isn’t that you have to agree with them (or me), Banno, but in your fullness of meaning in the absence of community (especially those communities feasting on putrifying deity), you can’t pretend as if your judgment (your aesthetic preference) is the necessary judgment. — Ennui Elucidator

I take your definition of "truth" then not to be a correspondence theory (to say the least), but a pragmatism that states the truth is that which is most helpful, not from a predictive perspective, but from a psychologically pleasing level. You anchor truth to subjective value, while, at the same time, admitting there exists an objective method of distinguishing truth from falsity (i.e. whether it corresponds to reality), but you just insist this objective method is "uninteresting" (your word, which I best understand as meaning "does not provide useful results" else you're just informing me it bores you).

To break this down to what I'm saying: If you say God created the world in 6 days, you claim that's a fact because it gives your life meaning, all the while knowing the actual world out there evolved over millions of years, correct? That is, you recognize clearly what is true out in the world, but your focus isn't in learning that, but in figuring out what you need to believe to get you mentally to the next day? What then to do with what you know the actual world to be like? Do you pretend it not to be? Does it obtain the status of all falsehoods, no different than theories that the world is flat for example?

That is: You call X a "fact, " and it is defined as a belief that succeeds under your utility theory even if it fails under correspondence theory. But what do you call belief Y that succeeds under corrrespondence but fails under utility? And, what do you call Z that fails under both?

Surely X, Y, and Z are deserving of different terms, with X and Y being metaphysically different. If you view Y and Z differently, you have to explain why, and that might erode your pragmatic theory if you are forced to admit it's because Y is a "fact," yet Z is not.

Also, how do meaningfully debate @Banno if he obtains psychological satisfaction from demanding that facts correspond to reality? How can you tell him he's wrong in his objections to you in this thread? Mustn't you afford him the same latitude as you did the starving man who needed to believe his apples weren't rotten and tell Banno all he has said is exactly right?

I do see our tacks being distinct here. I an committed to declaring there was no Noah's ark, that those who claim there was are wrong, but that the story itself is metaphorically true.

Have I understood correctly?

I’m not sure that what I wrote matches what you have described, but I’m happy to respond to specific quotes if you find they deviate too much from what I am writing now.

My definition of “truth” is that there is none, i.e. that when we say “is true” it adds nothing to the statement (uttered in the context of an assertion) - a position that is in the ball park of the redundancy theory of truth. So I am not saying that someone saying something makes it true in the traditional sense, but that the assertion of something is done because it advances the utterer’s purpose. I don’t want to go too far down this path because I think what I wrote earlier was about how people can use “truth” in multiple senses with the sense largely dependent on the context in which it is uttered.

What I said was uninteresting is metaphysics - that if we conceive of a fact as being what is out there ( a state of affairs), that fact becomes important only in-so-far as it interacts with our will. As we can only have theories about “out there” (which we can discuss elsewhere at length), we end up in a situation where what we think about/discuss is a theory and not a fact. If we theorize “wrong” (that is, our theory fails to adequately account for a fact) but accomplish our will, I am not sure what it is that would let us know that we got it wrong. (Consider the case of true belief with incorrect justification rather than no justification.). We could certainly try to theorize right and spend lots of effort at being right, but for reasons of testability/falsifiability I think you quickly run into epistemic problems that renders such efforts a waste of time.

“Facts” are similar to “truths” in-so-far as they are both just symbols. Facts are important things in our language, so things that are perceived as important tend to be called facts. “It is a fact that” and “it is true that” both accomplish the same sort of trick - to amplify the assertion that follows. It isn’t important to parse the word because in most circumstances, I am not sure that anyone cares what the difference is. So “it is true that X” and “it is a fact that X” when talking in a bar are not likely to convey a different message. Again, the context dictates what work “fact” does in that statement - is it the sort of statement that is about mining or about meaning? In my view, there is no reason to reconcile the two contexts and insist upon uniformity of linguistic function.

