That much is true, and I readily confess that I am one of them.

Unfortunately, the Greeks involved in the Parthenon's "reconstruction" appear to have made a right mess of it. And Prince Charles refuses to return the marble statues.

So, it's all Greek to me.

Socrates does not say he believes the sun and moon are gods, he asks whether Meletus is accusing him of not believing that they are gods as other men do. — Fooloso4

He is using that in his defense against the charge of asebia or impiety toward the Gods.

He starts his testimony by saying "Let the event be as God wills".

And he says that he would rather obey God than the men of Athens, etc. (29d)

In the Republic Socrates says that the sun is the offspring of the Good. (506e) Nowhere does he refer to the Good as a god. — Fooloso4

That looks like another straw man to me. In reality, Socrates says:

"Therefore we ought to try to escape from earth to the dwelling of the Gods as quickly as we can; and to escape is to become like God, so far as this is possible; and to become like God is to become righteous and holy and wise” (Thaetetus 176a – b).

He unquestionably believed in God, as already discussed and established beyond reasonable doubt.

Unfortunately, the Greeks involved in the Parthenon's "reconstruction" appear to have made a right mess of it. And Prince Charles refuses to return the marble statues. — Apollodorus

Can you read ancient Greek?

Socrates was accused of atheism. If he did not believe in the gods then he would have regarded the mystical prophecies as human inventions. — Fooloso4

Could be. We really don't know. — frank


We don't. . — Fooloso4

Correct.

Can you read ancient Greek? — frank

A little bit.

What we do know is his concern for the human things - self, morals, political life.

And that is why I said I suspect the answer to your question has to do with the assumptions you bring to it. — Fooloso4

And you, of course, never bring any assumptions to your questions. Except when you do, right?

What we do know is his concern for the human things - self, morals, political life. — Fooloso4

And don't forget the soul that gives life to a human being and that, according to Socrates/Plato is the most important part of man.

You means the reader, including me.

You means the reader, including me. — Fooloso4

Correct. And this is what you usually deny when it is pointed out to you.

What we do know is his concern for the human things - self, morals, political life. — Fooloso4

One of the things that gives us that impression is the style of Diogenes.

Examining the contrast between Plato and Diogenes, one might be inspired to stop mining Plato for traces of who Socrates was and just rely on Xenophon and Diogenes.

When talking about the Platonic dialogues it is standard practice to refer to Plato's Socrates simply as Socrates. Plato's Socrates is not the historical Socrates, but neither is Xenophon's.

There are some, who like Guthrie, back in the early 70's, tried to establish the historical Socrates. I don't know if there is much interest in that today. I haven't looked at Guthrie's "Socrates" in a long time, but I do remember that my impression at the time was that the evidence was thin and tenuous.

Examining the contrast between Plato and Diogenes, one might be inspired to stop mining Plato for traces of who Socrates was and just rely on Xenophon and Diogenes. — frank

I think there is a tendency to pay too much attention to Socrates. The problem with this is (1) we know very little about the historical person and (2) he is a character in other authors' works and therefore represents their views to some extent.

With regard to understanding Plato, I think looking into his connections to the traditions of Pythagoras, Zeno, Parmenides, et al., would be more productive. Though, of course, I wouldn't exclude Plotinus and other Platonists.

I haven't looked at Guthrie's "Socrates" in a long time — Fooloso4

You mean since the early 70's? I think that explains a lot ....

@Metaphysician Undercover

Thoughts on the atheism of Socrates?

Hi Frank,
I wouldn't say that Socrates was atheist, I would say that his form of theism was non-conventional. Couldn't we say the same of Jesus, that his form of theism was non-conventional? But no one would say that Jesus was atheist. I think both were accused of blasphemy, but that doesn't make one atheist.

But he was accused of impiety. What does that mean regarding his beliefs?

To me, that means he did not uphold the conventional rules of what it means to be pious, in his society. I think it says very little about his beliefs, it says something about what he refused to believe. Do you acknowledge the difference between rejecting a belief, and replacing the believe with something else? Skepticism rejects beliefs, and many people would argue that skepticism is a matter of replacing those rejected beliefs with others, but I don't think that this is really a good description.

What do you think he believed?

And could you explain the Euthyphro dilemma? What do you take away from it?

What do you think he believed? — frank

Socrates professed to know nothing, so his beliefs are scarce.

