    Hmmm, and what is the weight of evil acts? Is there a punishment for evil and a reward for good? Where does evil come from? What makes something evil or "good" or "bad"? What if you think that life is "bad"? What makes life "good"?

    Evil = Not doing in this case

    Evil = Not Feeling to do

    It is only about the actions and deeds or inaction and neglect: Not about feelings.
    spirit-salamander

    k, gotcha

    Why? Because the person is an end in itself. You intrinsically want to do justice to ends in themselves.spirit-salamander

    Ah, you are saying that kinship or commonality creates an "ought". It's teamwork. Very interesting. :)

    there is no morality possible between persons in need, since they have nothing to offerspirit-salamander

    Okay but all suffering is not equal. Some people think they are always in pain or suffering and their life is considerably better than other people who are suffering terribly but make sure to try and be happy and make the best out of life. How can you truly determine who is suffering more than you are? Unless they are about to lose a limb or something drastic, considering two healthy normal people, it would be impossible to tell who is suffering more.

    The main reason here is that you can never tell how much someone is sacrificing to live the life they live. Someone with incredible potential will have to tremendously sacrifice to live a menial life. They will be constantly sacrificing every waking minute and yet you expect that person to decide that other people are suffering more than he is somehow? Again, taking out the drastic measures such as someone dying of pain. But even then, hehe just kidding. :)

    An ethics that is universal. Self-knowledge is the highest thing a living being can be capable of, and this ability makes ethics and morality possible.spirit-salamander

    Hmm, maybe for humans but if there are other lifeforms they could achieve something higher than self-knowledge. Ahh, you are saying that because I can know that I am suffering then I can recognize suffering in others therefore making me reciprocally responsible to help others. As if to say, if I do not like the suffering in me then I should not want others to suffer as well. That's an ethics about love! :heart:

    Prauss definitely has the claim to support every step in his ethics argumentatively, i.e. to really derive everything instead of just giving mere assertions and posits. Kant, for example, simply postulates a moral ought. Prauss explains how such an ought comes about.

    I admit that one can have reservations about Prauss. It is best to compare him with another ethical system, with any one, and so you may see his strength. In the end, I agree with Schopenhauer: "Preaching morals is easy, grounding morals hard". Personally, I still find Prauss' grounding the most successful
    spirit-salamander

    How did you find out about him? I see most of his books are in German?
  • Jackson
    1.8k
    I actually completely disagree with Kant's deontological ethics and take the completely opposite side with Aristotle's teleological ethics.chiknsld

    Aristotle's ethics are not teleological. Sometimes called virtue ethics, it is just about better ways to act. It is empirical or observable in that we look at other people who seem happy and model their behaviors.
    Greedy, petty, people like Trump are not happy and power mad.
  • chiknsld
    285
    Aristotle's ethics are not teleological. Sometimes called virtue ethics, it is just about better ways to act. It is empirical or observable in that we look at other people who seem happy and model their behaviors.
    Greedy, petty, people like Trump are not happy and power mad.
    Jackson

    :snicker: Have you ever taken a basic ethics course? Lol.

    Aristotle is commonly considered the inventor of teleology, although the precise term originated in the eighteenth century. But if teleology means the use of ends or goals in natural science, then Aristotle was rather a critical innovator of teleological explanation.

    https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0199285306.001.0001/acprof-9780199285303
  • Jackson
    1.8k
    Have you ever taken a basic ethics course? Lol.chiknsld

    A shame you write insults. Not responding.
  • chiknsld
    285
    A shame you write insults. Not responding.Jackson

    That's an accusation. :rage:
  • Agent Smith
    9.5k
    For what it's worth, I'd say Kant was right on the money as regards immorality being a contradiction. I'm gonna speak in hedonic terms, hoping for a synthesis between deontological ethics & utiliatrian ethics. Contradictions are painful, ja?
  • spirit-salamander
    268
    Consequences are all that matter to me, not intention or internal duty.chiknsld

    One could perhaps say that Prauss has approached Aristotle and somehow finds himself between Kant and Aristotle.

    good and evil are attributes assigned to actions that directly or indirectly concern other human beings and are evaluated in light of their impact upon the lifetime of these human beings and, hence, morality and right do not dwell within our internal maxims or intentions.spirit-salamander

    Prauss is, after all, like Aristotle teleological, if we understand intentionality as a kind of teleology:

    Human will is not auto-referential but by essence directed to the success (and not to the failure) of the actions in which it is implicated. Due to this intentionality, good and evil are attributes we ascribe to actions, insofar as they respect the normativity (whatever its kind might be) that the agent has adopted and thereby freely ‘incorporated’ as his actual incentive (759).spirit-salamander

    Prauss also wants to avoid utilitarianism with his idea of lifetime sacrificed, so to speak, for someone in need:

    If one replaces being with will-to-live, he easily concludes that this synthesis allows for three modalities of action: “only life-to-take”, “not only life-to-take but also life-to-give”, and “only life-to-give” (1099). And if one further substitutes time for life (by which Prauss means Geistesleben), he will realize why these three modalities are not susceptible to any quantitative approach, since life-time can neither be augmented nor be re-gained and exchanged in any possible way, assuming that time is adequately apprehended as life-time [...]. Precisely because lifetime resists any quantitative approach, good and evil are categories proper to morality and right; that is to say, they are independent of any reference to goals evaluated according to the categories of utility. Hence, to ground morality and right on mere facts by emphasizing their formal (transcendental) implications is tantamount to resisting utilitarianism.spirit-salamander

    Your consequentialism would be a version of utilitarianism.

    take the completely opposite side with Aristotle's teleological ethics.chiknsld

    The question that would interest me here would be how Aristotle derives normativity. An ethics without normativity makes little sense. You will perhaps answer: The teloi or the telos make it possible. But how? A precise derivation would have to be given. As far as I know, Aristotle's moral norms are based on the requirements of the polis to which one belongs. So society generates imperatives for the individual.

    Ah, you are saying that kinship or commonality creates an "ought". It's teamwork.chiknsld

    In a certain sense, yes. One knows at least from oneself what it means to be an end in itself. Thereby, one is his own binding norm for himself. If outside oneself also an end in itself is given, then this has the same scope and normativity as for oneself. And how do I know that there are ends in themselves outside of myself? Intersubjectivity. Others are able to make demands on me where they themselves are the guideline.

    gotchachiknsld

    I am still working on getting an understanding of it myself. In principle, I only wanted to present the basic idea to the English-speaking world for the time being.

    Okay but all suffering is not equal. Some people think they are always in pain or suffering and their life is considerably better than other people who are suffering terribly but make sure to try and be happy and make the best out of life.chiknsld

    I agree your points are valid. As I said, Prauss uses a single example for his moral theory, that of the biblical Samaritan. And this example seems to be clearer. A person is down and if he doesn't get help quickly, he will die. All other cases are then a matter of weighing and evaluation and balancing. Nevertheless, it does not attack the basic idea of Prauss. It may weaken the effectiveness of his theory in the sense of persuasiveness, but it does not refute it.

    That's an ethics about love! :heart:chiknsld

    In a sense, yes. Prauss says love as paying respect. Because love as a feeling cannot be commanded.

    How did you find out about him? I see most of his books are in German?chiknsld

    There is no translation yet. But there might be one someday. Prauss is very highly esteemed in Kant circles all over the world and is considered important in philosophical history. Therefore, there should be translations or monographs in English about him at some point.
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