...not doubting what a block is is not sufficient for doing the correct thing. — Fooloso4

SO what?

Yes, the assistant has to learn that "Block!" is a command, and how to respond.

Where is it you think your argument leads? What's the point of your comment? Do you think it shows a problem with hinge propositions? then set it out.

The real problem is that the person can choose not to play that game. And that is why the whole game analogy, and the described "hinge propositions", as some sort of rule system which supports the game, is fundamentally flawed, as a descriptive tool for "language" in general. Language as a whole must consist of a multitude of games, under the game analogy, and the individual user of language has freedom of choice with respect to which games to play.

So the supposed "hinge propositions" which must be, of necessity, accepted for the purpose of playing a specific game, and cannot be doubted from within the confines of that game, can always be doubted from the play of another game. The character of "hinge" is specific to, as a feature of, a particular game.

Therefore portraying such hinge propositions as somehow indubitable is fundamentally wrong. All the hinge propositions of any, and every particular game, are always the subject of doubt from the play of another game. And, a human being has the freedom of choice to play one game one day, and another game the next day, at will. Therefore it is completely reasonable for a human being to doubt any supposed "hinge proposition".

What cannot be exposed by the game analogy is the relationships between the various games, becuase these are by definition outside any particular game and are not captured by the analogy. Since this type of language use, which is outside any particular game, is a key aspect of the philosophical use of language, as the means by which we doubt linguistic activity, the game analogy completely fails as a representation of the philosophical use of language. Philosophical use of language is the use of language which is outside the game analogy.

The relationship between freedom of choice to choose a linguistic game, and dogmatic enforcement of a game, is very evident in the history of "The Inquisition". The Inquisition was formed to resist the infiltration of secular language (as heresy) into the pure language, Latin, and the perceived threat of doubt, and inevitable corruption of theological principles, from such cross-gaming. History teaches us that the enforcement of the game (The Inquisition) did not win over the freedom of the will of individuals to choose their own games. In fact, efforts at enforcement appear to have had a negative effect overall.

Where is it you think your argument leads? What's the point of your comment? Do you think it shows a problem with hinge propositions? — Banno

It is not a problem with hinge propositions but with what counts as a hinge.

You asked:

What would be the hinge propositions here?

"Here is a bock"
"Here is a slab"
"Here is a beam" — Banno

For something to be a hinge something must turn on it. "Here is an X" is not a hinge proposition. Even a primitive language like the builder's consists of more than just identifying or naming objects.

Sure, one can choose not to play one game or another, or to change the way the game is played. But it is not possible not to play any game. Even being a hermit i playing a game. And further, there is nothing to speak of outside of the games.

Your argument is that a hinge in one game need not be a hinge in another, and I agree; but one cannot thereby conclude, as you would, that there are no hinges. That argument would be like saying that an American dollar is not an Australian dollar, and concluding therefore that money is worthless.

There is no language use that is outside language games. Looking at the relationship between language games is yet another language game. Philosophers who think they can step outside language while still using language are mistaken.

For something to be a hinge something must turn on it. "Here is an X" is not a hinge proposition. Even a primitive language like the builder's consists of more than just identifying or naming objects. — Fooloso4

Sure. What turns on "This is a slab" is the whole process described in the game. A better parsing would be "This counts as a slab". This is implicit in the playing of the builder's game. And yes, of course the game consists in more than identifying and naming objects.

A better parsing would be "This counts as a slab". — Banno

A better parsing would be: "Bring me this when I call slab".

"Bring me this when I call slab". — Fooloso4

But that is not a proposition, it is a command.

And further, it will not work unless what you call a slab is the same as what I call a slab; it will not work unless it serves to differentiate slabs from blocks for both of us.

Strictly speaking, "block", "slab", "beam" are the commands. What to do when you hear ""Slab!". is not a command but an explanation.

Both what a slab isis and what to do with it are learned ostensibly. Both what a slab is and what to do with it must be the same for both of us.

Strictly speaking, "block", "slab", "beam" are the commands. — Fooloso4

Yes.

What to do when you hear ""Slab!". is not a command but an explanation. — Fooloso4

Not sure what this means. Bringing a slab is not an explanation.

Both what a slab isis and what to do with it are learned ostensibly. Both what a slab is and what to do with it must be the same for both of us. — Fooloso4

Yes.

The question on this thread is "What is a hinge proposition", so I gave an example from the simplest language game.

And?

Bringing a slab is not an explanation. — Banno

It is an explanation of what to do when you hear "slab!".

Ok.

Again, where is this leading?

I gather that you do not think "This is a slab" a suitable example of a hinge proposition, but I am unable to see why.

