But the map is NEVER the territory.
— Olivier5

Can maps be more or less adequate to the territory? — Janus

Yes of course, some maps are more accurate (or less inaccurate) than others, for a given purpose.

↪Luke I wonder if it is what unenlightened has in mind, — Banno

Not really. One might have such an experience in sunshine with one's eyes shut. It is the situation where it makes most sense to talk about 'an experience of red'. But it is an experience that anyone can have who can see in colour. And if you ask what it is like, I might liken it to a glorious sunset or something. I still wouldn't be talking about "my experience of red" as if it were something similar or different to "your experience of red".

Most of the time one can live with a colourblind person and not notice that they see things differently. They usually do not notice themselves, and talk about colours just like a human being. But they sometimes make mistakes, and my friend discovered one day that he was red/green colourblind when he applied to be a telephone engineer and had to do a test. We were both surprised. So here is a question for philosophers - What is the experience of red of someone who is colourblind but does not know it? Expect to construct a large edifice in explaining this mystery.

I think you have to use the reply feature for me to get notifications because I missed this.

We do. We can detect brain states and XXY, ZZR and KKU are directly, inseparably linked to different brain states, so we know exactly which you're having. — Isaac

Let's look at the original example I gave. XXY and YYX. With the objects being red, red, green respectively. Here, it just so happens that the experience that causes you to reach for the word "Red" (X) is precisely the experience that would cause me to reach for the word "Green".

You can do an fMRI scan on both of our brains, and you wouldn't be able to extract this piece of information. We will show very similar activity. But since we don't have the exact same brains and bodies, that can account for why I'm having XXY as opposed to you having YYX. However you can't for example say: "Khaled's experience of red is Isaac's experience of green". You do not have evidence to conclude this. Because I could just be having KKR, or JJL, or MMW and in all of these cases we will both show similar fMRI scans.

Or to explain it another way:

Sure I agree that certain physical states cause certain mental states. Let's take an example where I have XXY and you have LLE. There will be a set of variables that determine why you have LLE and I have XXY. However this set of variables is undiscoverable. Since whether or not you have XXY or LLE makes no difference as long as structure is preserved. For all we know, the shape of your nose could be the reason you are having LLE as opposed to XXY.

There is a humongous set of things that are different about our physical conditions that can be used to explain why you have a different experience from me. We have no way to narrow it down. Because we have no "outside perspective" from which we can say "Ah, yes, it seems that people with this type of nose have Ls instead of Xs when looking at blood". We have no access to whether or not we are having the same Xs and Ys or how they're related.

We have no way of checking the dependent variable so we can't narrow down what the independent variables are. Though we know the independent variables belong to the set of "Physical differences".

What is the experience of red of someone who is colourblind but does not know it? — unenlightened

You can't explain to someone what an experience is like so I'm not sure what you're asking. As you said: The subjectivity leaves the picture. We can't talk about it.

What's the experience of red to someone who is not colorblind? How would you even answer that?

You can't explain to someone what an experience is like so I'm not sure what you're asking. As you said: The subjectivity leaves the picture. We can't talk about it. — khaled

But in this case we can talk about it. We discovered a difference. Richard discovered that he couldn't see red, but he had been seeing red all his life. So there is an experience of red of someone who cannot see red. In this case, it's is not that we cannot talk about it because it is private or subjective, but that we cannot talk about it because it never existed in the first place. 23 odd years of talking about something he could not see and not noticing that he could not see it. And no one else noticing either.

the experience that causes you to reach for the word "Red" (X) is precisely the experience that would cause me to reach for the word "Green". — khaled

Now you're leaving the realm of epiphenomenon. The epiphenomenon X can't 'cause' anything.

You can do an fMRI scan on both of our brains, and you wouldn't be able to extract this piece of information. We will show very similar activity. — khaled

Similar, but different. If fMRI isn't fine-grained enough, we could use nanotube probes.

However this set of variables is undiscoverable. Since whether or not you have XXY or LLE makes no difference as long as structure is preserved. — khaled

But it is discoverable because it's associated with different brain states, which we can detect.

we have no "outside perspective" from which we can say "Ah, yes, it seems that people with this type of nose have Ls instead of Xs when looking at blood". We have no access to whether or not we are having the same Xs and Ys or how they're related. — khaled

Brain states. We can ask why some people's brains look like X when being shown a red square and others look like Y. We can correlate the results with variables we suspect might be involved, test the significance...you know, normal scientific practice.

