Yes, you keep saying that, but I am yet to find a coherent account of an alternative view. Maybe I'll discover one when I get further into the Macherey book. But you have read the book and you have not managed to articulate any coherent and consistent alternative that I have noticed.

In relation to the idea that God's view must be from nowhere; I think this is wrongheaded, it must be from everywhere. It is from nowhere only insofar as it is from nowhere in particular. If all the individual experiences of all the percipient creatures (modes) are experienced by God, then they cannot be experienced as a fragmented chaos, just as our own experience would not be experience at all if it were a fragmented chaos. The finite unified individual experiences of all beings must be unified in God into a unified infinite experience, which is necessarily incomprehensible to us. This is the hermetic principle of "as above so below"; the diverse elements of each individual experience are unified by the transcendental ego into an intelligible whole unity.

This process of unification is necessarily transcendental for us because we can never know how it is done, for the simple reason that we only know from within its having always already been done. Only God, if there is a God, could know how it is done. According to the gospels God knows all things in heaven and in earth. Such a God is incomprehensible to us, but there is no other God worthy of the name. Impersonal, deistic gods can be nothing to us but logical fictions. We either choose to accept or reject that God; and that acceptance or rejection is entirely a matter of faith; of intuition, imagination and feeling, not a matter of logic or reason. It is a matter of art, not a matter of science.

I didn't listen to the Rohr lecture except for a bit, because I was turned off by his manner of presentation, but I agree with the idea of "unknowing'. It is the space of unknowing that surpasses dualistic reasoning, and allows the creative and mystical imagination and intuition to work. But I don't expect anyone to be convinced of this except by their own experience; argument will never do it.

The point is God is everywhere. Since the "whole" is necessary, the expression of all knowledge, all experience, all things, etc., God cannot have a beginning not end. God cannot be particular. God must be all at once, no matter the time. For God to be a viewpoint, to be a distinct moment such that we can say "God is X view but not Y view, " removes the infinite-- God becomes limited rather than limitless.

No I don't think you can. You have to look for it, you can't pull it out of your ass :P — Agustino

Sure, it can only come from the mind; the arse (corrected spelling, yours means a donkey) produces only shit. The mind is an organ of interpretation; so what you read between the lines (or even in them for that matter) will not necessarily, or even likely, be what I read.

For God to be a viewpoint, to be a distinct moment such that we can say "God is X view but not Y view, " removes the infinite-- God becomes limited rather than limitless. — TheWillowOfDarkness

God is never merely "a viewpoint"; God always experiences every possible viewpoint, and no one of them in particular. So, you are incorrect, no limitation is involved. Indeed, there would be a limitation in being a view from nowhere; the most extreme limitation in fact.

...the point was your account violates that. Where God has a beginning, a "how," is a causal actor (causing unification), God becomes a limited finite state, a mere viewpoint. At one point, God is only that which has not unified, at another God is only that which has unified-- a contradiction with a God that is everything all at once.

Where did I state or imply "God has a beginning"?

When you claimed God created unification-- that specifies God changes, turns from someone who has not created something to someone who has. God becomes states that are born and die. Rather than everything at once, at any time, God is limited to a mere viewpoint.

At one point, the God who is only not the creation of unification, at another poiny, the God who only has created unification.

This is a nonsense reading of what I said. You are trying to understand the infinite, eternal process of unification in finite and temporal terms. In short, you are doing the very thing you often erroneously accuse me of of doing: imputing the empirical nature to the infinite. It is not surprising that you impute your own mistakes to others, because you simply cannot think beyond the point your own mistakes allow you to.

But you have read the book and you have not managed to articulate any coherent and consistent alternative that I have noticed. — John

What is incoherent in the view that I have outlined?

In relation to the idea that God's view must be from nowhere; I think this is wrongheaded, it must be from everywhere. — John

From everywhere is identical with from nowhere though.

