It is often assumed that you can believe in the existence of hypothetical reasons without believing in categorical reasons. I would like to challenge that assumption. The thing to consider is that any claim of a hypothetical reason seems to imply a claim of categorical reason. For example, if someone claims that you ought to drink water if you want or aim to quench your thirst, then they seem to be implying that you ought to do what takes to get what you want or to achieve your aims. You might as well say that you have categorical reasons to drink water because you have categorical reasons to fulfill your wishes. After all, why does it make sense to conceptualize a separate category of reasons that relate to the fulfillment of one’s own wishes but not have other similar categories of reasons? For example, why not have a separate category of reason that gives us reason to do something if it fulfills someone else’s desire or aim? Why does it specifically have to relate to our own desires? In addition, why do many philosophers think that desires give people reasons to act and not other phenomena like pleasure or suffering for example? Finally, why think that our current desires give us reason to act but not our future desires?

I mention this because there are certain self-proclaimed anti-realist philosophers who are skeptical of categorical reasons but find hypothetical reasons uncontroversial. They seem to believe in a kind of “do whatever you want” ethic or life philosophy. But, it has always seemed to me that whether or not we have reason to do something simply because we want to do it is itself a bold and controversial ethical claim. Many philosophers such as myself don’t see how our own desires give us any more reason to act than say the desires of others. We may be motivated to act on our desires but I don’t think it implies that acting on our desires is always rational or that it’s something that we ought to do. So, a rejection of categorical reasons seems to equate to a rejection of any sort of normative reason in general.