You just arbitrarily believe that though material events can cause immaterial events, the reverse is not true. — Bartricks

Not arbitrarily. Though, again, it must seem so to you since your highest form of evidence is "It seems to me that way".

But a) nothing in the idea of material/immaterial causation violates those laws — Bartricks

False. You just don't understand them. Seeing as you are attributing physical laws to non physical things. I'll say it again, hopefully it sticks: Energy is literally only defined for physical things. It makes no sense to talk of energy that is not that of a physical thing. Same with momentum, mass, velocity, torque, etc.

And the funny part is, you whole argument for why the mind is immaterial was that you can't ask about its mass or color. Yet here you are repeatedly doing exactly that.

b) if it did, then your view involves a violation of them as well. For how, exactly, does a material event cause an immaterial event without that involving a transfer of energy? — Bartricks

Attributing energy to minds makes as little sense as attributing color to minds.

You know what, forget conservation of energy. You seem incapable of using the term correctly. So let's look at another conservation law that is more difficult to misuse. Conservation of momentum.

Are you going to propose that minds gain momentum and gives it back later in order to cause a change of momentum in the brain (which is just movement)? For a mind to gain momentum that would necessarily mean it has mass and velocity. That would make it a physical thing. But it isn't. So minds don't gain momentum. Therefore if a change of momentum occurs in the brain that is caused by the mind, then momentum is not conserved (as the mind couldn't have gained or lost any momentum, so any change it causes must be a net increase or decrease of momentum, which violates the law)

I decided - mental event - to raise my arm, and my arm raised - sensible event.

If all the evidence is that my mind is an immaterial thing, then what we have there is evidence that immaterial events can and do cause sensible events. — Bartricks

"Event B followed event A therefore A must have caused B"

Can't say I expected much better from you at this point but wow.

The problem is that materialism cannot explain how consciousness can arise from non-conscious stuff (e.g., working brain) when that stuff is put together a certain way. It can't even hint at the framework of a possible explanation. It can try and avoid the problem by claiming consciousness is illusionary, or other such non-sense, but that era is almost over.

The explanation is that consciousness cannot arise from non-conscious stuff. It's an absurdity. Since we know consciousness exists, therefore, we know there is no non-conscious stuff.

Now, what do you think the mind-body problem is, and how was it solved?

Yeah - on reflection I agree: it's a bad idea t mix descriptions - poor grammar.

2b. I decide to move my arm because certain neurones fired — khaled

No; your decision was not based on your knowledge of the firing of certain neurones.

1b. My arms move because certain neurons fired — khaled

Yep.

SO we nmight look for the connection that makes some of these mixes work, but not others.

No; your decision was not based on your knowledge of the firing of certain neurones. — Banno

Not knowledge of. Just that neurons firing caused my decision. And also the movement. In a pair.

I would even be willing to bet that they were the same neurons! But I don't know enough neurology to say so for sure. Though I think Isaac might have said something similar a while ago.

Mental events appear to cause sensible events, yes? — Bartricks

I didn't say otherwise.

If all the evidence is that my mind is an immaterial thing, then what we have there is evidence that immaterial events can and do cause sensible events. — Bartricks

"Material thing" - what's that , then? Is temperature a material thing? Light?

Let's drop that word, for fear of it leading us astray. Instead, go back to:

Two descriptions:
1. My arms move because I decide to move my arm,
2. Certain neurone fire, causing specific muscle fibres to contract.

One event. — Banno

Could you bring yourself to concur? We may not be disagreeing.

...neurons firing caused my decision. — khaled

I can't avoid the image of you sitting there saying "Ah, my c-fibres are firing - I think I might move my arm!" Or on my asking "why did you move your arm?", you reply "Because my c-fibres fired...!"

Nuh. You don't think that. SO what's going on?

Or on my asking "why did you move your arm?", you reply "Because my c-fibres fired...!" — Banno

Well we both agree there.

1b. My arms move because certain neurons fired
— khaled
Yep. — Banno

I can't avoid the image of you sitting there saying "Ah, my c-fibres are firing - I think I might move my arm!" — Banno

There is no buildup there (or any reason) for me to say that. My c-fibers would fire. And then I would feel like moving my arm. And also my arm would move shortly after (not sure if the c-fibers also did that part or not).

I would later say "I felt like raising my arm so I raised my arm". And by that I would mean "I raised my arm because my c-fibers fired, which, incidentally, is also what caused me to feel like raising my arm".

The former implies the latter. I felt like raising my arm, so the c-fibers must have fired. That also leads me to raise my arm. The "I felt like raising my arm so" is not meant to imply that the feeling is causal.

Nuh. You don't think that. SO what's going on? — Banno

Not sure what I said to make you think so. I've been saying that the brain causes both the act and the intent since the very start.

I didn't say otherwise. — Banno

That's why I said "yes?" just to confirm that you agree.

