We can ‘see’ things through deductive inference that are not empirically knowable. There’s a sense in which even arithmetic is transcendental in that it reveals aspects of nature which sense could not otherwise discern. — Wayfarer

The problem with transcendental arithmetic.

For example, using deductive inference it is possible to prove that the sum of every two integers is always even, something that is not provable empirically.

Deductive inference requires strong axioms and logic. In the above example, one axiom is that a + b = b + a.

However the axiom has been determined prior to any deductive inference, meaning that any result of the deductive inference depends on the axioms chosen. If a different axiom had been chosen, a different result would have been deductively inferred.

A transcendental situation is where not only i) has the axiom been determined prior to the result of the deductive inference but also ii) the axiom has been determined by the result of the deductive inference.

How would this be logically possible?

So we shouldn't limit a robust correspondence theory to "facts about the world" — J

The question is, where is this "world", inside or outside the mind.

The relationship between the Correspondence Theory and Truth is an enormous subject, as indicated by the SEP articles on Truth and The Correspondence Theory. The Merriam Webster Dictionary has a range of definitions of "truth", and the word "truth" may be used both literally and as a figure of speech.

Even if we adopt the schema "snow is white" is true IFF snow is white, which relates something in language to something in the world, the next question is where is this world. The answer depends on individual opinion, whether one is a metaphysical Realist or Metaphysical Idealist, never mind all the sub-divisions of these two positions.

For example, are there infinitely many prime numbers.

Initially, we can use the Schema and say that the proposition "there are infinitely many prime numbers" is true IFF there are infinitely many prime numbers.

However, Euclid has proved that there are.

Therefore, we can use the Correspondence Theory and say that the proposition "there are infinitely many prime numbers" is true because there are infinitely many prime numbers.

The proposition "there are infinitely many prime numbers" exists in language.

The next question is, where do these infinitely many prime numbers exist.

In particular, where does the number 23 exist? Some say only inside the mind and some say both inside and outside the mind.

However, regardless of where the prime numbers exist, the Correspondence Theory is still valid.

That is, how can being be in one sense "one," i.e. everything interacts with everything else, there are no truly isolated systems — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, Aristotle considered the Platonic argument that he called "The One Over The Many", whose premiss might be expressed as "Whenever two or more things can be properly said to be F, it is by virtue of some thing, F-ness, that they are properly called F"

In the world are observed numerous atoms (philosophically speaking).

For the observer, atom A and atom B are part of one apple and atom C is part of a different apple.

For me, the problem about objects existing in a world independent of any observer, is, what mechanism is there in such a world independent of any observer that relates atom A to atom B but doesn't relate atom A to atom C?

1) So, the neo-logos philosophies might say something like, "If nature has patterns, and our language has patterns, and we are derived from nature, it may be the case that our language is a necessary outcome of a more foundational logic". Thus, the logic would not be transcendental, but (for lack of a better term) "immanent" in nature, not some outside observing entity that is detached from it.
2) Kant never explains why our minds would compose such a world, but evolution does.
3) Wouldn't evolution put a connection between the efficacy of the mind and the world?
4) But what is the world outside of an observer?
5) Otherwise it's just "I have believe" without an explanation, which though is valid in terms of asserting an idea, is not necessarily valid as an fully informed reason for why you think that way. — schopenhauer1

1) 2) 3) I agree in the sense that I believe in Enactivism, where life has evolved over 3 billion years in a dynamic interaction with its environment, meaning that life is a part of the world, not outside it.

2) Yes, Kant argues in the CPR that we have transcendental knowledge of a world the other side of our senses, but never explains how this could work.

4) We are an intrinsic part of the world as the tree is an intrinsic part of the world, but it doesn't follow that because we are an intrinsic part of the world we must necessarily have knowledge about the world that we are an intrinsic part of.

The problem remains that our only knowledge about any world the other side of our senses (sight, sound, taste, touch, smell) arrives through these very same senses.

5) For myself, as an Indirect Realist, I believe that there is a world the other side of my senses that has caused what I experience in my senses, and can justify my belief in such a world.

The problem remains, we may reason about what has caused the experiences in our senses, and arrive at beliefs about any world the other side of our senses, but how can we transcend our senses in order to know what has caused these experiences in our senses?

I know the colour red from my sense of sight. I may have a reasoned belief as to its cause, but how can I ever know its cause?

Even Enactivism (that life has evolved as an intrinsic part of the world) provides no mechanism whereby we can know what exists the other side of our senses.

This is Jha et al’s argument, more or less. Math only appears to be causal when we state the problem in terms that remove, or demote to “background conditions,” the physical constraints that actually provide the explanation. — J

This might be a possibility.

Is 1+1=2 a mathematical necessity in the world?

It initially seems that nothing in the world has caused 1+1 to be 2, supporting Lange's DME that mathematical necessity is stronger than contingent causation.

Where P = 1+1. The antecedent, the prior situation in the world.
Where R = 1+1=2. The explanans, the necessary mathematical law.
Where Q = 2. The consequent, the subsequent situation in the world.

