Yeah Bartricks' definition is technically correct, but for the compatibilist accounts proposed by Dennett and cogni sci folks, they are a kind of "limited free will" in terms of the scientific parameters they’re trying to set right?

I merely saw your own message here:

An interesting debate on 'compatibalism (limited free will) vs incompatibilism (no free will)': — 180 Proof

...and was surprised that you would give such inaccurate glosses of those two terms. I was going to offer a correction myself, replete with that surprise, when I saw that Bartricks had already given an accurate one.

Actually clicking that link now, I see that the disputants' actual positions are accurately described both as 'compatibilist' and 'limited free will' on the part of Dennett, and both as 'incompatibilist' and 'no free will' on the part of Caruso. But the way you phrased it sounds like you're saying that 'compatibilist' means 'limited free will' and 'incompatibilist' means 'no free will'.

Caruso seems to be what Derek Pereboom calls a "hard incompatibilist", which is not just someone who is an incompatibilist in the usual sense (someone who thinks determinism and free will are incompatible) but additionally someone who thinks indeterminism and free will are also incompatible, and thus free will is impossible either way.

Yeah Bartricks' definition is technically correct, but for the compatibilist accounts proposed by Dennett and cogni sci folks, they are a kind of "limited free will" in terms of the scientific parameters they’re trying to set right? — Saphsin

Dennett specifically I would say yes, but I think that his notion of free will is more in keeping with the incompatibilist sense of the term than the usual compatibilist sense of the term (discussion of hard indeterminism at that link as well). I can't speak for "cogni sci folks" generally, but the archetypes of modern compatibilism as I'm most familiar with it are people like Harry Frankfurt and Susan Wolf, who hold that free will has nothing whatsoever to do with how (in)determined or (un)predictable anybody is, but instead everything to do with the specific kinds of functions that our minds do (which do of course, like every function of everything, depend on at least adequate determinism to have any reliable functionality to speak of at all).

and do you believe it is an illusion?

yes, I agree we all make are own choices. But I think some people are heavily influenced by others and don’t necessarily have complete freedom of will due to their environment.

yeah, I guess it is quite a broad topic to discuss. I personally just wanted to hear different concepts from as many people to understand it better

that is an interesting notion, thank you

No, not in the slightest. Thank you very much

As I understand it, Pereboom coined the term 'hard incompatibilist' to describe his own view, which is not that free will is impossible but rather that what free will requires we highly unlikely possess, even if determinism is false. This is because in his view it requires not just indeterminism, but agent-causation. And he thinks it unlikely that we have agent-causal powers.
Needless to say, he is just another naturalist who thinks that if you can't naturalize something it doesn't- or likely doesn't- exist.

I also believe that Frankfurt has never officially declared a side. He is widely assumed to be a compatibilist simply because he has argued that moral responsibility does not require alternative possibilities (a claim which, if true, would seem to help the compatibilist cause more.....though many incompatibilists, including Pereboom, agree with Frankfurt on this). But, like I say, he himself has never explicitly endorsed compatibilism and everything he has argued is consistent with incompatibilism (I suspect that like me he is actually an agnostic on the issue).

Wolf, I think, holds a bizarre asymmetrical view according to which right-doing and praisewothiness are compatible with determinism whereas wrongdoing and blame worthiness are not (or at least require alternative possibilities). An unstable view.

Wolf, I think, holds a bizarre asymmetrical view according to which right-doing and praisewothiness are compatible with determinism whereas wrongdoing and blame worthiness are not (or at least require alternative possibilities). An unstable view. — Bartricks

I think you can make sense of her asymmetry thesis if you keep in mind that the rational practical abilities of human agents (and, even more so, their abilities to correctly evaluate ethical features of practical situations) are essentially normative. Hence, when an agent sets up to deliberate between doing A and doing B, say, and only the first option is the right thing to do, then for the agent to choose to do A (on cogent grounds) constitutes the proper actualization of her rational abilities of practical deliberation whereas for her to choose to do B constitutes a failed or defective actualization of those abilities (such as a manifestation of akrasia, of some other vice, or of some culpable ignorance, etc.).

Hence, unlike many agent-causal libertarians, Wolf deems agents to be blameworthy when they fail to actualize their ability to do the right thing, on the condition that they indeed possess such an ability, but it makes no sense to view them as praiseworthy just on the condition that they would have an ability refrain from doing the right thing. But that's not so much (or primarily) because praiseworthiness is uniquely compatible with determinism, but rather because there is no such rational ability (to chose to do the wrong thing). Failing or refraining to do the right thing just is a failure to properly exercise the ability to do the right thing.

