I don't think your depiction of it is mistaken, but it's not the whole story. Recall a salient passage from the original paper:

The really hard problem of consciousness is the problem of experience. When we think and perceive, there is a whir of information-processing, but there is also a subjective aspect. As Nagel (1974) has put it, there is something it is like to be a conscious organism. This subjective aspect is experience. When we see, for example, we experience visual sensations: the felt quality of redness, the experience of dark and light, the quality of depth in a visual field. Other experiences go along with perception in different modalities: the sound of a clarinet, the smell of mothballs. Then there are bodily sensations, from pains to orgasms; mental images that are conjured up internally; the felt quality of emotion, and the experience of a stream of conscious thought. What unites all of these states is that there is something it is like to be in them. All of them are states of experience. — David Chalmers, Facing Up to the Hard Problem of Consciousness

What I think Chalmers is actually trying to convey by 'something it is like...' is, simply, being. Being, and what it means to be, is surely one of the major preoccupations of philosophy (and much else besides) although it's not always explicit - for Heidegger questioning the meaning of being is philosophy. (And I do wonder whether eliminative materialism is in some ways a manifestation of what Heidegger called 'the forgetfulness of being'.)

Another point I'd make is that there is the study of consciousness as an object of analysis - which is cognitive science - which I'm interested in, and trying to get a better understanding of. And cognitive science and philosophy definitely converge in a lot of ways. But the philosophical question about the nature of the mind (a term I prefer to 'consciousness') is broader, and deeper, than the specific questions which are the subject of cognitive science. That is reflected in Chalmer's distinction between the easy and hard problems of consciousness. And you find within cogsci, there are those with different philosophical aims, views, objectives. They will agree on some things - methodologies, empirical facts - but differ in others, such as intepretation, what conclusion to draw from the facts.

But at the bottom of it, the fact is that the subject of experience - you and I - are not reducible to objects - which is what neuroreductionism, as a philosophical attitude, tends to do.

I’m a robot, and you’re a robot, but that doesn’t make us any less dignified or wonderful or lovable or responsible for our actions,” he said. “Why does our dignity depend on our being scientifically inexplicable? — Daniel Dennett

I think there's a completely unambiguous answer to that: we are not robots, or machines, or even simply organisms, but beings, and a science that doesn't understand that is a risk to humanity. You never know what you, or the person next to you, is capable of being, or becoming.

My objection to neuro-reductionism is that what it is seeking to explain is something which is different in kind to other topics of scientific analysis, and in so doing, it can't help but treat the human as a species, or a specimen - as an object of analysis, something which will yield to scientific method. Daniel Dennett, who is one of its leading advocates, puts it like this:

What, then, is the relation between the standard ‘third-person’ objective methodologies for studying meteors or magnets (or human metabolism or bone density), and the methodologies for studying human consciousness? Can the standard methods be extended in such a way as to do justice to the phenomena of human consciousness? Or do we have to find some quite radical or revolutionary alternative science? I have defended the hypothesis that there is a straightforward, conservative extension of objective science that handsomely covers the ground — all the ground — of human consciousness, doing justice to all the data without ever having to abandon the rules and constraints of the experimental method that have worked so well in the rest of science. — Daniel Dennett, Who's on First?

In Dennett's view, scientific method must be truly universal in scope - whatever can't be included in it, is either not worth knowing about, or unknowable. Notice that this basically assumes that science is capable of being all-knowing - the literal meaning of 'omniscient' - in respect of human nature.

Hence the frequent angry outbursts at those who dare challenge the supremacy of science, and the many scornful references to woo-woo and soft-headed philosophers who 'don't know the science'. And as always, the most vigorous advocates of 'scientism' never seem to comprehend the fly in their ointment; because, I guess, the difficulty is a philosophical one, and so it is not demonstrable in empirical terms - it becomes something like, 'you need to provide scientific evidence for why this can't be a scientific issue' - at which point, debate becomes futile.

I think what is behind this is the fear of the mystery of consciousness - the fear is what provides the sense of urgency, the impatience with critics, and the demand that we all must recognise scientific authority as the only path to certainty.

I've started this, about 20 minutes in as I write this. Insightful and important video, I think a must watch.

