Would that it were that simple.

t would be so nice if people here would talk about philosophy. Fights between teenage girls I can find down the pub. — Herg

I have got good advice that I am taking. Where is that pub?

:up: Sláinte. Thank goober it's Friday!

Where is that pub? — tim wood

A bit early here.

The classic refutation of the argument is of course that existence is not a predicate. This came up a week or so ago in another thread, but I can't locate my relevant posts. The idea is roughly that logic does not permit the deduction of the existence of an individual. ∃(a) is not well-formed.

The classic refutation — Banno

I buy/follow Collingwood on this. That the existence in question is an absolute presupposition. As such not true or false, just presupposed. And not relatively but absolutely, which means never subject to question, being, again, just presupposed absolutely.

For the believer, then, affirming it as true is more than a little peculiar, reflecting a failure to understand the nature of his or her own beliefs. E.g., we take gravity for granted. A problem arises if we insist gravity is true, because of course it's a model, theory, and a presupposition, with nothing to do with truth, however useful as descriptive.

I wonder if Tillich's 'ground of being' (i.e. 'ultimate concern') was influenced by Collingwood's 'absolute presuppositions' ...

That the existence in question is an absolute presupposition. — tim wood

I'm not familiar with Collingwood. If the notion is that the existence of individuals is supposed in the formation of the language used to discuss them, then I agree. The error in the ontological argument is supposing that a certain predication - "...is a greater than which cannot be conceived" - leads to the deduction of the existence of that individual. As Russell pointed out, it's finding where this occurs that is tricky.

Again, the problem is that the argument seeks to demonstrate the existence of an individual - "God exists" looks like it ought be parsed in first-order logic as "∃(a)", but of course that is not well-formed. Hence any argument in which the conclusion is ∃(a) is invalid in first-order logic. It remains open for the theist to insist that the ontological argument uses a different sort of logic in which ∃(a) is well-formed; and indeed, it may be prima facie not unreasonable to suppose such, since we can say things such as that London exists or that Unicorns do not. But as argued elsewhere, the way "exists" is used here is not the same as the way it is being used in the ontological argument.

The ontological argument doesn't prove too much because it takes the maximum of good and puts it together, which might not be possible of course, but assuming its premise that we have the maximum idea it doesn't prove inadvertently that lesser things exist of which we have an idea. It says the maximum idea must have its natural correlate. Otherwise it is not the greatest being thought but an inferior idea. Kant separates the argument with a tactical move by saying whether God exists or not does not affect the perfection of the idea but Descartes would, and did, insist that the perfect idea cannot be in a mind unless it corresponded to a real being

As for the OP here, the distinction between actual and potential infinities is a non-starter. Consider the distinction between an actual five and an potential five... what could that mean? It's misplacing the notions of actual and potential.

That's a clever approach. Cantor would have presumably claimed that God was the sum of all those infinite infinities... Your point is that there is no such summation - there is always more to be added?

I wonder what you make of the debate here. Events that occurred a few weeks before you joined.

Edit: Ah, leave it. I see you have already responded.

Anselm first claimed that the greatest idea must represent the greatest being by using a slight of hand but it was a meditative technique. Aquinas the rationalist easily disproved it but earlier objections didn't work. A perfect lion or island doesn't have to exist because it merely represents the highest idea. It being the highest idea was Anselm's contribution to philosophy by using it in that context. Descartes turned it into a modern argument by saying thoughts represent reality necessarily so since we have the perfect idea, as he thought, it must correspond to something otherwise the thought has no substance although any lesser ideas represent merely the highest

there is nothing to prevent God being both imaginary and self-contradictory. — Herg

If god is self-contradictory then god renders himself unavailable for discussion.

(p & ~p)⊃q

If god is self-contradicting, anything follows, and so anythign can be asserted. Conversation ends; truth becomes falsehood.

Hence, if you assert that god is, and is self-contradictory, you are not worth talking to.