Yes, I do not deny that her view is coherent. Ought implies can, and ought not implies can not. Which seems sufficient to explain how it is that right-doing and wrong-doing might require different abilities (one to do, the other to do otherwise).

But it nevertheless seems prima facie implausible. For instance, it seems implausible that if determinism is true, then we are praiseworthy for all our right deeds, but blameless for our immoral ones. Intuitively if one is one, one is the other - it's a package deal.

Yes, I do not deny that her view is coherent. Ought implies can, and ought not implies can not. Which seems sufficient to explain how it is that right-doing and wrong-doing might require different abilities (one to do, the other to do otherwise). — Bartricks

Actually, I was putting forth, on behalf of Wolf, the thesis that right-doing (and hence also, praiseworthiness) and wrong-doing (and hence also, blameworthiness) do not require different abilities. They both require the exact same ability, which is to deliberate correctly what it is that the agent ought to do, and to do it. It's not an asymmetry of abilities that is postulated, but rather an asymmetry in the way good and bad deeds relate to that one singular ability: as the manifestation of its proper actualization, or as a manifestation of its defective (or failure of) actualization, respectively.

But it nevertheless seems prima facie implausible. For instance, it seems implausible that if determinism is true, then we are praiseworthy for all our right deeds, but blameless for our immoral ones. Intuitively if one is one, one is the other - it's a package deal.

The way I would rather put it, again, on behalf of Wolf (although I myself agree with her), is that blameworthiness (responsibility for bad deeds) requires a rational ability to have done otherwise (namely, the right thing), whereas praiseworthiness doesn't require a rational ability to have done otherwise (since there is no such thing as a rational ability to do the wrong thing). I agree with you that the metaphysical requirements of personal responsibility (for good and bad deeds alike) all come in a single package and hence it doesn't make much sense to say that the truth of the metaphysical doctrine of determinism is a requirement for blameworthiness and not for praiseworthiness. It seems to me that Wolf's picture, correctly understood, show why that wouldn't make much sense. It's been a while since I've last read Wolf, though, so maybe she slips up somewhere. Maybe you can point out to me where exactly you think she might have advanced the implausible thesis.

I am not sure I follow. If right-doing requires the ability to do the right thing, then right-doing does not require the ability to do otherwise. But if wrongdoing does require the ability to do otherwise, then wrongdoing is plausibly incompatible with determinism in a way that right doing does not appear to be. Which seems to me to motivate the idea that, in fact, right doing also requires the ability to do otherwise (or that neither do). My point being that it is no good removing the asymmetry at a deeper level if we still end up with wrongdoing requiring something incompatible with determinism while right doing does not.

Re rational abilities to do wrong. There seems an ambiguity here. I agree that we never have overall reason to do wrong, and thus someone who does wrong is defying reason. But it can - and is - rational to want to have the ability to defy reason. So the ability to do wrong is one it is rational to have, eventhough it is not rational actually to do wrong.

I am not sure I follow. If right-doing requires the ability to do the right thing, then right-doing does not require the ability to do otherwise. But if wrongdoing does require the ability to do otherwise, then wrongdoing is plausibly incompatible with determinism in a way that right doing does not appear to be. — Bartricks

The issue isn't just what the conditions are for there existing agents who have rational practical abilities, but also what the conditions are are for there being responsible agents who have those rational practical abilities. Rational agents can only be deemed praiseworthy (end hence personally responsible) for successfully exercising their rational abilities if those abilities are fallible. An ability being fallible just means that it has a liability to fail. If you hold that the fallibility of such abilities is inconsistent with the thesis of determinism (in whichever way you understand this thesis) then this would mean that indeterminism is a requirement for praiseworthiness and blameworthiness alike. That's because indeterminism, on that view, would be a requirement for the possession of the fallible abilities, the possession of which grounds both praiseworthiness and blameworthiness.

I think Wolf would rather hold the opposite thesis: that determinism and the fallibility of rational abilities are compatible. Hence she would hold indeterminism to be a requirement neither for praiseworthiness nor for blameworthiness.

It therefore seems to me that Wolf's asymmetry thesis regarding the requirement for an 'ability to have done otherwise', for holding agents responsible just in cases of a failure to act rationally (and/or ethically), and the lack of a similar requirement for deeming them praiseworthy of having done the right thing, is preserved by her compatibilist account of fallible rational abilities. The metaphysical doctrine of indeterminism, on the one hand, and the thesis that agents have, in some circumstances, an 'ability to have done otherwise' (than what they actually did), on the other hand, are consistent with one another on her compatibilist stance.

