If, however, you agree that we know consciousness is real, then we at minimum can claim to have discovered three things being real: matter, energy, and the consciousness via which these are known. — javra
Excuse the limitations of the English language via which this is expressed, but not everything will be a thing, i.e. an entity. Processes are for example known to occur, and a process - though being something - is not a thing/entity. — javra
As of yet, no. And they may never be able to.
— Philosophim
Is this not the hard problem in a nutshell? — javra
You can propose that consciousness is some magical entity
— Philosophim
That's not what I proposed, but it's not surprising that it is how you read it. You show no sign of having actually grasped the argument that I proposed, so I'll give up. — Wayfarer
But we can't talk realistically, and rationally, about things which we have no knowledge of being real.
— Philosophim
There's a lot written about dark matter. — Wayfarer
No one, including philosophers and other breeds of thinkers from the world of science and other fields, will ever undertake anything worthwhile if fae doesn't have a stake in it whatever that may be. It would be superfluous to mention the man on the Clapham omnibus at this point. Given this is so, rationalization seems inevitable and is likely to be universal - happening everywhere, anywhere, to anybody. — TheMadFool
What does it mean for an idea to 'match' or 'correspond' with reality? — Wayfarer
. So far, the only thing we have discovered in the universe is matter and energy.
— Philosophim
Thereby 'affirming the consequent.' You frame the question in a certain way, and it means there's only a certain type of answer that will be accepted. — Wayfarer
the objective sciences can't in principle provide complete description of the first-person point-of-view — Wayfarer
Philosophim, for instances, simply assumes that there’s no difference between enzymes and concepts — Wayfarer
Let’s assume nothing is eternal. Either this is true for a limited time, or for all eternity. — leo
But what if one knew - using the model - that a given goal could not be pursued? — TVCL
Are you sure? Let's think about that. Now, I agree with you that knowledge as-such is not a goal, but what of the idea of positing a goal to be pursued if one does not believe that the goal can be attained? We can either say that a goal is a belief or at least based upon a belief: the implicit belief that the goal can be pursued. Now, like any belief, the goal is a working hypothesis - one knows that they can pursue a goal in so far as it is non-contradictory and in so far as the can, in fact, pursue it. — TVCL
Admittedly, at this point the argument only goes as far as to argue that the model can reveal what sets of goals one should have in reference to their hierarchy of goals or even their primary goals. — TVCL
it does not yet give an argument for which primary goal we should have as opposed to another. The only thing that is worth adding to this is that the model will reveal that not all primary goals are possible because some simply cannot be pursued. — TVCL
I've read the first and second of your essays, but neither address the degree to which deductive beliefs form networks. — Isaac
Nonetheless, there's an attempt to reason, no matter how contrived or affected, even in rationalization, right? Commendable in spirit then, if not in letter. — TheMadFool
Faith is not an valid argument. — Gus Lamarch
Just as the model allows us to discover which means do or do not facilitate the attainment of particular goals, it allows us to discover which goals we can or cannot pursue as-such. After all, if one's belief that a given goal can be pursued cannot be put into action, that belief is not applicable and is therefore not knowledge. Therefore, if we are seeking knowledge the process of discovery will rule out those goals that cannot be pursued. — TVCL
Given the model, we should search for knowledge if we want to be better equipped to pursue our goals. — TVCL
What I am saying is that the theory that brain = mind is a default position, a theory, not a proven fact. — EnPassant
Evidence can be data, physical facts or convincing argument. But in your world view - if I understand you correctly - only physical facts are admissible as evidence. — EnPassant
How do you decide which is the first premise? Is it just the one you first thought of (temporally arranged)? In my example - A belief that A and a belief that evidence exists contrary to A (which we're calling a belief that B) - which is the 'first' premise and why? — Isaac
3) Physics can never show "WHY" Reality behaves as it does until we understand its inherent flaws. — Chris1952Engineer
I can put the same question to you; what evidence is there that the brain is conscious? — EnPassant
So why can't someone offer an alternative theory? — EnPassant
Provide some evidence of a mind existing apart from the brain
— Philosophim
It doesn't work like that. — EnPassant
The Greeks invented geometry to measure the physical world. Their calculations are congruent with the actual world which is why they were able to create their famous architectural pieces. This means that geometry and deduction about the world is very similar, if not identical, to the objective world. So, to a large extent, we are conscious of what is actually there. — EnPassant
Either way, how do you avoid the problem I mentioned at the beginning that one cannot distinguish the presence/absence of evidence from unchecked belief? — Isaac
Induction is not the recognition of patterns. Induction is drawing a conclusion that does not necessarily conclude from the premises, or evidence involved. — Philosophim
That's not induction specifically, that's just any invalid inference. — Pfhorrest
Induction doesn't give you certainty like deduction does, but noticing patterns (which is all induction really amounts to) is still a way to form beliefs — Pfhorrest
It's not until you wonder to yourself "is that really right though?" — Pfhorrest
You may not necessarily have thoroughly vetted the idea yet, so that belief may not count as knowledge. If you have thoroughly vetted it, such that you would have already found that it was false if it were false, then you know it. — Pfhorrest
The issue of whether a belief is 'examined' is another matter - the effort one puts in to gather even more external data relevant to the belief. Here the issue is scaler and the answer can be none, but in fifteen years of working on beliefs I've yet to see any evidence of a single belief which is 'unexamined' in this sense. — Isaac
A question that I think is worth considering is, in what sense do numbers exist? — Wayfarer
One question I would ask is this: is there anything that exists that does not have a temporal beginning and ending (i.e. begins and ends in time) and is not composed of parts? — Wayfarer
Actually, the human mind is capable of far outstripping the requirements for 'successfully interpreting the world'. Any animal must do that if it is to survive. But h. sapiens has gone far beyond what can be rationalised solely in terms of the requirements for survival. You don't need to be able to weigh and measure the Universe just to get by. — Wayfarer
Of course but that is because the interface/brain has been damaged. If a camera is damaged you can not see through it but that does not mean the camera sees. The body is an interface between the mind and the world. If the interface is damaged then of course information cannot reach the mind. But the mind is also conscious independently of the body. For example, it can think and it can say 'I think therefore I am'. The mind's knowledge is not restricted to the five senses. — EnPassant
What has been established is that there is a physical analogue of the mind's interaction with the world via the brain. — EnPassant
If you replace the meter stick with geometry you'll get very close. Geo-metry means 'earth measuring'. — EnPassant
There is no evidence that the brain is conscious. What does exist is a materialistic dogma that insists there is no difference between the brain analogue and the mind. It is simply dogma. — EnPassant
No, because the mind is the processing brain.