Note-- Like what? — Gnomon

If you read the remainder you might get Nagel's point.

Interesting current Aeon essay on this topic Meaning Beyond Definition.

The poster you're referring to is knowledgeable and articulate, and is making sound criticisms. Take this as a warning - keep it up and you'll be suspended and/or banned.

You are free to make any arguments you like, but please refrain from ad hominem attacks and insults ('I don't know under which rock you have been living', 'the woo woo land of your definitions').

Why invoke 'fear of religion'... — Isaac

Have you read the essay that this is quoted from, Evolutionary Naturalism and the Fear of Religion, by Thomas Nagel? I think what he says in that essay is extremely relevant to many of the arguments we see on this forum, including this one, which is why I quoted it.

Kant’s most basic idea, the axis around which all his thought turns, is that what distinguishes exercises of judgment and intentional agency from the performances of merely natural creatures is that judgments and actions are subject to distinctive kinds of normative assessment. - Brandom — plaque flag

Hence the incompatibility between transcendental idealism and naturalism.

I'm wondering where that self-confidence comes from. — Isaac

The original exchange which you keep referring to was a long time ago, but I think it had to do with something like the 'hard problem' issue. I noticed that in connection with that (and should we decide to pursue it again, it should be in one of the threads on it) that you tend not to recognise that there is a problem which neuroscience can't address. So at the time I made that remark, what I was trying to convey was that if you don't see it as a problem, then there's no use in trying to explain it further.

here you are deriding as 'evil' world views... — Isaac

Specifically I was referring to the eliminative materialism of Daniel Dennett and the way he uses Darwinian biology in support of that view, which I (and a lot of people) regard as anti-humanist. I was certainly not characterising anyone I differ with as evil.

Objective idealism is not postulating an object that can (perhaps) never be encountered by a subject. It is saying that there is an all-experiencing subject (often equated with God), who thus gives rise to all of reality — Ø implies everything

Could it also be seen as saying that the ideas, forms and principles that comprise the fundamental elements of reason are invariant, and so are grasped by all minds in the same way?

You may be interested in browsing the chapter extracts of a book on this topic, Mind and the Cosmic Order, by Charles Pinter, which argues the opposite of what you are saying. Pinter says that the mind is what distinguishes form, colour, and spatial relationships, which it interprets in terms of gestalts, or meaningful wholes, and that none of these are real in the absence of mind (although he doesn't limit this to the human mind but the entire realm of 'the animal sensorium').

However, the view is also compatible with indirect realism for the brain is continuous with the matter of the world and so as the world may be colored so may be a visual field within the brain. — lorenzo sleakes

I don't know if the brain, or any living organism, is 'continuous' with matter in that sense. Certainly the fundamental material elements in both are all those of the periodic table but the differentiators for living organisms are the ability to maintain homeostasis, to retain information in the form of memory, to act intentionally, and so on. There is nothing on the level of physics or chemistry alone which accounts for those attributes of living organisms (which is the principle insight behind biosemiotics).

It's only that design in nature seems obvious to me, but obviously there are those who don't agree, and I can't think of a way to make the case. I don't say that it means there is a designer, but I'm also sceptical of the idea that the order of nature can be explained purely in terms of naturalistic principles. I suppose what I believe is that whilst science explores, understands and can exploit the order of nature to great advantage, it still has a rather dim idea of the nature of the order. Like, we can see the laws of motion, but why we have those laws is not itself a scientific question, but a metaphysical one.

You seem to have argued essentially that you don't like Darwinism — Tom Storm

I reject neo-darwinian materialism as a philosophical attitude, personified by Daniel Dennett, who has published books in its defence. There are many other schools of evolutionary thought which are not nearly so extreme nor so ideological, although I’m also critical of ‘scientific naturalism’. To me, the fact that humans can wonder about their purpose in the abstract is itself an indication of their ability to transcend their biological origins. And the fact that such wondering is itself regarded as being suspiciously close to fundamentalism, says something.

