• jancanc
    126
    Schopenhauer essentially states:

    If anything is an appearance it is known conditionally
    We know that we act directly/unconditionally
    Therefore action as such cannot be a appearance.


    "known conditionally" - we know appearances in a conditioned way; an appearance (a tree, a glass, another person, etc) is an object for a subject.
    However we know our own willing directly, a kind of non-observational knowledge.
  • Tobias
    1k
    That is what Schopenhauer says yes. Willing is much more direct according to S. When we experience pain for instance we experience pain, pure and simple. It does not matter whether the pain is caused by a phantom limb or by a small black box like in the book Dune. The pain is real. So Schopenhauer state we have access to the real via another way than our reason, namely our will. Clever man Schopenhauer was, very clever. Clever and cranky though, very cranky.
  • jancanc
    126
    yes, but with respect to premise 2- We know that we act directly/unconditionally- in order to for his argument to be formally valid, should he not have this premises states as: "we know we act ONLY in a direct/unconditioned way"?
  • alan1000
    200
    I'm sorry, jancanc, but I am not sure what question you are asking here? Everything in your post is correct, I think. What exactly are you asking?
  • Deleted User
    -1
    If anything is an appearance it is known conditionally
    We know that we act directly/unconditionally
    Therefore action as such cannot be a appearance.
    jancanc

    Actually yes, I think it is.
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