Getting to your question about X, Y, and Z, if I state, “It is a fact that my keys are in my pocket”, it isn’t immediately clear what that sentence does in the context in which it was uttered. If I am alerting someone where to find my keys, it tells them where to look. If I am trying to get you stop asking me where they are, it tells you to stop asking. So now I say it and my keys aren’t in my pocket, is the statement false? Sure. Did it accomplish the key finding purpose? No. Did it accomplish the stop asking me purpose? Sure. Could it be that there are other contexts that render the utterance more or less useful? Absolutely.

What does my utterance have to do with belief? Potentially nothing. I might have uttered it as a result of reading a piece of paper that I don’t understand. I might have uttered as a result of repeating what you just said to me. This all gets a bit complicated and far afield, but I am trying to highlight that language does something independent of what I think.

Now let’s say I believe out there is in some way but I want to accomplish something that either necessitates that out there is otherwise or is irrelevant to out there. The latter case is easy, my belief is neither here nor there. And the former? Well, that is where @Banno’s imposition of the world comes in. Either I can’t get what I want or if I do get what I want, my belief was “wrong”. The thing is, why I am frustrated may be because my belief about out there was right or that some other fact (which I hold a false belief about) is so. Frustration is not, therefore, a way to confirm my beliefs, just an obstacle to be overcome or moved on from.

I am sure this has confused things more than clarified them. I am absolutely not saying that statements or beliefs make things facts, I am saying that people use language how they want and that we can use language differently in different language communities. When we say that the story of Noah’s ark is true, it isn’t that we are parsing metaphor from non-metaphor and simply equivocating on the interpretation of the story, but that we are equivocating on what “is true” means. Noah’s ark being literally true is meaningless when discussing the balance of my bank account but useless (and even counterproductive) when trying to make a coherent narrative about the archeological/geological record. Using truth in the religious context in a non-religious context is like trying to move a bishop diagonally on his own color when directing a guy in a red hat down a hallway with a variegated carpet to the pope’s chamber. You’ve failed to change your language game.

Now telling @Banno he is wrong in this thread is easy, whether I’ve given him latitude or not. Banno, you’re wrong. My saying it doesn’t mean much and merely announces my judgement to people capable of making their own. Appealing to my own authority for getting you to agree with me that Banno is in error is likely a bad rhetorical flourish.

In the end, facts are not about me, but about us. Insisting that people use language the same in all contexts is amusing, but misguided.

I see all of philosophy in service to a purpose with no reason to invest in an idea beyond its utility. — Ennui Elucidator

Despite felling a bit loath to indicate a percieved error in someone I have come to consider my philosophical better, I must say, Ennui, that I think you wrong on this particular point. This type of consequentialist rationale, this Benthamism, inclines towards a general failure of consensus, for while a given consequence renders increased meaning for the other guy, it may diminish my own purpose of generating meaning for myself. Bentham's utilities only pertain to human happiness as an aggregate. The thing not considered by Bentham (I tend to consider such as Bentham and Marx to have been "soft philosophers", much in the way that psychology is a "soft science", and such as Aristotle, Spinoza, and Schopenhauer to have been "hard philosophers") and his sociologically-minded ilk, is that one man's happiness is often another man's sorrow, one man's utility is another's...not worthlessness, but contemptibility. More specifically, not all utilitarian claims are as universally beneficial as the claim that "there is a teacup orbiting the sun" might be to both yourself and myself, if you and I were both in orbit within our rocket ship. The result in this world of the condition wherein utilitarian propositions have exhibited differentialities of beneficience, has ever been to fight, and so let power decide which of competing utilities should obtain. In my view, the purpose of philosophy is to aid in the avoidance of this type of process. In a world within which man can never apprehend ultimate truth, is to evaluate the truth of propositions based upon sound modes of thinking, and so to distinguish those propositions that we can know to be true from those that we cannot, thereby enabling one to adjudge utilitarian propositions based upon the truths that we can know, and so to avoid at least some cases of competing utilitarian claims. The goal of philosophy, then, should be to impose a rationale for the implementation, or not, of given utilitarian propositions rather than allowing implementation based upon a popular consensus (which might itself be based upon fallacy) to take an unwarranted effect in human society. In short, the purpose of philosophy, again in my view, is not to evaluate the utility, but what is a more basic function, to evaluate the truth of ideas and how that effects the validity of propositions, leaving questions of utility to the sociologists and politicians, latter of whom we should advise on questions of truth and validity. Am I expressing my thoughts clearly? I'm not so sure...