What reasons do you have for concluding that evolution has a goal or a designer, if this is what you are suggesting? — Tom Storm

I said that I’m not atheist, but I’m also not particularly theist. It’s more that I reject the specifically modernistic idea that life arises by chance or by fortuitous origins, that it’s a kind of cosmic crapshoot. I’m not going to defend any obviously ID-related position. It’s more that today’s culture, in rejecting traditional religious accounts, have also rejected a great deal of philosophical reflection on life’s meaning and purpose with it - throwing the baby out with the bathwater, as the saying has it. And that’s because in our religious history, having the wrong ideas about such things could get you burned at the stake. This has left a deep shadow in Western culture.

My philosophy, as I’ve explained at length elsewhere, is that in sentient rational beings, the Universe comes to know itself. (That’s why I provided that link to Julian Huxley who also said that, this is not something unique to me.) Religious ideas are metaphors for that realisation, although obviously some more so than others. I have a book on my shelf, ‘You Are the Eyes of the World’, by the Dzogchen master LonChenPa. I think the East has a more explicit understanding of it, but it is nevertheless a theme or idea found in many world cultures (‘You are the world’ was both a globally-released pop song to save starving Africans, and a book by Krishnamurti.) And in the animal world, every single creature is more or less engaged in that undertaking. Check out that Steve Talbott essay I posted upthread.

...now it's his fault that some bookshops put his work in the 'Religion' section. — Tom Storm

That is by design!

Can you demonstrate that there is design in nature? — Tom Storm

I myself don't think it needs to be demonstrated, but that if I need to demonstrate it, then probably nothing I could say would be effective.

Once minds such as ours originate, they themselves become the possibility of memetic and technological evolution, till all three work together toward an exponential increase in human knowledge power. — plaque flag

That is a completely different matter from evolution by natural selection. As is well known, ideas of evolution were found in many cultures prior to Darwin, but it was the idea of natural selection that distinguished Darwin’s discoveries. And even then, it was quickly applied to (some would say, misappropriated by) those with other agendas, to promote agendas like eugenics. Evolution is one of those marvellously flexible words that can be applied to almost any sense of things improving or changing for the better.

God or the demiurge was a designer, right? — plaque flag

Plato’s demiurge was a designer, but God was not described in those terms until the early modern age. That is one of the points of Karen Armstrong’s Case for God, which said that by depicting ‘nature’s laws’ as ‘the handiwork of God’, early modern science laid the groundwork for the kind of atheist polemics that are the speciality of Dawkins.

But, prior to our development of design, and the coining of the word ‘design’, there were no instances of design in the cosmos, right? If the apparent design in nature is only apparent, and not actual, that must be the implication, mustn’t it?

Yes. Those on the Dawkins forum - the very first forum I joined - constantly used this defence against his many howlers, notwithstanding that his books are in the ‘Religion’ section of shops all over the world.

In fact, Darwin explained 'purpose, meaning, and design as fundamental features of the world.' — plaque flag

Only insofar as they serve the purposes of evolutionary theory, which is to survive and reproduce, and no further. The philosophical significance of the theory is gravely overstated in my view.

Apropos of all this, a splendid article by Jules Evans on Julian Huxley’s evolutionary transhumanism

https://julesevans.medium.com/julian-huxley-and-the-otter-potential-movement-45dbda59fac5

He should have stuck to his knitting. He did a great job as a science explainer, but he is not very good at philosophy. The first chapter of TGD book was entitled 'a very religious non-believer' and was about Einstein as an exemplar of his scientific atheism. But Einstein said things which Dawkins would never contemplate, like, 'there are people who say there is no God. But what really makes me angry is that they quote me for the support of such views' (quoted in Isaacson's Einstein: His Life and Universe).

Religion has had much to fear from science in general — plaque flag

Any religion has something to fear from scientific discovery is not worth respecting in my view (although the misuse of scientific knowledge is another thing altogether.) You know, none of Darwin's books were ever condemned or prohibited by the major Christian denominations, outside American protestantism. And also, please do know that Thomas Nagel, in that essay, states unequivocally that he himself is atheist, lacks any religious sense. He's critical of the idea of neodarwinian materialism purely on philosophical grounds, elaborated in his later Mind and Cosmos.

Is there a need to anthropomorphise this process? — Tom Storm

No, but there's also no need to explain it away. Dawkins will often say that the processes he describes give rise to the 'appearance of being designed'. Compared to what? I wonder. Is anything designed whatever? Does the word have any referent, outside the activities of h. sapiens?