"Material thing" - what's that , then? Is temperature a material thing? Light? — Banno

Something extended in space.

A 'thing' incidentally, is a bearer of properties. So, if something is extended in space, then there will be a boundary between the space it occupies and the space it doesn't. Therefore it will have a shape. Shape is not a thing, but the property of a thing. Temperature would also be a property of a thing.

I don't think material things exist - I don't think they make sense - but 'if' they exist, then I think there's no problem with them interacting with immaterial things. Immaterial things, btw, are things that are not extended in space.

Let's drop that word, for fear of it leading us astray. Instead, go back to: — Banno

Fine by me - I call them 'sensible objects'. Let's call them that, for that term is neutral between materialist and immaterialist interpretations of them. Plus there is no dispute that my arm is a sensible object.

One event. — Banno

No, obviously not. My decision is a mental event. No doubt it was caused by a sensible event. But it is a mental event. And it causes a sensible event.

You - you - think that material events cause immaterial ones, yes?

So explain how that is consistent with the physical laws you're mentioning. Do. It.

The problem is that materialism cannot explain how consciousness can arise from non-conscious stuff (e.g., working brain) when that stuff is put together a certain way. It can't even hint at the framework of a possible explanation. It can try and avoid the problem by claiming consciousness is illusionary, or other such non-sense, but that era is almost over.

The explanation is that consciousness cannot arise from non-conscious stuff. It's an absurdity. Since we know consciousness exists, therefore, we know there is no non-conscious stuff.

Now, what do you think the mind-body problem is, and how was it solved? — RogueAI

If the mind is an immaterial object and not a material object, then one does not have to explain how consciousness arises from material substances, does one? It doesn't.

So, 'how can material objects be conscious?' They aren't. Consciousness is a property of an immaterial thing, not a material thing. As one will see if one attends to the evidence - the evidence provided by Plato, Avicenna, Descartes and the like.

This is how you get the mind/body problem: you 'assume' that the mind is the body, and then you have a problem. Silly, isn't it?

It's like me just assuming that my partner is not in the garden lopping down branches and then thinking "how is it that branches are just magically dropping from my trees, all neatly cut?".

How is it inconsistent?

The physical laws talk about how material things interact. I’m saying that interaction also causes minds and such.

Let’s look at conservation of momentum for example. When objects collide the total momentum of the system remains constant, assuming the system is closed. I am saying that when objects collide in a specific manner, minds pop out. What’s inconsistent in the latter statement with the former?

And besides, it’s weird that you ask me this when even you think that material events cause immaterial ones. Why am I the one that has to explain this supposed inconsistency away?

And I like how you completely ignore the entirety of my comment and address nothing. And instead ask me to deal with a non-existent inconsistency that is in both of our positions.

Address what I said. Or don’t waste my time. Do. It.

assuming the system is closed. — khaled

By 'closed' do you mean to exclude immaterial objects? If so, then you are begging the question.

If the system includes them, then two-way interaction between the material and the immaterial will not violate the law.

But anyway, you now allow, clearly, that one thing can cause another without transferring any energy to it, yes?

By 'closed' do you mean to exclude immaterial objects? — Bartricks

No. This is elementary school physics. Closed means no energy exchange from outside the system to inside it or vice versa. If it is too complicated for you just consider the whole universe as a system. Momentum and energy are conserved in the universe.

If the system includes them — Bartricks

A physical system cannot include non physical things.

I am talking physics. Not non-physics. Which means it applies to, guess what, physical things! And you’re just talking nonsense.

And don’t repeat the “It’s begging the question to assume energy only applies to physical things”. No it isn’t. And I’ve explained why in multiple ways and I’m not going to repeat myself.

Is it begging the question to assume momentum only applies to physical things too? You want non physical things that have momentum? IE mass and velocity?

But anyway, you now allow, clearly, that one thing can cause another without transferring any energy to it, yes? — Bartricks

Don’t overgeneralize. I have no clue where you got this or what it means.

What I allow is that physical events cause non physical events.

Seriously, what does “one thing can cause another without transferring energy to it” mean? What is “it” here? An event? You don’t transfer energy to an event. A thing? You don’t cause a thing! Nonsense! Complete word salad!

I find it incredibly difficult to believe you’re not trolling again.

If the mind is an immaterial object and not a material object, then one does not have to explain how consciousness arises from material substances, does one? It doesn't.

If an immaterial mind is caused by the brain, there needs to be an explanation for how that works.

Something extended in space. — Bartricks

...so, European Autonomy is a material thing?

The One, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church is a material thing?

The traffic code of New South Wales is a material thing?

I don't think material things exist — Bartricks

I agree; but cups and chairs do.

I call them 'sensible objects'. Let's call them that, for that term is neutral between materialist and immaterialist interpretations of them. Plus there is no dispute that my arm is a sensible object. — Bartricks

No, because that's not right. The cup is more than just what I sense. Calling them such prejudges their existence outside sensibility. It won't do.

