So, if you ask 'where's the pub?' and I say 'I think it's at the end of the road', I'm implying that my belief is neither justified nor true?

If so, why on earth would I have said it? — Isaac

You're conflating the strict meaning of the sentence with its use in practice. This is addressed in Moore's paradox: "It is raining, but I do not believe that it is raining". The sentence is consistent, and possibly true, but not something that anyone would say in real life as assertions of something's truth tacitly imply that one believes that thing to be true.

If you just want to argue for an ordinary language approach to the issue of knowledge then you can, but that's probably beyond the scope of this discussion. In this discussion a distinction is drawn between a true belief and a false belief. You might believe that my name is Andrew, but you don't know that my name is Andrew – in part because my name is not Andrew.

I also believe the Earth is spherical rather than a disc because I believe in science and personal experience (watching ships dip over the horizon). I have never been into space though to see for myself. I cannot say with utter and complete certainty that anything I hold to be ‘true’ in reality to actually be True because I immediately have the ability to doubt that which I bring into conscious attention. That is why I use my own definition of knowledge not JTB which is little more than the kind of games and word play used by lawyers - no thanks.

So if something is ‘justified’ it is ‘true’? — I like sushi

No. Being true and being justified are two separate conditions.

You're conflating the strict meaning of the sentence with its use in practice. — Michael

How do we determine what the 'strict meaning' of a sentence is outside of its use?

How do we determine what the 'strict meaning' of sentence is outside of its use? — Isaac

Not really sure. I just know that there's a difference in meaning between "it is raining" and "I believe that it is raining". The former is a statement about the weather, and is true if it is raining. The latter is a statement about my belief, and can be true even if it is not raining. However, I also know that if I assert that it is raining then I am implying that I believe that it is raining.

It is very simple for me to point out that WE DON’T KNOW EITHER WAY. — I like sushi

Because, arguably, none of our beliefs are justified, and so the second condition isn't met. And in the case of the flat-Earthers, they don't have knowledge because their belief is false, and so the third condition isn't met.

Remember that your original claim was that flat-Earthers have knowledge simply because they believe that their beliefs are justified and true. I'm simply pointing out that this isn't sufficient for knowledge. They only have knowledge if the Earth is in fact flat.

there's a difference in meaning between "it is raining" and "I believe that it is raining". The former is a statement about the weather, and is true if it is raining. The latter is a statement about my belief, and can be true even if it is not raining. — Michael

I agree. But 'I know' doesn't seem to be properly of either kind, using a JTB definition.

You say that 'I know it's raining' is different to 'I believe it's raining' (I can be wrong about the former but not the latter, the former being about the weather itself in some way).

So 'I know' still seems no less pointless this way around. His could...

'I know it's raining'

...differ from...

'it's raining'?

'I know it's raining'

...differ from...

'it's raining'? — Isaac

The former is true if 1) I believe that it is raining, 2) I am justified in believing that it is raining, and 3) it is raining, whereas the latter is true if 1) it is raining.

The former is about both the weather and my belief, whereas the latter is only about the weather.

So...

'I know it's raining' is to mean...

'I believe it's raining' [my state of mind],...

'I'm justified in that belief' [a social claim that I could mount a generally acceptable argument],...

and 'it's raining' [a claim about the world].

But that means that the claim 'I know it's raining' contains the claim 'it's raining', which itself can never be anything more than the claim 'I believe it's raining', which is just the first part of the claim.

Because, arguably, none of our beliefs are justified, and so the second condition isn't met. — Michael

That is my point. They are ONLY met in abstraction. That is not the claim of JTB though as it is applied to real life where limits and rules are unknown to us.

But that means that the claim 'I know it's raining' contains the claim 'it's raining', which itself can never be anything more than the claim 'I believe it's raining', which is just the first part of the claim. — Isaac

"It is raining" doesn't mean the same thing as "I believe that it is raining". The former is a claim about the weather, and is true if it is raining. The latter is a claim about my belief, and can be true even if it is not raining.

So what are you willing to assert about the present, that you don't presently believe?

That is my point. — I like sushi

Plenty of our beliefs are justified. It's just that beliefs about aliens probably aren't.

So what are you willing to assert about the present that you don't presently believe? — sime

Nothing. What relevance is that?

Nothing. What relevance is that? — Michael

I'm trying to understand how you distinguish your concept of your beliefs from your concept of reality.

The same way most people do. The world isn't just what I believe it to be. Sometimes the things I believe turn out to be wrong.

If you want to argue for subjective idealism or some other metaphysics then this isn't the discussion for that. This discussion takes some form of objective realism for granted.

But that doesn’t make them true. Truth is not, as far as we know, existent in reality. It is an abstract concept.

Btw I think there is more justification in the belief for aliens existing than not. It would be surprising if the Earth was the only planet in the entire universe to ever harbour life.

There a many cosmologists and xenobiologist who’d likely agree with me … it is NOT true though as far as we know. Discovering aliens would make it ‘true’ but I doubt everyone would believe it as some will not see past their beliefs.