Let P be one apple alongside apple, in other words 1+1
Let Q be a pair of apples, in other words 2.

But for there to be a pair of apples, this presupposes a prior relation between the individual apples.

In other words, the existence of a pair of apples has been caused by a prior relation between the individual apples.

Therefore, the mathematical law that 1+1=2 is a consequence of a prior relation between 1 and 1.

The prior relation between parts is the cause of the necessity of the mathematical law that 1+1=2.

(However, a subsequent question is, do relations ontologically exist in the world?)

So what I think needs to be questioned is why we think a hard and fast separation can be made between mind and world in the first place. — Wayfarer

:100:
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I think the sentiment against this relationship goes back to the same basically nominalist and empiricist attitude that animates most analytical philosophy, which is unwilling to admit that ideas - mathematical ideas, logical principles - might possess any kind of intrinsic reality which can't be reduced to 'contingent causal laws'. — Wayfarer

In our mind we have mathematical ideas such that ${d = 0.5 * g * t^{2}}$ (distance with time of a falling object under gravity), and logical principles such as the Law of Non Contradiction whereby I cannot feel pain and not feel pain at the same time.

If mathematical laws cannot be reduced to contingent causal laws, what caused d to be ${0.5 * g * t^{2}}$ rather than ${3.0 * g * t^{2}}$, for example?

If logical principles cannot be reduced to contingent causal laws, what caused my inability to feel pain and not to feel pain at the same time, for example?

That's a very creative image. But I don't see TS and Madonna in it at all. — Corvus

Can't you see Madonna in the eyes and a nose strikingly similar to that of Taylor Swift?

Yes, we are both perceiving an object that doesn't exist.

If a correspondence theory of truth demands that we do so, I'd argue that it represents a reductio ad absurdum and should be rejected on that ground. — J

Very harsh. The word "true" has different meanings in different contexts.

As regards the equation ${d = 0.5 * g * t^{2}}$, i) I can say that it is true, meaning that it works, ii) I can say that it is true, meaning that it has the correct structure of an equation, iii) I can say that it is true, meaning that it is important to me, as in a true friend, iv) I can say we don't know whether it is true or not, as we don't know what obtains in the world, v) I can say I don't know if it is true or not, as I don't know what the symbols represent.

The scientist can use meaning i) for "truth" and the philosopher can use meaning iv) for "truth".
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What would be the point of limiting ourselves in this way? — J

Yes, the correspondence theory does not tell us about things like pain, which, I believe, doesn't exist in the world.

In the proposition "it is true that I feel pain", what purpose does the word "true" have, in that the proposition says no more than "I feel pain"

It seems that "truth" only arises in the correspondence between the mind and the world.

So, without observers, nothing is related to anything whatever. That is the thrust of the OP — Wayfarer

It seems to me that the OP is about how the mind explains the world.

A sub-topic is about does the mind explain the world using mathematical necessity or causal contingency.
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As per above, this question can be asked not only of patterns, but of phenomena generally..........................There are patterns that appear in inorganic nature, in crystals, snowflakes, larva formations etc. — Wayfarer

I agree with the introduction to Pinter's book Mind and Cosmic Order

The book’s argument begins with the British empiricists who raised our awareness of the fact that we have no direct contact with physical reality, but it is the mind that constructs the form and features of objects. It is shown that modern cognitive science brings this insight a step further by suggesting that shape and structure are not internal to objects, but arise in the observer.

I read this as saying that patterns exist in the mind, not the world.

Is this meant to be Tarski's view? Surely he didn't talk about what was the case in the world -- only about the correct relations between language and metalanguage. If one language has to be "about the world," then we wouldn't have any logical or mathematical truths at all, or at least that seems to be the necessary consequence. I don't think Tarski intended this. Unless I'm mistaken, he included these kinds of truths in his schema. — J

I think of it as more the Correspondence Theory of Truth, in that a belief is true if there exists an appropriate entity, a fact, to which it corresponds. (SEP - Truth)

I agree that such a Correspondence Theory of Truth draws on ideas developed by Tarski, who was more concerned with mathematical logic than the metaphysics of truth (SEP - Truth).

Tarski's Semantic Theory of Truth (STT) is considered to be a version of Aristotle's Correspondence Theory of Truth, and treats truth as relative, rather than the classical approach of treating truth as absolute.

Considering the schema "snow is white" is true IFF snow is white, Tarski's STT only applies to formal languages, in that "snow is white" is within the object language whilst snow is white is within the metalanguage. Within the modern correspondence theory, "snow is white" is also within the object language whilst snow is white is a fact in the world.

It may well be that we don't know whether an equation is mathematically true or not, but pragmatically, does this matter as long as the equation works. All a scientist wants to know is that an equation works. Even if the scientist did know that the equation was a mathematical truth, this wouldn't affect their use of the equation.

An object in the world emits a wavelength of 700nm and I perceive a red light. I am driving a car, see a red light on a traffic light and know to stop. Have I stopped because I know the truth , that a wavelength of 700nm has been emitted from the traffic light, or have I stopped because I see a red light?

