Don't tear me apart, I'm correcting my earlier post

The main point is that your argument for aseity is fallacious, I think. — ToothyMaw

But you earlier agreed that it was deductively valid. I did not invoke necessity.

Here is the argument:

1. If I have come into existence, then I have been caused to come into existence by external events that I had nothing to do with.
2. If I have been caused to come into existence by external events that I had nothing to do with, then I am not morally responsible for my initial character.
3. Therefore, if I have come into existence, I am not morally responsible for my initial character.
4. I am not morally responsible for my environment or the laws of nature that prevail in it.
5. If I am not morally responsible for my initial character and not morally responsible for my environment. and the laws of nature that prevail in it, then I am not morally responsible for anything.
6. Therefore, if I have come into existence, I am not morally responsible for anything.
7. I am morally responsible for some things.
8. Therefore I have not come into existence.

There's no fallacy there. No premise says 'if this, necessarily that'. They just say 'if this, then that'.

You need to deny a premise.

I don't dispute that argument. The argument I dispute is formed from this:

1. If we have free will, we exist with aseity
2. We have free will
3. Therefore, we exist with aseity

According to the aseity argument you outlined in you latest post, it is logically necessary that if we have free will, we exist with aseity, and, thus, are morally responsible. (it is logically necessary that((FW => A) =>MR))

I mean, we have no control over whether or not we have free will, and thus exist with aseity, and thus have moral responsibility. How could we control those things? If we could, then maybe we could just wish away our moral responsibility or something.

Unless I'm mistaken you do indeed use the argument:

1. If we exist with aseity, we have free will.
2. We exist with aseity.
3. Therefore, we have free will.
4. If we have free will, we are MR.
5. Therefore, we are MR.

You also use this one:

1. If we have free will, we exist with aseity
2. We have free will
3. Therefore, we exist with aseity

The first premise of the first one correctly asserts that aseity => free will, while the first premise of the second correctly asserts that free will => aseity.
Thus, since both premises are true, aseity <=> free will.

The expression ((A => FW) => U) is implicit in the first argument outlined in this post that you use. (FW is free will, U is MR, A is aseity)

The following argument is analogous to the first one outlined in this post that you use:

1. A => FW
2. A
3. Therefore, FW
4. FW => U
5. Therefore U

If that is true, and considering the implicit expression, then this is essentially the metalogic (I think I'm using that word correctly) you are using to support your MR argument:

1. It is logically necessary that(FW => U)
2. FW
3. Therefore, it is logically necessary that(U)

which is fallacious.

I mean I could say:

1. It is logically necessary that(if one makes a crappy analogy, then they should be ashamed of themselves).
2. One makes a crappy analogy.
3. It is logically necessary that(one should be ashamed of themselves).

How on earth is 3 a logical necessity? Maybe you should just grow a thick skin and not give a shit what people think of your crappy analogies. You are presuming something is logically necessary based on the logical necessity of its constituents; there could indeed be a world in which moral responsibility is nonexistent, even if some things are logically necessary for it to exist.

If you say that it is not logically necessary that we are morally responsible, then there must be alternatives to being morally responsible by us existing with aseity (the only way we can have moral responsibility). But you have demonstrated that the only alternative is a deterministic view that negates both agency and any sort of moral culpability. I don't see how you can square the two without us existing with aseity.

I am having trouble following you. First, I haven't the faintest idea what all those symbols and letters mean. Not sure you do either! Anyway, they're not necessary and I do know that whatever they mean, they do not capture my argument for my argument certainly committed no modal fallacy.

According to the aseity argument you outlined in you latest post, it is logically necessary that if we have free will, we exist with aseity, and, thus, are morally responsible. — ToothyMaw

The argument assumes we are morally responsible and have free will and concludes that we exist with aseity.

I did not say 'necessary' once. So you're introducing the notion of necessity, not me. It is not present in my argument. I do not believe in necessary truths. The argument I made was deductively valid and all of its premises are true, or at least are far more reasonably believed than disbelieved. So its premises are 'true' (not 'necessarily' true, just true) and its conclusion is too. Not necessarily: it just is.

