The other thing that changes with a long contiguous border is the missile time is extremely short.

The biggest thing that this changes is that there's little risk of your missile attack being misinterpreted.

If forces are far apart then even if you wanted to just casually nuke a base here or there you'd have to consider the possibility that your opponent misinterprets your intentions and believes this to be the start of a larger strike and so unloads their arsenal, or then a larger response plan (that you don't think is rational if they knew you "only wanted to nuke a few things"), in a panic.

However, if it's all over in a minute there's no risk that your intentions are misunderstood, exactly what targets you wanted to hit, how hard, and without a followup volley to put the ball "in the other court" etc.

No one will be wondering as they watch the radar screen "where is this missile going, should we panic? Like, honestly, I feel like panicking, anyone else?"

(Targets far away also don't really serve any purpose to randomly nuke, which is very different to targets right across your border, is also another difference.)

There's not much point in discussing nuclear war. If there is going to be nuclear war, it will be between the US and China (or their Pacific allies), and even then both sides will have nothing to gain and everything to lose, making the chance of it happening very slim.

The US would never go to nuclear war over Europe, and the Russians would only go nuclear if Russia itself is invaded by overwhelming military force.

There's not much point in discussing nuclear war. If there is going to be nuclear war, it will be between the US and China (or their Pacific allies), and even then both sides will have nothing to gain and everything to lose, making the chance of it happening very slim. — Tzeentch

Sure, chance is slim but the consequences are very high, and so wroth discussion .

It's also been an explicitly stated reason for plenty of policy decisions, such as not sending troops, not sending "offensive" weapons, not sending "heavy weapons", not sending long range missiles, and not sending fighter planes, and not sending stealthy fighter planes, and so on, is to "avoid WWIII".

The chances of nuclear war is fundamental for understanding the war, as without nuclear weapons we'd probably already be in a WWIII situation. People want to minimize it when it's inconvenient for their preferred policy (such as send more weapons to Ukraine or intervene directly) but then exaggerate the threat when again it's convenient: such as Finland has absolutely nothing to fear because a nuclear strike on Finland would for sure result in nuclear retaliation from the US.

It's this minimizing-maximizing to suit one's conclusion that I take issue with.

Likewise, simply dismissing the issue altogether because chances are low is equally unmerited. NASA put some effort into evaluating the risk of an extinction size space rock hitting us, no one claims that's a waste of time to consider because chances are low but consequence would be very high.

The US would never go to nuclear war over Europe, and the Russians would only go nuclear if Russia itself is invaded by overwhelming military force. — Tzeentch

That's exactly my point.

If the US would never go to nuclear war over Europe, what's the deterrence for Russia to use nuclear weapons to assert its policies?

Of course, a lot of escalation would be needed, and I don't see that happening while the war in Ukraine is ongoing, at least in its current form.

However, let's imagine the war in Ukraine comes to an end and a decade from now there's some entirely new crisis we can't really imagine now between the US and Russia.

Or then Macron makes good on his threat to send in ground forces, and tensions spiral out of control and Russia is risking conventional defeat.

By your own reasoning Russia would then use nuclear weapons.

If the US is just wants chaos in Europe (your own point you just espoused, which I agree with) ... how would that be bad for the US to push Russian into a little nuke play? Wouldn't that cause maximum chaos and thus maximum benefit to the US?

Once nukes are used, US doesn't even need to continue intervening in Europe to ensure tensions and chaos are at an acceptable level, so it's really the economically efficient strategy.

However, let's imagine the war in Ukraine comes to an end and a decade from now there's some entirely new crisis we can't really imagine now between the US and Russia.

Or then Macron makes good on his threat to send in ground forces, and tensions spiral out of control and Russia is risking conventional defeat.

By your own reasoning Russia would then use nuclear weapons. — boethius

That's piling hypotheticals upon hypotheticals.

Besides, Macron is a clown. France has no capable army and the people of France would probably have his head at la Place de la Révolution before going to war with Russia (again :lol:).

The other thing I take issue with is ceding the low probability risk-analysis to a given side.

For example, in this case the justification for Finland to join NATO is the low probability that Russia conventionally attacks Finland for basically no reason (Finland has not strategically important locations or resources). Therefore being in NATO will deter this low-probability largely irrational invasion.