Insisting that people use language the same in all contexts is amusing, but misguided. — Ennui Elucidator

This is true...

In the end, facts are not about me, but about us. — Ennui Elucidator

..but this seems not to be. Fact and reality exist apart from subjective valuation and agreement, and are the philosopher's object of scrutiny.

[

If there is no God, everything is permitted.
— Dostoevsky

The quote above, taken as true, implies that without the facticity of God's existence, morality has no leg to stand on. In other words, religions - humanity's preliminary expeditions in the moral universe - have to be "factually correct" from beginning to end. — TheMadFool

And yet at my thread "what can replace God?" you were doubting that most people even nowadays get their morals from religions.

Well I struggled to pass it over and not comment that but damn, my Ego grabbed me from my balls.

And yet at my thread "what can replace God?" you were doubting that most people even nowadays get their morals from religions. — dimosthenis9

Maybe I wasn't clear enough but I did mention religious morals are acceptable but the reason for doing so seems to rather deplorable - want of reward/fear of penalty. That's just monetary logic - you're merely buying your way into heaven with good deeds as the currency of choice.

Secular ethics, if you take care to notice, is neither about reward nor about punishment. The secular moral theories out there are all about good for the sake of good.

That's just monetary logic - you're merely buying your way into heaven with good deeds as the currency of choice. — TheMadFool

Exactly. And unfortunately it's what humanity still needs. What "works" better, for most people at least. Or else people wouldn't maintain so passionately religions till now.

Exactly. And unfortunately it's what humanity still needs. What "works" better, for most people at least. Or else people wouldn't maintain so passionately religions till now. — dimosthenis9

With or without religion, good people can behave well and bad people can do evil; but for good people to do evil - that takes religion. — Steven Weingberg

[ — Michael Zwingli

]

I thought I might help you finish what you started. :grin:

With or without religion, good people can behave well and bad people can do evil; but for good people to do evil - that takes religion. — Steven Weingberg

Well I don't agree with Mr. Steven on that at all. Being good or evil is a mater of personal choice at the end. And nothing else. If people use as an excuse religion to be good or evil that doesn't change that it is still a personal choice after all.

Religion isn't a magic pill that "transforms" good people into evil.

I thought I might help you finish what you started. :grin: — TheMadFool

Thanks alot! Between my fat fingers, and the bright sunlight on my screen, I guess I didn't know what I was doing for awhile there.

Well I don't agree with Mr. Steven on that at all. Being good or evil is a mater of personal choice at the end. And nothing else. If people use as an excuse religion to be good or evil that doesn't change that it is still a personal choice after all.

Religion isn't a magic pill that "transforms" good people into evil. — dimosthenis9

You're trying to eat the cake and have it too. You can't claim religion has been a part of our lives and then go on to assert that religion has no role in evil.

Thanks alot! — Michael Zwingli

You're welcome!

Religion has a role both in evil and good of course. And if you want to attribute evil in religions you have to attribute good also. If we wanna be fair.

But my point is that religion doesn't transform people from good to evil. It's always a personal choice what you will follow.
It is true that many people use religion as an "excuse" for being good or evil. But if someone chooses to follow evil (or good) he would use any other excuse also even if it wasn't religion. Some tragedy in his life, or anger for corrupted political system, or unhappy childhood etc etc. We can't take away the personal responsibility from each persons choices and just attribute it to religion. Blame "bad" religions for everything . Of course religion is a force that can affect and influence many people. But still we, ourselves, "pull the trigger" of our behavior, our acts and our choices.

And at my thread if you remember I was strongly doubted that religions make more evil than good at the end. That people who probably use them as a "reason", "excuse" to act good are more than those who use them for evil. Maybe that's why is still necessary for our societies. Imo it's still the best "worse" moral glue for humanity.Considering the average low intellectual level of humans worldwide.