It by no means provides us with any evidence that evolution is directed by 'supernatural' powers. — Tom Storm

The fact that any discussion of purpose is bound to be interpreted as a reference to the supernatural is significant. Purpose, meaning and intentionality are fundamental items in the philosophical lexicon.

All he missed—and Darwin provided—was the idea that this Intelligence could be broken into bits so tiny and stupid that they didn’t count as intelligence at all, and then distributed through space and time in a gigantic, connected network of algorithmic process. — plaque flag

Connected by what, and how? Evolution itself is not an agency, it doesn't 'do' anything. People speak about 'the wonders of evolution' nowadays, but natural selection is a filter, not a force.

This would be a slanted or polemical account of evolution, right? — Tom Storm

One of Dawkin's books is called 'The Blind Watchmaker'.

The problem of intentionality, meaning, and purpose is a very deep one, although, as Thomas Nagel observed, much of the debate about it is shaped by the fear of religion:

Darwin enabled modern secular culture to heave a great collective sigh of relief, by apparently providing a way to eliminate purpose, meaning, and design as fundamental features of the world. Instead they become epiphenomena, generated incidentally by a process that can be entirely explained by the operation of the non-teleological laws of physics on the material of which we and our environments are all composed.

The topic I was discussing at the time was Daniel Dennett's materialist philosophy, in the context of which I said that I don't believe we are products of the Dawkins/Dennett dumb physical forces driven by the blind watchmaker - which I don't. I don't know how many evolutionary biologists believe it - some, I imagine, but I would think it's hardly a consensus.

I did glean, in my brief reconnoitre on the topic, that Chomsky himself is sceptical about some Darwinian claims, indeed I recall a book co-authored by him and Robert Berwick, Why Only Us? The authors argue that language is an innate ability that is unique to humans and cannot be explained by traditional Darwinian evolutionary theory. Instead they propose a new theory of language evolution, which they call the "biolinguistic" approach. They argue that the language faculty evolved as a result of natural selection, but that the development of language cannot be explained solely by the gradual accumulation of small changes over time. Instead, they suggest that there was a sudden genetic mutation that allowed for the development of language, and that this mutation was a key factor in the evolution of the human species.

Overall, some of Chomsky's ideas are uncomfortably close to innatism for the liking of empiricist philosophers. There's something altogether too platonic about his 'innate grammar'.

OK, I think I see what you mean. I specifically referred to Richard Dawkins and Daniel Dennett, who have global reputations as evangalising atheists, and the kind of ideology they represent.

As for a very nuanced consideration of the idea of telos and teleology in biology that is opposed to materialism but still within the bounds of naturalism, have a read of Steve Talbott's Evolution and the Purposes of Life

I still don't understand your point, nor which evil ideology you're saying that I'm in thrall to, if that is what you're saying.

without mistaking our opinions for truth and knowledge. — Fooloso4

Could you elaborate a little on the distinctions that Plato draws between pistis, doxa, and noesis? Do you think that he equates noesis with opinion?

However, the idea that if you don't accept that this is somehow reflected in the cosmos at large and you don't believe evolution has a purpose — Jamal

That is rather ambiguous - can you explain what you mean by that?

I take it, following Galen Strawson, that consciousness is a wholly physical phenomenon, it arises from configurations of matter. So, there is no "immaterial"-material problem. — Manuel

If there are real abstract entities, it torpedoes that claim.

Bought his At Home in the Universe a long while back. Neither he nor his ilk are targets of my criticism of neo-darwinism.

Am I to believe you'll stop loving your family if it's somehow proved to you that there is no god and just Darwinian evolution ? — plaque flag

It's a simplistic way of putting it, but there are ramifications. Ideas have consequences. I read a thread on some other forum, or Quora, about someone who had really taken on board some philosopher's argument for determinism. He had really come to believe that he had no agency whatever and was deeply unhappy and dissillusioned by it, but couldn't free himself from the idea and it had driven him to despair. We have a current thread about wrestling with solipsism. These ideas do matter. Dennett's most insidious book was called Darwin's Dangerous Idea, in which he says that his form of Darwinism is like an acid that eats everything it touches, including the container it's in. Among its victims are any form of traditional culture and even philosophy itself.