I gather that you do not think "This is a slab" a suitable example of a hinge proposition, but I am unable to see why. — Banno

I would only be repeating myself. In the builder's language "slab" means more than "This is a slab." Knowing what a slab is is requisite, but knowing what to do with it is as well.

Do you think Moore's "here is a hand" is a hinge proposition?

I would only be repeating myself. In the builder's language "slab" means more than "This is a slab." Knowing what a slab is is requisite, but knowing what to do with it is as well. — Fooloso4

There's nothing here with which i would disagree...?

Do you think Moore's "here is a hand" is a hinge proposition? — Fooloso4

"This counts as a hand" might be. Use is what counts. SO in so far as Moore was setting up a langauge game in which this counted as a hand, yes.

I can't make sense of the idea of a proposition that does not have a truth value - not a proposition for which we don't know if it is true or false, but a proposition which is not eligible for truth or falsehood. Sam26 was entertaining that idea here. — Banno

What reason is there to assume that hinge propositions are no different to ordinary propositions? It may be worth noting that Wittgenstein doesn't use the phrase "hinge proposition" in OC. If hinge propositions are just ordinary propositions then why does W appear to indicate that they cannot be doubted or known? We can doubt and know ordinary propositions. Or do you think he is talking about some other (third) type of proposition in this regard?

It may be worth noting that Wittgenstein doesn't use the phrase "hinge proposition" in OC. — Luke

Oh, yes indeed. It is an contrivance grafted post hoc onto the apparatus - a bit like the private language argument. The plain way to make his point might be to claim that in any given game there will be some aspects that are indubitable. One gets to hinge propositions by then inferring that one could state what it is that is indubitable - not a long stretch, and that's in effect what I did here:

"Here is a bock"
"Here is a slab"
"Here is a beam" — Banno

So a hinge is not so much a type of proposition as a way one might make use of some propositions.

Hence, Searle's constitutive propositions are interesting because they might give a grammar for one way that a proposition can be used as a hinge - "this counts as a slab".

One gets to hinge propositions by then inferring that one could state what it is that is indubitable — Banno

I don’t follow why you would accept that hinge propositions are not like ordinary propositions in the sense that hinge propositions are indubitable (and therefore unknowable) whereas ordinary propositions are not. Yet you insist that hinge propositions must be like ordinary propositions in the sense of having a truth value.

I don't see an issue. What am I missing?

Hinge propositions are indubitable, and hence true. Hence they have a truth value.

The argument is that the notion of justification does not apply to them, and that hence they cannot be known. It is not that they cannot be known because they do not have a truth value...

Hinge propositions are indubitable, and hence true. — Banno

Hence we know them?

It is not that they cannot be known because they do not have a truth value... — Banno

I haven’t made any such argument. I’m asking why they must have a truth value when they are not ordinary propositions and they are distinguished from ordinary propositions in other ways.

SO in so far as Moore was setting up a langauge game in which this counted as a hand, yes. — Banno

Is that what he was doing? Is it only in certain games that it to count and not others?

Is that what he was doing? Is it only in certain games that it to count and not others? — Fooloso4

That is a damn good question. It's an issue of exegesis as well as epistemology. Did Wittgenstein think that beng beyond doubt was only within a given game - it seems likely. Was he right? I suspect so, but it remains an open question.

I’m asking why they must have a truth value when they are not ordinary propositions and they are distinguished from ordinary propositions in other ways. — Luke

Yeah, I must have missed something. What is an "ordinary" proposition here?

SO we have that in order to participate in some given language game, one must take certain things as indubitable.

Those things can presumably be stated.

Some folk call such statements hinge propositions.

Hence hinge propositions are true. Hinge propositions are undoubted. Hinge propositions are unjustified.

Hence the conclusion that if what is known must be justified, then hinge propositions are true but unknown.

That right?

That is a damn good question. — Banno

Actually two questions, both about Moore's "Here is a hand".

With regard to Wittgenstein, I agree that what is beyond doubt is only within a given game. For one of Wittgenstein's tribes very different things might be beyond doubt, just as in earlier times different things were beyond doubt in western culture.

If hinge propositions are just ordinary propositions then why does W appear to indicate that they cannot be doubted or known? We can doubt and know ordinary propositions. — Luke

I don’t follow why you would accept that hinge propositions are not like ordinary propositions in the sense that hinge propositions are indubitable (and therefore unknowable) whereas ordinary propositions are not. Yet you insist that hinge propositions must be like ordinary propositions in the sense of having a truth value. — Luke

Well, most obviously, because hinge propositions are propositions. Propositions are the sorts of things that have a truth value. A proposition without a truth value would be a contradiction in terms. And I don't think W ever gives us reason to believe he doesn't think there is some fact of the matter as to whether e.g. "here is a hand" or whether "I've spent my entire life in close proximity to the Earth"- in other words, that these propositions have a truth-value. What he questions is whether Moore is correct to say he knows these propositions.

