a) the hypothetical consent is informed and not a product of ignorance; — Bartricks
b) the actual informed consent is not practically possible; — Bartricks
c) when not doing X to Rachel would either result in her being harmed, or deprived of a significant benefit; — Bartricks
d) when the hypothetical consent can be considered to be present prior to the performance of the act. — Bartricks
Problemo! If Rachel has a different set of values, you wouldn't be able to give/withhold consent on her behalf. One man's meat is another man's poison. — Agent Smith
sometimes it won't be easy to tell if c is satisfied. — Bartricks
I repeat: not knowing whether C is satisfied or not is not evidence that C is false.
We ought not to hurt another, other things being equal. But sometimes we can't tell whether doing X will hurt another or not. By your wonky lights that's evidence that it is false that we ought not to hurt another. — Bartricks
You're contradicting yourself. — Agent Smith
First you affirm it isn't (always) possible to know what someone wants and then, second you deny that very position by averring that hypothetical consent is permissible. — Agent Smith
Similar to how hypothetical dissent could be possible, provided that clear signs of interests in an alternative state of affairs are present ;) — DA671
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