This is why I like to talk about our 'lifeworld' — plaque flag

When philosophers talk about the “I”, they presuppose the “we”, because they do not mean a single empirical subject but the universal form of subjectivity, an idea that assumes its instantiation in a plurality of individuals, i.e., society. — Jamal

That is to say, idealism is parasitic on the real. — Jamal

If you can give an account like that — Banno

Where is the observer ? Does it have a body ? — plaque flag

what can be meant by perception if there are no brains? — plaque flag

The stream of knowledge is heading towards a non-mechanical reality; the universe begins to look more like a great thought than like a machine. Mind no longer appears to be an accidental intruder into the realm of matter...we ought rather hail it as the creator and governor of the realm of matter. — James Jeans

The idea of a universal mind or Logos would be, I think, a fairly plausible inference from the present state of scientific theory. — Arthur Eddington

The physical world is entirely abstract and without actuality apart from its linkage to consciousness. — Arthur Eddington

Can you clarify? — Tom Storm

But who will doubt that he lives, remembers, understands, wills, thinks, knows, and judges? For even if he doubts, he lives. If he doubts where his doubts come from, he remembers. If he doubts, he understands that he doubts. If he doubts, he wants to be certain. If he doubts, he thinks. If he doubts, he knows that he does not know. If he doubts, he judges that he ougth not rashly to give assent. So whoever acquires a doubt from any source ought not to doubt any of these things whose non-existence would mean that he could not entertain doubt about anything. — Augustine, On the Trinity 10.10.14 quoted in Richard Sorabji, Self, 2006, p.219

Is "The Aristos" worth reading — T Clark

I would say yes but it is very difficult to resolve since one has to deal with such a deep conditioning on many levels. — TheMadMan

So the snake is... and here I'm trying to work out what it is Hoffman would say... some sort of community of interweaving conscious agents. — Banno

My philosophy is ALWAYS based on the latest scientific epistemology and on the actual goals of science — Nickolasgaspar

The dude who wrote the above doesn't understand the role of cognitive science and neuroscience. — Nickolasgaspar

the philosophy of mind you are referring to has nothing to do with the actual science — Nickolasgaspar

Jerome Feldman isn't a Neuro or Cognitive scientist — Nickolasgaspar

What we do know is that there is no place in the brain where there could be a direct neural encoding of the illusory detailed scene (Kaas and Collins 2003). That is, enough is known about the structure and function of the visual system to rule out any detailed neural representation that embodies the subjective experience. So, this version of the NBP really is a scientific mystery at this time.

Well neuroscience can only describe the brain mechanisms responsible for creating the subjective experience of being — Nickolasgaspar

What [neuroscience] cannot do is replace the wide range of ordinary psychological explanations of human activities in terms of reasons, intentions, purposes, goals, values, rules and conventions by neurological explanations . . . . And it cannot explain how an animal perceives or thinks by reference to the brain's, or some parts of the brain's, perceiving or thinking. For it makes no sense to ascribe such psychological attributes to anything less than the animal as a whole. It is the animal that perceives, not parts of its brain, and it is human beings who think and reason, not their brains. The brain and its activities make it possible for us—not for it—to perceive and think, to feel emotions, and to form and pursue projects. (p. 3) — Review of Bennett and Hacker, Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience

First of all,made up pseudo philosophical ''why" problems are not "hard problems". — Nickolasgaspar

We have being doing it for decades, this is why we have Medications on psychopathology, this is why we have Brain Surgery protocols for different pathologies and this is why we can make Diagnosis (predictions) based on the physical condition of the organ (brain imagine). — Nickolasgaspar

Jerome Feldman isn't a Neuro or Cognitive scientist — Nickolasgaspar

Existence is not a predicate — green flag

What Bragg [said] was that this case is not a garden-variety fiddling with the books. Bragg made that clear in two sentences in the indictment and one sentence in his media conference:

“The defendant Donald J. Trump repeatedly and fraudulently falsified New York business records to conceal criminal conduct that hid damaging information from the voting public during the 2016 presidential election. From August 2015 to December 2017, the defendant orchestrated a scheme with others to influence the 2016 presidential election by identifying and purchasing negative information about him to suppress its publication and benefit the defendant’s electoral prospects.”

Addressing the media, Bragg said that under New York law it is a crime to “conspire to promote a candidacy by unlawful means. That is exactly what this case is about.”

In other words, says Bragg, Trump was criminally messing with the 2016 presidential election. Much bigger than bad bookkeeping. ...The Bragg indictment presents a credible case of an unlawful attempt to decisively affect the outcome of the presidential election.