And could you explain the Euthyphro dilemma? What do you take away from it? — frank

I think that the Euthyphro dilemma was simply presented as an indication of the problems existing within the religious thinking of his day. It's not meant to be resolved, just like Zeno's paradoxes are not meant to be resolved, it's meant to show a problem in the habitual ways of thinking that are prevalent. It's a skeptic's tool, to show deficiency in the accepted ways of thinking.

If I remember correctly, the problem is in the relationship between God and good. I think the lesson is that it's wrong to even define "good" in relation to the gods, or even in relation to God, because it can't be logically done. And so with Plato and Aristotle there's a moving away from this, toward a pragmatic definition of "good", "that for the sake of which", in Aristotle, the end. This defines "good" in relation to what the individual person needs or wants. Then there's the further distinction of the real good, and the apparent good. The apparent good is what appears to the individual as what is wanted, and "real good" is an appeal to some reasoned or rational good, beyond the individual's wants. So the ethical human being seeks to produce consistency between the real good and the apparent good, such that what is wanted is the rational end.

That makes sense. Thank you!

Anytime.

If I remember correctly, the problem is in the relationship between God and good. I think the lesson is that it's wrong to even define "good" in relation to the gods, or even in relation to God, because it can't be logically done. And so with Plato and Aristotle there's a moving away from this, toward a pragmatic definition of "good", "that for the sake of which", in Aristotle, the end. This defines "good" in relation to what the individual person needs or wants. — Metaphysician Undercover

In the Republic, Plato’s Socrates corrects the Athenians in the traditional interpretation of their gods, showing them how those views are not rational...

...as far as how Aristotle defined the good according to individual need...I would desire proof to believe it. The individual good, that is, the good for every man, is a product of the Enlightenment.

The problem as I understand it is with our inability to know the good itself.
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/557494

...as far as how Aristotle defined the good according to individual need...I would desire proof to believe it. The individual good, that is, the good for every man, is a product of the Enlightenment. — Leghorn

I believe the distinction between real good and apparent good (good as apprehended by the individual), was first presented in its primitive form by Aristotle. I do not have time now to look up a reference. However, it was definitely expounded on by Aquinas, who presented many thoughts on this distinction. So the idea was around long before The Enlightenment.

The problem as I understand it is with our inability to know the good itself. — Fooloso4

I guess that would depend on how you define "know". According to Plato In The Republic, the philosopher gets a glimpse of the good, enough to know of its existence. The good is what makes intelligible objects intelligible, just like the sun makes visible objects visible. In a way we see the sun, and in a way we know the good. So in the cave allegory, the philosopher sees that the things people look at, material objects, are just reflections, or shadows, of the immaterial objects, But the philosopher also sees the good, behind the real immaterial things, which is responsible for creating the shadows or reflections, the material things which the cave dwellers see as the real things.

From this, Aristotle proceeded to define the good, in the teleological terms of final cause, that for the sake of which. Plato gave priority to the immaterial ideas, in the cave allegory. But a principle is needed whereby material things might come into existence from the immaterial Forms (Timeaeus). This principle is "the good", which moves the will to act, in the case of human beings and artificial things, and also, the Divine Will in the case of natural things. Final cause (will) is an immaterial cause, which causes material things to come into existence from immaterial Forms.

According to Plato In The Republic, the philosopher gets a glimpse of the good, enough to know of its existence. — Metaphysician Undercover

Correct. Aristotle, who understood Plato sufficiently well, speaks of contemplating divine realities.

But Greek "contemplation", theoria, is not mental ideation, it is the act of observing something that you actually see. The Platonic Forms are "that which is seen" (eidos), they are not ideas or assumptions.

I guess that would depend on how you define "know". — Metaphysician Undercover

Noesis. What the intellect grasps or sees.

According to Plato In The Republic, the philosopher gets a glimpse of the good, enough to know of its existence. — Metaphysician Undercover

“... the good isn't being but is still beyond being, exceeding it in dignity (age) and power."(509b)

The good is not something that is.

The argument, laid out in the other thread, leads to the conclusion that there can only be opinion about the good itself.

The good is what makes intelligible objects intelligible — Metaphysician Undercover

He gives his opinion about it. (509c) Whether it is true or not, he cannot say.

“... in applying the going up and the seeing of what's above to the soul's journey up to the intelligible place, you'll not mistake my expectation, since you desire to hear it. A god doubtless knows if it happens to be true. At all events, this is the way the phenomena look to me: in the knowable the last thing to be seen, and that with considerable effort, is the idea of the good …” (517b-c)

A god could say, but he is not god and neither are we.