Now you're leaving the realm of epiphenomenon. The epiphenomenon X can't 'cause' anything. — Isaac

Misspoke. How about "comes with". Idk why you're raising this objection now though because that's always what I've said.

Brain states. — Isaac

But we don't know if brainstate1 causes X or Y or Z or U or G. That's the point. We cannot see the value of the dependent variable to be able to find the independent variables.

But it is discoverable because it's associated with different brain states, which we can detect. — Isaac

But we don't know which brain state causes X as opposed to Y or Z or U or G. Because as long as the structure is the same we have no idea if the subject is having an X or Y or Z or U or G.

But we don't know if brainstate1 causes X or Y or Z or U or G. — khaled

There's no knowledge there to be gained. Epiphenomenon X doesn't pre-exist. We've got no reason at all to assume it. The only justification for labelling epiphenomenon X would be if we had a modelling assumption that a unique epiphenomenon existed for each unique brain state. Under such an assumption we would, on noticing brain state X, invoke the theoretical existence of epiphenomenon X. We'd just have no reason at all to do it the other way around - invoke epiphenomenon X (for no reason at all) and then search for the brain state which might match it, if it even exists. Why would we do that?

Epiphenomenon X doesn't pre-exist. We've got no reason at all to assume it. — Isaac

I would say that that we have experiences is a bit more than an assumption no? It precedes the neurology even.

Epiphenomenon X does pre-exist. The experience you get when looking at red things precedes your knowledge of whatever brainstate is behind that experience. Evidence: I have an experience when looking at red things, yet I have no clue what my brain is doing at the time.

Now, I can assume you also have some experience when looking at red things. We can call mine X and yours Y. Both pre-exist. Both precede the neurology. And they do not have to be the same.

The difference between them would be due to physical differences. Which physical differences, we have no way of determining. Because we cannot study these pre-existing epiphenomena.

As to why we would want to in the first place? No clue, you're the one that proposed it:

The point at which I disagree is that these are intrinsically private. They're different brain states. They may be accessible to introspection, in which case we can (and probably have) come up with words for them that way, or they may be accessible only to neuroscience or cognitive psychology, in which case we can come up with technical terms for them. — Isaac

Odd. So there could be something publicly shared yet which is entirely subjective? I'm not following you. — Isaac

In the relevant Wittgensteinian sense, there could be something publicly shareable, in principle, which is entirely subjective. There are such things, such as thoughts one has which are not yet shared, unexpressed pain hiding behind a stoic disposition, a poker face, and the like.

But even if it becomes shared, there remains an intrinsically private aspect - how it feels to the subject. What cannot be shared is for me to have your pains and vice versa.

Like phones. My phone is 'my' phone entirely by virtue of whose legal possession it is in, no property of the actual phone. Your pain is 'your' pain entirely by virtue of whose mind it is in, not any property of the actual pain. — Isaac

Phones are not mind-dependent, but yes, pains are subjective to the mind/person that experiences them.

So what on earth would 'intersubjective' mean? Something which takes place in multiple minds at once? Not sure where that model leaves intersubjectivity. — Isaac

Publicly shared, I suppose; an expressed subjective experience that is made public, usually via language but not necessarily.

would say that that we have experiences is a bit more than an assumption no? It precedes the neurology even.

Epiphenomenon X does pre-exist. The experience you get when looking at red things precedes your knowledge of whatever brainstate is behind that experience. — khaled

That's proof that we have epiphenomenon, not that we have unique epiphenomenon X or Y in response to the same external inputs. Alk the evidence you have so far is that our epiphenomena are the same in response to the same stimuli. We reach for the same words, we understand the same implications, we even notice those who don't respond the same and single them out as being in need of help.

The only justification for thinking your epiphenomena are unisex would be if we...

a) had a modelling assumption that unique brain states resulted in unique epiphenomena, and

b) noticed unique brain states in response to identical stimuli.

Other than that we've no reason at all to assume our epiphenomena are different, in fact the evidence seems to point to them being the same in most cases.