So, to then dismiss the counter-argument that there's also a low probability scenario where being in NATO results in being nuked, when otherwise Russia would neither nuke Finland nor invade Finland conventionally, is extremely bad faith.

Which is not what I'm saying you are doing, but obviously the decision to join NATO was taken by Finland so the reasoning is clearly relevant to consider.

Like you, I don't see the US going to nuclear war over Europe, and therefore I don't see being in NATO as providing Finland a nuclear deterrent. At best being in NATO is irrelevant (or drags Finland into other pointless wars elswehre), and so increasing geopolitical tensions generally while providing no benefit to either Finland or anyone else, and at worst causes exactly that thing which being in NATO was meant to avoid (a fight with Russia).

That's piling hypotheticals upon hypotheticals. — Tzeentch

And the decision to join NATO was based on non-hypotheticals?

You're basically arguing that the hypothetical situation which serves as the justification to join NATO is relevant but the hypothetical situation which would justify not joining NATO can be dismissed on the grounds it's hypothetical.

And the decision to join NATO was based on non-hypotheticals? — boethius

Even if it was a foolish decision, it was based on a very tangible perceived 'Russian threat'.

What the Finns missed is that they are only putting themselves in the line of fire while there's literally zero chance of the Americans coming to their rescue when they get into trouble with the Russians - trouble that they themselves brought closer by joining NATO.

Moreover they seem to have also failed to realize that they put themselves into prime position to be used as a pawn by the United States in the geopolitically tumultuous time we are heading into, in which the United States will view Europe as a potential rival to be kept down (destroyed even) rather than 'a friend'.

We are roughly in agreement on that, I gather. But what I'm taking issue with is making the discussion about nuclear war that will never happen.

The only correct answer to someone bringing up nuclear war and Finland is: Russia won't go to nuclear war over Finland, and the Americans won't go to nuclear war to defend it.

Simple as.

Even if it was a foolish decision, it was based on a very tangible perceived 'Russian threat'. — Tzeentch

Yeah, sure, but 'Russian threat' also includes being nuked by Russia precisely because you joined NATO.

What the Finns missed is that they are only putting themselves in the line of fire while there's literally zero chance of the Americans coming to their rescue when they get into trouble with the Russians - trouble that they themselves brought closer by joining NATO. — Tzeentch

We agree. Hopefully doesn't happen and I would also guess Finland would still have to let itself be played in escalating things to the point of getting nuked, so hopefully we don't do that.

Moreover they seem to have also failed to realize that they put themselves into prime position to be used as a pawn by the United States in the geopolitically tumultuous time we are heading into, in which the United States will view Europe as a potential rival to be kept down (destroyed even) rather than 'a friend'.

We are roughly in agreement on that, I gather. But what I'm taking issue with is making the discussion about nuclear war that will never happen. — Tzeentch

We agree on both points.

I only have a problem with people dismissing the prospects of nuclear war entirely. Even if it never happens, which hopefully it doesn't, that would be precisely because decisions are made to avoid it.

The only correct answer to someone bringing up nuclear war and Finland is: Russia won't go to nuclear war over Finland, and the Americans won't go to nuclear war to defend it.

Simple as. — Tzeentch

For now.

But as you just said above, Finland is now put itself in the position of being used as a pawn.

What I fear, as a Finn, is that the war in Ukraine comes to a close, situation is stabilized, and Finland then becomes the only vector in which to stoke military tensions with Russia in the future and the US engineers a situation in which suddenly its "all eyes on the Finnish border".

Even simply being used as a focal point of tensions and needing to mobilize to show Finland and NATO are "serious" would bring serious economic harm to Finland. Along with being dragged into wars far from Finland and that have nothing to do with Russia, these sorts of smaller happenings I would agree are far more likely than being nuked by Russia ... but if we agree that the US won't actually defend Finland then we Finns are just insuring costs to support US policy without even getting the main benefit.

May not be so relevant to anyone else, but as a Finnish-Canadian I feel the onus to serve as cultural bridge to explain to my fellow Finns that the US isn't gonna come and help us and few Americans would even notice Finns being killed in some new foreign policy fiasco, which, as you've pointed out, is the fundamental policy of the US in Europe.

Of course, the hypothetical discussion could go on indefinitely and perhaps Russia one days goes around nuking every non-NATO country on its border and we Finns can breath a sigh of relief; I just find that of all the low-probability scenarios getting nuked is the highest probability. But it's all very low probability, I'm not making any predictions, and as a Finnish-Canadian I definitely don't need to stick around if it turns out our leaders made a foolish decision.

