The Story of 'Wittgenstein's Poker': What Significance Does It Have?

Jack Cummins

In 'Wittgenstein's Poker: the story of a ten-minute argument between two great philosophers', David Edmonds and John Eidenow tell me story of a big disagreement between Wittgenstein and Karl Popper. It took place in 1946 at the Cambridge Moral Science Club. Bertrand Russell and other influential people were there. Apparently, there has been some disagreement over the exact sequence of events amongst the various witnesses. Popper was due to deliver a speech on, 'Are There Philosophical Problems? There was a heated exchange between him and Wittgenstein, who was challenging him and Wittgenstein was waving a poker around. Bertrand Russell became involved and said, 'You're mixing things up, Wittgenstein. You always mix things up', and Wittgenstein left the room in a 'huff'.

The disagreement was over whether philosophy is concerned with problems or puzzles. It may be that it went deeper into the relationships between the philosophers, including their general approaches. Edmond and Eidenow suggest that Popper was marginalised in the philosophy established of Britain, for maintaining that 'the study of problems is worthwhile' and 'the study of puzzles is trivial'. In contrast, for Wittgenstein, the aim of philosophy was 'to disentangle ourselves from self-enveloped confusion'. He saw this as being about linguistic puzzles, criticising those who 'look for an explanation, a universal answer...'

I am wondering if other forum members have read the book or other accounts of the argument. What was its significance and how does the issue of philosophy problems vs puzzles stand in the twentieth first century? I probably approach philosophy in terms of problems but I am aware of how difficult it can be to go beyond the analysis of language. The idea of problems is heavier and more intense. What do you think?

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Tom Storm

↪Jack Cummins

No idea about this event but I have assumed for some years that Wittgenstein likely had autism given his presentation and behaviour. This would have made communication difficult on occasions.

Sometimes on this site you hear similar claims made between people who privilege the superphysical and those who take a philosophy of language approach. The latter sometimes being accused of playing games rather than engaging in a deeper way.

javi2541997

↪Jack Cummins

Jack, it is so interesting the conversation between Popper and Wittgenstein you shared with us. Do you know where I can read more of this event?
I am not sure of the significance but we have to keep in mind that philosophers tended to use a lot of metaphors when they were debating. Wittgenstein's pocket could be another metaphor related to how he always interpreted philosophy in his own.

Jack Cummins

↪Tom Storm

I had no idea that Wittgenstein may have had some kind of autism. I once read a book that suggested that Kant may have had this too, although I guess there is a danger in applying diagnostic labels to writers. However, it is possible that in previous times these kinds of disorders would not have been picked up on as they are today.

I find it hard to juggle between the issues of how far to go in the direction of seeing philosophy as language analysis. That is because my own inclination is to go into metaphysical analysis. However, it also seems that language analysis is important, especially as the issue raises was the difference of the meaning of problems or puzzles.

Jack Cummins

↪javi2541997

I found the book in a charity shop a couple of months ago. There may be some discussion of it online and I will have a look to see if I can find any further references of material related to the discussion.

Joshs

↪Tom Storm

but I have assumed for some years that Wittgenstein likely had autism given his presentation and behaviour. This would have made communication difficult on occasions. — Tom Storm

That seems unlikely to me because Wittgenstein’s focus was on meaning as sense , and sense is a form
of feeling. He would have had to have an extraordinarily nuanced understanding of the relation between affectivity and conceptualization, which is precisely what autistics
lack. His social difficulties may in fact have been due to too much emotional sensitivity. Just speculating here.

Heracloitus

That seems unlikely to me because Wittgenstein’s focus was on meaning as sense , and sense is a form
of feeling — Joshs

More likely Wittgenstein's notion of sense is derived from freges distinction between sense and reference, which has little to do (if anything) with feeling. Sense is the expression of a sentence, while reference is the truth value.

Jack Cummins

↪javi2541997

I have found a discussion of the book by Sean Walsh (6. 2. 2021) in www. the article.com . Walsh says: 'The verdict? That Wittgenstein may or may not have been guilty of a failure of donnish etiquette (or attempted assault). The Edmonds- Eidenow prosecution file is an agreeable condensation of most of the historical issues'.
That is how I found the book in the sense that it spells out that there were different accounts of it but there is so much ambiguity of the details in the book.

Walsh also describes it as being 'a beautifully written portrait of the idiosyncrasies of the main protagonists (including Bertrand Russell), but as 'wonderful psychology and incomplete philosophy'. This seems true in that it builds up the character of Russell who taught Wittgenstein, but the book is vague in many ways. It was written in 2001, and this may account for the vagueness because it is so much later than the event, although there is a fairly extensive bibliography included.

Walsh says that it was the only time that Popper and Wittgenstein ever met each other and that Wittgenstein died 5 years later. He also suggests that at the time of the meeting, Wittgenstein, 'considered philosophy as a diversion, one which merits little more attention than a crossword puzzle.'

Tom Storm

↪Joshs

I'd be surprised if he wasn't, but yes it is speculative. Psychiatrist Christopher Gillberg has certainly suspected this. Based on W's behaviors as described by Monk and others - odd formal speech even in childhood, social withdrawal, reluctance to form friendships, easily slighted, eating exactly the same meal day after day, his obsessive narrowly defined technical interests, wearing same clothing each day, inability to do small talk...