Now, at least on the standard account, we know a given proposition if the proposition is true, and if we are justified in our belief in that proposition. So if W is questioning whether Moore knows these propositions, he could either be questioning whether the proposition is true, or whether we can be justified in believing these propositions (or both). And so the idea is that W is attacking whether these propositions can be justified, and is ultimately arguing that they can't be justified (and therefore cannot be known) because they form the background against which we evaluate and justify propositions in general: they therefore cannot themselves be justified, upon pain of circularity.

What is an "ordinary" proposition here? — Banno

Unless you know of any other types, ordinary propositions are those which are not hinge propositions. Do you acknowledge that ordinary propositions are not the same as hinge propositions?

Those things can presumably be stated.

Some folk call such statements hinge propositions.

Hence hinge propositions are true. Hinge propositions are undoubted. Hinge propositions are unjustified. — Banno

Your argument appears to be that if a proposition can be stated then it must have a truth value. But this is just to ignore the distinction between ordinary propositions and hinge propositions and does not explain why hinge propositions must have a truth value, especially given your acceptance of the other differences between hinge propositions and ordinary propositions that have been noted.

Well, most obviously, because hinge propositions are propositions. — Seppo

But that is also in question here. Again, W does not refer to “hinge propositions” in OC. Also, if they cannot be doubted or known, then they are unlike (ordinary) propositions in at least some other ways.

Your argument appears to be that if a proposition can be stated then it must have a truth value — Luke

No, the argument is that if its a proposition, then it must have a truth-value, because that just is what a proposition is (i.e. the sort of thing that has a truth-value).

But this is just to ignore the distinction between ordinary propositions and hinge propositions and does not explain why hinge propositions must have a truth value — Luke

The distinction that myself, Banno, and Jamalrob have urged between ordinary propositions and hinge propositions is that the difference lies in the latter's inability to be justified (and that because of the role hinge propositions play in language, particularly in the process of justification).

But that is also in question here. Again, W does not refer to “hinge propositions” in OC. Also, if they cannot be doubted or known, then they are unlike (ordinary) propositions in at least some other ways. — Luke

No, but he does refer to the claims in question as propositions. And a proposition without a truth-value would be a contradiction in terms. And the argument here is that hinge propositions cannot be doubted or known, not because they differ from ordinary propositions in lacking a truth-value, but because they differ from ordinary propositions in being unable to be justified.

, ordinary propositions are those which are not hinge propositions. Do you acknowledge that ordinary propositions are not the same as hinge propositions? — Luke

Well, the way you set this up, no. But I'm not seeing the point of the exercise. Pins are not the same as not-pins.

Your argument appears to be that if a proposition can be stated then it must have a truth value. — Luke

What gave you that impression? Where'd I say that? Arguably, "the present king of France is bald" does not have a truth value...

A proposition - stated or no - is the sort of thing that can have a truth value...

And if a proposition is to be taken as undoubted - and that seems to be the case - then by that very fact it is true.

I'm still not seeing your line of thought here.

Glad to see you are having trouble following this... Thanks. Seems pretty direct, to me.

Yeah I find this all perplexing, it seems pretty straightforward to me: Moore doesn't know whether "here is a hand", not because "here is a hand" is neither true nor false (how could it be neither true nor false? What is a proposition without a truth-value, other than a contradiction in terms?), but because "here is a hand" is, to use your previous analogy, one of the rules of the game: that here is a hand is one of the hinges upon which our evaluation of other propositions swings.

No, the argument is that if its a proposition, then must have a truth-value, because that just is what a proposition is (i.e. the sort of thing that has a truth-value). — Seppo

By the same logic, if it is a proposition then it must be justifiable, dubitable and capable of being known, because that is just what a proposition is. Yet hinge propositions are none of these things.

The distinction that myself, Banno, and Jamalrob have urged between ordinary propositions and hinge propositions is that the difference lies in the latter's inability to be justified (and that because of the role hinge propositions play in language, particularly in the process of justification). — Seppo

I’m aware. I’m “urging” the further distinction that they do not have a truth value either.

And a proposition without a truth-value would be a contradiction in terms. — Seppo

But a proposition that cannot be justified, known or doubted isn’t a contradiction in terms?