No....and isn't this to compound truth and belief? — Banno
Not at all. By way of clarification, or correction, I refer in my previous post to 'truth-seeking' and 'inquiry' as distinct, even separate, from 'truth per se'. It's habits-forming from truth-seeking inquiry that has utility. Also, I don't mention or imply any thing is or needs to be "justified". It's unlike you, Banno, to read so poorly (no matter how poorly written a post may seem); fortified by a few strong drinks this evening / morning out in your parts? :smirk:Or at least to forget about truth and pretend that belief justified by utility will suffice?
I don't know what it means for "I ought not kill" to be true or false, so I can't answer that question. — Michael
Absolutely.I once came across an essay by a highly regarded philosopher about, if I remember correctly, why it is wrong a bake a child in the oven. The point was that we all recognize this as wrong but moral arguments as to why it is wrong fail. — Fooloso4
This just goes to show that taboos are still essential to thinking about morality.Though a few of your interlocutors seem to be either incapable of, or disinterested in, finding a charitable interpretation of your statement — Cartesian trigger-puppets
Yes, and yesterday, I actually collected those posts and commented on them with "Way to gloss over the issue!"I find your humility and intellectual honesty quite refreshing.
Reread my preamble for context. Ethics, as I understand it, is fallibilistic (i.e. pragmatic(ist)) and performative, not justificationist and propositional. — 180 Proof
This just goes to show that taboos are still essential to thinking about morality. — baker
I have no such wish. You misread my tone: I'm actually agreeing with and .You respond only to the sentiments of my comment shared with Michael regarding the uncertain modality we express regarding a moral proposition and its negation, whiles at the same time you completely ignore the arguments presented in (the substance) my comment. If you wish to to refute my defense of a default agnostic position — Cartesian trigger-puppets
People typically do it with a reference to "gut feeling" and by stigmatizing/ostracizing anyone who lacks such a gut feeling or questions it.How does one maintain intellectual honesty while holding the untenable position of defending a moral claim to knowledge with no grounds to warrant such an assertion?
At most forums, if someone said what Michael did, they'd get accused of psychopathy/sociopathy (which is what happened here), but they'd probably get banned as well. So strong is the taboo against probing into the origins of moral intuitions. Taboos aren't to be underestimated.Taboos are an obfuscation of which I make systematic efforts to reduce and that many who express emotional responses to such meticulous considerations of these hypotheticals, as if an anathema to them, seem to be the ones most affected.
If I lack sufficient data to meet the burden of proof required to defend a proposition or its negation, and my aim is towards truth, then I maintain agnosticism on grounds of insufficient evidence. For example, if I have insufficient evidence to support the proposition "I ought to kill," or its negation "I ought not to kill," then I should hold the only remaining tenable position; namely agnosticism. — Cartesian trigger-puppets
Then that's the crux. What makes you think I "think otherwise"?? Because I'm not feistily enough against it, don't show enough contempt for it??Our disagreement is pretty simple. I find the narrative shared here concerning reincarnation is unconvincing. You think otherwise. — Banno
For keeping up with you guys.I don't see a roll for testicles in the discussion.
I wasn't just arguing that I don't know whether or not particular moral claims are true; I was arguing that I don't know what it means for moral claims to be true. I think that the sentences "thou shalt not kill" and "don't kill" mean the same thing, and I don't know what it means for "don't kill" to be true. — Michael
I understand what physical facts are, I understand what mathematical facts are, I understand what logical facts are, but I don't understand what moral facts are supposed to be. — Michael
Morality: "Treat others as you would like others to treat you." — SpaceDweller
Morality is never in the treatment, but only and always in the reason for the treatment. — Mww
Sure, but first I would have to imagine my self as being a big fat ugly slob, and then assume how would others treat me for being an idiot?You may very well have no issue in treating me as a big fat ugly slob — Mww
”Treat others as you would NOT like others to treat you." — SpaceDweller
My point is that if you're a big fat ugly slob then you're immoral toward yourself, and as such nobody is going to help you. — SpaceDweller
The correspondence theory is often traced back to Aristotle’s well-known definition of truth (Metaphysics 1011b25): “To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true”—but virtually identical formulations can be found in Plato (Cratylus 385b2, Sophist 263b). It is noteworthy that this definition does not highlight the basic correspondence intuition. Although it does allude to a relation (saying something of something) to reality (what is), the relation is not made very explicit, and there is no specification of what on the part of reality is responsible for the truth of a saying. As such, the definition offers a muted, relatively minimal version of a correspondence theory. (For this reason it has also been claimed as a precursor of deflationary theories of truth.) Aristotle sounds much more like a genuine correspondence theorist in the Categories (12b11, 14b14), where he talks of underlying things that make statements true and implies that these things (pragmata) are logically structured situations or facts (viz., his sitting and his not sitting are said to underlie the statements “He is sitting” and “He is not sitting”, respectively). Most influential is Aristotle’s claim in De Interpretatione (16a3) that thoughts are “likenesses” (homoiomata) of things. Although he nowhere defines truth in terms of a thought’s likeness to a thing or fact, it is clear that such a definition would fit well into his overall philosophy of mind. (Cf. Crivelli 2004; Szaif 2006.)
I disagree that there are moral facts. — Moliere
if someone were to point to some moral fact, say in a book of all moral propositions, that said something you disagreed with would you really change your mind? — Moliere
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