Religion has a role both in evil and good of course. And if you want to attribute evil in religions you have to attribute good also. If we wanna be fair.

But my point is that religion doesn't transform people from good to evil. It's always a personal choice what you will follow.
It is true that many people use religion as an "excuse" for being good or evil. But if someone chooses to follow evil (or good) he would use any other excuse also even if it wasn't religion. Some tragedy in his life, or anger for corrupted political system, or unhappy childhood etc etc. We can't take away the personal responsibility from each persons choices and just attribute it to religion. Blame "bad" religions for everything.

And at my thread if you remember I was strongly doubted that religions make more evil than good at the end. That people who probably use them as a "reason", "excuse" to act good are more than those who use them for evil. Maybe that's why is still necessary for our societies. Imo it's still the best "worse" moral glue for humanity.Considering the average low intellectual level of humans worldwide. — dimosthenis9

Of course there are many reasons, some you've mentioned, why people turn to the dark side but you can't deny that religion is one such reason. History is replete with instances of religiously-motivated atrocities. We could, with great effort of course, forgive such heinous acts (genocide and more) but then to also have to accept that it was divinely ordained is a tad too much, no?

History is replete with instances of religiously-motivated atrocities. We could, with great effort of course, forgive such heinous acts (genocide and more) but then to also have to accept that it was divinely ordained is a tad too much, no? — TheMadFool

Yes it is too much indeed. And that's why you can never have a fruitful discussion with a fanatic (both sides fanatic, theists or atheists).

If a religion person denies these historical atrocities or excuses them saying it was "God's will" then you better turn your back and leave. Anything else would be a waste of time.
But then not all theists are like that. Some recognize them and realize how unjust these atrocities were.

Yes it is too much indeed. And that's why you can never have a fruitful discussion with a fanatic (both sides fanatic, theists or atheists).

If a religion person denies these historical atrocities or excuses them saying it was "God's will" then you better turn your back and leave. Anything else would be a waste of time.
But then not all theists are like that. Some recognize them and realize how unjust these atrocities were. — dimosthenis9

True but what made "some (religious folk) recognize them (atrocities) and realize how unjust these atrocities were"? Can't be religion itself - scriptures have remained exactly as they were for nearly 20000 years. Ergo, this moral growth has to be the work of secular/atheistic forces.

To be fair, I feel both theism and atheism are, despite their antithetical relationship, partners insofar as ethics is the issue - they seem to work synergistically. Concordia discordis.

To be fair, I feel both theism and atheism are, despite their antithetical relationship, partners insofar as ethics is the issue - they seem to work synergistically. Concordia discordis. — TheMadFool

I so agree on that. For me, they are both working together as a continuous effort of ethical transformation. Like opposite forces which at the end work for the same purpose.

And yes moral growth is more possible to occur from atheistic forces. As long as these forces though respect theists and don't be aphoristic against them. Treating theists like "idiots" and laughing at them.
Unfortunately this is the common behavior that most atheists have against theists. And that's what creates more rivalry and more fanatics from both sides. Making the moral growth process moving slower and slower.

With or without religion, good people can behave well and bad people can do evil; but for good people to do evil - that takes religion. — Steven Weingberg

I fear this is a fairly wise quote. I think of the good citizens of a suburb near me who are Christians and good family people but are willing to condemn any others that are not part of their 'approved by God' group - gay and trans people, women with careers. But worse that that, think of the religious prohibitions against condoms that effectively spread AIDS, or the religious folks who think God will save them from COVID (no mask no vaccine necessary). They seem to be dying in notable numbers... As the quote suggests, one doesn't have to be a slip smacking sociopath to do evil - in some cases just follow the directions of your local preacher...

Yes it is too much indeed. And that's why you can never have a fruitful discussion with a fanatic (both sides fanatic, theists or atheists). — dimosthenis9

Thank god you are not one of them, Dimosthenis9.

kept in check only by our ability to concieve of right and wrong — Michael Zwingli

Your theory would be fine, if only people wouldn't have such vastly differing ideas about what constitutes right and wrong.

