We can't tell the difference between

1. God doesn't exist

and

2. God exists but we haven't come across the evidence that He does.

Compare the above to

3. God exists [ I have proof that God exists]

We can't actually prove God doesn't exist (a negative) for we can't tell if it's because of my ignorance (of the proof).

For positive claims, there's no such complication.

We can't actually prove God doesn't exist (a negative) for we can't tell if it's because of my ignorance (of the proof). — Agent Smith

A "God" without definite, sine qua non, predicates renders this statement Not Even Wrong. Nonetheless, I disagree with what I think you're saying, which is that negative proofs are not possible ...

[ ... ] predicates of X entail search parameters for locating X (i.e. whether or not X exists where & when). — 180 Proof

So which predicated g/G are we even talking about?

A "God" without definite, sine qua non, predicates renders this statement Not Even Wrong. — 180 Proof

Use the relevant predicates to make it right? :chin: It matters not to the point which is we can't prove a negative. It's just an example of a positive statement.

Nonetheless, I disagree with what I think you're saying, which is that negative proofs are not possible ... — 180 Proof

Woops. Looks like I made a boo-boo.

Anyway, let's look at some other example to avoid getting bogged down in the atheism-theism debate.

1. X is a poison.

2. X is not a poison.

There must be something special about negation (not). It just doesn't make sense to say that positive and negative statements are equally easy to prove, as if the negation (not) makes no difference at all.

@180 Proof's point about predicates seems to be the entire issue - which could be broken down at tedious length. In short, no predicates (or lacking appropriate predicates) means ignorance, and proof from ignorance is no proof at all.

It's a rule in Aristotelian logic - of syllogisms - that a negative premise requires a negative conclusion (to be valid), and from two negative premises no valid conclusion follows. And this can be seen by drawing Venn diagrams.

Where life gets a little bit tricky is when the negative can be converted into a positive. X is not a poison into X is a not-poison. In part the ability to work this depends on whether the not-X constitutes a well-(enough)-defined class. And often enough, not-X cannot be so defined.

Apparently, you didn't follow the link (handle to the quote) where I flesh-out my argument for negative proofs.

A "God" without definite, sine qua non, predicates renders this statement Not Even Wrong. Nonetheless, I disagree with what I think you're saying, which is that negative proofs are not possible ...
[ ... ] predicates of X entail search parameters for locating X (i.e. whether or not X exists where & when).
— 180 Proof
So which predicated g/G are we even talking about? — 180 Proof

The word god is so bloody vague. Do you think that in neophyte philosophical discussions such as these it should be clearly spelt out what kind of theism or deism is being referred to? We have no properties to explore here or any kind of connection from this notion of god to any existing branch of theism. It seems rather empty.

:up:

Apparently, you didn't follow the link (handle to the quote) where I flesh-out my argument for negative proofs. — 180 Proof

Pardon the oversight. I hadn't slept well the day before. I see your point how predicates should inform us about search parameters and if the search turns up empty, we can (via modus tollens à la falsifiability claim nonexistence of entity assigned the predicates). I hope I got that right.

In short, no predicates (or lacking appropriate predicates) means ignorance, and proof from ignorance is no proof at all. — tim wood

That's right! I can't find something if I don't know what I'm looking for. Did I catch your drift?

It's a rule in Aristotelian logic - of syllogisms - that a negative premise requires a negative conclusion (to be valid), and from two negative premises no valid conclusion follows. And this can be seen by drawing Venn diagrams. — tim wood

Yes, from an Aristotelian logic perspective negation is different in terms of its scope (the correct concept would be distribution). See below for more.

Where life gets a little bit tricky is when the negative can be converted into a positive. X is not a poison into X is a not-poison. In part the ability to work this depends on whether the not-X constitutes a well-(enough)-defined class. And often enough, not-X cannot be so defined. — tim wood

I've never completely understood positive, negation and complements.

1. X is a poison (positive)

2. X is not a poison (negative)

3. X is a non-poison (positive using a complement viz. non-poison)

Venn diagrams, as you suggested, reveal more.

All I can say for now is negation should have some kinda impact on provability (possibility, ease, and so on).

I see your point how predicates should inform us about search parameters and if the search turns up empty, we can (via modus tollens à la falsifiability claim nonexistence of entity assigned the predicates). I hope I got that right. — Agent Smith

:up:

:heart:

Your argument boils down to, absence of evidence is evidence of absence — TheMadFool

True -- maybe there really is an elephant sitting on your chest. Maybe one day evidence will emerge that shows this to be the case. If this is what you end up concluding, then something has gone terribly wrong. Try identifying where the problem occurs.

Part of it, in my view, is that logic, theory, propositions, abstraction, generalizations, etc., can only take us so far. I see a useful distinction in theory and practice, and it can extend to this example.