My main beef is that we were promised a referendum on the NATO question if ever it seemed necessary, by the very same politicians that then explained that promise meant absolutely nothing and took a dump on their own word; so that for me is breaking the social contract in a very profound way and I feel no responsibility to fight for Finland in an eventual war with Russia. If there had been a referendum as promised, and we joined NATO, then I would feel responsible for defending a democratic choice that just so happened to lead us to war.

The US will be forced to pivot sooner or later.

When that happens, NATO and American influence in Europe will be used to send Europe into chaos, the seeds for which have already been sown when the US sought to change Ukraine's neutral status which was the key to stability between Europe and Russia. — Tzeentch

?

What is happening is that the US fears that Russia and/or Europe will become the laughing thirds when the US is sucked into a large-scale conflict in the Pacific. Provoking war between these two is the way it intends to stop that from happening. — Tzeentch

Quite incredible idea. This goes into the tinfoil hat category.

People here are simply misunderstanding the US' central strategic challenge, which is to keep the Eurasian continent divided (as described by Mackinder, Wolfowitz, Brzezinski, etc.) in times of peace, and in utter chaos in times of war. (and also to stop any regional powers to arise in the Western Hemisphere, but that's another topic). — Tzeentch

This is the kind of anti-US bullshit that won't fly, if you don't even give any kind of actual reference of Wolfowitz, Brzezinski actually saying this.

If your capable of giving actual quotes, then it's fruitful and interesting to continue this discussion forward.

And if by "Eurasian continent" you mean Russia with the rest of Europe as the junior partner, just look at the mirror and asked just who and how got neutral countries like Sweden and Finland into NATO.

Let's say NATO brings into Finland enough forces to legitimately threaten an invasion of Russia and conventional victory over Russia. — boethius

NATO's not going to do that.

To put the nuclear question aside (until someone wants to dismiss its relevance completely again) and continue my periodic analysis of the war situation.

We are currently seeing the breaking point of the Ukrainian defensive line.

I would argue the reason the West didn't setup any maintenance system for the heavy weapons, such as tanks, is not because they "forgot" as the Western media seems to imply, but because their military analysis concluded it wouldn't matter.

There's simply too many limiting factors coming into play to sustain the Ukrainian war effort on the current front, most notably air defence.

Therefore, the West's, in particular the Biden administration's, main strategic concern since the much hyped counter offensive is setting up the blame game for the Ukrainian front collapse.

"We forgot to do things like setup maintenance" is one reason: "Oh yeah, we really gave it a good shot, but, shucks, forgot that maintenance thing".

Of course, the main reason is that the Republicans didn't pass the funding, setting up blaming the Republicans for the failure in Ukraine.

Money won't change much on the ground from here to the election so passing the funding would be a politically a bad decision at best and political suicide at worst. Imagine if the 60 billion was passed and Ukraine suffered defeat after defeat anyways, which the funding wouldn't anyways prevent.

Ensuring the funding doesn't pass, allows at least blaming the Republicans for failure in Ukraine.

"Ukraine is a disaster!" can now be met "Because you didn't fund it!" and democrats will go wild for that sort of pun.

Of course, a bare minimum of funding is necessary to avoid a total Ukrainian government collapse which would be more politically damaging than collapse of the front ... meet the EU.

Under assurances that the 60 billion would certainly be passed (the deal from the outset was certainly 50-50 in terms of financing Ukraine), a "who goes first" situation arose.

Guess who went first.

Europe went first.

From what I can tell, the plan is to keep Ukraine (with Europe's money so that the US, more specifically Biden, isn't "funding failure") in a tactical retreat mode until the election.

I'm not the first person to point it out, but this puts Russia in a prime position to influence the outcome of the election by determining events on the ground. Of course, exercising such influence can always backfire, but presumably what actually happens on the ground in Ukraine favours one candidate over the other.

Longer term, Ukraine simply has an immense demographic problem.

Ukraine is already in a demographic collapse and then millions of young people left the country and aren't going to return. Men aging into the military is a critical factor of sustaining a long war.

Not only do older men accumulate health conditions and their combat effectiveness isn't so good, generally speaking, but they also accumulate skills that are vital for the economy and maintaining the war effort generally speaking. Boys that pass the age limit have neither of these problems.