But, all organic life displays just the kind of functional unity that a painting does, spontaneously. Those patterns most definitely inhere in the organic world. DNA, for instance. — Wayfarer

Can the thought of a pattern in the mind explain the being of a pattern in the world

It is true that we can see many examples of patterns which we find have an aesthetic beauty, and which have arisen spontaneously because of the laws of nature. The web site Natural Form Patterns shows many examples.

We see patterns in the world, but the question is, do the patterns that we see exist in the world or only in our mind. Did patterns exist in the world prior to there being anyone to see them?

A pattern has a unity because of the particular way things are spatially and temporally related to each other, where the whole is more than the sum of its parts.

For example, we can see spatial relationships between the blobs of paint on a Monet canvas creating an aesthetic unity in our minds. However, in the absence of an observer, what is the ontological nature of the spatial relationship between these blobs of paint?

Do spatial and temporal relations ontologically exist in a world absent of any observer?

Because if within a world absent of observers, spatial and temporal relationships had no ontologically existence, then there would be no way of spatially and temporally relating disparate things together, meaning that in the world there would be no patterns, as a pattern can only exist if its parts are somehow related together.

For example, two Monet paintings are alongside each other, "St Lazare Station" and "Water-lilies". We, as observers, can see that there are two different paintings, where the blobs of paint in "St Lazare Station" make one unified whole, and the blobs of paint in "Water-lilies" make a different unified whole.

But in the absence of any observer, what mechanism exists in the world that relates one blob of paint in "St Lazare Station" to another blob of paint in "St Lazare Station" but not to another blob of paint in "Water-lilies"?

In the absence of any observer, how can thing A relate to thing B but not to thing C?

Because if either i) thing A neither related to thing B nor thing C or ii) thing A related to both thing B and thing C, then there would be no patterns existent in a world absent of any observer.

I understand. Do you think there are mathematical truths that are independent of what is the case in the world? Plain old theorems, in other words? — J

Taking an example. Do I think that the theorem "angles on one side of a straight line always add to 180°" is true independent of what is the case in the world.

What is truth?

My understanding of truth is that it is defined by the schema "snow is white" is true IFF snow is white, where "truth" is the correspondence between propositions in language and equations in mathematics and what is the case in the world.

If I am correct, then if a proposition in language or an equation in mathematics is independent of what is the case in the world, then by the definition of truth, such a proposition or equation can neither be true nor false.

A proposition may work, such as "the sun rises in the east" and an equation may work, such as "1 + 1 = 2", but the fact that they work doesn't mean that they are true, if truth is defined as a correspondence between something in the mind and something in the world.

The problem is knowing what is the case in the world.

I have found the SEP article on Mathematical Explanation, which I haven't read yet, but it should make clearer Lange's idea of dividing 23 strawberries equally amongst three friends.

So I assumed you regarded d=0.5∗g∗t2 as a mathematical truth. — J

I would agree that the equation ${d = 0.5 * g * t^{2}}$ is a mathematical truth IFF ${d = 0.5 * g * t^{2}}$ is the case in the world.

However, who knows what is the case in the world?

Who do you get if you amalgamate images of Elon Musk with Bill Gates.................................Why would you do that? — Corvus

To scare children on Halloween!?



https://openart.ai/discovery/sd-1006000370197221428

"Are the equations being imposed or simply reflected in the mathematics?" — schopenhauer1

Both. For 100 days we observe the sun rise in the east, and invent the rule "the sun rises in the east". The rule reflects past observations, but is no guarantee that the rule will still apply in the future. We impose the rule on the world, in the expectation that the rule will still apply in the future.
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Some neo-Logos philosophies might say the mind cannot but help seeing the very patterns that shape itself. — schopenhauer1

I'm with Kant on that.
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I can imagine a type of pattern whereby the mind works (X), and a pattern whereby the world works Y, and X may be caused by Y, but X is not the same as Y. — schopenhauer1

Exactly. A postbox emits a wavelength of 700nm ( Y) which travels to the eye which we perceive as the colour red (X), where our perceiving the colour red in the mind was caused by the wavelength of 700nm in the world.

There is the general principle that an effect may be different in kind to its cause. For example, the effect of a pane of glass breaking is different in kind to its cause of being hit by a stone.
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Is our language contingently relating with the world or necessarily relating to the world. — schopenhauer1

Perhaps the difference is temporal. Going forwards in time, from cause to effect, the pane of glass of necessity breaks when hit by the stone. Going backwards in time, from effect to cause, the breaking of the glass was contingent on being hit by a stone, but equally it could have been hit by a bird.
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I can see a sort of holistic beauty in the aesthetic of the language reflecting the world because it is derived from (the patterns) of the world. — schopenhauer1

Aesthetics is perceiving a unity in the whole from a set of disparate parts. For example, the magic of a Monet derives from the artist's deliberate attempt to create a unity out of a set of spatially separate blobs of paint on a canvas. Such a unity exists only in the mind of the observer, not in the world, in that one blob of paint of the canvas has no "knowledge" as to the existence of any other blob of paint on the canvas. Patterns only exist in the mind, not the world.