You also seem to be confusing the claim that aseity is required for moral responsibility with the different claim that if we exist with aseity we 'are' morally responsible.

I have not made that claim. Something could exist with aseity yet not be morally responsible. It is the reverse that I deny.

You're the one committing fallacies. This:

1. If P, then Q
2. Q
3. therefore P

is fallacious. Yet that's how you're reasoning. For my argument establishes the truth of this premise:

1. If we are morally responsible, we exist with aseity

But you've reasoned like this:

2. We exist with aseity.

3. Therefore we are morally responsible

That's a fallacious argument and it is no argument I made. Note, my claim is that aseity is needed for moral responsibility, but that does not entail that it is sufficient.

Again, this is how I have reasoned:

1. If we are morally responsible, we exist with aseity
2. We are morally responsible
3. Therefore, we exist with aseity


Presumably what you are doing is arguing that despite existing with aseity, we lack moral responsibility because we did not choose to exist with aseity - is that correct? That's what this suggests.

I mean, we have no control over whether or not we have free will, and thus exist with aseity, and thus have moral responsibility. How could we control those things? — ToothyMaw

You're assuming, falsely - indeed, absurdly - that to be morally responsible we need to have 'control' over everything that contributes to our decisions. That's ridiculous and has no support from our reason.

Take an everyday example: John says "P" and that annoys me and I punch him. Am I morally responsible for punching him? Intuitively, yes. What about the fact - the obvious fact - that I had no control over John saying "P"? Can I appeal to that as an excuse? No, nobody in their right mind would accept that as an excuse, even though it is obviously true that I lacked control over John saying "P".

What's needed for moral responsibility - as my argument shows - is not control over everything, but the power truly to originate one's decisions.

1. If we are morally responsible, we exist with aseity
2. We are morally responsible
3. Therefore, we exist with aseity — Bartricks

So you are saying that if we have free will we are morally responsible, right? I assume that that is what you mean. Furthermore, how does that argument mean that if we exist with aseity then we are morally responsible? You said yourself that it is only necessary, not sufficient. So I don't see how it goes both ways, unless there is another argument you are leaving out.

But you've reasoned like this:

2. We exist with aseity.

3. Therefore we are morally responsible — Bartricks

No, I argued that aseity implies free will, which then implies moral responsibility. You use this premise:

8. Therefore I have not come into existence. — Bartricks

To support the assertion that we have free will. There must be an argument saying that aseity implies free will if the premise 1 of your moral responsibility argument is true. Furthermore, if that argument exists, and if free will implies moral responsibility, then I don't see how my argument is fallacious.

What's needed for moral responsibility - as my argument shows - is not control over everything, but the power truly to originate one's decisions. — Bartricks

Define aseity, then.

I do know that whatever they mean, they do not capture my argument for my argument certainly committed no modal fallacy. — Bartricks

Then you understood what I was trying to say enough to realize that I was accusing you of a modal fallacy, and that that was what I was trying to express. You probably could've figured it out. You are assuming that my argument was fallacious while attempting to conceal an important argument that might mean you committed a fallacy.

So you are saying that if we have free will we are morally responsible, right? — ToothyMaw

No, if we are morally responsible, then we have free will.

It is possible to have free will and not be morally responsible (that would be the case if, for example, we had free will but moral nihilism is true).

But if we are morally responsible - and we are - then we have free will.

I keep saying "If P, then Q" and you keep responding "so, if Q then P". No. 'If P then Q' does not entail 'if Q then P'. If we are morally responsible, then we have free will. It doesn't follow that if we have free will we are morally responsible. And if we are morally responsible, we exist with aseity. It does not follow that if we exist with aseity we are morally responsible.