I didn't mean to suggest the topic was too broad, but rather that the starting point of examination was to focus on which features of the concept are controversial, so it's better to replace the term free will with some thing else.

:up: Very clear explanation of details that are actually new to me. :smile:

I got the idea from an essay I wrote, I had to “assess the claim that human beings are not really free to make moral choices”.

yes, I agree we all make are own choices. But I think some people are heavily influenced by others and don’t necessarily have complete freedom of will due to their environment. — Charlotte Thomas-Rowe

The degree to which we are influenced by external or internal factors, varies and constantly changes, but ultimately we make choices. If we have any choice in anything, then that's it. Nothing is determined. There is a choice being made, for some event. It just takes one choice, to shatter any kind of deterministic view of life. If they is no choice, then just sit back and let the Bug Bang take care of everything, and certainly give credit to the Big Bang for the biggest miracle of all, the creation and determination of everything - sort of like the "scientific" version of God.

The reason of literally billions of people tells them that their wills are free and that they are responsible for the decisions they make. That is staggeringly good evidence. — Bartricks

I doubt this. I think it’s mostly because if you ask anyone on the street “do you think you have free will” they will answer in the affirmative confusing free will with a general sense of feeling free.

The problem is that free will is defined differently. By some definitions we definitely have it (a general sense of freedom). By others, there is some doubt. That’s why I don’t think there is strong support for the statement “we have free will” at all. There is definitely strong support for “we feel free”, but as for “we have free will” that depends on the definition.

I think free will in a dualistic framework is under doubt for example. As it requires “minds” causing physical changes. Yet we have extremely strong evidence that the only thing that can cause physical changes is physical stuff. That’s what the laws of conservation mean.

Similarly, some people still insist that free will must require indeterminism. To them, free will is under doubt.

“Free will” isn’t this monolithic concept, so the fact that most people say they have it doesn’t really mean anything specific

Well, that's fine if her view is that blame and praise come with the same control and origination requirements (I am not sure if that is her view - though it has also been a while since I read anything by her, and the last thing I read was her Freedom within Reason, which is quite old so perhaps her views have changed or perhaps the view I attributed to her was not her view). But from memory her view there was that someone born evil is not morally responsible for their subsequent evil acts, whereas someone born good is morally responsible for their subsequent good acts. And if that's right, well, it seems prima facie implausible.

Anyway, as you know I find it hard to understand how anyone in their right mind can consider someone blameworthy or praiseworthy for something - a decision, a desire, whatever - that was the causal product of external factors that the agent had no hand in. That seems no less unfair than blaming someone for their height or the age in which they were born.

I think it's more productive to get to the roots, like what are we exactly interested in? — Saphsin

There is a reason that we should justify the existence of free will. There are numerous scientific literatures showing that belief in free will results in a happier life, as well as being more academically successful and productive at work. Because of the belief's positive effects on people, there is a moral incentive to have people believe in it.

From a certain pragmatist point of view, this evidence is proof of the existence of free will.

Consider the practical effects of the objects of your conception. Then, your conception of those effects is the whole of your conception of the object. — Charles Sanders Peirce

This pragmatist believes that introspective knowledge (like a priori) is purely inferences from external facts. For example, the concept of self is created from the interactions we have with the world and not the other way around. This pragmatist further asserts that real and true are words that can only be understood in the context of 'what works' or in other words, its usefulness, such that what is the most useful is the truth. Thus, overwhelming evidence showing that believing in free will 'works' better for people, than not believing in free will existing is proof that free will exists.

This view is contentious even among pragmatists, but I try to present their view to address the original question. My version of pragmatism doesn't necessarily relate usefulness directly to truth, although I do believe that if a false belief is less useful than a true one, then that truth does not have as much value to be known relative to the false one.

It is not a good idea to ask average members of the public questions about complex metaphysical issues, as most of them are complete berks.

But among philosophers - so among those who have undertaken to reflect on this matter in a highly disciplined way - there is broad agreement on the basic concept, despite disagreement reigning over exactly what it takes for our wills to answer to that concept.

Free will is 'that which is needed to make one morally responsible for one's actions'. There's near universal consensus on this, which is why you'll find 'moral responsibility' and 'free will' used pretty much interchangeably in the debate. So, for instance, when Harry Frankfurt argued that moral responsibility does not require alternative possibilities, that was taken to be a powerful source of support for compatibilist positions on free will, as defenders of such views would - if Frankfurt's argument works - now no longer have to argue that their conditional analysis of alternative possibilities was more plausible than the incompatibilist unconditional analysis and could instead sidestep the whole issue.