In theory, absence of evidence doesn't "prove" something isn't there -- whether God, or the elephant, or the spaghetti monster -- there's just no practical reason to believe it's there, and no reason to believe any evidence will ever show up that will demonstrate that it's there.

There's also the issue of why a claim like this is even being made, which is a more interesting point. 180 made the claim about an elephant. He conjured it up out of thin air to prove a point. Should we waste any time whatsoever wondering about whether or not it's true? Likewise, should we devote any more time about the claims of Semitic peoples that have been handed down to us over millennia? Also: we generally agree about what an elephant is, yet we have almost no idea about God. The word is empty and almost completely meaningless. It persists in its use, however, and many people find it important -- so that fact alone perhaps makes it worth spending time on, but for psychological reasons.

IF 'absence of evidence entailed by a particular X's predicates', THEN this 'absence of entailed evidence' necessarily is evidence of the absence of that particular predicated-X. — 180 Proof's Tractatus Teleologico-Absurdicus

Your argument boils down to, absence of evidence is evidence of absence which, fortunately or not, is not as good as you seem to think it is.

It actually is a pretty good argument. I'm not sure where the saying "absence of evidence isn't evidence of absence" came from, but its simply incorrect: not only is absence of evidence evidence of absence, that absence of evidence is evidence of absence is a provable theorem of probability theory. And how strong of evidence it is, depends on the likelihood or the expectation of the presence of a particular sort of evidence, if the proposition in question were true.

Now, people often confuse/conflate "evidence" and "proof" and so in at least some cases I think that what people mean when they say that absence of evidence isn't evidence of absence is that evidence of absence isn't proof of absence. And that is true enough. But it is evidence, the only question is just how strong or compelling it is.

And so showing that the evidence we would expect if Christianity (or anything else) were true (special creation, a moral world order, efficacy of prayer, miracles, etc) is absent, is a strong argument against the truth of Christianity.

Russell's teapot.

Russell's teapot is an analogy, formulated by the philosopher Bertrand Russell (1872–1970), to illustrate that the philosophic burden of proof lies upon a person making empirically unfalsifiable claims, rather than shifting the burden of disproof to others. — Wikipedia

If we're asked to prove a negative, the problem is we will have to sometimes try and prove that which is essentially unfalsifiable.

Imagine you're a cop and about to enter a dark room D.

There could be someone in D or there could be no one in D. You're uncertain.

If you assume there's someone in D, you'll pull out your gun.

If you assume there's no one in D, you'll keep your gun in its holster.

If you don't assume either way, how would you act?

In practice, we adhere to NEITHER of the following principles.
1. the burden of proof rests on the positive statement
2. the burden of proof rests on the claim
Imagine a few people sitting at a table in a restaurant. There is a large window such that the diners can see that it is raining outside. A woman enters the restaurant with wet hair. For some reason, one of the persons at the table says, “Her hair got wet in the rain.”
Someone else at the table says, “That’s not true.”
I think everyone would feel that the burden of proof rests on the second speaker, though the first speaker has made a positive claim.
I am afraid that in practice we feel that the burden of proof rests with the statement that is farthest from common sense. Since common sense is demonstrably defective, this criterion is sloppy, sheeplike, and depressing. Can we come up with a good workable criterion for the burden of proof?

Exactly. The common understanding (in cases when there is one) typically has at least experiential if not evidentiary data to back it up. Proposing an alternative requires "proof" to counter the common understanding.

I am afraid that in practice we feel that the burden of proof rests with the statement that is farthest from common sense. — Jedothek

This is basically correct. The burden of proof is on the claim that is contentious or contrary to the prevailing consensus, and this could also be expressed in terms of common sense.

this criterion is sloppy, sheeplike, and depressing — Jedothek

No, it's not, and there's an important point at play here. In philosophy today people like to follow Descartes and think that everything ought to be crystal clear and perfectly certain. They think <Conclusions ought to be apodictic; but deriving the burden of proof from prevailing consensus is not apodictic; therefore this is an incorrect way to derive the burden of proof>.

This is a completely wrongheaded way to think about precision. Not everything is or should be apodictic, and the burden of proof is one of those things. The burden of proof is itself little more than a loose convention with respect to debate and dialogue. It cannot be ascertained in an apodictic way; it is not susceptible to a high degree of certainty; it is not a very important concept in the first place; and it is itself just as sloppy as notions such as consensus and "common sense." Simpler: if the burden of proof were not a sloppy concept, then it would require a non-sloppy alternative; but the burden of proof is a sloppy concept.

We must be content if we can attain to so much precision in our statement as the subject before us admits of; for the same degree of accuracy is no more to be expected in all kinds of reasoning than in all kinds of handicraft. — Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, I.iii