This is the hermetic principle of "as above so below" — John

I disagree with your interpretation of this principle. I agree with this principle, in-so-far as it postulates that reality is fractal or holographic - the whole is found within each of the parts. But this doesn't mean that God has a personality the way you have a personality - that's just absurd. That's a very literalist, philosophical caveman like reading I think :P

This process of unification is necessarily transcendental for us because we can never know how it is done — John

What do you mean how it is done? Do you expect an explanation for this like A goes here, B goes her, and together they form the process of unification, or what are you imagining?

It is the space of unknowing that surpasses dualistic reasoning, and allows the creative and mystical imagination and intuition to work. But I don't expect anyone to be convinced of this except by their own experience; argument will never do it. — John

We have nothing to guide ourselves by except reason though. If you take some hallucinogen you may have a mystical experience, and yet you understand what caused that mystical experience, which was merely the effect of the drugs on the brain. If you start imagining that it wasn't the drugs, and it was something different, you're only deluding yourself. Reason is all we have in order to navigate the world. If you want to restrict our reliance on reason, then there is nothing beyond reason to hold us.

What is incoherent in the view that I have outlined? — Agustino

Coherent alternative. What is it then? Surely you don't mean this?:

Furthermore - experience is always from a point of view - a point of view always implies partiality, but God - being the Whole - can't have any partiality, and hence has no point of view, and it would indeed be incoherent for God to have one, for then God would be particular and empirical... — Agustino

I've already dealt with that.

From everywhere is identical with from nowhere though. — Agustino

This is utter garbage, Agustino, and I suspect you know that, or else you are very stupid. So cut the disingenuousness.

But this doesn't mean that God has a personality the way you have a personality - that's just absurd. That's a very literalist, philosophical caveman like reading I think :P — Agustino

And this is a very poorly disguised straw dog. Where have I said that God has a personality in just the way humans have? We have finite thought, extension, love, goodness, knowledge, understanding, experience, personality and existence and God has infinite thought, extension, love, goodness, knowledge, understanding, personality and existence. Or else God doesn't exist; as I said before no other God is worthy of the name. Deistic Gods inspire no worship.

This is something that can merely be felt, intuited, and held in faith; it cannot be rationally understood in terms of some detailed explanation, because it deals with the infinite, and the infinite is incomprehensible to us except as a negation of the finite' it is 'understood' only apophatically. It is understood as being in itself, and as conceived in itself, but it is not conceived in itself for us. You haven't provided any cogent arguments against any of the objections I have raised against Spinoza's rationalistic claim to be able to know the nature of God through pure reason. All you do is keep the straw dogs and tired ad hominems pouring forth. Its becoming boring, man; you need to do much better than this if you want me to continue discussing with you.

Now, I am saying this from the position of someone who is not, by any measure, a firm believer, but who merely hopes to be open to the experience of God. I am not going to believe in God for merely rational reasons. Spinoza basically rehearses the Ontological Argument in the Ethics, and I was convinced long ago that the Ontological Argument has no teeth, so I don't find anything more in his philosophy than a very creative exercise in logical deduction from a set of definitions.

We have nothing to guide ourselves by except reason though. — Agustino

Yes, reason guides us in remaining consistent to our presuppositions; it cannot start form a presuppositionless point and provide the axioms on which to build a philosophy. It regulates only the forms of our arguments, it cannot provide the content; that must come from personal experience. People choose different metaphysics not because some are right and others are wrong; all metaphysical systems are nothing more than inadequate models. Spinoza's dream of adequacy is just that: a dream.

What's worse, Spinoza's philosophy is inconsistent with any claim that God is wholly immanent, because he says that God has infinite unknowable modes. Also neither you nor Willow have been able to address the objection that if God has no experience of His own, independently of the individual experiences of all sentient creatures, then he is literally nothing beyond the modes but a formal entity. If he is an "activity" that gives rise to the activity which is nature (the modes) then what exactly is that activity beyond the activity of the modes themselves, and if it exists or is real rather than being merely formal, then how would that not constitute a transcendence? Stop playing with words and casting bullshit aspersions, and start coming up with cogent arguments, or I really am done with you, Agustino.