Which is the fundamental reason I would guess (as others have) the latest mobilization hasn't taken into effect as there's just a limit to how many men you can take out of other work and things keep functioning. For example, a lot of men are needed to repair the power grid, move enough of them to the front and the power grid can no longer be repaired and you have a much bigger military problem than the men were worth as frontline soldiers. Sending women to the front is likewise a double edged sword that doesn't necessary help ("fighting for the women" is a foundational factor in morale; if they're dying on the front too things make less sense).

In short, we are now seeing the consequence of entering a war of attrition with a far larger adversary.

Now that Russia has "the momentum" it can more easily recruit foreign mercenaries (lot's of people are willing to fight for money ... but only if they think you're winning), can more easily shore up both domestic and foreign diplomatic support.

Beyond simply the attritional resource battle, the Russians are now reaping the training dividend.

2023 was all about training hundreds of thousands of new recruits while Ukraine fought mercenaries, such as prisoners, that no one cared about.

In order to simply tread water in the war, Ukraine needed essentially full commitment but also limited training potential. The ability for Ukraine to train in Ukraine is limited by the threat of airstrikes, whereas NATO training some 30 000 troops over a few months, is not that much, and in different countries through interpreters on totally new equipment, is simply not comparable to Russia's cohesive training over a whole year.

NATO's not going to do that. — RogueAI

Why not?

Let's say tensions rise, use your imagination, and Russia is building up on Finland's border, even if everyone understand's it's just "to flex", doesn't NATO need to respond in kind to show it's equally capable of "flexing"? Does not a tinderbox scenario result where a single shell can start the war?

What's the point of having Finland in NATO if that doesn't threaten Russia?

You really think the US sat down and said to itself "we really need to protect those Finns, could be next on Putin's chopping block, we can't let that happen! We need them in NATO so they're safe and protected"?

... or because it's a way of applying pressure on Russia?

Pressure that leads to tensions that can lead to escalations that can go out of control and have unintended consequences.

In addition, I think in a sense NATO (or actually the US) is too powerful and therefore can get away with military aggression. The EU wouldn't be but it could be powerful enough with sufficient nuclear deterrence to really be just a defensive organisation. — Benkei

I think the real problem was that many countries thought after the collapse of the Soviet Union that Russia a) would never get on it's feet and b) never would return to it's old imperialist ways. People genuinely thought that Russia could join NATO. Yet both a) and b) happened. It took a long time, several wars, several annexations (both in Ukraine and in Georgia) and simply one all out war for people to understand this. People eagerly dismiss all the "rebooting efforts" the US made on the way. Just like the US thought that through time Communist China wouldn't be run by Communists, even if they themselves say that they have figured the correct way to go with Marxism.

The real problem were all those people "inventing" a new role for NATO and declaring that the old idea of military defense of European territory to be old. Last person to say so was actually incredible Donald Trump, a decade later than anybody else, but still. In fact I'm happy that Finland became a NATO member only now, because if it had become a member in the 1990's, it would have been NATO itself demanding Finland to dissolve it's "antiquated ideas" of a reservist army that defends it's own territory. Sweden did that and basically dismantled it's army. Luckily there was more understanding about the Russian's here.

And in truth EU as a defense treaty of NATO minus US (minus Canada, perhaps minus UK also?) would simply be far more weaker entity and far weaker even in defense. So weak, that likely many countries choosing the road of Finlandization with Russia. But if let's say the Turks invaded some islands belonging to Greece or tried the full invasion of Cyprus, would your or my country go to war with Turkey in the traditional way? After all, it would be an non-EU country attacking an EU country. Likely not, as if Erdogan did this hypothetical (and crazy) thing, he wouldn't try to bomb either Amsterdam or Helsinki.

And furthermore, even if the EU can entangle itself in debacles (like Libya) without even the US, it is lacking very important factors, starting from the fact that it's not a single sovereign entity and not a Great Power itself. It's de facto a confederacy of independent states with large amount of bureaucrats. However much it wants to be the United States of Europe, it simply isn't!

And lastly, if you want that an European country doesn't get entangled with military adventurism, have then universal conscription and a reservist army! With "volunteer" armies people get the strange idea that the military is just a service as anything else which they pay with taxes and there's nothing else to it.