That's a clever approach. Cantor would have presumably claimed that God was the sum of all those infinite infinities... Your point is that there is no such summation - there is always more to be added? — Banno

Are you referring to Cantor's absolute infinite? The point is that the class of all ordinals is not a set. Well that's not my point, it's just a fact that Cantor and others discovered, Burali-Forti in particular. But I'm not sure exactly how to relate this to your post to me here. Apologies, I'm a bit lost.

Apologies, I'm a bit lost. — fishfry

I think I'm not being very clear; I watched old Dr Who episodes until the wee small hours last night and my head isn't that clear.

Perhaps I can make the point more clearly, but without mathematical exactitude. There's this capacity to add to any group - take 1, add another 1, get 2, add another, get three...

Then one realises that this process can go forever. Infinity is uncovered.

Then Cantor finds he can add to infinity... and add to each subsequent infinity, and so on

Subsequent mathematicians found that they could add even to that...

Hence, is it that there is no number, a greater than which cannot be conceived? That for any number of which on conceives, there is a greater?This as a lay version of your point at

The upshot being that, so far as the analogy of god to infinity posited in the OP goes, there is no being a greater than which cannot be conceived?

TMF was saying in *reality* there is no actual infinity. I assume he knows we can think of infinity in terms of numbers

The ground of being is beyond number

1. By infinity would you accept the term or concept of eternity as one in the same?
2. The concept of infinities and finites, can they be analogous to (or treated like) temporal time/space time and eternal time as a unity of opposite concept? — 3017amen

1. Temporal infinity is, to me, a type of infinity.

2. Why not? I took a finite 15 minutes to finish my tea while the future is infinite.

TMF was saying in *reality* there is no actual infinity. — Gregory

You say that as if it were helpful.

There are:

1) actual infinity of things

2) abstract infinity of numbers

3) quasi-infinity of the past

4) essential nonnumerical infinity of the ground of being

I'm not sure reason can decide which of it's concepts must conform to reality is they are not processed through the senses

...and I'm saying that this is a pointless misleading line of thought.

TMF said there is no actual infinity in reality but God is not a numerical infinity so this doesn't apply to God I say in response.

What?

No, don't worry. I'm not that interested.

What's your point?

What's my point?

Well, I suppose it is that I don't get your point, here:

An infinity of numbers does not prove an infinity in what's real but nor does it prove a highest being can't exist which was your point

@tim wood
Many facts are subjective.
Much of science is speculative nonsense, witness many worlds theory and the big bang.

@180 Proof
At this point your like a parrot of cliches and well worn out tropes.
Ranting is not truth or wisdom.

Greater in what way? Since you (and Anselm) don't say in what way, should we assume in every way possible? If so, that would include greater in height, greater in ability to eat pies in a pie-eating contest, greater in armpit smelliness, and a whole lot of other greaters. — Herg

Yes. The a priori argument posits greatest in everything and in everyway possible. It's based on logically necessary truth's.

Well, yes. My concept of God now is of a very tall dude who can eat more pies than anyone else and has smellier armpits than anyone else. I often wondered what God was like. Thank you for clarifying that for me.
12hReplyOptions0 — Herg

Sure. Absurdity qualifies also. (Pure reason has those effects... . Yet another reason why A-theism is not logical)

but I recommend no longer bothering to take the likes of 3017 seriously. — 180 Proof

3017amen : What 180 is about to say is false.
180 Proof: 3017 has just spoken truly.

What other logical question would you like me to answer? Rematch to avenge your loss?

If you're scared, say you're scared :razz:
LOL

Why not? I took a finite 15 minutes to finish my tea while the future is infinite. — TheMadFool

Paul Davies writes: Turning to the scientific position on the origin of the universe one can again ask about the evidence that there actually was an origin. It is certainly possible to conceive of the universe of infinite duration and for much of the modern scientific era following the work of Copernicus, Galileo and Newton, scientists did in fact generally believe in an eternal cosmos. There were however some paradoxical expects to this belief.

Do you think that notion (of infinite) is reminiscent of Einstein's relatively, speed of light, and eternity?