True but what made "some (religious folk) recognize them (atrocities) and realize how unjust these atrocities were"? Can't be religion itself - scriptures have remained exactly as they were for nearly 20000 years. Ergo, this moral growth has to be the work of secular/atheistic forces. — TheMadFool

Or those people weren't particularly religious to begin with. Religions have cracks, and some people who were boon into religions, fall through those cracks.

Insisting that people use language the same in all contexts is amusing, but misguided. — Ennui Elucidator

Oh, the irony of using language for saying this.

Where you and the Christians differ is in the qualitative evaluation of some past events.
— baker

I don't think so. That the books were not transcribed, were thrown in the rubbish, and were burned is not a question of opinion. Again, 90% of the literature of the classical world disappeared over a few hundred years, at the instigation of Bishops, christianised emperors and their acolytes. We have the commands they gave. We have descriptions of their deed in their own words. And we have the hole in our literary heritage. — Banno

When you burn a pile of trash, do you feel sorry for doing so? Do you think you've done something bad? If someone asks you about it, will you indulge in their questions? No on all counts.
That's how the Christians feel about the matter of destroying other cultures.

But you've got an interesting clash of cultures here: You're sure of your position, and the Christians are sure of their position. And neither of you will budge.

What is at issue is not inherited guilt. It is an inherited denial of historical fact. It is an attitude that permits the churches to entrench the disenfranchising of women and to hide paedophilic predation. Should the destruction of indigenous lives and culture by Canadian residential schools also be whitewashed as saving souls? — Banno

Would you speak openly, truthfully, in detail if you were questioned by someone whose authority you do not acknowledge? You probably wouldn't. Same with Christians. They consider it beneath their dignity to discuss themselves and their church with outsiders.

Look, I'm not defending Christians or Christianity here. If the posters here had a competition as to who was most wronged by Christians, I'd probably be among the winners.

I can't quite tell whether you're just a stubborn authoritarian, or a romantic idealist, so I don't know how to tailor my responses to you.

Your theory would be fine, if only people wouldn't have such vastly differing ideas about what constitutes right and wrong. — baker

Yes, of course. I recognize the differentiation, but also realize that it is, along with an individual brain's ability to produce a "higher mind", precisely that which accounts for the differing abilities of the "higher mind" (Superego) to counter the inner urgings of the "primal mind" (Id). It must also be recognized that differences in percieving right and wrong can themselves have differing etiologies: acculturation, malacculturation, organic brain abnormalities, "thinking problems" (mental illness) deriving from other than said abnormalities, etc. Regardless, I think the model holds.

1. Dawkins focuses on the fact of Islam, or Christianity or any other religion being factually incorrect.But what if the goal of a religion is not to be factually correct, but to give people moral guidance, thumos and social cohesion? — stoicHoneyBadger

What if it is? I suggest that in the long run, the aim of "giving people moral guidance, thymos, and social cohesion" is well-served by promoting the value of truthfulness, and is impaired by promoting bullshit, lies, delusion, literal belief in fiction -- and generally speaking, a culture of unreasonableness.

2. Giving moral guidance in a form of only 10 commandments or 4 noble truth, etc. just printed on a page would not have much interest, so it need to be wrapped in an intriguing story of a hero living out those believes. — stoicHoneyBadger

There's plenty of ways to make moral instruction appealing without asking people to believe "supernatural" fictions are literally true. If a) moral instruction, inspiration, and social cohesion can be effectively promoted by other means, and b) promoting unreasonable expectations and literal belief in fiction has negative consequences (e.g. for morality, thymos, and social cohesion), it would seem advisable to find another way to get the job done.

3. The fact of the wrapper-story being factually correct or not has very little to do with whether the content is useful. After all, the 'secular humanism' Dawkins is promoting, is pretty much the same Christianity, just without the supernatural wrapper. — stoicHoneyBadger

I suppose secular humanism has something in common with a wide range of religious traditions, not just Christianity.

On the other hand, Christianity means different things to different people. Who gets to decide what counts as "content" and what counts as "wrapper"? This is one of the features of exegesis that people will disagree about. The wrapper, by its very design, is open to more or less fundamentalist interpretations of a great many sayings -- and under those interpretations, for the people who thus interpret, those features are part of the content of the religion.