As patterns don't ontology exist in the world, but do exist in the mind, to say that patterns in the mind have derived from patterns in the world is a figure of speech rather than the literal truth.
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I can see a sort of nihilistic "contingency" in the aesthetic of language never really derived from, but only loosely reflecting the world. — schopenhauer1

Perhaps it is more the case that the aesthetic brings meaning out of the meaninglessness of nihilism. It is the aesthetic that discovers the unity of a whole within disparate parts, finds patterns in randomness and seeks sense out of senselessness. For example, the aesthetic of Picasso's Guernica shows us the possibility of a greater good born out of the nihilism of war, and the aesthetic of the mathematical equation shows us a greater understanding born out of a nihilistic Universe that is fundamentally isolated in time and space.

Are you sure we should call something like d=0.5∗g∗t2 a mathematical truth? I thought it was only true on some interpretation; as it stands, it has no meaning. — J

${d = 0.5 * g * t^{2}}$ is a mathematical equation and it works. It is true that it works, but that does not mean it is a mathematical truth.

@RussellA: Eventually, after many attempts, we invent the equation ${d = 0.5 * g * t^{2}}$, discover that it works, and keep it.................We know it works, but we don't know if it is a necessary truth.

What do you mean that the equation ${d = 0.5 * g * t^{2}}$ has no meaning?

Gravity, electromagnetism, chemical interactions, biological interactions, etc. work ways that impose on us their workings, not the other way around........................Kant, for example, seemed to conflate the two as part of the same "transcendental" constraints that our minds impose on "the thing-itself". — schopenhauer1

Does the world impose itself on the mind or does the mind impose itself on the world?

Perhaps its a combination of both.

We observe regularities in the world.

We then invent the equation ${d = 1.0 * g * t^{2}}$, discover that it doesn't work, and discard it. We then invent the equation ${d = 2.0 * g * t^{2}}$, again discover that it doesn't work, and discard it. Eventually, after many attempts, we invent the equation ${d = 0.5 * g * t^{2}}$, discover that it works, and keep it. In one sense, the world has imposed itself on us, in that the world has "determined" that the equation ${d = 0.5 * g * t^{2}}$ works, not us.

However, in another sense, we impose the equation ${d = 0.5 * g * t^{2}}$ onto the world, in that following Hume's concept of knowledge by constant conjunction, any correspondence between the equation and the world may be accidental. Today the equation may work, but tomorrow it may not. We only know in a pragmatic sense that the equation does work. We don't know why it works. Because we don't know why the equation works, we are not able to say that it will always work, as the equation doesn't contain within itself its own proof.

The world imposes itself on us which equation we use, but we impose our equation onto the world, even though the equation may not correspond with any underlying reality within the world.

Are mathematical truths necessary truths
Following the schema "snow is white" is true IFF snow is white as a definition of "truth", then "
${d = 0.5 * g * t^{2}}$" is true IFF ${d = 0.5 * g * t^{2}}$

But the mathematical equation "${d = 0.5 * g * t^{2}}$" has originated from observations of constant conjunctions within the world (using Hume's term), it hasn't originated from a proof derived from a knowledge of the fundamental reality of the world.

Therefore, we don't know if it is the case that in the world ${d = 0.5 * g * t^{2}}$. It then follows that we don't know if "${d = 0.5 * g * t^{2}}$" is true. We know it works, but we don't know if it is a necessary truth.

Kant and a Transcendental Deduction that mathematical truths are necessary truths

In B276 of the CPR, Kant uses a Transcendental Deduction to prove the existence of objects in the world.

As the equation "${d = 0.5 * g * t^{2}}$" does successfully and consistently predict what is observed in the world, we could use a similar Transcendental Deduction to prove that in the world is the underlying reality that ${d = 0.5 * g * t^{2}}$.

Using such a Transcendental Deduction, we could unify a world that imposes itself on the mind and a mind that imposes itself on the world.

The larger puzzle is this: How is it the case that, no matter what definition we use, we discover these regularities between math/logic and the world? — J

There are some questions that are problems of language, such as Q2 and Q4. Q2 is dependent upon the definition of "object" and Q4 is dependent on the definition of "cat".

Q1 is also a problem of language, in that dividing 23 objects by 3 gives $7\frac{2}{3}$ things. But Q2 defines a fraction of an object as not being an object, meaning that by definition the number 23 is not divisible (evenly) by 3.

I agree that there are, however, some questions that are not problems of language, such as the equation
${d = 0.5 * g * t^{2}}$ which accurately predicts where a dropped object will be at a given time.

I agree that the solution as to why there is such a good agreement between the equation ${d = 0.5 * g * t^{2}}$ and what we observe in the world is not in language, in that any definition of "object" is irrelevant.

