“Once division had come on the scene,” I said, “the two strains of iron and bronze in their race each pulled them in the direction of moneymaking and of acquiring land and houses and gold and silver, while the other two strains of gold and silver, inasmuch as they weren’t needy but rich in their souls by nature, led them toward virtue and the ancient order of things. — Plato, Republic, 547b, translated by Joe Sachs

“That’s not hard,” he said, “because almost exactly like now, you were acting as though you’d gone completely through the discussion about the city, saying that you’d rate a city of the sort you’d gone over at that point, and a man like it, [543D] as good, though for that matter it seems as though you were able to describe a still more beautiful [544A] city and man. So anyway, you were saying that the other cities were misguided if this one is right, and you claimed, as I recall, that there were four forms among the remaining polities about which it would be worth having an account, and worth seeing the ways they, and the people like them, go astray, so that, when we’d seen them all and come to agreement about the best and worst sort of man, we could consider whether the best is the happiest and the worst the most miserable, or whether it might be otherwise. — Republic, 544a, ibid. (Underlining is mine)

Very few both then and now would consider the regime of the Republic just. In some important respects it is closer to tyranny than to the other regimes described. — Fooloso4

Rather than regarding this as an accurate description of the development of historical and present regimes, it useful to consider how what is most valued in each leads to its eventual downfall. — Fooloso4

In keeping with the Polis and the individual being seen as parallel lives, the change from one kind of regime to another is traced by the type of man who lives in them. The role of wealth, as a personal good, plays a part in each change. The first change is described this way: — Paine

But it is important to remember that the 4 regimes being discussed do not include the Fifth that the previous books of the Republic described as the best. As Glaucon says: — Paine

The first degree of corruption is honour. It is described as coming about through some mathematical principles which allow the prescribed principles of eugenics that keep the aristocracy pure, to be degraded. The rulers then trend toward infighting, civil war, and war opens up to them, the spoils of war, property and riches seized. The turning toward money pushes them into the second degree of corruption. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, this is quite clear. However, the reason I published was to discuss the relevance of such a prognostication listed above, not necessarily to discuss the "Just City," or lackthereof, itself. — Garrett Travers

procession of tyranny by describing each stage, or "unjust regime, — Garrett Travers

The first deviant regime from just kingship or aristocracy — Garrett Travers

I don't think you can achieve the second clause of this sentence, without first assessing what, if anything, is true regarding the first. Which is what I was hoping to do. — Garrett Travers

Yes, If I take your meaning, when I first read the work and learned what each of them generated together as the "Just City," it struck me as being anything but. At best, just another specimen to add to the collection of failed state models. — Garrett Travers

“So consider: of the men, of whom there are three, who’s the most experienced in all the pleasures we’re speaking of? Does the lover of gain seem to you to be more experienced in the pleasure that comes from knowing, because he learns the truth itself for what it is, or does the lover of wisdom seem more experienced in the pleasure that comes from [582B] gaining something?”
“There’s a big difference,” he said. “It’s necessary for the one to taste the other pleasures starting from childhood, but for the other, the lover of gain, it’s not necessary to taste or to get any experience of learning how things are in their nature, of the pleasure in that and how sweet it is; what’s more, even if he were eager to, it wouldn’t be so easy.”
“So,” I said, “the lover of wisdom greatly surpasses the lover of gain in his experience of both sorts of pleasure.” [582C]'
“Greatly indeed.” “'
And how about in relation to the lover of honor? Is the lover of wisdom more inexperienced in the pleasure that comes from being honored than that person is in the pleasure that comes from using intelligence?”
“On the contrary,” he said; “honor is attached to them all, so long as each achieves what he sets out for. Even the rich person is honored by many people, as are the courageous and the wise. So all are experienced in what the pleasure is like that comes from being honored, but it’s impossible for anyone except the lover of wisdom to get a taste of what’s involved in the sight of what is, or of the sort of pleasure it has in it.” [582D]
“Therefore, as far as experience is concerned,” I said, “he’d do the most beautiful job of judging among the men.”
“By far.” — Republc, 582A, translated by Joe Sachs