One event.
— Banno

No, obviously not. My decision is a mental event. No doubt it was caused by a sensible event. But it is a mental event. And it causes a sensible event. — Bartricks

Not obvious at all. Seems to me that you are stuck with an unhelpful sundering of the mental from the physical. I offered you a way to mend the break.

"No, because that's not right. The cup is more than just what I sense."

You're making an assumption here.

There is no buildup there (or any reason) for me to say that. My c-fibers would fire. And then I would feel like moving my arm. And also my arm would move shortly after (not sure if the c-fibers also did that part or not). — khaled

Yes, I know that is what you want to say, but it still looks odd.

We seem to agree that movement happens because of neurons.

And that intents happen because of neurons. Or, at least that intents don’t cause movements (or else you get telekinesis), just precede them.

So what’s odd?

...so, European Autonomy is a material thing?

The One, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church is a material thing?

The traffic code of New South Wales is a material thing? — Banno

No, I refer you to my earlier answer.

I agree; but cups and chairs do. — Banno

Yes, not really the issue though.

No, because that's not right. The cup is more than just what I sense. Calling them such prejudges their existence outside sensibility. It won't do. — Banno

Well, we're not going to have a profitable conversation then, are we? I am going to call them sensible objects because in that way no questions are begged.

Not obvious at all. Seems to me that you are stuck with an unhelpful sundering of the mental from the physical. I offered you a way to mend the break. — Banno

No, you're just an amateur. The direction of help is me to you, not you to me.

334
↪Banno "No, because that's not right. The cup is more than just what I sense."

How do you know that? — RogueAI

It has an extended place in the world.

It is more than just what I sense, because you see it, too.

It is more than just what I sense, because I once mistook it for a bowl - it looked like a bowl, not a cup. My senses were mistaken. If it were just my senses, it would have become a bowl instead of a cup.

That'll do.

No, I refer you to my earlier answer. — Bartricks

All three are extended in space...?

I am going to call them sensible objects because in that way no questions are begged. — Bartricks

:rofl:

No.

No, you're just an amateur. — Bartricks

You get paid?

I used to get paid to do philosophy, back when I were a lad.

Once, long ago, amateurs were held in higher regard than professionals, because professionals only did it for the dollars, while amateurs did it for love.

Ah, well, it's long been suspected that @NOS4A2 was being paid, by the Kremlin, perhaps, or North Korea. Who pays you to post here?

Yeah, they are. So they match your definition.

Look, it ain't my fault your definition seems to include odd material things.

They're not extended in space. They're not objects and they're not extended in space (unless you meant actual churches - as in the buildings - they are, of course).

They're not objects and they're not extended in space... — Bartricks

The One True Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church is extended in space - it's in Italy, Canada, Brazil - how odd that you should deny this.

if something is extended in space, then there will be a boundary between the space it occupies and the space it doesn't. — Bartricks

The traffic code of NSW is extended in space, having "a boundary between the space it occupies and the space it doesn't", just like you said. Hence, by your definition it is a material thing.

Yeah, might leave it. I think we agree more than not. Agreed?

The One True Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church is extended in space - it's in Italy, Canada, Brazil - how odd that you should deny this. — Banno

This is getting tedious as it is beside the point. But no, it isn't extended in space, because what you're talking about is a set of beliefs - yes? - and they're not extended in space. Coz they're mental states - states of mind - and minds aren't extended in space.

Or you're talking about the bodies of the believers - yes, those are extended in space if, that is, material objects exist (which they don't).

Or you're talking about the churches the bodies of these people go and hang around in. Those are extended in space (if material objects exist, that is, which they don't).

I have not argued that immaterial minds are caused by the brain. Consciousness is a state of mind, yes? It's not a thing. It's a state. A state of a thing.

Minds are immaterial. There's a ton of evidence that they are, and none - I stress, none - that they are not.

Sensible events clearly have affects on our minds. They often alter what conscious state they are in. The wine in the glass in front of me is a sensible substance. If I down it, this will affect my conscious states.

My decision to drink the wine is a mental event. It causes - or seems to be causing - my arm to raise the wine to my face. The drinking of the wine is also a sensible event. And the improved mood that the wine induces is mental.

You can perform these experiments yourself. Indeed, one is happening right now - for these words are appearing on a sensible computer screen and you're seeing them and thinking about them. Your visual sensations and your thoughts are mental states.

Clearly then, a quick survey of how things appear to be reveals that there is plenty of causal interaction between the sensible and the immaterial.

Do I have to explain how that occurs? Nope. Not sure what an 'explanation' would be in this context. But anyway, one is not owed. One does not have to be able to explain how something is the case, before one has evidence that it is the case.

My typing on the keyboard is clearly affecting what appears on the screen in front of me. I have excellent evidence for this. Yet I haven't a clue how it is happening.