In the relevant Wittgensteinian sense, there could be something publicly shareable, in principle, which is entirely subjective. There are such things, such as thoughts one has which are not yet shared, unexpressed pain hiding behind a stoic disposition, a poker face, and the like. — Luke

Yeah, I can agree with that. So is that what you mean by subjective but not intrinsically private? Something which requires a mind but has not yet been shared despite being shareable?

even if it becomes shared, there remains an intrinsically private aspect - how it feels to the subject. What cannot be shared is for me to have your pains and vice versa. — Luke

So you seem back to intrinsically private again. If subjectivity is not the cause of a thing being intrinsically private, then what is?

Alk the evidence you have so far is that our epiphenomena are the same in response to the same stimuli. — Isaac

False. We have no evidence of that. As I've shown, you can have radically different epiphenomena and still be able to do all of:

We reach for the same words, we understand the same implications, we even notice those who don't respond the same and single them out as being in need of help. — Isaac

So that in itself is not proof.

Other than that we've no reason at all to assume our epiphenomena are different — Isaac

Agreed. And no reason to assume they're the same.

a) had a modelling assumption that unique brain states resulted in unique epiphenomena, and

b) noticed unique brain states in response to identical stimuli. — Isaac

These would be reasons for deducing a differently structured set of epiphenomena not even different ones.

Let's say you have XXY and I have YYY. I would probably be colorblind in that case. Because I can't tell the difference between the first two and the last object. You do an fMRI scan and find some difference or other in my brain state.

But in this example, we have the same epiphenomena ( Y ) in some cases. So the difference the fMRI detected is not necessarily a difference in the Xs and Ys but again, a difference in their structure.

We have no evidence of that. As I've shown, you can have radically different epiphenomena and still be able to do all of: — khaled

I don't disagree with that. It's about parsimony. Why introduce something for which there's no evidence?

no reason to assume they're the same. — khaled

That's the default position. We don't subdivide without cause because it is less parsimonious to do so. We don't add unnecessary complexity to our models, why would we?

So the difference the fMRI detected is not necessarily a difference in the Xs and Ys but again, a difference in their structure. — khaled

No, because we just established that epiphenomena are caused by physical phenomena. So if there's a difference of any sort whatsoever in the epiphenomena, it must result from an equivalent difference in the the causing physical phenomena. Otherwise we've invoked some other non- physical causal factor.

I'll put it another way. Physical difference result in mental differences correct? So let's split up physical differences into two types, structural, and content-determining.

A structural physical difference results in different structures of epiphenomena. So for example, glaucoma, is an example of of structural physical difference. As if I have glaucoma the structure or my experiences will be different from yours. You'll have XXY and I'll have LLL for example. I won't be able to tell that the last object has a different color. There is a clearly measurable difference in behavior.

A content-deciding physical difference results in different epiphenomena. So assuming neither of us is colorblind (neither of us has structural physical differences), it is still possible that you are having XXY and I am having something like AAB. We would still be able to communicate. But the content-deciding physical difference is what makes me have AAB as opposed to XXY.

My point is, we can never find out what the content-deciding physical differences are. Because, although they exist, we have no way of surveying the dependent variable. If you have XXY and I have AAB no test will tell me exactly why. I can come up with any number of physical differences between us that can account for the difference in experience. The size of your toe could be what's causing you to have AAB for all I know. So I can never narrow it down.

On the other hand, structural physical differences are very easy to see. Because we can test for the dependent variable (the structure). You can ask me to name the color of 3 objects, and if I can't distinguish, then you can scan my brain and compare it to people who CAN distinguish. In this case, you will be able to find out exactly what physical differences bring about color blindness. That is because you were able to test for the dependent variable (the structure).

Why introduce something for which there's no evidence? — Isaac

I am not definitively saying that our experiences are different I'm saying they could be. There is just as much reason to assume they are the same as to assume they are different. The model doesn't become any more or any less complex by assuming either.

So if there's a difference of any sort whatsoever in the epiphenomena, it must result from an equivalent difference in the the causing physical phenomena. Otherwise we've invoked some other non- physical causal factor. — Isaac

Correct, and we will have no way to narrow down which physical phenomena is doing it. Because a difference in the content of the epiphenomena makes no difference as long as structure is maintained. So we cannot access the dependent variable to see how it changes (because it makes no difference how it changes)

What is the experience of red of someone who is colourblind but does not know it? — unenlightened

Yes, :ok: if we can address it without slipping back into the Cartesian version, as possibly here,

23 odd years of talking about something he could not see and not noticing that he could not see it. — unenlightened

... as though (on one reading) the problem (slash non-problem) is that he was seeing a different colour but calling it like us.