Dianoia is the discursive thought that intellectually "grasps" an abstract or metaphysical concept.

Noesis is a more direct form of perception in which the subject actually perceives or sees what the intellectual concept can only describe.

The whole point of philosophical training in Plato, Aristotle, and other Platonists is to enable the philosopher to actually see the Forms and other metaphysical realities in a higher form of perception.

The true telos of Platonic philosophy is to fine-tune and refine man's intellectual faculties whereby he can perceive realities that are imperceptible to the untrained intellect, in a similar way a trained wine taster can identify flavors and scents that are imperceptible to an ordinary person, or a trained tracker can read animal trails that are invisible to the untrained eye.

I posted this in my thread on Socratic Philosophy. Since many of the same issues have come up in both thread I am posting it here as well:
An essential key to understanding the Republic is to understand the role of the dual position of opinion. It opines both what is below being and above or beyond being, both about the visible world, and the good itself.

Socrates is circumspect in his discussion of this. It is better to have an opinion of the good shaped by his opinion than one in which any and every man is the measure. To this end he conceals his opinion and in its place presents an image of the good not only as something known to the philosopher, an eternal, unchanging truth. But the concealment is not complete. Behind the salutary public teaching is the teaching suitable only for the few.

This was a common practice in both ancient and modern philosophy. In Plato we find:

But Hera's bindings by her son, and Hephaestus' being cast out by his father when he was
about to help out his mother who was being beaten, and all the battles of the gods Homer
made must not be accepted in the city, whether they are made with a hidden sense or
without a hidden sense.
Republic 378d

Now I tell you that sophistry [in the original sense of practical wisdom] is an ancient art,
and those men of ancient times who practiced it, fearing the odium it involved, disguised
it in a decent dress, sometimes of poetry, as in the case of Homer, Hesiod, and Simonides.
Protagoras 316d-e (see also Euthyphro 3c; Theaetetus 152e; and Cratylus 402a-c)

Plato also suggests that Homer, Hesiod and some other early poets were covertly presenting
Heracleitean ideas about nature when they gave their genealogies of the gods and other mythical accounts. As Socrates states in the Theaetetus:

Have we not here a tradition from the ancients who hid their meaning from the common herd in poetical figures, that Ocean and [his wife, the river-goddess] Tethys, the source of all things, are flowing streams and nothing is at rest?
– Plato, Theaetetus 180c-d

And about Plato and the practice in ancient times:

In their writings the most famous philosophers of the Greeks and their prophets
made use of parables and images in which they concealed their secrets, like
Pythagoras, Socrates, and Plato.
– Avicenna, “On the Parts of Science,” 85

All ...who have spoken of divine things, both barbarians and Greeks, have veiled the first principles of things, and delivered the truth in enigmas, and symbols, and allegories, and 4 metaphors, and such like tropes.” And why should I linger over the barbarians, when I can adduce the Greeks as exceedingly addicted to the use of the method of concealment. – Clement of Alexandria, Stromata, 233-34 (5.4), 247 (5.8)

It is well known, that the ancient wise Men and Philosophers, very seldom set forth the
naked and open Truth; but exhibited it veiled or painted after various manners; by
Symbols, Hieroglyphicks, Allegories, Types, Fables, Parables, popular Discourses, and
other Images. This I pass by in general as sufficiently known.– Thomas Burnet, Archæologiæ philosophicæ, 67

The ancients distinguished the ‘exoteric’ or popular mode of exposition from the
‘esoteric’ one which is suitable for those who are seriously concerned to discover the
truth.
– G. W. Leibniz, New Essays, 260

The ancient Sages did actually say one Thing when they thought another. This appears
from that general Practice in the Greek Philosophy, of a two-fold Doctrine; the External
and the Internal; a vulgar and a secret.
– Bishop Warburton, The Divine Legislation, 2:14

These are taken from https://press.uchicago.edu/sites/melzer/melzer_appendix.pdf

The site contains many more testimonials both ancient and modern. A real eye opener!

There are the easy to find statements in the dialogues for all to see, and for those who look carefully enough, something quite different.

But Greek "contemplation", theoria, is not mental ideation, it is the act of observing something that you actually see. — Apollodorus

“Theoria, a looking at, viewing beholding,...of the mind, contemplation, speculation, Plat , etc.” from Liddell and Scott. The word speculation itself derives from the act of seeing. I suspect there is a connection in every language between words which convey the notions of seeing and thinking, as in English, when we say, “I see that” in the sense “I understand that”.