That God has infinite modes does not mean God is the modes. This is the point you are missing. God is not the modes (including experiences like ours). It's the infinite itself, Real and not any finite state (mode)-- or to borrow from conversation in another thread, the truth of the infinite set that is none of its members.

I was convinced long ago that the Ontological Argument has no teeth, so I don't find anything more in his philosophy than a very creative exercise in logical deduction from a set of definitions. — John

Indeed, for the very reason it fails to make Spinoza's separation between the necessary and contingent.

The problem with the Ontological Argument is it tries to justify the presence of contingent state (in one realm or another) through the logic. Obviously this doesn't work, as it is only true if it's contingent premises are true (e.g. God is good, God is a mode) and they are properly defined (e.g. what constitutes the mode of God, what amounts to greatness, to ethical action, etc.).

That God has infinite modes does not mean God is the modes. This is the point you are missing. God is not the modes (including experiences like ours). It's the infinite itself, Real and not any finite state (mode)-- or to borrow from conversation in another thread, the truth of the infinite set that is none of its members. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Agutsino claims God is an activity. I haven't said that God is the modes: I have asked what He is over and above the activity ( the only activity we know) that is the modes. You accuse me over and over of saying that God is empirical or is the modes; when I am saying precisely the opposite; God is not anything we can identify because He is infinite.

You also say God is the infinite. Fine, we already knew that. But the infinite is unknowable, so it is not, on any coherent definition, immanent. What it is supposed to mean to say that the infinite is immanent in the finite is never explained. It is not explainable, and so the infinite is transcendental for us. You might say that the infinite is immanent for itself, but what could that possibly mean to us? And what could it possibly mean to God if he is not a Person?

...God is an activity.I haven't said that God is the modes:[/quote}
— John

I have asked what He is over and above the activity ( the only activity we know) that is the modes. — John

...you say the opposite, that God (activity) is the modes, in the next clause.

God is activity and NOT the modes. God, the activity, is over and above modes. Activity is not modes.


The point is the infinite is knowable. Being self-defined, the infinite means, unsurprisingly, the infinite. To say the infinite is immanent is the finite is described-- it means, within the finite, the infinite is expressed: modes express unity, each moment expresses the infinite, within the finite world, logic has significance (e.g. states of the world have form, express meaning, are something in thought).

Activity is not modes. — TheWillowOfDarkness

What are modes if they are not activity? Spinoza, I seem to recall, refers to the modes as "affections of substance", thus he sees them not as general categories but as particular modifications, and modifications are changes, which means that they just are activities.

Um, modes.

Things are self-defined in Spinoza's philosophy. It doesn't use the correlationist account where everything must be logically defined by something else.

And yes, Substance has modes. That doesn't mean the modes are Substance or that Substance is the modes. It's like the infinite set. It has members, but none of the members are the infinite set and vice versa.

You're just playing with words.

No. I'm making a logical point.

The infinite set has members (... a,b,c,d...). Take any particular member, let's say "a", which is the mode of John's experience reading this post.

Is this mode the infinite set? No. Your experience reading this post is certainly not the set of infinite modes. It's but one mode. Clearly, one mode is not infinite modes.

Now what about the infinite set? Is it the mode of your experience reading this post? Again, the answer is no. Your experience is only one mode. The infinite set cannot be this single definite mode alone.

Either of these approaches would reduce the infinite set to a finite member, so they are therefore impossible: an infinite set cannot be any of its members and any member cannot be the infinite set.

Is it the mode of your experience reading this post? — TheWillowOfDarkness

Reading a post is an activity. You say it is a mode, and yet you denied modes are activities.
:s

You're not paying attention to the terms being used. We aren't using "activity" to describe someone acting in the world.

You do this a lot. When you have a disagreement with someone on metaphysics, you ignore what they are saying and throw in some other definition which confirms your own position. Could you be honest for once and actually address the concepts being argued?

The definition of "activity" used here refers to becoming. Since the infinite set never ends, there are always more and more members, an endless stream of modes (not a mode, but the changing of modes that never ceases), such that the only constant of the infinite set is this becoming-- "activity" which can't be specified in terms of any particular mode.