Joshs

↪emancipate

More likely Wittgenstein's notion of sense is derived from freges distinction between sense and reference, which has little to do (if anything) with feeling. Sense is the expression of a sentence, while reference is the truth value. — emancipate

I always understood the later Wittgenstein’s notion of sense as a critique of Frege’s distinction between sense and reference.

javi2541997

↪Jack Cummins

Thank you for your commitment, Jack. It clarified a bit more this interesting case. I want to quote the following phrase you shared:

considered philosophy as a diversion, one which merits little more attention than a crossword puzzle.

It seems to have another mystery inside itself

180 Proof

↪Jack Cummins

I read Wittgenstein's Poker about two decades ago and came away disagreeing with both men. Philosophy, as I understand it in modern terms, concerns clarifying conceptual confusions (puzzles? I prefer 'perplexities') often resulting from habits of discursive misuses (e.g. inconsistencies, incoherences, fallacies, rhetorical tricks, failed analogies, etc) in order to better reframe (translate) intractable factual-problems (re: historical, formal, natural sciences; or politics; or arts ...) into either more tractable factual-problems or expose them to be mere pseudo-problems. It seems to me Witty and Popper were looking through opposite ends of the same Viennese tele/micro-scope; and though I've been very much influenced by them both, I interpret their "dispute" as misguided from a more Peircean/Deweyan discursive perspective wherein grammar (i.e. language-use (know-how)) is a necessary but not sufficient condition for epistemology (i.e. know-that/what).

Joshs

↪Tom Storm

I'd be surprised if he wasn't, but yes it is speculative. Psychiatrist Christopher Gillberg has certainly suspected this. Based on W's behaviors as described by Monk and others - odd formal speech even in childhood, social withdrawal, reluctance to form friendships, easily slighted, eating exactly the same meal day after day, his obsessive narrowly defined technical interests, wearing same clothing each day, inability to do small talk. — Tom Storm

A quick search on Google turned up evidence of Asperger’s that did seem convincing to me. I find that remarkable. Perhaps his difficulties in parsing affectively tinged meaning gave him an advantage from a philosophical perspective. Being an outsider, he could see patterns i. what others took for granted. I’m reminded of Temple Grandin seeing herself as like an anthropologist on Mars.

Jack Cummins

↪180 Proof

Thanks for your reply and I am glad that you have read the book. I think that you are right to say that both Popper and Wittgenstein were looking 'opposite ends of the Viennesse tele/microscope' and that it is more complex than than. In terms of rhetoric, it is interesting that Edmonds and Eideinow had chapter 18 called, 'The Problem with Puzzles' and chapter 19 called, 'The Puzzle Over Problems', which is a play on the conceptual differences.

What I do wonder about though is whether there was more going on in terms of competition between Popper, Wittgenstein and Russell. That is because dynamics go beyond actual arguments and have a psychodynamic element. The authors of the book do not state this but the focus on the lives of the philosophers does hint at this. What do you think about this aspect?

180 Proof

↪Jack Cummins

I don't care much for third-hand accounts (the book) which are second hand recollections (witnesses) of other persons' "psychodynamic" interactions. I'd be far more interested in what the principles themselves thought of – took away from – this encounter had they themselves written about it; I don't believe either man ever did. I do find scholarly biographical accounts about philosophers interesting but I also think they are onlyvmarginally useful for understanding the philosophical work these thinkers have left behind. As Freddy points out: though every philosoohy is autobiographical, it must be read – studied – against itself and from within it's indigenous cultural-social context, which for non-contemporaries (i.e. posterity), of course, requires charitably imaginative interpretive skills and patience (i.e. scrupulous rereading). Reading about philosophy or philosophers in no way is comparable to reading philosophers doing philosophy or oneself actively philosophizing. For me, there's far too much of the former and not nearly enough of the latter (especially in online forum discussions).

Jack Cummins

↪180 Proof

The biggest problem is that the book is written 50 years after the evening which makes it like a fictitious fabrication. I came across so much writing ABOUT Wittgenstein and I only began reading his own writing a few months ago. It can be a problem hearing others' interpretations of a thinker's ideas rather than focusing on the writing itself. It probably gives distortions, especially as it is difficult not to be influenced by the interpretations. I wish that I had started reading his work before reading so many other's thoughts about what he meant.

baker

That seems unlikely to me because Wittgenstein’s focus was on meaning as sense , and sense is a form
of feeling. He would have had to have an extraordinarily nuanced understanding of the relation between affectivity and conceptualization, which is precisely what autistics
lack.

His social difficulties may in fact have been due to too much emotional sensitivity. — Joshs

How can that be, "to too much emotional sensitivity"?

It seems likely that his "social difficulties" came from him taking his work seriously. Most people, including professional philosophers, turn into ordinary people once they punch out for the day. It even seems that people make a concerted effort not to allow their work to "get to them", whatever that work might be. Few are those who take the implications of their research seriously and apply them in their daily lives.

At college, one thing that always struck me as strange about students who majored in philosophy is how it left no trace on them. They kept making the same errors of reasoning as ordinary people, they were as superficial in their analysis of life problems. From what I've seen, academic philosophers aren't that different either.

I had a linguistics professors who ridiculed her colleague. I forgot the details by now, but the point was that this colleague actually applied the findings from her field of research in daily communication with people, and that apparently made her strange and hard to talk to.

Cuthbert

When they put central heating in Oxford Colleges it must have made tutorials less exciting but quite a bit safer.

Olivier5

Personally I agree with Popper that philosophers should try and be 'real' ie focus on problems that are relevant to the general public, science, politics or art. In philosophy, puzzles are a mere reasoning tool, means to an end. He saw Wittgenstein as a sophist, rightly so in my view.

The Story of 'Wittgenstein's Poker': What Significance Does It Have?

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