Better to address it as: what class of things (even better: class of illumination events) was he associating with any one thing he called red, i.e. what things was he disposed to call red, i.e. what was the extension of "red" when he asserted it of a thing?

And then, what if anything does that difference in our external reds have to do with our colour discourse which purports to talk about internal reds?

So you seem back to intrinsically private again. If subjectivity is not the cause of a thing being intrinsically private, then what is? — Isaac

I've said from the outset that subjectivity has both private and public aspects. On reflection, though, perhaps it should be that subjectivity has both intrinsically private (unshareable) and non-intrinsically private (shareable) aspects.

Originally, my view was basically that the internal (e.g. feeling of pain) was private and the external (e.g. expression of pain) was public. Your questioning on the matter has led me to reassess the distinction between subjectivity and intersubjectivity. What is expressed (e.g. an expression of pain) now seems better categorised as intersubjectivity. However, I have trouble giving up the idea that there remains a degree of subjectivity in the expression of subjective experience, i.e. in the intersubjective, especially since those expressions are made by individual subjects. Maybe intersubjectivity also requires an element of understanding rather than mere expression (or sharing). If a lion could talk...

As you see above, I do not think I am red or have a red or a red experience, and I don't believe you do either. I see red things, — unenlightened

You probably are reddish here or there. Most probably your blood is red, for instance.

(Hey, I can nitpick too)

Yes, Popper saw himself as Kantian.

It is not a mistake. because it cannot be recognised as a thing. "I see a red apple" means I see a thing in the world that is red. There is nothing in my interior world that is red. But "an experience of red" suggests that the red is in my head in my interior world (whatever that is). But I don't see colour in my experiences, because I never look at them - my eyes point outwards not inwards. It is a linguistic construction that is mistaken for a thing The experience of seeing cannot be seen and thus cannot be coloured. Only what is seen is coloured and never the experience of seeing. — unenlightened

Again, I think that's obviously a mistaken proposition. We all "look" at our experiences, we look at them with our minds. If we didn't we'd have no memory, as that's what memory is, looking at our experiences. So when you look at a red apple, and turn away and later talk about it, you are looking at your experience of having seen a red apple and this is what allows you to talk about it. When you understand that this is the reality of the situation, that your mind (your "interior world") is necessarily the medium between the red apple, and talking about the red apple, then the interior world is necessarily a "thing" which we can talk about. Otherwise we cannot account for our capacity to talk about remembered things.

I think you'll find that it's very clear that you don't see colour with your eyes. "Colour" refers to a generic concept, grasped only by your mind, while your eyes see particular instances of different colours. It really doesn't matter that people say "I see colour with my eyes" because our common expressions do not represent what is really the case, they are just formed around facilitating communication. We also say that the sun comes up, and the sun goes down. We need to get beyond what the common expression appears to mean, to understand what is really the case in that situation referred to by "I see colour with my eyes".

Hey, frank - what's your take on reality?

I think it an odd question; perhaps your answering it will make clearer what it is you are after...? — Banno

I think that question was put on the table by the OP. MU expressed my view pretty well:

If it can be recognized by you as a thing, then by that fact, it has made a difference, and cannot be excluded as non-existent. — Metaphysician Undercover

That's indubitable. Theories are secondary (in my view). People who reverse that and put theories first are acting out some psychological shenanigans.

I understand the idea that the psyche is not really as private as it seems, the ego being the part that claims privacy for itself and the rest obviously open to instinct, cultural heritage, collective unconscious, or whatever

Plato would agree with this. Schopenhauer would, so my philosophical heroes are in that camp, but maybe not in the direction you're pushing toward? I don't know. You're not being explicit about the direction you're going in ontologically, and I don't expect that to change.

So I make up an OP who is arguing that subjective privacy is an illusion because the ego itself is, but as opposed to opening up to idealism, as this view traditionally does, we go in the deadened direction of eliminativism.

In this setting, making the ego an illusion should also make the whole world into an illusion. There's nobody in this thread who will take up this side of the topic and explore it, so it just lays there, poor thing.

Thanks for asking.

Can maps be more or less adequate to the territory? — Janus

I guess, sure, but “more or less” is pretty open-ended and “adequate” doesn’t say much.

What’s the catch?

We all "look" at our experiences, we look at them with our minds. If we didn't we'd have no memory, as that's what memory is, looking at our experiences. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, we don't.