It’s the same alleged modus operandi in the 2020 campaign. Trump is vulnerable to being indicted for committing the same class of crimes in Georgia. (“I just want to find 11,780 votes!”) — Bruce Wolpe

( 6 ) What it feels like to be in a reflexive, ongoing, intentional, historicising, projective, story telling and unitary affective state. What is it like.

I imagine much of the dispute regarding whether neuroscience and its philosophical analysis suffices for an explanation concerns whether ( 6 ) should be included in the list. — fdrake

First of all we not only analyze first person experience.... — Nickolasgaspar

Mental is just a label we place on properties produced by specific physical processes in the brain. — Nickolasgaspar

There are intractable problems in all branches of science; for Neuroscience a major one is the mystery of subjective personal experience. This is one instance of the famous mind–body problem (Chalmers 1996) concerning the relation of our subjective experience (aka qualia) to neural function. Different visual features (color, size, shape, motion, etc.) are computed by largely distinct neural circuits, but we experience an integrated whole. This is closely related to the problem known as the illusion of a stable visual world (Martinez-Conde et al. 2008).

There is now overwhelming biological and behavioral evidence that the brain contains no stable, high-resolution, full field representation of a visual scene, even though that is what we subjectively experience (Martinez-Conde et al. 2008). The structure of the primate visual system has been mapped in detail (Kaas and Collins 2003) and there is no area that could encode this detailed information. The subjective experience is thus inconsistent with the neural circuitry. ....

Traditionally, the Neural Binding Problem concerns instantaneous perception and does not consider integration over saccades (rapid movement of the eye between fixation points). But in both cases the hard problem is explaining why we experience the world the way we do. As is well known, current science has nothing to say about subjective (phenomenal) experience and this discrepancy between science and experience is also called the “explanatory gap” and “the hard problem” (Chalmers 1996). There is continuing effort to elucidate the neural correlates of conscious experience; these often invoke some version of temporal synchrony as discussed above.

There is a plausible functional story for the stable world illusion. First of all, we do have a (top-down) sense of the space around us that we cannot currently see, based on memory and other sense data—primarily hearing, touch, and smell. Also, since we are heavily visual, it is adaptive to use vision as broadly as possible. Our illusion of a full field, high resolution image depends on peripheral vision—to see this, just block part of your peripheral field with one hand. Immediately, you lose the illusion that you are seeing the blocked sector. When we also consider change blindness, a simple and plausible story emerges. Our visual system (somehow) relies on the fact that the periphery is very sensitive to change. As long as no change is detected it is safe to assume that nothing is significantly altered in the parts of the visual field not currently attended.

But this functional story tells nothing about the neural mechanisms that support this magic. What we do know is that there is no place in the brain where there could be a direct neural encoding of the illusory detailed scene (Kaas and Collins 2003).

OK, science geeks, how do we determine whether an AI is conscious? — RogueAI

What is in the teachings of Jesus that are not in the teaching of Jewish scriptures and works of the rabbis? — Fooloso4

It's not unreasonable to assume that there is some organism in the world that has some sense that we don't. — Michael

How conscious are the latest famous bots ? Do they have selves ? — green flag

Q: Are you, ChatGPT, conscious? Are you a self?

A: As an artificial intelligence language model, I am not conscious in the same way that humans are, nor do I have a sense of self. I am a collection of algorithms and data structures that process input and generate output based on that input. While I can simulate conversation and provide helpful responses, I do not have the ability to experience consciousness or self-awareness.

Don't see it. — Banno

Ideas similar to MUI theory are found in various forms of idealism. But, as Searle (2004, p. 48) says:

idealism had a prodigious influence in philosophy, literally for centuries, but as far as I can tell it has been as dead as a doornail among nearly all the philosophers whose opinions I respect, for many decades, so I will not say much about it.

This is a simple misunderstanding. MUI theory is not idealism. It does not claim that all that exists are conscious perceptions. It claims that our conscious perceptions need not resemble the objective world, whatever its nature is. — Donald Hoffman

Other scholars—especially those working in other branches of science—view Platonism with skepticism. Scientists tend to be empiricists; they imagine the universe to be made up of things we can touch and taste and so on; things we can learn about through observation and experiment. The idea of something existing “outside of space and time” makes empiricists nervous: It sounds embarrassingly like the way religious believers talk about God, and God was banished from respectable scientific discourse a long time ago.

Platonism, as mathematician Brian Davies has put it, “has more in common with mystical religions than it does with modern science.” The fear is that if mathematicians give Plato an inch, he’ll take a mile. If the truth of mathematical statements can be confirmed just by thinking about them, then why not ethical problems, or even religious questions? Why bother with empiricism at all?

Why do people create sock puppets? What are they for? — Tom Storm

So now we have 20 'translations' which contain the 'same' idea. Do we think perfect translation is possible ? Is a perfect paraphrase in the same language even possible ? — green flag