If I say "it's necessary for you to buy me some butter" what do I mean? Do I mean that it is a necessary truth that you will buy me some butter? No, clearly not. I mean that it is urgent, important, imperative, that you do so. That's typically what words such as 'must' 'always' 'never' and so on mean when we use them.

So, the language of necessity is used in everyday life not to describe the world, but simply to emphasize things - that is, it functions 'expressively'. — Bartricks

Yes, I'd say that "necessary" here means that there is good reason for it.

But philosophers - most, anyway - think that there is this weird thing 'metaphysical necessity'. It's a strange glue that binds things immovably. So, a 'necessary truth', on their usage, is not a truth it is extremely important that you believe (which is what it'd be if the word 'necessary' was functioning expressively), but a truth that cannot be anything other than true - so a proposition that has truth bonded to it so strongly that it can never come away. — Bartricks

Oh, I see the problem, you think there is some sort of "metaphysical necessity" referred to, which is a "strange glue" , and that's why you don't like the usage. I suggest you just release that idea of a metaphysical necessity, and just look at "necessity" here in the normal way, as meaning "good reason", and your problem will be solved.

Now, 'that' kind of necessity - metaphysical necessity - is the kind that I am suggesting we can dispense with. It is really just a case, I think, of us taking language that normally functions expressively, literally. As such we can dispense with it. — Bartricks

OK, I agree there's no need to assume this "metaphysical necessity". But do you agree that when the conclusion follows logically from the premises, then it is "necessary" in the normal sense, meaning that there is good reason for it?

It's just when I draw a conclusion, I think the conclusion 'is' true, whereas others will think that it is 'necessarily' true. But there's no real difference. It's not like there are two grades of truth. There are just true propositions and false propositions and a story to tell about how they got to be that way. — Bartricks

I tend to think that there are different grades of truth, depending on the reasons the person has for believing what is believed. True or false is a judgement we make, and the judgement can be made for a variety of different reasons, some better than others. So, suppose that the truth of the conclusion is dependent on both the truth of the premises, and the strength of the logic employed. If this is the case, then the truth of the premise is a higher grade of truth than the truth of the conclusion, because it is more likely that the conclusion would be false.