Furthermore, how does that argument mean that if we exist with aseity then we are morally responsible? — ToothyMaw

I haven't made that argument! That's the argument 'you' keep making, as if it is mine. My argument estalibhses that if we are morally responsible, we exist with aseity (and as we are morally responsible ,then we do exist with aseity). But it does not show that if you exist with aseity you are morally responsible.

Once more, 'if P then Q', does not entail that 'if Q then P'. If you are a basketball player, then you are tall. It doesn't follow that if you are tall you're a basketball player.

An object exists with aseity when it exists but has not been brought into being. Thus, objects that exist with aseity have always existed. They do not have prior causes.

We know a couple of things about this kind of object. We know that some - at least one - must exist. For if everything that exists has been brought into being, then we will find ourselves off on an infinite regress. As there are no actual infinities in reality, we can know that there must exist some things that have not been brought into being. Thus we know that there are objects that exist with aseity.

We also know that at least some of these objects can originate causal chains. For as before, if every cause has an event as a prior cause, then we will be off on another infinite regress of events. Thus some objects must be capable of causing events, directly as it were. That is, they must be able to cause events without being caused to do so. It's known as the power of 'substance causation'.

If we exist with aseity and if we are substance-causes, then we will be the originators of our decisions. That is, the causal chain that explains why we decided as we do will terminate with us. And thus we will be capable of being morally responsible for that decision. (Note, then, the power of substance causation is also needed to have free will and be morally responsible, which just underlines that existing with aseity is not sufficient).

I did not say 'necessary' once. So you're introducing the notion of necessity, not me. It is not present in my argument. I do not believe in necessary truths. — Bartricks

You appear to believe that determinism is a necessary truth, however. Or at least you presume so in your argument. I don't see how you can say that determinism is basically true in your aseity argument to support that we exist with aseity, and then say something like that aseity shows determinism isn't a necessary truth. As far as I can tell, determinism is either true or not true, and if true, it is necessary.

My argument does not assume determinism. Which premise asserts determinism?

3. Therefore, if I have come into existence, I am not morally responsible for my initial character.
4. I am not morally responsible for my environment or the laws of nature that prevail in it.
5. If I am not morally responsible for my initial character and not morally responsible for my environment. and the laws of nature that prevail in it, then I am not morally responsible for anything. — Bartricks

To say that one is not morally responsible for those things seems to me to be rendering them external to the will, and if those are the only things that affect our decisions, as you have indeed implied, then all factors affecting our decisions are external to the will, so determinism, based on how I have defined it, is also implied.

Determinism: the doctrine that all events, including human action, are ultimately determined by causes external to the will.

Furthermore, your assertion that if we come into existence then we are not responsible for our initial character implies you believe that all other events not related to human action are also determined; our initial character, if it is predetermined, must be the result of causes outside of our control that can be identified with a state of the universe. If said state of the universe is necessarily the result of previous states, and it would have to be for your character to be predetermined, then it seems to follow that determinism is true.

I assume you will dispute my definition of determinism

If said state of the universe is necessarily the result of previous states, and it would have to be for your character to be predetermined, then it seems to follow that determinism is true. — ToothyMaw

What I'm saying here is that at some specific way things were in the past at a time t, we can say that what ensues from there that results in one's initial character is fixed as a matter of natural law - in other words predetermined. This follows from the definition of determinism used by the SEP:

Determinism: The world is governed by (or is under the sway of) determinism if and only if, given a specified way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law.

If said state of the universe is necessarily the result of previous states, and it would have to be for your character to be predetermined, then it seems to follow that determinism is true. — ToothyMaw

correction: later states of the world can be seen as fixing earlier states of the world; I'm no physicist.

Essentially I'm saying this: you claim all of the factors that affect our character, and thus actions, are external to the will. One of those elements, our initial character, if it is to be out of our control, must be the result of factors outside of our character that can be identified with a state of the world. Furthermore, if this state of the world is fixed as a function of previous states of the world that originate with a specific state of the world at some time t, and it would have to be if it were determined, then determinism must be true.