If after 500+ pages of discussion these thinkers and their works are still a mystery to you, I can't be bothered to educate you either. (I have mentioned, quoted and linked them many times) Do it yourself:

The Geographical Pivot of History (Mackinder, 1904)

Defense Planning: Guidance FY 1994-1999 (aka "The Wolfowitz Doctrine", Paul Wolfowitz, 1992)

The Grand Chessboard (Brzezinski, 1997)

But you don't need to read these works at all to understand that what I'm laying out is the basic formula for US dominance. It must keep the Eurasian mainland divided, or lose its dominant position. With strong powers on the Eurasian mainland, the US would simply be an island with a mere 300 million inhabitants, incapable of securing global dominance.

That's the basic strategy which has propelled US foreign policy since the 1900's, and with renewed intensity after the end of the Cold War. It's the basic strategy that one talks about when they talk about the Project of a New American Century (PNAC), 'neocons', etc.

The Anglosphere, consisting of all 'island nations' in practical terms, shares this basic strategic challenge, which is why the Anglosphere and the Five-Eyes alliance is the actual military alliance the US cares about. Europe simply represents temporary interests. When the US can no longer control Europe (and we are rapidly approaching that moment), it will seek its ruin. Just like the US cannot allow Russia or China to rise, it cannot allow Europe to rise either.

And this is what is propelling US strategy today. This is why the US is pursuing long-term war in Ukraine - with the express purpose of dragging Europe into long-term conflict with Russia.

Talking about "conspiracy" is just an admission of ignorance. All warfare is deception, and "conspiracy" is the rule, not the exception.

Macron is talking about sending troops into Ukraine as we speak ... and you're arguing that NATO wouldn't send troops into NATO.

Makes zero sense.

But it's not necessarily troops that would be the focus of tensions but weapon's systems.

You may say ... well because of all this Finland won't allow in provocative US weapons systems.

But then the problem with that logic is why be in NATO to protect yourself from Russia if you don't want NATO to increase your defences against Russia. Whole point of being in NATO is as a deterrent, so that logic easily dominates the logic of being less provocative (that was the logic of being neutral); you can't have the benefits of NATO and neutrality at the same time, so if you're already in NATO you easily conclude you should at least have the defensive benefits.

If after 500+ pages of discussion these thinkers and their works are still a mystery to you, I can't be bothered to educate you either. (I have mentioned, quoted and linked them many times) Do it yourself:

The Grand Chessboard (Brzezinski, 1997) — Tzeentch

From those I've read the Grand Chessboard and even if Brzezinksi can be quite accurately be seen as proof of the evil intentions the US has for Russia (assuming one ex-security advisor literally speaks for US foreign policy), he never states what you said about Europe. For example he goes so far as to say that a Russia divided to three parts would be the best. But that's about Russia, not about the whole continent.

Defense Planning: Guidance FY 1994-1999 (aka "The Wolfowitz Doctrine", Paul Wolfowitz, 1992)

Actually a very interesting document, but it also doesn't AT ALL SAY WHAT YOU ARE IMPLYING IT SAYING. Keep Europe divided, keep it in chaos during war? Nothing like that! And anyway, why was the US so OK with European Integration in the first place???

So learn how to use references, @Tzeench. It's very sloppy and wrong (at least in academic circles) to say something and then refer to papers that don't say what you are saying!

So educate yourself first and stop fabricating things up.

So learn how to use references, Tzeench. It's very sloppy and wrong (at least in academic circles) to say something and then refer to papers that don't say what you are saying! — ssu

They paint a clear picture. I could dig through them to find the exact quotes, but I have done that enough times to know you will handwave them simply because it's not something you want to hear.

It's this type of willful naivety towards US intentions that allows the US to get away with things like Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, Ukraine etc. (it's a very long list...), and Europe will be the next on that pile of nations ruined by the US.

If you think I'm going to conform myself to academic standards to educate people who don't want to be educated you are sadly mistaken.

Engage with my arguments instead. They are simple enough.

They paint a clear picture. I could dig through them to find the exact quotes, but I have done that enough times to know you will handwave them simply because it's not something you want to hear. — Tzeentch

No, if you say person, be it Brzezinski or Mersheimer says something, then they really have to say that. Not something similar.

Learn to use quotes.

Or then simply say "I think".