Isn't there a downside to this openness to fundamentalist interpretation, that might offset the utility you have so narrowly emphasized? As I suggested above, if the "wrapper" promotes unreasonableness, we might expect it to have effects that in the long run are contrary to the goals you've selected, among other negative effects.

Is there an analogous problem for secular humanism -- or for any ideology that promotes morality, thymos, and community along with truth and reason?

4. Looking at Afghanistan, it looks like the Muslims are winning. We might laugh about their religion being archaic, but they aren't the ones hanging from the helicopters. ;) So their religion, while being incorrect to say the least, gave them thumos and cohesion to take over the country in a week, yet Christians and atheists, while being much more powerful, don't have the balls to do anything about it. — stoicHoneyBadger

This strikes me as symptomatic of a profoundly confused view of events in Afghanistan, of American foreign policy, and of the history of the past century or so, to say the least. I suspect it would take us too far off topic to clear this up here. I hope we can pursue the conversation without getting bogged down in such examples.

What if it is? I suggest that in the long run, the aim of "giving people moral guidance, thymos, and social cohesion" is well-served by promoting the value of truthfulness, and is impaired by promoting bullshit, lies, delusion, literal belief in fiction -- and generally speaking, a culture of unreasonableness. — Cabbage Farmer

I would argue that our logic and reason can work only within some 'metaphysical box', i.e. what we assume as good or true without any evidence.

This strikes me as symptomatic of a profoundly confused view of events in Afghanistan, of American foreign policy, and of the history of the past century or so, to say the least. I suspect it would take us too far off topic to clear this up here. I hope we can pursue the conversation without getting bogged down in such examples. — Cabbage Farmer

What do you think would be the right view on the given conflict?

As the quote suggests, one doesn't have to be a slip smacking sociopath to do evil - in some cases just follow the directions of your local preacher... — Tom Storm

But there has to be something in a person that makes them follow those directions. Because not everyone follows those directions, only some do.

So you believe in objective/absolute morality?

Despite felling a bit loath to indicate a percieved error in someone I have come to consider my philosophical better, I must say, Ennui, that I think you wrong on this particular point. — Michael Zwingli

Don’t be so loath. I’m glad to have the chance to reconsider things as new information/view points become available. And as the saying goes, flattery will get you everywhere.

Fact and reality exist apart from subjective valuation and agreement, and are the philosopher's object of scrutiny. — Michael Zwingli

Just as I do not discuss religion as being unified, I would also not discuss philosophy as being unified. In this instance, I was speaking for myself. As a general proposition, I think you will run into trouble if you consider philosophy (or philosophers) to think of fact and reality as their object of scrutiny. It isn’t so much that metaphysics (ontology and the like) aren’t fields within philosophy, but that they do not exhaust the fields of philosophy. Further, I think you’ll find that many contemporary philosophers don’t really focus on facts and reality as such, but sort of assume the contingent nature of theories/beliefs about facts and reality and adapt to the circumstance in which facts/reality are invoked.

In any event, I wasn’t intending to sound like a utilitarian/consequentialist (in ethical terms). I was speaking for myself and how I approach philosophy. I very much agree that people have different causes for being happy and that one person’s joy can be another’s pain. I understand the appeal to something like objectivity to settle disputes, but not everyone agrees about objectivity or that disputes hinge on a particular objective fact. Problematically, we only ever have language and people do what they do in response to it independent of whether that language accomplishes your purpose. Words about facts are never facts themselves (something like “the map is not the territory”), and so appealing to words as if they are facts obscures what is happening rather than providing additional information/warrant. In the end, we have symbols and behaviors. To the extent that we are in society (a world of other minds), we have symbols and behaviors that lead to mutual interest/benefit and symbols and behaviors that do not. All we can ever do is assume that our personal interpretation of the symbols and behaviors is sufficiently similar to other minds that we can organize our worlds. Saying that there is a “fact” in this context does little for me beyond adding rhetorical flourish.