— Philosophim
That has yet to be established. — EnPassant
The question is; how closely does subjective experience resemble the objective reality that is the source of that experience? — EnPassant
But that does not mean the physical context is consciousness. — EnPassant
I guess technically on my account there is no such thing as an unexamined “belief“, because that would just be a “perception”: belief are what you get when you examine your perceptions and either affirm or deny their accuracy. — Pfhorrest
Emotions are not a bad thing. They are just another way to think, in fact. — Olivier5
What on earth is an "emotional argument"? :chin: — TheMadFool
what I'm saying is that such a situation is neurologically impossible. No matter how much you insist you did, there is no know (or even plausible) mechanism by which a belief can be formed without the sensory, or interoceptive inputs to form it. — Isaac
The abstract point I'm making is we can have beliefs that are examined, and beliefs that are unexamined. Is an unexamined belief knowledge? — Philosophim
"If the body is a physical context, then can't we extend this reasoning further and argue that the pain is not really in the brain either, but in the mind? — EnPassant
If we are locating things in the body can't it also be argued that neuroscience is locating/contextualizing experience in a physical context in the brain but the real conscious experience is outside the physical context altogether? — EnPassant
Indeed, can physical matter, no matter how complex, have experiences? — EnPassant
Do 'we' know that? What does 'produce' mean, here? What is it that is being produced? And how is it being produced? And, is the brain 'a physical thing?' Extract a brain from a human, and it is still the same matter, but it's now an inert object, even though it's stil a physical thing. When situated in a living being, the brain has more neural connections than stars in the sky. It is no longer simply an object, but a central part of cognition and is central to any possible theory, including any theory about 'what is physical'. So in what sense is it a 'physical thing' in that context? — Wayfarer
But the fact of the existence of this school shows that the ground is already shifting towards a more 'mind-like' and top-down causal model of life and mind. — Wayfarer
But as I've said - the contrary also works, and that is demonstrable by observation and experiment. Humans can perform mental acts which alter the physical configuration of the brain. A physical change to a brain is through injury or a medicine or substance which literally alters the material structure. But if the structure is altered through a volitional act, then that is mental in origin. — Wayfarer
That is 'brain-mind identity theory'. But 'wetness' does not stand in the relationship to hydrogen and oxygen that consciousness does in relation to matter. — Wayfarer
Besides, consciousness does not only work within the brain, it is present at some level in the operation of all living organisms. — Wayfarer
So, you're operating within the latter explanatory framework. So any 'theory of consciousness' that I would try and submit, would have to fit within that explanatory framework. But there's a fundamental problem with that, because to do so requires treating 'res cogitans' as an object - which it never is. There is no object anywhere called 'mind'. You can only deal with the question if you can conceive of the subject of the question in objective terms. — Wayfarer
Can you really think of a scenario where you'd have zero justification though? — Isaac
Government forbidding or not, what does this have to do with people respecting other peoples exercising their right to vote to suppress other people's rights to vote? Not trying to be hostile, just curious about this answer. — The Questioning Bookworm
On my account, you were weakly justified to believe your friend went on a date at first, and then when observation that could have falsified that didn't, your justification increased. It's difficult to state that in the terminology of "knowledge", because it's odd to say something like you "knew a little" at first and then "knew a lot" later. — Pfhorrest
And you're simply assuming the opposite. And, what is 'physical', anyway? What does it mean? — Wayfarer
My point, exactly. Can't be fit into the bottom-up scenario. — Wayfarer
Have you ever heard Karl Popper's expresssion 'the promissory notes of materialism'? This refers to the tendency to say in just such cases, 'hey, science hasn't figured it out yet, but we will! It's just a matter of time!' — Wayfarer
— Wikipedia (For Chalmers) — Wayfarer
A nonreductive theory of consciousness will consist in a number of psychophysical principles, principles connecting the properties of physical processes to the properties of experience. We can think of these principles as encapsulating the way in which experience arises from the physical. — Philosophim
— Howard Pattee — Wayfarer
In other words, because semantic and semiotic laws can't be derived from physical laws. — Wayfarer