I don't want to defend this or that religious institution but I'm not atheist - my view is that the falsehoods of religions arise from distortions of an originally profound truth. Philosophically, I see enlightenment (not in the sense of the European enlightenment and scientific rationalism) as having cosmic significance, that the Cosmos comes to understand horizons of being that could never be revealed otherwise, through living beings such as ourselves, and that is what the higher religions reflect, although often poorly. So, no, I don't believe we are products of the Dawkins/Dennett dumb physical forces driven by the blind watchmaker. I believe it's an evil ideology masquerading as liberalism.

I also noticed that Chomsky differentiates 'mysteries' from 'problems'. He says that the nature of consciousness is 'a mystery' - not 'a problem' that can be solved. Of course this is anethema to Dennett and materialism generally, whose role it is to drive out of consideration anything which cannot be accomodated in the procrustean bed of neo-darwinian materialism or brought within the purview of the objective sciences.

The point is humans choose their values and also ignore them and a belief in god or transcendence has never safeguarded rights or preserved the sanctity of human life. — Tom Storm

The fact that religious institutions routinely violate their own principles is not an argument those principles.

It matters to us. What better reason do we need? — Tom Storm

What if it doesn't matter to others? What if I am the authority in a one-party state who doesn't recognise human rights? Would that matter to you? What if your comfortable acceptance of subjectivism is the legacy of a culture in which the concept of 'human rights' developed in the first place, largely on the basis of Christian ethical norms which uniquely recognised the inestimable worth of every human soul. If you were part of a persecuted minority group in the PRC - of which Christians are one constituency - the absence of the recognition of the intrinsic worth of every individual might have profound ramifications.

I haven't been able to find any of Chomsky's remarks about Dennett, but I know they'd be natural antagonists. In a review of Dennett's last book, we read:

Dennett is one of those American philosophers of mind, so unlike most of their British counterparts, who is comfortable conversing with and responding to the work of evolutionary biologists and cognitive scientists. His heroes, cited frequently here, are Charles Darwin and Richard Dawkins in biology, Alan Turing and Claude Shannon in artificial intelligence and information theory. His enemies are creationists and mysterians in general, philosopher John Searle, polymath linguist Noam Chomsky, and biologists Stephen Jay Gould and Richard Lewontin. His aim is to provide a materialist account of the evolutionary origins of the human mind and consciousness by way of an extension of gene-based natural selection into human culture through the invocation of memes. — The Guardian

I don't understand how it can't be demeaning. It completely undermines human agency and freedom. Dennett is a Darwinian materialist in his cosmology and metaphysics while also strongly affirming human dignity as well as a progressive brand of liberalism in his ethics and politics. Herein lies the massive contradiction of his system of thought. He boldly proclaims that we live in an accidental universe without divine and natural support for the special dignity of man either as a species or as individuals; yet he retains a sentimental attachment to liberal-democratic values that lead him to affirm a humane society that respects the rights of persons and protects the weak from exploitation by the strong and from other injustices. I don't think he can have it both ways - if we really are robots or blindly-propagating genetic machines, then the only reason to value humanity as such is convention or sentimentality, it has no real basis, because nothing important is at stake.

I also think Dennett is right to be frustrated with those who block the road of inquiry. — plaque flag

It's not 'enquiry' that is at issue, but subordinating the subject within the scope of the objective sciences. It's intrinsically demeaning to declare that really, humans are confabulations of unconscious processes that only appear to be intelligent due to the requirements of survival.

To me the hard problem is maybe a diluted version of the forgetfulness of being. — plaque flag

There's definitely a connection there - Dennett not only forgets being, but wishes to eliminate it altogether. Which I think is actually the motivation for eliminativism - it's to avoid the responsibility of facing up to what Eric Fromm describes as 'the fear of freedom'. Better to pretend you're a robot or an animal.