You are the person being dishonest here. You said:

Your experience reading this post is certainly not the set of infinite modes. It's but one mode. Clearly, one mode is not infinite modes. — TheWillowOfDarkness

You are saying here that my reading a post is a mode; so I am saying 'right, then, it is an activity, a modification of substance'. Previously you said that a modes is not an activity, but I will leave that aside.

Previously Agutsino claimed that the activity of substance is not the activity of modes. Fine, so I am asking what it is over and above the activity of modes; in what sense can it be an "activity" that is not any kind of activity we can experience? And you won't answer that, you keep deflecting the question into other red herrings like "Clearly one mode is not infinite modes", when I haven't questioned that.

I have asked you what the difference is beyond merely saying that one is finite and the other infinite. Saying that tells us nothing, it is just playing with words.

No. That's not what I'm saying.

Substance doesn't get modified. Activity doesn't get modified. It's always the same. It never changes. The infinite set is always activity: the endless formation of new modes.

We can experience it too-- we may understand the infinite of becoming, that the infinite set never ends and the only constant is the formation of new modes. (it's just this is activity (of Substance) known, rather than us, a mode, being activity of Substance itself).

Your objections aren't addressing being argued. By definition activity of Substance (the infinite set) is other to activity of modes (the members of the infinite set) and it can be experienced.

The difference between saying one is infinite and one is finite is metaphysical. When I point out one mode is not infinite modes, I'm not only saying there are the finite and infinite, but also that it's impossible for the finite (a mode) to be infinite (the infinite set of modes).

In metaphysics this is a critical (and frequently heretical move)-- it means the transcendent is shown to be incoherent. The transcendent functions by the infinite also being finite. It is the infinite realm which nevertheless acts upon the finite, to make a difference in the finite world. Unity (the infinite set) is supposed to be this definite state, an activity of mode, which makes finite states happen one way. The infinite set is posed a member of itself.

In distinguishing activity of Substance, this is denied. Since activity of Substance cannot ever be activity of mode, the transcendent cannot function. If something is engaged in activity of mode (e.g. causing a state), it cannot be activity of Substance. There can be no infinite that defines the presence of a particular mode. "Infinite" and "finite" are fully specified. We aren't just saying "infinite and "finite." We understand them as their own positive concepts with logical significance.

We can experience it too-- we may understand the infinite of becoming, that the infinite set never ends and the only constant is the formation of new modes. (it's just this is activity (of Substance) known, rather than us, a mode, being activity of Substance itself). — TheWillowOfDarkness

The constant formation of new modes is known only in the formation of the modes themselves. The constancy of this formation of modes is known only finitely as constant change over some finite period. This is extrapolated as a never-ending constancy, but that never-ending constancy is known only as a generalization, as an abstract idea.

But this is only the extrapolated endless constant formation of finite modes of existence. No infinite mode of existence is known in this. The only infinite quality of finite modes is the in(de)finite quality that consists in the fact that our determinations are not the thing-in-themselves, but models. Things are in-finite only insofar as they are ultimately indeterminable, or better insofar as they are understood to ultimately exceed any possible determination.

Substance doesn't get modified. Activity doesn't get modified. It's always the same. It never changes. — TheWillowOfDarkness

And yet Agustino had said it is activity and that it is differentiated. Now I know you are not Agsutino, but you both claim to be representing Spinoza's views.

In any case you are wrong, because activity does get modified. My activity is never the same from one moment to the next. Of course we can say that God's activity which is not temporal but eternal, never changes; He is always 'doing' everything that has ever been done, is being done, or will be done.

We can say that, but we don't really comprehend it; and this means that the principle of eternal and infinite activity is incomprehensible to us; we can comprehend only temporal activity, and even that imperfectly. So, eternal activity is transcendental to both our experience and understanding; it is nothing more from the purely rational point of view than an 'empty' abstract notion which is arrived at apophatically by negating our understanding of temporal activity.