By the way, , you claim to have read The Grand Chessboard.

So how come you have failed to notice chapter 2 makes exactly my point?

Dishonesty? Illiteracy?

Again, you have wasted my time.

Just reading through some of these passages has me reeling at how incriminating this stuff is.

To put it in a terminology that hearkens back to the more brutal age of ancient empires, the three grand imperatives of imperial geostrategy are to prevent collusion and maintain security dependence among the vassals, to keep tributaries pliant and protected, and to keep the barbarians from coming together. — Zbigniew Brzezinski

This once again proves one cannot be too cynical when analysing US foreign policy.

Macron is talking about sending troops into Ukraine as we speak ... and you're arguing that NATO wouldn't send troops into NATO. — boethius

I'm saying NATO is not going to pour troops into Finland as part of some invasion force that Russia will feel compelled to nuke. NATO will have a presence in Finland. That's it. NATO has no interest in invading Russia.

And if France sends troops to Ukraine, Russia will not nuke them. Russia knows France has no plans to invade Russia.

Quite, kills two birds with one stone. Keeps Europe weak and keeps Russia weak also. But I don’t think that the U.S. intended a war in Ukraine, but rather now that there is one they can capitalise on it. It is performing a useful role of keeping Russia occupied and weakened while it has imperial ambitions and it kicks the EU up the backside forcing them to increase their military spending and so take the Russia problem off their hands.

I fear what happens when the US can no longer keep Europe weak.

Ever since the end of the Cold War, there has been plenty of anti-American sentiment in Europe as a result of the various wars that have been fought.

Populism / nationalism are on the rise, and such movements are generally critical of participating in the US' geopolitical games (for example, PVV in the Netherlands, AfD in Germany).

We are soon approaching a point where populism takes over, and the muppets and puppets who have been shilling for the Americans will be ousted.

Moreover, the US will be forced sooner or later to address China, giving it less room to focus on Europe.

As I mentioned, at that point Europe will simply be seen as a potential rival, and there are a lot of buttons the Americans can press with which it can try to embroil Russia and Europe into a long-term war with each other, which I have no doubt they will try to do - in fact, I believe this is already the American strategy for Ukraine.

The fact that their goal is "to weaken Russia" is clear for all to see. Now it's time for the Europeans to realize that "to weaken Europe" is the other side of that coin.

I cannot find the book now, but luckily you have made it easy to reply further:

This once again proves one cannot be too cynical when analysing US foreign policy. — Tzeentch

Perfect example of your faulty argumentation. As you can notice, Brzezinski is talking about 'brutal age of ancient empires'. It's the Noam Chomsky's of the World who do this, and they aren't running the US.

Usually US leadership and even former security advisors don't relate the US to brutal ancient empires. But actually from Brzezinski himself you can find just how wrong you are.

Best here a QUOTE (meaning to write what the author has said about the issue at hand) Brzezinski. Here's what for example Brzezinski wrote in 2000 about the US and Europe:

The transatlantic alliance is America's most important global relationship. It is the springboard for US global involvement, enabling America to play the decisive role of arbiter in Eurasia - the world's central area of power - and it creates a coalition that is globally dominant in all key dimensions of power and influence. American and Europe serve as the axis of global stability, the locomotive of the world's economy, and the nexus of intellectual capital as well as technological innovation

And in fact, Brzezinski continues later where he actually says exactly what you get wrong:

Europeans often fail to grasp both the spontaneity and the sincerity of America's commitment to Europe, infusing into their perception of America's desire to sustain the Euro-Atlantic alliance a penchant for Machiavellian duplicity.

See Living with a New Europe

And that's exactly what I think you are saying: that the whole Euro-Atlantic alliance is some kind of powerplay from the US to keep Europe down. Or as Brzezinski says, the penchant for Machiavellian duplicity.

And moreover to the point, the US has actually done exactly the opposite to a Machiavellian power play by giving an OK to European Integration in the first place. If the US would be such a Machiavellian player when it comes to Europe, why favor then the emergence of the EU? The simple fact is that the relationship has been mutually beneficial, just as Brzezinski said above. The US was crucial in the start of the European integration process and the European states do not want that the US goes away from Europe. This couldn't be more clear from the fact that the US wants the European countries to arm themselves and take more role in their area.