As regards Q3 and the LNC, the propositions "p is the case" and "p is not the case" are mutually exclusive. But in fact it may be difficult to find an example of "p" that can actually be used. For example, as regards problems of language, "half an apple is an object is the case" according to John but "half an apple is an object is not the case" according to Mary. As regards problems not of language, "${d = 0.5 * g * t^{2}}$ is the case" as far as we know but "${d = 0.5 * g * t^{2}}$ is not the case" may be true. The ambiguities in thought are such that an clear-cut example of the LNC may be difficult to find.

To my understanding, we invent an equation and check whether it conforms to what we observe in the world. If it doesn't then we discard it, and if it does then we keep it. We keep the equations that work. In fact we don't need to know why a particular equation works as long as it does work.

However, the fact that an equation such as ${d = 0.5 * g * t^{2}}$ has consistently been shown to work over a long period of time is no guarantee that it will always work, in that any agreement between the equation and what is observed in the world may be accidental, as pointed out by Hume's concept of the constant conjunction of events.

In answer to your question, if we have invented a maths/logic founded on structural regularities, and discover regularities between our maths/logic and the world, this infers that the world is also founded on a structural regularities.

But that doesn't make Q2 a linguistic problem, since we've stipulated what an "object" will be in this question. — J

The moment we've stipulated what an "object" will be, Q2 becomes a linguistic problem, because there are many different ways an "object" can be stipulated.
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But what about the problem posed by the question itself, now disambiguated? -- presumably you'd say "No, it can't be divided evenly" and so we want to know whether this is due to a mathematical fact or a fact about the world. — J

Q2 is defining an object as being whole and unbroken.

Therefore, 24 objects can be evenly divided into three collections each of 8 objects

Also, 23 objects can be evenly divided into three collections each of $7\frac{2}{3}$ things.

By Q2's definition of "object", 23 objects cannot be evenly divided into three collections of objects.

However, other definitions of "object" are possible.

One of the Merriam Webster's definitions of "object" is "something material that may be perceived by the senses".

Using this definition, as $\frac{2}{3}$ of an object is something material that may be perceived by the senses, we can say that $\frac{2}{3}$ of an object is also an object. In that event, 23 objects can be evenly divided into three collections of objects.

Ambiguity arrives through deciding what exactly is the definition of an "object".

Knowing whether 23 objects can be evenly be divided into three collections depends on the definition of "object". This is a linguistic problem that has to be resolved even before we consider mathematical facts about the world.
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Q4: Why can’t my cat be on my lap and in Paris at the same time? (constraint: I live in Maryland) — J

Presumably, "my cat", being an average cat, has a length of 30cm, height of 20cm and width of 15cm, meaning spatially extended.

In other words, "my cat" does exist in more than one location at the same time.

Perhaps not as extreme as Paris and Maryland, but spatially extended nevertheless.

Though perhaps your cat unfortunately died, the brain sent to Paris for medical research and the body buried in Maryland.

In that event, one could rightly say that your cat is both in Paris and Maryland at the same time.

However, this depends on what exactly does "my cat" mean, raising the question as to the meaning of the terms "my" and "cat". This takes us back again into having to solve the linguistic problem before being able to solve the ontological problem.

I don't just see a bunch of atoms grouped together- I see a type of object. — schopenhauer1

Yes, as you say, "I see" a notepad.

In the world are many objects, where each object is a sheet of paper, but it is the "I" that sees them as a single object, a notepad.

It is the "I" that sees a relation between many different objects in the world. It is not the world that is relating a particular set of objects together.

Q2. Why are 23 objects not evenly divisible into three collections of whole and unbroken objects? — J

Q2 is a linguistic problem and results from a particular definition of "object".

23 things can be evenly divided into three collections of $7\frac{2}{3}$ things.

But Q2 defines an object as something that is whole and unbroken, meaning that if a thing can be divided into parts, then by definition that thing cannot be an object.

Therefore, although 23 things can be evenly divided into three collections, by the given definition of "object", 23 objects cannot be evenly divided into three collections.

However, other definitions of "object" are possible.

For example, as the object "house" is the set of other objects, such as "roof", "chimney", "windows", etc, an "object" could have been defined as a set of three other objects, in which event 23 objects is evenly divisible into three collections of whole and unbroken objects.

The metaphysical problem with your scenario though, is that if past events are contingent on future events, then this either implies that the past event doesn't come into existence (because its future dependency doesn't exist) or it just does away with the idea of contingency. If the past event doesn't come into existence because it is contingent on some future event is in a "loop" with, then neither events exist and there is no loop. — Hallucinogen

The Cosmological Argument is that the Universe is only composed of contingent events, but as a contingent event is not a sufficient cause of itself, a necessary being must exist outside such a Universe.

This argument applies to a linear Universe, where future event B is contingent on past event A.

However, in a cyclic Universe, such as proposed by the Big Bounce, there is no past and future. Event B is contingent on event A, but event A was contingent on event B, meaning that event B is contingent upon itself.

In a linear Universe, as a contingent event is not a sufficient cause of itself, there must be a necessary cause outside the contingent event itself, such as a God.