BUT, and this is a big 'but', the idea of eternal activity can also be a deeply intuitive, profoundly inspiring poetic, religious or mystical idea, and if it is not any of those then it is literally nothing to us but a vacuous formulation.

That's wrong. The constant formation of new modes is not known in the modes themselves. Knowing some particular mode doesn't tell you about the infinite of modes. If I notice the computer in front of me, I don't realise the constant of becoming. All I have is awareness of the computer. In that experience, I do not know there are never ending modes. Even modes aren't known in themselves. When someone knows a mode, they do so in thought (i.e. meaning and logic) as expressed by a different mode (i.e. an existing experience).

The constant of becoming is known to exceed all modes, for it is no matter the mode and modes are infinite. It's not a constant change over a finite period at all.

Indeed, a constant change over a period of time is activity of mode-- it specifies particular modes, and where they begin and end. The constant of becoming is never such a change. It is not a generalisation or extrapolation of the finite all, but being all on its own. Rather than abstraction, there is a grasping of the infinite itself.

The constant formation of new modes is not known in the modes themselves. — TheWillowOfDarkness

The constant formation ( if constant is taken to mean 'unceasing over some period of time) of new modes is known in our experience of the modes. If constant is taken to mean 'never-ending, then of course that constancy is not experience. But I already explained this! That is what is so frustrating about trying to engage in discussion with you; I find myself constantly having to correct your mistaken readings of what has been said.

And now you contradict yourself again in saying that modes aren't known in themselves. If you mean by this that they are known only as phenomena, well yes, of course; but that would be to assert the phenomenal/noumenal distinction, a distinction which you explicitly deny.

The infinite is either an empty abstraction or it is a real infinite existence; we can say that, even though we have (from the viewpoint of pure rationality) no idea what an infinite existence could be: we can say that just because they are, logically, the only two possibilities.

Yours and Spinoza's position is fatally flawed by inconsistencies; why not just own up to it?

Rather than abstraction, there is a grasping of the infinite itself. — TheWillowOfDarkness

You can say that, and I would agree that there is an intuitive "grasping"; but you can't give an explanatory account of what that grasping consists in. You can only allude to it, you cannot rationally explicate it. Spinoza thinks he can, he is the arch-rationalist; he is, however, sadly wrong.

( if constant is taken to mean 'unceasing over some period of time) — John

Constant formation doesn't mean unceasing over some period of time. It means without beginning or end. There is no "period" of time because the infinite never begins nor ends. You not correcting what's been said. You're blatantly ignoring the definition I am using.

(If you mean by this that they are known only as phenomena, well yes, of course; but that would be to assert the phenomenal/noumenal distinction, a distinction which you explicitly deny. — John

I don't mean that. Nothing is known in the mode itself. Knowledge is a different state to what is known. Experiences of knowledge are always different self-defined states to any modes which are known. For the phenomenal (i.e. modes), knowledge by the mode itself impossible because any knowledge of a mode is obtained through a different mode. In the case of the noumenal (i.e. logic), knowing in the mode itself is impossible because it is not mode at all.

Constant formation doesn't mean unceasing over some period of time. — TheWillowOfDarkness

And yet you said this:

Indeed, a constant change over a period of time is activity of mode-- it specifies particular modes, and where they begin and end. — TheWillowOfDarkness

I'm tired of your contradictions, misreadings, and evasions, Willow: time for you to find someone else to annoy. You and Agustino are two of a kind when it comes to that although at least you are not insulting and obnoxious.

I'm not interested in conversations unless they consist in genuine engagement which means good faith, charitable reading and honest acknowledgement of mistakes and inconsistencies when they are pointed out.

Yeah... I was juxtaposing constant change over a period of time against the the constant formation I'm talking about. The point being that constant change over time is what I am not talking about, as I'm referring to formation without beginning nor end.

The constant formation I'm about talking involves no period of time. It cannot be change over a period of time.

Yeah...the problem is its always about what YOU are talking about and never about what the other is talking about, and hence is not really a conversation.