We can mentally divide a component entity into its components, and we can then mentally divide each component into its own components. Do we ever reach bottom? Do we ever arrive at something which has no parts, which is pure and simple and homogeneous? — Art48

As you started the thread with reference to the Buddha, this is another verse from the early Buddhist texts that is apposite, an account of a brief talk given by the Buddha to the monks on the subject of the unconditioned"

There is, monks, an unborn–unbecome–unmade–unfabricated. If there were not that unborn–unbecome–unmade–unfabricated, there would not be the case that escape from the born–become–made–fabricated would be discerned. But precisely because there is an unborn–unbecome–unmade–unfabricated, escape from the born–become–made–fabricated is discerned. — Ud 8:3 Unbinding (3) (Nibbāna Sutta)

(It has sometimes been argued that this verse is a Buddhist reference to the same 'wisdom uncreated' of the Judeo-Christian tradition, although Buddhists will vigorously contest that as they maintain a strict differentiation from the theistic traditions.)

If you were to ask what the "unborn-unbecome-unmade" is, there is no easy answer to that, other than to point to the fact that coming to know it is the aim and culmination of the Buddhist path. It is not a concept or something amenable to conceptual or discursive analysis but becomes evident to the Buddhist aspirant as a consequence of 'unbinding', another name for Nirvāṇa, whereby identification to the illusory domain of craving has been anulled.

In Western philosophy, I think the nearest equivalent is to be found in Plotinus and 'the One', which is likewise unconditioned and unmade. As a theme in traditional philosophy. the unmade or uncreated came to refer to the distinction between the compound, manifest, and created with the simple, indivisible and uncreated, customarily identified with God .

My view is that there is no conceptual equivalent for the uncreated in the modern lexicon. The idea of the indivisible material unit, or atom, is long gone. I suppose you could, at a stretch, try and identify it with the idea of the quantum fluctuations which supposedly can be shown to give rise to the Universe, but there are many deep conceptual problems with that, as I understand it (such as, what gave rise to the Universe in which such quantum fluctuations exist in the first place?)

What would we expect from an explanation? It seems to me the motive of a great deal of the theorising about consciousness is to dispell any lingering notion that it is something mysterious or inexplicable. After all it's right at the centre of your existence, so the suggestion that something this obvious and fundamental might be at the same time irreducible to the categories of the natural sciences can't be allowed to stand. So I suspect that a lot of attempts at explanation are motivated by that itch.

As for Chomsky's idea that we have no definition of the physical, he seems correct about that. Physical models are subject to constant revision and besides the 'standard model' of physics is known to be radically incomplete. I dispute that there is anything that can be described as purely or only physical. As an heuristic, it is useful for the description of the attributes and behaviours of 'medium size dry goods' but it can't be seen as anywhere near comprehensive or complete.

The term physical is just kinda like an honorific word, kinda like the word 'real' when we say 'the real truth'. It doesn't add anything, it just says 'this is serious truth'. So to say that something is 'physical' today just means 'you gotta take this seriously'. — Noam Chomsky

Politicians and commentators on behalf of political parties rely on demeaning and degrading their opponents to attract attention and gain support. — AntonioP

This is particularly true of American politics in the last 2-3 decades. Here in Australia, the state I live in recently had a State election, and it was a highly civil affair, with leaders of both parties maintaining a focus on policy and principles rather than personal attacks and criticism. And in fact generally speaking Australian (and I think English) politics is considerably less vituperative and spiteful that US politics, especially since the Orange Emperor's reign.

*1. New mysterians : — Gnomon

I see that list is drawn from Wikipedia. I don't trust the provenance of that article and I'm sure few of those names would be willing to be described with that name. I'm sure Nagel shouldn't be on it. The only one who willingly adopted it was McGinn afaik.

Besides what would it be to 'explain' consciousness? The whole idea might be a red herring. Of course it is true that psychology is not a precise science, but then you're dealing with the subject of experience, not objects whose properties can be precisely specified.

some things are just beyond the scope of human beings. — Mikie

So ‘man know thyself’ was a furphy?

Politicians and commentators on behalf of political parties rely on demeaning and degrading their opponents to attract attention and gain support. — AntonioP

You’re writing from America?

I deleted the remark of mine you’re commenting on because it was impulsive and not constructive.

You mean, the reality that exists in the absence of any observers, right?
— Wayfarer

I mean the reality that the observers are part of and that is bigger than them. — Jamal

As the issue at hand is the role of the observer in the construction of reality, then the assertion of a reality that is 'bigger than the observers' begs the question - it assumes what needs to be shown.

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