Anyway, among those who think carefully about the matter, the majority agree that we have free will of the moral responsibility-grounding kind. And they think this despite disagreeing over whether that kind of free will requires indeterminism.

What does this tell us? Well, it tells us that it is more clear and distinct to the reason of careful reasoners that we have free will - or, if one prefers, that we are morally responsible - than it is that free will requires indeterminism, or whatever. (That is, it is clear and distinct to the reason of virtually all careful reasoners that moral responsibility requires free will; and it is clear and distinct to the reason of virtually all careful reasoners that we are morally responsible for what we decide to do; and clear and distinct to the reason of virtually all careful reasoners that it follows from this that we have free will, whatever it may involve).

There are exceptions - there are hard incompatibilists (such as Derk Pereboom) and there are impossibilists (such as Saul Smilansky and Galen Strawson) - but they are all guily of being unduly conservative about the nature of reality and how much our reason can tell us about it (which is somewhat ironic given that they are nevertheless willing to conclude that something that so patently exists - free will - doesn't).

there is broad agreement on the basic concept, despite disagreement reigning over exactly what it takes for our wills to answer to that concept. — Bartricks

I would say “there is broad agreement on the basic concept BECAUSE of disagreement reigning over what exactly it takes for our wills to answer to that concept”

Everyone is defining it so that it exists. But that doesn’t mean that it exists in all its definitions. That’s my point. For example:

I think free will in a dualistic framework is under doubt for example. As it requires “minds” causing physical changes. Yet we have extremely strong evidence that the only thing that can cause physical changes is physical stuff. That’s what the laws of conservation mean. — khaled

So a definition of free will that involves an immaterial mind being able to cause material changes means free will doesn’t exist. Or that it needs redefining.

No, they don't define it, not in any substantial way, for the definition is the end-point of analysis, not the beginning.

Again: they are talking about what's needed to be morally responsible for one's decisions. That's what compatibilists and incompatibilists are disagreeing over.

If you define 'free will' as 'a type of jam' then you are simply not talking about what they are talking about.

They are talking about what's needed for moral responsibility. And they're disagreeing over what's needed. But 'what's needed' is the issue. And 'free will' is what they agree is needed. And once the disagreement is resolved, we will know what having free will involves.

Is it needed for an immaterial mind to be able to cause physical changes for said mind to be morally responsible?

No, I don't see why you'd think it did.

Moral responsibility requires being the originator of one's decisions, I think. And that requires being an immaterial soul, as all material entities - if any exist - have come into being.

Right. But these “decisions” are mental things. Are they supposed to have physical effects?

Or in other words, do you think free will exists if epiphenomenalism is true?

Right. But these “decisions” are mental things. — khaled

They are states of mind, not really 'things' as such (a state of mind is a state of a thing - minds being things - but it is not itself a thing).

Are they supposed to have physical effects? — khaled

I do not really know what you mean.

Or in other words, do you think free will exists if epiphenomenalism is true? — khaled

Those aren't other words for what you previously said.

What do you understand epiphenomenalism to be?

What do you understand epiphenomenalism to be? — Bartricks

Physical stuff causing minds which do nothing

Physical stuff causing minds which do nothing — khaled

I do not understand what you mean. Seems confused.

A mind is a thing. An object.

Minds do things, such as think, desire, decide, hope and so on.

Thinking, desiring, hoping, intending - these are activities of mind (exclusively so).

So do you mean by epiphenomenalism the thesis that the activities our minds engage in are the causal product of material events, but that those mental activities are impotent to cause any material events?

If so, then I think that bizarre and unmotivated thesis is nevertheless entirely consistent with us being morally responsible for the activities our minds engage in, so long as we are morally responsible for being the minds that we are.

For instance, if I form the intention to do X and try to do X, and X occurs but entirely coincidentally and not as a product of my trying to do X, I remain fully morally responsible for trying to do X. Yes?

For instance, if I form the intention to do X and try to do X, and X occurs but entirely coincidentally and not as a product of my trying to do X, I remain fully morally responsible for trying to do X. Yes? — Bartricks

I would think no. Because the intention to do X didn’t affect whether or not you tried or succeeded at doing X, physically.

I would think to be morally responsible in that scenario you’d need some social definition of moral responsibility. “You are responsible when you do something you weren’t coerced into doing” or something like that.

If so, then I think that bizarre and unmotivated thesis — Bartricks

Why bizarre? It comes from splitting up the world into mental and physical stuff. Then noticing that the physical stuff seems to be self determining with no need of mental stuff.