When Socrates speaks of the three kinds of men, lovers of wisdom, honor, or money, the regime not yet realized can be recognized as the one where the lover of wisdom is above all others in authority. The highest of the failed four can include the lover of wisdom as a righteous citizen but not as a singular agent. Consider the following discussion of the possible experiences of each kind of man: — Paine

As a blueprint of an ideal city, it has some odd features. The problem of inheritance, as the cause of bad outcomes, is not made less sharp by how difficult it would be to remedy it. Socrates is pulling upon beards.
The entire dialogue centers upon trying to disprove Thrasymachus's assertion that justice is only the preferences of the powerful. It turned out that we had to explore many sides of human motivation to approach the question.
The city or words allows the other regimes to be distinguished from each other.
Socrates was killed for bringing some of the city of words into the city of Athens.

It is sort of a mirror image of Dante's Hell: "Why do I know so many of these losers"? — Paine

The entire dialogue centers upon trying to disprove Thrasymachus's assertion that justice is only the preferences of the powerful. — Paine

The question of whether Thrasymachus will benefit or harm his students, is an echo of the accusation against Socrates' corrupting the youth of Athens. — Fooloso4

Opposing people may empower them. But what is the alternative? Silence? — Paine

I don't know. We see it on the national stage and we see it here on this forum. We cannot eliminate sophists, zealots, and those who are convinced that they are in possession of the Truth and must endlessly promote and defend it. All make use of reason and evidence, but abandon them when they run counter to their own ends. — Fooloso4

Thus, a strong state structure with a bit of Thrasymachus' inclincation toward strength is the only thing that can guarantee that the philosopher demographic can possibly expect to live free. — Garrett Travers

I think Plato's political philosophy played the long game. Rather than enter the political arena he shaped it from the outside, by asking fundamental questions about political life. By political life I do not mean politics in the narrow sense, but rather, life in the polis. In the Republic Plato does not simply deny that the philosopher acts out of self-interest, but that it is against the interest and benefit of the philosopher to rule. The philosopher is portrayed as selfless benefactor. — Fooloso4

Justice is defined as minding your own business. This is highly ironic. On the one hand, the business of the philosopher king is the business of the city. On the other, everyone else is to mind their own business and not meddle with philosophy or philosophers. The philosopher is compelled to rule, but it is only by ruling that she is free to pursue philosophy. The philosopher is not simply the selfless benefactor she appears to be. — Fooloso4

There is a double sense in which Socrates teaches Thrasymachus to be a better sophist. In one sense it means to improve his powers of persuasion by appearing to be something he is not, by hiding is true motivation, by being less honest. In another sense, he becomes a better sophist if he no longer disregards the benefit of his students and will teach them to take the benefit of others into consideration. — Fooloso4

A good point about the long-game, but are we sure about the selfless benefactor? — Garrett Travers

But, isn't it also mentioned among the comrades that the philosopher is the only one who can even be trusted to rule? Which thereby creates his obligation. What do you think on that? — Garrett Travers

There is a difference between the way the philosopher was portrayed and what was thinly veiled. The philosopher, despite the portrayal was not a selfless benefactor. It was a guide taken on to mask the danger philosophy posed to conservative society.

Virtue means excellence. In its highest form, the realization of the best humans are capable of. But this is something that can only be attained by a few. A "virtuous society" is problematic to say the least. — Fooloso4

The argument in the Republic, if I remember it correctly, is that their obligation to the city is based on their being raised and educated by the city, that the city makes possible their way of life. It does not take much to see how weak this argument is. — Fooloso4

I really enjoy the way you process these concepts. I haven't been impressed all that much here on the philosophy forum, you and Paine seem to be consistently erudite in your assessments. Great job. I've met many people, including on this website, who did not understand this aspect of the dialogues. — Garrett Travers