Memory is not looking at experiences, because one can remember in the dark. I remember the last time I was in the chip shop, the smell of hot fat and vinegar, the soft shine of the stainless steel counter and the bubbly battered fish hot under the lights. But I am looking at the words appearing on the computer screen and smelling the clean washing just out from the dryer.

There is no confusion of memory and experience, even if the memories are vivid, as they often are, though there might be, if one were not fully conscious. You can imagine me typing, my wife can see me typing, and neither of you confuses their actual seeing with their imagining or remembering by and large. "The mind's eye" is a metaphor, and you are allowing a turn of phrase to deceive you again.

In fact there is a test for eidetic memory (which in my case I have not got), in which you have to compare memory to present experience by 'as it were' superimposing them. This illustrates both how very different they are and how hard it is for most of us to put them together.

the schema of conceptions are entirely the product of imagination, which is sufficient reason for justifying that I can name any perception of mine, any damn thing I want.
— Mww

Right, so as I said above it is not possible to create a private language (one constructed entirely in private terms) but it is possible to have private names for things that can be pointed to. We seem to be in agreement. — Janus

Close, but not entirely. If I combine a few imagined, private, names in an organized composition, wouldn’t I have created an imagined, private language? Note there is yet no incursion of meaning, intentionality, or explanation. There is only composition from extended representations relating to each other, which sufficiently defines the conception of language in the first place (contra Witt), as yet having nothing to do with the use of it.

“....When we say: “every word in language signifies something” we have so far said nothing whatsoever; unless we have explained exactly what distinction we wish to make...”
(Wittgenstein, P.I.,1,13, in Anscombe, 1958)

there is an experience of red of someone who cannot see red. — unenlightened

Nice plot twist.

Popper saw himself as Kantian. — Olivier5

I will try not to hold it against him.

Sure, you can play chess by yourself. It's still a game for two players.

Yes of course, some maps are more accurate (or less inaccurate) than others, for a given purpose. — Olivier5

So, we must know something of the territory in order to be able to say that some maps (or models) are more accurate than others?

Close, but not entirely. If I combine a few imagined, private, names in an organized composition, wouldn’t I have created an imagined, private language? — Mww

I guess it depends on how you define 'language'. It seems to me that you could create a private set of words, and even phrases, for things you can visualize.This invites the question as to just how much, with what degree of complexity, we can think without language. It seems we learn the more complex concepts through language and other forms of interaction with others which are only possible in a linguistic culture. It certainly doesn't seem possible that and English speaker could create a private language anywhere near as complex and comprehensive as English without relying on English to do it. This reliance would mean that the created language is not entirely, or even mostly, private at all.

I guess, sure, but “more or less” is pretty open-ended and “adequate” doesn’t say much.

What’s the catch? — Mww

The catch is, as I replied above to Olivier5, that we must know something of the territory in order to determine that some maps are more accurate than others. The question is how do we know anything of the territory if not through maps (models or representations or whatever you want to call them)? ( I'm not suggesting we don't; I'm asking the question because I think we must).

So, we must know something of the territory in order to be able to say that some maps (or models) are more accurate than others? — Janus

Indeed, we can only map what we know, or think we know. Nevertheless, the map will never be the territory, for a host of reasons e.g.

1. A representation of something is by definition not the thing it represents. As Magritte put it, this is not a pipe.

2. The territory keeps changing, so maps are always outdated.

3. No map can be exhaustive of all possible variables and dimensions, and in any case map users are not interested in knowing all there is to know about a territory, only some aspects of the territory would typically interest them.

4. We don’t know everything about the territory, so cannot map everything.

5. Such a map would have the same size as the territory and would be quite useless as a map.

As far as the playing of the game is concerned, there are two players if I am playing both colors. The quality of the game isn’t the least affected no matter who’s moving the pieces, as long as the movements conform to the rules.

Popper appreciates you respecting his metaphysical dispositions. If it’s any consolation.....Einstein didn’t.

I still wouldn't be talking about "my experience of red" as if it were something similar or different to "your experience of red"...

What is the experience of red of someone who is colourblind but does not know it? — unenlightened

Mustn’t my experience of red (as a non-colourblind person) and your friend’s experience of red be different, just as they would be different if your friend was blind and unable to see? My ability to distinguish red from green, or your friend’s inability, is not due to linguistic fluency. Therefore, isn’t the difference of experience at least part of what it means to be blind or colourblind?