You might ask "well what's to say that it's determined?" Well, if all the external factors that dictate one's character after they have come into existence due to external forces are fixed, and are the only external forces, then why would they not be fixed before those external forces created us? Being created by external forces you have nothing to do with does not dictate a change in the laws of physics in the past - or whether or not it was necessary that it would rain last Monday.

If my reasoning here is faulty just say so.

Determinism: the doctrine that all events, including human action, are ultimately determined by causes external to the will. — ToothyMaw

That's a circular definition as you've included the word 'determined'.

Anyway, no premise in my argument asserted the truth of determinism. And no premise in my argument said anything about necessity (determinism essentially involves a claim about necessity, for if determinism is true then every event that occurs was necessitated by past circumstaces and the laws of nature).

your assertion that if we come into existence then we are not responsible for our initial character implies you believe that all other events not related to human action are also determined — ToothyMaw

First, if was no an assertion, but a conclusion. Second, it does not imply that at all.

I assume you will dispute my definition of determinism — ToothyMaw

Yes, because it wasn't one. You can't mention the term you're defining in the definiens.

Determinism: The world is governed by (or is under the sway of) determinism if and only if, given a specified way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law. — ToothyMaw

That's not a good definition either, as 'fixed' means 'determined' yes? An event is determined to occur if it is necessitated by the past and the laws of nature.

Again, no premise in any argument I made asserted the truth of determinism. And no premise in any other way asserted a supposed necessary truth. I made no appeal to necessity in anything I argued.

The aseity argument establishes that we exist with aseity. If you think it doesn't, you need to take issue with a premise and to provide independent evidence of its falsity.

That's a circular definition as you've included the word 'determined'. — Bartricks

That is an idiotic assertion. The word derives itself from the concept in the definition. That's like calling the definition of ornithology circular for having "the science of watching birds" in it.

If my reasoning here is faulty just say so. — ToothyMaw

Er, yes. It's all over the place. I mean, 'faulty' would be kind.

Essentially I'm saying this: you claim all of the factors that affect our character, and thus actions, are external to the will. One of those elements, our initial character, if it is to be out of our control, must be the result of factors outside of our character that can be identified with a state of the world. Furthermore, if this state of the world is fixed as a function of previous states of the world that originate with a specific state of the world at some time t, and it would have to be if it were determined, then determinism must be true. — ToothyMaw

I just can't follow that at all. My view is really not hard to understand. I am arguing that if we have come into existence, then we will not be morally responsible for anything we are or do, for eveything we are and do will be the causal product of factors we were in no way morally responsible for.
That will not be the case if we exist with aseity. Therefore, if we are morally responsible we exist with aseity. And we are morally responsible. Therefore, we do exist with aseity.

It's not hard. I haven't mentioned determinism. I haven't mentioned necessity. i don't know why you're mentioning them.

Circular definitions are correct. So, here's my definition of bread. Bread is bread. That's correct. Bread really is bread. But it's totally unhelpful and stupid. That's what's true of your definition of determinism, a thesis you clearly do not grasp. You've said 'Determinism is what you have when things are determined". Er, yes. Correct, but lacking in substance. Anyway, I've reached the conclusion you can't reason you're way out of a paper bag.
"You mean a plastic bag? And that I can't reason my way into one?"
No, you can't reason your way out of a paper bag.
"But if a bag is paper, then it is plastic. Here is my definition of a paper bag: a plastic bag. Please tell me if you disagree with my definition".
Yes, I disagree with it. It's not a definition of a paper bag.
"But if you want me to get out of a bag, then I must already be in it".
What?
"Your own argument is that if I am in a paper bag, then I am in a plastic bag, and you want me to get out of it. Please tell me if I am reasoning badly".
Er, yeah, you're not so much reasoning badly as reasoning insanely.
"But here's SEP's definition of a paper bag - a bag that is made of paper".
Yes, so?
"But isn't this your argument 1: bags are necessarily paper, 2, if something is necessarily paper, then it is necessarily plastic. 3. Therefore I am in paper bag.?"
No. That's just mental. What are you on?