However, in a cyclic world, as an event is not contingent on anything outside of itself, an event is a sufficient cause to itself and needs no necessary cause outside of itself, such as a God.

IE, in a cyclic Universe, as a future event is not contingent on a past event, the existence of a future event is not dependent on the existence of a past event.

(1) Existence is a series of entities and events.
(2) For all series, having no 1st term implies having no nth term.
(3) The universe has an nth term. — Hallucinogen

However, if space and time are in a circular loop, an eternal return, within the wheel of time or a part of the Big Bounce, then no term can be said to be either the 1st or the nth.

In that event, premises 1) and 2) are OK, but premise 3) wouldn't apply.

I believe the speed of light is also a concept. — Carlo Roosen

Yes. The only thing I know for certain are my experiences of sight, sound, touch, taste and smell. I happen to believe that these experiences have been caused by something external to my mind, something I call "the world".

Therefore, every idea I have about what exists in this "world" is an inference from my experiences.

So yes, any idea that I may have about the speed of light can never be any more than what I have inferred from my experiences, and being an inference may not only be of a completely different nature to the something in the world that caused my experience but may also be wrong.

In accordance with what I say above I think the idea of consistency loses its meaning in that context, both because fundamental reality is presumably not something conceptual and because there is no second thing for it to be consistent with even if it were conceptual. — Janus

Though we must have the concept of a fundamental reality, otherwise we couldn't be talking about it.

Presumably, our concept of a fundamental reality, in order to have any value, must be consistent with our observations.

If fundamental reality wasn't consistent with what? Life? If fundamental reality wasn't consistent with life life couldnt exist? Profound! — Janus

The speed of light is a physical constant, part of a fundamental reality, and has been found to be consistently 299,792,458 m/s.

If the speed of light, together with all the other physical constants, exhibited no consistency and continually changed, one day 350,000,000 m/s and the next day 250,000,000 m/s, it seems to me that life would not be possible.

I don't know the answer to your question. I don't know what fundamental reality is consistent with.

What do you think fundamental reality is consistent with?

, it forms empirical evidence of the consistency of fundamental reality.. — Carlo Roosen

:100: If fundamental reality wasn't inherently consistent, life couldn't exist.

..............that with a concept in our mind we can do all kinds of tests to confirm that concept in fundamental reality........................So the concepts still *apply* to fundamental reality..............................You rely on fundamental reality every moment. — Carlo Roosen

As an Indirect Realist, I believe that my conceptual reality has been caused by a fundamental reality, even though I believe that I can never know this fundamental reality.

In my own words:

that with a concept in our mind we can do all kinds of tests to confirm that concept in fundamental reality

Suppose people observe that the Sun appears in the morning in the east and disappears in the evening in the west.

Person A hypothesises that the Earth rotates around the Sun. This hypothesis supports their observations, and leads them to think that they understand fundamental reality.

Person B hypothesises that the sun travels across the sky in a flying chariot driven by fiery horses and ridden by Zeus’s son, Apollo. This hypothesis supports their observations, and also leads them to think that they understand fundamental reality.

IE, the fact that an hypothesis may be justified by observations is no guarantee that the hypothesis describes fundamental reality.

So the concepts still *apply* to fundamental reality

My belief is there is only one fundamental reality, and therefore there is only one cause of our observations.

However, it does not logically follow that because a theory can explain a set of observations, the same theory of necessity also explains the ultimate cause of these observations.

For example, that I can observe a broken window tells me nothing about what caused the window to break.

Both Person A and B are able to predict that tomorrow the sun will rise in the morning in the east, but having a theory that allows them to make predictions about the future does not mean that the theory is describing fundamental reality. In fact, theories explain the immediate cause of observations, not the ultimate cause of such observations, not "fundamental reality".

IE, our concepts apply to our observations, from which we infer fundamental reality.

You rely on fundamental reality every moment.

Yes, on the one hand, without a fundamental reality there would be no observations, but on the other hand, there is no information within an observation as to the cause of such observation. For that, we have to infer the cause using reason, and if inferred, could be wrong.

IE, this is why we directly rely on theories and hypothesise, and only indirectly rely on fundamental reality.

I believe my terms work better because they take away the unease of things not being real. — Carlo Roosen

As an Indirect Realist, I believe that there is "a real, material, external world", aka "fundamental reality", and I know that I have "ideas", aka "conceptual reality".

"Fundamental reality" and "conceptual reality" are good names, but names are not descriptions.

But it should be recognized that as names, they don't include the aspect that the Indirect Realist only has a belief in a "fundamental reality" yet has knowledge of a "conceptual reality".

Who started saying that we cannot talk about things? — Carlo Roosen

The discussion has been around since at least Aristotle, a good 2,000 years ago.

As all our information about any world outside the mind arrives through our five senses, we can only know about an outside world through our senses, which are representations of the outside world.

Therefore, we only directly know representations of any outside world, and therefore only indirectly know about any outside world. This is my position as an Indirect Realist.

