• Eugen
    702
    I've recently found out about Coleman's version of panprotopsychism or neutral monism, which aims to get rid of all issues related to panpsychism's combination problem. Coleman actually says that the secret is to consider the qualities irreducible, but the subjects that experience them to be reducible.
    Now I've also found an objection on this one, which I don't fully understand due to my lack of technical language and also because I'm not native.

    Here's the link for the objection: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10670-020-00256-x#Sec8

    From what I understand, Coleman solves the combination problem but faces an emergent issue: how do you get from non-subjects to subject? Is that what the whole point of the objection is or I am totally wrong? Could someone offer me a simple explanation for the objection presented in the link above?

    Thank you!
  • Enrique
    842


    Maybe you'll get some ideas from my own initial version of a theory like panprotopsychism. I've developed some more nuance since then, but looking at these blog posts at philosophyofhumanism.com might help:

    Quantum Biology
    The Origins and Evolution of Perception in Organic Matter
    The Nature and Human Impact of Qualia
    Humanity and the Evolutionary Phenomenology of Preanthromorphic Cognition

    I think a solution to the combination problem as you call it will be derived from psychological neuroscience, especially by applying quantum physics (think additive wavelengths as base fragments of perception and feeling in specifically adapted molecules that also have emergent biochemical shapes). Be sure to give me your analysis at some point so I can refine my model! And if you reference my essays in a paper, props for caring! Trying to escape my quantum consciousness desert island lol
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