Yet many naturally think otherwise, especially those who have the naive idea that everything evolves around the evil doings of the US and everybody else is either it's stooges or it's victims. These kind of attitudes don't take into account that global order is the end result of larger and smaller players acting together and totally dismiss even the idea cooperation that creates mutual benefit.

If WW2 ended with the allies occupying Germany, that there are still US troops in Germany isn't a sign of a continued occupation, but that the fact that actually Germany, as the Europeans, want the US to be hear as the Euro-Atlantic link has been successful.

If the US would be such a Machiavellian player when it comes to Europe, why favor then the emergence of the EU? — ssu

That's easy. The EU is an undemocratic, untransparent, bureaucratic monster of an institution - inept and easily corruptable by design, which grants the US easy avenues of influence and saves it the hassle of having to deal with each European nation seperately.

Gee, thanks America!

I'm sorry, but this is just naive.

I'm saying NATO is not going to pour troops into Finland as part of some invasion force that Russia will feel compelled to nuke. NATO will have a presence in Finland. That's it. NATO has no interest in invading Russia. — RogueAI

Again, such limited imagination.

How escalation works is a series of tit-for-tat actions which spur each side to buildup and "show of strength".

As I mentioned, how things go hot in these sorts of scenarios is when each side decides to call the others bluff. There's some new crisis, Russia engages in some sabre rattling and NATO calls that bluff and builds up forces in Finland to "protect NATO's border", insert misunderstandings and shenanigans of various kinds, and Russia decides to make good on it's threat and call NATO's bluff of retaliating with nuclear weapons.

We're not talking about now but a time span of many decades. Things can look very different to what they look like now.

Maybe the US becomes weak, maybe the US is the first to deploy tactical nuclear weapons in some other theatre and it's "just what nuclear powers do now", maybe Russia's position as a energy exporter is rock solid and it feels it can basically get away with anything and should demonstrate its resolve to do so.

Of course, speculation can go both ways, and, as I mention, maybe Russia goes around nuking every non-NATO member.

That's easy. The EU is an undemocratic, untransparent, bureaucratic monster of an institution — Tzeentch

EU is basically a confederacy of sovereign states, so wtf with it being "undemocratic"?

My country is democratic and I don't wish any intergovernmental union to have any more of that sovereignty, especially when we do have the European Parliament and it's elections.

Untransparent, bureaucratic, yes! Well, so is the UN and still I would keep that organization around too.

So if you naively think that Brexit made the UK better, then that's your opinion, not mine and not something that many Europeans would agree on. And just ask how many Britons are satisfied how that went. We should thank the British of showing how awful it is if and when similar UKIP idiots would be followed. The BREXIT disaster put off similar aspirations in other EU countries pretty well.

and saves it the hassle of having to deal with each European nation seperately. — Tzeentch

Which actually also is a benefit for smaller countries when they have to hassle with Russia. Another good effect that EU membership gives. Without the EU, Russia could bully European countries picking them individually.

Russia's next move:

Transnistria asking for help!!!

Politicians in Moldova’s Kremlin-backed breakaway region of Transnistria have appealed to Russian President Vladimir Putin to “protect” it against “pressure” from Chișinău.

“[We resolved to] appeal to the Federation Council and the State Duma of the Russian Federation, requesting measures to protect Transnistria amidst increased pressure from Moldova,” read a resolution adopted by hundreds of Transnistrian politicians in Tiraspol, the region’s capital and largest city.

The appeal stops short of directly asking Moscow to integrate Transnistria into Russia, as had been predicted by one Transnistrian opposition politician in the days before the resolution was adopted.

Let's see when how this is masked to be a NATO plot, especially when Moldova is neutral by it's constitution. :smirk:

:D

Pesky to announce that the Kremlin is carefully considering their request to come to the aid of their operativ...err...pu...cough compatriots, ahem after a proper democratic vote of course (ending separatism), and that violations against Transnistrian brothers and sisters will be addressed.

I don’t recognise your characterisation. It’s true that in the post WW2 settlement there was a tacit understanding that Germany in particular and Europe in general were not going to fully re-arm, but rather the U.S. and U.K. would maintain a strong presence and provide security under the umbrella of NATO.

At the very moment Putin threatened NATO with nuclear weapons on the day of the invasion of Ukraine, that understanding ended and we will now see the re-arming of Europe. The U.S. will be glad of this as they are likely to become overstretched if they pivot to the east.