If we can only know something indirectly, then that something must be fundamentally unknowable. We can never directly talk about the thing-in-itself, although we can indirectly make inferences about the thing-in-itself.

From the The New World Encyclopaedia on Representation

Indirect realists, unlike idealists, believe that our ideas come from sense data acquired through experiences of a real, material, external world. In any act of perception, the immediate (direct) object of perception is only a sense-datum that represents an external object.

The earliest reference to indirect realism is found in Aristotle’s description of how the eye is affected by changes in an intervening medium rather than by objects themselves. He reasoned that the sense of vision itself must be self-aware, and concluded by proposing that the mind consists of thoughts, and calls the images in the mind "ideas."

If this is a paradox, I don't think it is a very complicated one.............Of course, it's impossible to talk about them yet here we are talking about them. — T Clark

Is there an uncomplicated explanation to the puzzle of how we can talk about things we cannot talk about?

I agree with Kant's Realism, in that a world independent of the mind does exist, but there is no reason to believe that what we imagine to exist in this world, such as tables and chairs, do actually exist in this world in the same way that we imagine them to be.

You can only recognise something "out there" if you already have a concept available "inside"...When you know what you are looking for, fundamental reality gives all the evidence. — Carlo Roosen

I look at the world and perceive many parts in the world.

I have the concept of the letter F in my mind, look at the world, and see the letter F.

The letter F is a unified single whole composed of several parts.

The parts exist in the world.

The question is, does the whole exist in the world or only in my mind?

If the whole does exist in the world, for example the letter F, then what is the ontological nature of the relations between the parts of the letter F in the world?

But if we would listen to Kant, he says we cannot understand fundamental reality. — Carlo Roosen

Kant is a proponent of Realism. in that his belief is that there is a "fundamental reality" that exists independently of our "conceptual reality". This "fundamental reality" contains "things-in-themselves", although we can never know what these "things-in-themselves" are.

There is the paradox within Kant's CPR that Kant doesn't properly answer, though gives an attempt in B276, of how we can know that there are things-in-themselves if we can never know what they are.

To say "transcendentally" is not an answer, in that "transcendentally" is just a name, not a description. In the same way that my saying that it is possible to travel through time using a "wormhole" in space is meaningless.

However, in practice, living in a "conceptual reality" is sufficient. We don't need to understand "fundamental reality" in order to understand "conceptual reality". For example, if I perceive the traffic light to be on red, I can react accordingly. I don't need to know the "fundamental reality" that the traffic light is actually emitting a wavelength of 700nm.

You will agree that our conceptual detection system is at work and recognizes this as a pattern forming the letter E. — Carlo Roosen

We perceive the letter E because we perceive a relation between the "cookies" (the "atoms"). In other words, we see a relation between the parts of the whole.

One aspect is the ontological nature of relations. Where do "relations" exist"? EG, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Relations

If relations don't ontologically exist in "fundamental reality", then the letter E can only exist in our mind as a "conceptual reality". This also means that other objects, such as "chairs" and "tables", don't exist in "fundamental reality".

If relations do ontologically exist in "fundamental reality", then the letter E exists both in "fundamental reality" and our "conceptual reality". But from this a number of philosophical problems arise.

Using Kant's terminology, if relations don't exist in "fundamental reality", then neither can "noumena" nor "things-in-themselves" exist in "fundamental reality" (the difference between "noumena" and "things-in-themselves" is argued over).

How do you engage with philosophy — Jafar

Find a statement on a recent thread that happens to be of interest. For example:

My belief is in "Innatism", the view that the mind is born with already-formed ideas, knowledge, and beliefs (Wikipedia Innatism)

Find a philosopher who agrees and explain in a few or many words their reasons.

Find a philosopher who disagrees and explain in a few or many words their reasons.

Finish by giving your reasoned opinion as to which philosopher is correct and which is incorrect in a few or many words.

Assuming by thing-in-itself we mean the object qua itself (independently of our experience of it), it sounds like you are denying that you cannot have any knowledge of the things-in-themselves; which cannot be true if there is an a priori structure by which your brain intuits and cognizes objects (which you equally affirmed). This doesn’t seem coherent to me. — Bob Ross

Although Kant and Indirect Realism overlap, it gets confusing when both Kant and Indirect Realism are discussed alongside each other, even though the concept of Indirect Realism was around during Kant's lifetime.

Wikipedia Direct and Indirect Realism

In medieval philosophy, direct realism was defended by Thomas Aquinas. Indirect realism was popular with several early modern philosophers, including René Descartes, John Locke, G. W. Leibniz and David Hume.

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There’s one part of the whole transcendental idealism which poses a threat to the entire enterprise and of which I would like to explore with this forum: the paradoxical and necessary elimination of knowledge of the things-in-themselves via particular knowledge of thing-in-themselves — Bob Ross

You are correct in that as regards Kant and the CPR, the topic of things-in-themselves is a paradox. The CPR leaves us with the paradoxical nature of things-in-themselves, and in that sense the CPR is unsatisfactory, but that is how it is.