What we believe often trumps reality. We are not robots. Facts and truths are not synonymous. You appear to be talking about facts rather than what is true.

The whole JTB nonsense is stuck because it openly ignores the distinction between facts and truths.

"It is raining" doesn't mean the same thing as "I believe that it is raining". — Michael

That's not what I claimed though. I claimed "it's raining" means the same as 'I believe "it's raining" - note the location of the quotations, I've tried to clarify.

So the claim 'it's raining', at the end of the exploded JTB claim is the same as 'I believe "it's raining".

The same way most people do. The world isn't just what I believe it to be. Sometimes the things I believe turn out to be wrong. — Michael

It is obviously that case that you aren't necessarily willing to presently assert your previous beliefs, or to presently assert my present beliefs.

This is why i precisely asked

"So what are you willing to assert about the present that you don't presently believe? "

Which is the case precisely raised by Moore's paradox.

I claimed "it's raining" means the same as 'I believe "it's raining" — Isaac

It doesn't. The former is a claim about the weather, and is true if it is raining. The latter is a claim about my belief, and can be true even if it is not raining.

But that doesn’t make them true. Truth is not, as far as we know, existent in reality. It is an abstract concept. — I like sushi

Whether or not the Earth is flat is not an abstract concept. Whether or not the Earth is flat "exists" in reality. Whether or not the Earth is flat is independent on what anyone believes.

You appear to be talking about facts rather than what is true. — I like sushi

If you're drawing a distinction then you're missing the point. If you prefer it can be rephrased as:

X knows that Y if 1) X believes that Y, 2) X is justified in believing that Y, and 3) it is a fact that Y.

Which is the case precisely raised by Moore's paradox. — sime

Moore's paradox has nothing to do with this discussion, and was only brought up because of Isaac's misleading question. Given the JTB definition of knowledge:

John knows that it is raining if:

1) John believes that it is raining,
2) John is justified in believing that it is raining, and
3) it is raining

It would be a mistake to interpret this as saying that John knows that it is raining if:

1) John believes that it is raining,
2) John is justified in believing that it is raining, and
3) I believe that it is raining

This latter argument is obviously fallacious.

Note the position of the quotation marks.

If 'I know it's raining' is taken to be a claim about both my mental state, and the world, then it can be false if I don't believe it's raining (whether or not it actually is), or it can be false if it's not actually raining (whether or not I believe it to be). But this latter state cannot ever be ascertained, it can only ever be assumed by survey of my (and other's) beliefs.

The point goes back to what you said earlier, which really is the crux here. If there is some 'strict sense' of an expression which is other than the actual sense in which it is used, then you need to first establish what the truthmakers are for this 'strict sense', otherwise I might just as well say that the meaning of "I know" in the 'strict sense' is "I have a hat on", and I'd be no less justified in such a claim.

Note the position of the quotation marks. — Isaac

I did, and they still don’t mean the same thing. A claim about the weather is not a claim about one’s belief.

But this latter state cannot ever be ascertained — Isaac

It can, given the JTB definition of knowledge.

If it is raining and if I believe that it is raining and if I am justified in believing that it is raining then I know that it is raining. If I know that it is raining then I have ascertained that it is raining.

If it is raining — Michael

How do you ascertain this other than by survey of your beliefs about whether it's raining?

The justification for a true belief is how the truth is ascertained.

The justification for a true belief is how the truth is ascertained. — Michael

Go on...

(this doesn't seem to be a complete answer to the question of how I ascertain that it's raining other than by survey of my beliefs)

Whether or not the Earth is flat is not an abstract concept. Whether or not the Earth is flat "exists" in reality. Whether or not the Earth is flat is independent on what anyone believes. — Michael

Yes ... I point being that JTB only works with abstractions. JTB framed as a definition of day-to-day 'knowledge' about historical facts and such is nonsense.

Using an abstract formula as evidence of something being True in reality only has limited Justification. There is no distinct line between these.

I noticed you avoided commenting about the Chess game analogy? Are you saying that someone, in the real world, can know (with certainty) what the rules of a game are without ever being told what the rules are? That makes no sense at all. I can certainly agree that if they observed people playing the game multiple times they would have a better idea what the rules were but I see no way how they could state with absolute certainty that they knew ALL the rules. Granted, if the game was simple and there were only a few possible 'moves' in the game then they would feel more and more confident with each viewing ... and therein lies the problem of how humans operate. We believe when it suits us and frame beliefs as certainties when it suits our fragile understanding even in the face of facts that show otherwise.

This is part of the reason why flatearthers exist and part of the reason why people laughed with incredulity at Galileo for disputing what Aristotle said, because people will believe what they believe as true and some will not even budge once you show them they are wrong.

Go on... — Isaac

What’s there to say? I believe that it’s raining because I’m outside, getting wet, and can see the water falling from the clouds. That’s the justification for my belief and how I’ve ascertained the truth that it is raining.