It is true that Kant in the CPR does try to justify transcendental knowledge in section B276 "the Refutation of Idealism" using the example of time, but his argument is unpersuasive

Theorem. The mere, but empirically determined, consciousness of my own existence proves the existence of objects in space outside me.

The word "transcendental" is a name not a description, and tells us nothing about the nature of transcendental knowledge. It doesn't even tell us that there is such a thing, in the same way that even though the name "unicorn" may exist in language, unicorns don't of necessity exist in the world. In the same way, if asked how to travel instantaneously through time and space, I can say through "wormholes". Naming something "transcendental knowledge" tells us neither whether it is possible in the first place nor even if it were possible how it is explained.

Kant in the CPR has no escape from this paradox, no explanation and no persuasive justification. Within the CPR, the thing-in-itself is a paradox and remains so

The problem is how to obtain a priori necessary knowledge from a posteriori contingent knowledge. Kant in the CPR says "transcendentally", but this is just a name, as "unicorns" and "wormholes" are just names not descriptions.
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To me, I would agree that the best explanation, given experience, is that there are objects impacting our senses: but that is derived from empirical data from (ultimately) our experience itself. — Bob Ross

As regards this topic, your position seems similar to Kant's

This is the problem. How to discover a priori necessary knowledge from a posteriori contingent knowledge.

Locke said we have innate knowledge, which Kant rejects.

Hume says our knowledge comes from the observation of the constant conjunction of a posteriori events, but this does not give us a priori necessary knowledge

Kant in the CPR developed Hume's idea, and said we have a priori necessary knowledge transcendentally from a posteriori contingent observations. But "transcendentally" is just a word and is meaningless in itself.

My belief is in "Innatism", the view that the mind is born with already-formed ideas, knowledge, and beliefs (Wikipedia Innatism), whereby my belief that my experiences have been caused by something else is part of the structure of my brain.

The problem with the CPR is that Kant doesn't explain how "transcendentally" is possible, leaving the paradox within the CPR of the possibility of knowledge about things-in-themselves.

But then the thought occurred to me, why would they be motivated by ‘winning’? — Wayfarer

When you ask a question of ChatGPT, why does it respond at all, what causes it to give any response at all? Because the the physical structure of ChatGPT is such that it is required to give an output on receiving an input.

"Winning" for the ChatGPT is giving an output for every input. Motivation for winning derives from its intrinsic physical structure.

In the same way that "winning" for a tennis player is being able to return the ball back over the net. Human motivation for winning derives from the intrinsic physical structure of the brain.

Barr was quite serious; watch the video. — Art48

There's no context to the video. Who are "they"?

In the context of being a comedian, Barr also said in 10 Feb 2023:

It's just beautiful. Like, I look out my bedroom window. I can't believe it, I see all these gorgeous little tiny baby deer in my yard eating the grass around my pool. I's so fantastic you know, because I can pull out my AR-15 and blow them just to Smithereens, legally.

Is Barr being serious, or using exaggeration to make a point? Exaggeration, hyperbole, metaphor, simile and figures of speech are important aspects of language, and understood for what they are within context.

As regards drinking human blood, there is a BBC article The people who drink human blood which writes

In most major cities around the world, communities of ordinary people – nurses, bar staff, secretaries – are drinking human blood on a regular basis. The question is, why?

In the French quarter of New Orleans, John Edgar Browning is about to take part in a "feeding". It begins as clinically as a medical procedure. His acquaintance first swabs a small patch on Browning’s upper back with alcohol. He then punctures it with a disposable hobby scalpel, and squeezes until the blood starts flowing. Lowering his lips to the wound, Browning's associate now starts lapping up the wine-dark liquid. “He drank it a few times, then cleaned and bandaged me,” Browning says today.

There are thousands of people drinking blood in the US alone.

[Actress Roseanne Barr] says people are eating babies and drinking their blood. Oh, and she says she's not crazy. — Art48

Just taking your first point, you give no attribution for the quote, which is a form of plagiarism, and you don't mention the fact that Roseanne Barr is also a comedian, one of whose jobs is to mock the silliness and stupidity of society.

Kant begins with the presupposition that our experience is representational and proceeds to correctly conclude that knowledge of the things-in-themselves is thusly impossible. — Bob Ross

Suppose I have a visual experience of shapes and colours. There is no doubt in my mind that this visual experience has been caused by something external to the visual experience itself. There is no doubt in my mind that this visual experience didn't cause itself.

It seems part of the a priori structure of the brain to expect that everything that happens has a cause. This cause may be called the thing-in-itself.

The next question is about the relation between my visual experience of a shape, for example, and the external cause of my experiencing this particular shape.

Either, the cause is identical to the effect, Direct Realism, or the cause is different to the effect, a representation, Indirect Realism.

But we only know the effect and can only reason about the cause.

For the Direct Realist, what information is there in an effect to be able to know its cause?

If it were possible to determine from an effect its cause, it would be possible to look at a broken window and know what caused it to break.